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JOURNAL
OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LETTERS

University of Calcutta

Journal
of the
Department of Letters

Vol. XXVII



CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS

1935

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY BHUPENDRALAL BANERJEE
AT THE CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY PRESS, SENATE HOUSE, CALCUTTA.

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A ROMAN ALPHABET FOR INDIA

BY

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Unity in Diversity—this is the keynote of India as much as it is of Humanity. We, in India, are all conscious of our various provincial entities; but as a background of that consciousness, there is always present a sense of the Fundamental Unity of India. The diversity that is in Indian life is brought home to us most forcibly by the presence of the various provincial languages. I shall not mention religion, for however bigots and enthusiasts might attempt—and often attempt successfully—to disturb the peace of Indian life, the masses are on the whole sound, and, Hindu or Muhammadan or Christian, they share in a common Indianism or Indianness—in what may be called ‘Bhāratīyatā’ or ‘Bhārata-dharma,’ or ‘Tahannud’—that is, in a common Indian attitude, an Indian way of thinking and acting which forms the firm bed-rock below the surface upheavals. The diversity of speech in India has a unifying factor in Sanskrit, the great mother and feeder of the vernaculars, forming a link binding together the provincial languages—barring a few speeches of Muhammadan inspiration like the Urdu form of Hindustani, and Sindhi. In the case of these last, too, judging from the path taken by the great non-Arab Muhammadan languages outside India, *viz.*, Turkish and Persian, which have started movements favouring the restriction (if not the entire elimination) of foreign elements in them (Arabic and Persian in the case of Turkish, and Arabic in the case of Persian), it will not be a wild dream to expect that Urdu and its peers will once again fall back upon the native Sanskrit for ordinary culture-words (retaining, of course, their special Arabic and Persian vocabulary in connexion with the Muhammadan religion), and thus fall in line with their other sister-speeches. But that is a matter for speculation, at present, and not directly connected with our present topic. We are trying to counteract this diversity of speech by other and conscious efforts—by setting up an All-India National Language in Hindustani (Hindusthani, or Hindi) which we are striving to establish both as a current *Lingua Franca* among our people (which it already is to a large extent) and as a language of political and public life and of high culture among

our intelligentsia in the place of English. It is doubtful whether Hindustani (Hindi) will ever be able to supplant English entirely, as English is now not a mere national language—it has become international, the unique vehicle of World-culture. But it is quite true that our Indian national unity finds an appropriate symbol in Hindustani (Hindi) which alone has the greatest right to be the National Language of the future Federation of the United States of India, a right which is merely the reiteration of what is largely a fact and which has received almost universal recognition everywhere. Our mind set at rest about the National Language (with only the question of Arabic or Sanskrit in the matter of culture words in it being still undecided—the Indian National Congress has shirked this crux of the question, but to my mind there is not the least doubt that Sanskrit and not Arabic will be the most natural feeder of the National Language of India), the question of a National Script is exercising some of us.

This question of script involves not only the National Language, Hindustani (Hindi), but also our provincial languages; as what we decide for the National Language cannot but have a tremendous bearing on the provincial languages as well.

We have three well-defined types of writing in use in India :

- [i] the native Indian system, represented by some dozen provincial scripts all closely related to each other, *e.g.*, Devanāgarī, Bengali, Gujarātī, Kaithī, Gurmukkhī, Oṛiyā, Telugu and Kannaḍa, Tamil, Mālayālam, and Maithilī and a few less known, besides Sinhalese, Burmese and Tibetan; of these, the Devanāgarī is the most important, and has a prestige and a prevalence far transcending that of any of the rest, particularly because during the last century it has become the recognised All-India Script for Sanskrit;
- [ii] the Perso-Arabic system, comprising Urdu and Sindhi; and
- [iii] the Roman, in which among Indian languages the Konkani of Goa is regularly written, besides a number of aboriginal dialects, and to an extremely limited extent Hindustani (Urdu) as used in the Indian Army and among some Hindustani-using North Indian Christians.

Of these, the second can at once be dismissed from consideration, as from the nature of the alphabet it is one of the most imperfect scripts when applied to non-Arab languages: usually it ignores the vowels, and the shapes of many of the consonants are very similar, the divergence among them often consisting only in a number of dots. Besides, it has remained

at the best a subsidiary script, Hindustani being more widely written (albeit in its Hindi form) in the Devanāgarī script than in the Perso-Arabic ; and Sindhi, too, has an alternative script, the one used by merchants and others, derived from the Śāradā alphabet of the North-west, a cousin of Devanāgarī.

Of the native Indian scripts enumerated under [i], Devanāgarī alone has the right to be regarded as *the* national script for India. Of course, the importance of Devanāgarī is of recent origin : previous to the 19th century, the provincial scripts were employed in their respective areas for writing Sanskrit. Devanāgarī, however, had a wider area than the other scripts, as it was the script native to what are now the United Provinces, Central India Agency, Rajputana and Gujarat, and part of the Central Provinces, and had spread to South Bihar, the Panjab, Maharashtra and the sub-Himalayan tracts, for writing Sanskrit. Devanāgarī is *the* representative in modern times of the Brāhmī, the finished Indian alphabet of two thousand years ago and more, and has remained faithful to the spirit and the method which characterised Brāhmī, the oldest native Indian script associated with the Aryan speech in India.

The Indian system of writing has certain advantages over all other systems in vogue in the world, and its most noteworthy superiority consists in the scientific order followed in the arrangement of the letters. Those who built up the ancient Indian system of writing and arranged the letters of the alphabet were among the most advanced phoneticians of all time ; and it was probably done early in the first millennium B. C. while reducing to writing the Indo-Aryan dialects. It is, however, not unlikely that, even prior to that, this alphabet (which can in this primitive stage be described as 'Proto-Brāhmī') was a finished instrument, and had evolved among the civilised non-Aryans of India, and that the Aryan speakers merely adapted it for the Aryan dialects—Vedic, the Prakrits, and Classical Sanskrit. But of course, its perfection, at any rate its formulation, was the work of the grammarians describing the Aryan Vedic.

About Devanāgarī (and other Indian scripts generally), three points may be mentioned in which the script is capable of improvement—and as these three points are vital in any system of writing, they rather counter-balance the superiority which the Indian system has in the scientific arrangement of its letters. They are—

- [1]. **Comparative Intricacy or Complexity of the Letters**, as compared, e.g., with those of the Roman Alphabet.
- [2]. **Syllabic and not purely alphabetical character of the writing.**

[3]. Use of Conjunct Characters, involving the necessity of additional abbreviated forms of a great many of the letters, and in some cases the development of entirely new additional letters.

To consider these points briefly one by one :

[1]. The scientific order of the Indian system is admitted, but the ungainly shapes of the letters remain. The original Indian writing, the Brāhmī of the 3rd century B.C., is much simpler than any of the dozen Indian alphabets of the present day which are its descendants. Thus Brāhmī + = [k] is simplicity itself when placed beside its modern representatives like Devanāgarī क, Bengali ক, etc.; so is 𑀓 = [kh] much simpler than ख and খ, 𑀕 = [g] than ग and গ, 𑀖 = [j] than ज and জ, 𑀗 = [tʰ] than ठ and ঠ, 𑀘 = [t] than ट and ট, 𑀙 = [dh] than ध and ধ, 𑀚 = [n] than न and ন, 𑀛 = [b] than ब and ব, and so forth. Of course, the Brāhmī script has a sculptural or monumental quality about it, resembling Greek and Roman capital letters, which would disqualify it for a running hand, but it looks quite admirable in print. Devanāgarī has retained much of this sculptural or monumental quality, although in a different way; and a cursive Devanāgarī has given rise to Kaithī or Mahājānī and Gujarātī, which are more commodious in writing if less ornamental to look at. Compared with the Devanāgarī letters, it must be admitted, when we look at the question without prejudice, that the Roman letters also are, generally, much simpler. The unnecessary top-line is absent, and the letters require fewer strokes; thus [k] = क, [n] = न, [s] = स, [h] = ह, etc. The Roman letters are less tiring to the eye, and they are easier to remember: and this last point of view is one which is not to be lightly brushed aside, because habituated as we are to the Devanāgarī (or some other Indian system) from our childhood we may not find it irksome now; but we should take into consideration the difficulty we feel in learning another Indian alphabet which is not our own provincial or vernacular one and which cannot be described as being more complicated than Devanāgarī, although the principle of formation is familiar to us.

[2]. A purely alphabetic system of writing should represent clearly and unambiguously *all* the sounds, vocal and consonantal, that go to make a word. In a word like मनु = [manu], धर्म = [dharma], or इन्द्र = [indra], we get the sounds as follows: म + अ + न + उ = [m + a + n + u], ध + र् + म + अ + र् + न + उ = [dh + a + r + m + a], इ + न् + द + र् + अ = [i + n + d + r + a]; or in a word like ब्रह्मण्य = [brāhmaṇya], the sounds are ब + र् + अ + ह् + म + अ + न् + य + अ = [b + r + ā + h + m + a + n + y + a]. In the Roman system, the symbols are merely placed one after the other, in the order in which

their sounds occur in speech ; the vowels and consonants are both indicated fully, each item standing on its own merits, and on its own dignity, as it were. But in the Indian system of *akṣaras* or syllable-representing letters, the independent items are made subservient to groups—as, e.g., म-नु = [ma-nu], ध-र्मा = [dha-rma], इ-न्द्र = [i-ndra] ; and in each group the various elements are clipped and curtailed, both the vowels and consonants. In Roman, a word like [karnōtpala] or [atyukti] is quite plain sailing ; but in the Indian system, कर्णोत्पल or अत्युक्ति means क-र्णो-त्प-ल or अ-त्यु-क्ति, that is [ka-rṇo-tpa-la] or [a-tyu-kti], or, to follow something like the Indian habit—[ka-rṇo-tpa-la] or [a-ty-^u-ⁱkt], with the letters in fragments. To speak in the language of Chemistry, in the Roman system, we have the atom as a unit in writing, while in the Indian system, we have a molecule, with the component atoms mutilated in the process of combination, as it were. The Indian system often obscures the normal or natural sequence of sounds. Thus in a word like [dharma], [dhar] is the root, and [ma] is the termination ; but in the Indian system of writing, ध-र्मा, we get a sub-division into [dha] and [rma]. Probably contemporary habits of pronunciation, while the Brāhmī alphabet as applied to Sanskrit was being evolved, were at the basis of this sort of subdivision—habits of pronunciation which preferred open syllables like [dha] and [brā] rather than [dhar] and [brāh], as in ध-र्मा [dha-rma], ब्रा-ह्म-ण्य [brā-hma-ṇya]. The Indian system would easily turn what is *Shak-spere* or *Shake-spere* into शेकस्पियर = [Śe-ksa-pi-ya-ra], and *Herbert* into हर्बर्ट = [Ha-rba-rṭa]. This in itself is not a grave sin, but it means the absence of the true alphabetical principle, which brings in its train a number of practical difficulties of varying importance.

In the first instance, what may be called the “root-sense,” which is always present in the mind of the speaker when a word is uttered, particularly an inflected word—this root-sense is unduly sacrificed in the Indian system of writing. Thus सद्य is really [sah-ya], root [sah] + suffix [-ya], but the orthography makes it [sa-hya] ; हन्ति is really [han-ti], root [han] + inflexion [-ti], but in writing it becomes [ha-nti]. In the vernaculars, this untoward thing is also in evidence : witness, for example, the Bengali words করছে, পারবে (= করছে, পারবে) ‘He is doing, I shall be able,’ which are really [kor-che], [pār-bo], the roots being [kar] or [kor], and [pār] ; but a common tendency would be (which tendency was given fullest scope to by the late Dwijendralal Ray in the orthography of his dramas and other works) to write such words as করছে, পারবে (= করছে or করছে, পারবে).

पाचो or पाचो), i.e. [ko—reche] or [ko—rehe], [pā—rbbo] or [pā—rboj]. This kind of awkwardness is not found in Hindi to the same extent as in Bengali, in the spelling of genuine Hindi (Prakritic or *tadbhava*) words, as Hindi spelling is much more well-ordered than Bengali spelling and Hindi prefers single consonants to conjuncts (e.g., [karnā] ‘to do’ would be written in Hindi as करना, that is, [ka-ra-nā] and not कर्ना [ka—rnā]); and for the same reason Marathi and Gujarati are better placed than Bengali.

The syllabic nature of the Indian system makes analysis of words difficult or awkward. The analysis of a written word which stands for the spoken one can be from two standpoints—(i) from the standpoint of sounds, and (ii) from the standpoint of function. Thus, Bengali রাখিলাম (রাখিলাম)=[rākhilām] ‘I placed, I kept’, is, from the first point of view র্+খ+ই+ল্+আ+ম্ (র্+খ+খ্+ই+ল্+আ+ম্), and from the second point of view is root রাখ्+past-indicating affix ইল্+person-indicating inflexion আম্ (রাখ্+ইল্+আম্). It is at once evident how the syllabic character of the Indian script makes the work of analysis clumsy. But in a purely alphabetic script like the Roman, either kind of analysis can be visualised by means of a plus or a hyphen most easily and naturally—e.g., [r + ā + kh + i + l + ā + m] and [rākh + il + ām]: or simply, [rākhilām = (i) r-ā-kh-i-l-ā-m, (ii) rākh-il-ām]. So Hindi मुझे ‘to me’ = (i) म्-उ-भ्-ए, (ii) मुभ्-ए (base मुभ् + case-termination ए), but in the Roman, [mujhe = (i) m-u-jh-e, (ii) mujh-e], चलाना ‘to cause to walk’ = (i) च्-अ-ल्-आ-न्-आ, (ii) चल्-आ-न्-आ (root चल् + causative affix आ + verbal noun suffix न् + definitive आ), but in the Roman [calānā = (i) c-a-l-ā-n-ā, (ii) cal-ā-n-ā].

It has to be borne in mind that when the Roman letters are definitely used for an Indian language, we have to abandon their English names, but give them the Indian names, or, better, simply pronounce their sounds: [c] would thus be named, not सी (sī) as in English, but च्, or च; [r], not आर् (ār), but र्, or र; [kh], not कै-एच् (‘kay-aitch’), but ख्, or ख (of this, more later). So, Marathi करून ‘having done’ and राहिला ‘he remained, he lived,’ are much better analysed visually with the Roman letters as [karūn = (i) k-a-r-ū-n, (ii) kar-ūn] and [rāhilā = (i) r-ā-h-i-l-ā, (ii) rāh-il-ā] than with the Bālbodh or Devanāgarī letters as [करून = (i) क-अ-र-ऊ-न् and (ii) कर्-ऊन्] and [राहिला = (i) र्-आ-ह्-इ-ल्-आ and (ii) राह्-इल्-आ]. Breaking up the Indian syllables into their components for purposes of analysis would thus mean the very negation of the Indian syllabic principle. To write an English word like *strength* in the Devanāgarī script as स्तरेण्गथ, as they do in Parsi Gujarati (=sa-ta-rem-ga-tha), instead of स्ट्रेण्गथ (=stre-ṅga-th), is entirely against the spirit of the Indian system.

The syllabic character of Indian writing is at the root of the subordination of the vowel to the consonant element in the syllable. It is responsible for the subsidiary or post-consonantal forms of the letters for the vowel sounds. Thus क [ā] has two forms—क (initial), and ँ (post-consonantal); so उ [u] has the initial form उ, and the post-consonantal forms ँ and ँ, which are subscribed below the consonants—*e.g.*, कु=[ku], रु=[ru]. In practice, it means that the script has two sets of letters for the vowels—quite a needless complication, which adds its quota in rendering the script difficult for learners.

[3]! Use of conjunct consonants is a further complication of the Indian system, and is a logical consequence of the syllabic system. The post-consonantal or subsidiary forms of the vowels are an inheritance from the Brāhmī, and this inheritance is undoubtedly very old. In the Brāhmī, the formation of conjunct consonants was very simple and easy, as they were made up simply by putting one consonant above another. In quick writing in a cursive script, these simple and easily made-out combinations were contracted and altered, so that at the present stage we have quite a multiplicity of symbols found only in the conjunct consonants, in some of which the shapes of the components are entirely obscured. Thus क्=[k]+ख=[ṣ] give the letter क्ख=[kṣ], and ज्=[j]+ञ=[ñ] give ज्ञ=[jñ], which has acquired in Hindi the new value of [gy], in Marathi of [dny]. In most of these conjuncts, however, the components are clear enough, although they are abridged or abbreviated; but some of them have assumed the complicated shapes of Chinese characters, which are difficult of acquirement for young learners and are frightening in their appearance (*e.g.*, त्सं=[rtsna], ण=[ṣṇa], ह्य=[hya], क्षव=[kṣva], etc.).

The presence of the conjuncts in the Indian system is responsible for three things: (i) Adversely affecting the eye-sight of learners: the complicated forms are bad for the eyes—this is a matter which we do not usually appreciate, but we ought to look at it from the point of view of tender children who are first learning their alphabet; (ii) they prevent small or fine type-founts from being made and put into use. Usually a Devanāgarī book is printed in pica type, and type smaller than the small pica is not found or employed in printing Devanāgarī. This means that there is bound to be waste in space and in paper. Here, of course, we find an unconscious adjustment with the inherent defect in the system of writing—small founts are bound to tire the eyes much more, the shapes of the letters being so complicated; and besides, very fine founts of complicated conjunct and other letters are economically unsuitable, they are apt to get blurred,

broken and so become useless in a short time. (iii) What is very important as a practical proposition—the conjunct consonants increase the cost and the time and labour required in printing, and they form an extremely cumbersome business. In the Roman type-cases as used in printing English, there are in all 152 chambers for types *plus* numerals, brackets and punctuation marks and all accessories in the shape of spaces, leaders, etc. (The capital letters in English mean a duplication of 28 type chambers, included within the 152). Contrasted with this, we see that in the Bengali type-cases there are 455 chambers, and this is not enough for all the types used in Bengali printing, many of the chambers having from 2 to 3 types apiece; in printing Bengali, no less than 474 different letters, 49 signs, numerals, spaces, etc., and 40 ‘kerned’ types with special marks above and below—in total, 563 separate type-items are required. In the Calcutta-face Devanāgarī, there are 700 different letter-types (simple, conjunct and kerned), 3 spaces, and 3 quads—in all 706 separate type-items. The old style Bombay face has 455 chambers holding 626 different type-items; and the new style Bombay face has reduced the number to 450 different items (simple, conjunct, kerned and fragmentary types *plus* accessories). But this number in the new Bombay face has been arrived at after considerable sacrifice of elegance and beauty, broken or fragmentary forms of letters being used in framing conjunct consonants, which in the far more elegant Calcutta face or in the magnificent Oxford face of the Devanāgarī types (the Oxford type has been used in Max Müller’s edition of the Rīgveda Samhita) are represented by single types (thus, the Calcutta (and Oxford) face has त्=[tya], त्=[tva], ष=[bdha], न्=[nta], ष्=[tsa], स [sya], all single types, but the Bombay face has त् त् व न्त त्स स्य which are composites, with fragmentary components, which add to the detriment of the beauty of the face, and has some bad effect on the eyes also, as the fine spaces which appear like breaks or blurs in the type interfere with the free movement of the eyes). 450 types *vs.* 152 types: if we eliminate the capitals, the small capitals, and some special or superfluous letters of Roman, the number 152 might be still further reduced—we might manage with considerably less than one hundred Roman types. Surely, in learning to read and write, and in printing, the advantages of the Roman are obvious: particularly, if without adding any new type to the number of 26 found in the current Roman we could employ it for our Indian languages, making provision for adequate representation in this Indian Roman or Indo-Roman script of all the letters (and sounds) in our Indian alphabets.

As contrasted with the above three great drawbacks of the Indian alphabets (the Devanāgarī, etc.), the advantages of the Roman can be seen

with a little unbiassed study of the problem. The Roman letters are on the whole exceedingly simple; they are thus more easily learnt. They are easier to write, both in the printing type (block letters, capital or small), and in cursive or script form. The Roman letters will take a little more space than the Devanāgarī letters of the same size to write a word, true; any page of a work like Whitney's Sanskrit Grammar, which gives the Sanskrit words in both Devanāgarī and Roman, will show this. But the legibility of the Roman and its simplicity would far outweigh this. The length of the Roman transliteration is due to the fact that the vowels are written in their full, as distinct letters, and particularly the vowel [a] (short), which is not specially indicated in the Devanāgarī, being regarded as inherent in the consonant letter: thus चरित्र = [caritra], अनवरत = [anavarata], भविष्यस्तम् = [bhaviṣṭyāstām], etc. But the gain would be considerably more than any loss of space.

These are some of the advantages of the Roman script. Being simpler to learn, they should appeal to any one who wants to spread literacy among the masses. Printing in the Roman character being easier and cheaper, the use of the Roman script will mean cheaper books and journals: the 'Indo-Roman' as proposed below will make printing cheaper still. Besides, the greater portion of the civilised world uses the Roman script, and in the present age, when our culture is becoming more and more international, the advantages of falling in line with the rest of the world are obvious. The Roman letters are familiar to an ever-increasing number of English literates in India, and many who are not familiar with the English language at least know the Roman numerals (the so-called 'Arabic' numerals—1, 2, 3, 4, etc.) and the Roman letters. It does not look likely that the Devanāgarī will be able to supplant the other scripts of the country, even with the spread of Hindi. There is no lack of provincial patriotism for the local scripts. The Devanāgarī as a second or additional script for the different vernaculars would not appeal to the people. With a strong central government, a single script could be imposed on the vernaculars. But it is not likely that the British government in India will give a lead in this matter. Scripts are unfortunately connected with religion, both among Hindus and Muhammadans; and many Muhammadans will not agree to give up the Perso-Arabic script in favour of the Devanāgarī, although the latter is the script employed by the largest group of people in India.

The problem of the Babel of scripts in India presents itself to me as being capable of a final solution only through an Indo-Roman script. I have been observing the situation. There are signs that the apathy or hostility

towards the employment of the Roman script for the vernaculars, which we notice to-day among the average run of our educated people, will not continue for long; opinion among the educated, as time and often a few minutes' talk has shown, can be induced towards the Roman script easily enough. But nevertheless, it cannot as yet be said that the problem is one which can be described as being of primary importance. At the best, it is still a matter of academic interest only. At an All Parties' Conference held in Calcutta in 1927 in connexion with the Indian National Congress, a representative from Sindh, supported by one from Bengal, brought in a proposal that the national language, Hindustani, should be written in the Roman script, instead of Devanāgarī (or optionally Perso-Arabic), and this proposal was poohpoohed by most of the members. But early in 1934, I was told by some South Indian (Telugu) Congress-men, enthusiasts for Hindi, that in the course of an extended tour in Northern India, they found many people, both Hindus and Muhammadans, favouring the Roman script. At the All-Bengal University and College Teachers' Conference held at Faridpur in April 1934, a proposal was brought recommending the use of the Roman alphabet for Bengali and other vernaculars, but it was lost by seven votes, 25 voting for and 32 against. These isolated and sporadic proposals from members of the intelligentsia are not much in their sum total, but they are symptomatic,—we see in them the genesis of a new idea.

Sporadic and not too well-directed attempts were made to introduce the Roman script for Indian languages ever since the Roman alphabet was brought to India by the Roman Catholic missionaries under Portuguese auspices, from the beginning of the 16th century, and these attempts were successful only in imposing the Roman script on the Konkani dialect of Goa, where it is used by a large population of converts to Roman Catholicism. Orientalistic studies with reference to Indian languages began with the foundation of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in Calcutta in 1784. J. B. Gilchrist began as an orientalist from the eighties of the 18th century, and he and his colleagues at that other centre of oriental learning at Calcutta, the College of Fort William, devised and employed a system of Roman script for Hindustani and other Indian languages from the end of the 18th century. The Roman alphabet was used for Sanskrit and other Indian languages for scientific purposes—in grammars meant in the first instance for Europeans, and in philological works. In the thirties, European Pali scholars decided for the Roman script in printing Pali books, since a common Pali alphabet was lacking—

the language being written in Sinhalese characters in Ceylon, in Burmese (Mōn) characters in Burma, and in Siamese (Cambodian) characters in Siam (and Cambodia). Some German and other continental scholars sought to do the same for Sanskrit, as upto the middle of the 19th century Sanskrit did not possess an All-India script. Each province employed its local character for Sanskrit—Bengali was used in Bengal, Maithili in North Bihar, Oriyā in Orissa, Śārādā in Kashmir, Telugu in the Andhra country, Kannaḍa in the Kannaḍa tract, Grantha in the Tamil-land, and Mālayālam in Malabar. The most erudite Sanskrit scholar from Conjeeveram or Navadwip, Sringeri or Darbhanga, Puri or Srinagar ordinarily would not be able to read, much less write the Devanāgarī character, which was confined to what is now the United Provinces, South Bihar, the Panjab, Rajputana, Gujarat and Maharashtra. Of course, as the script of North India, the homeland of ancient Indo-Aryan history and culture, and as that of Benares as the centre of Hindu culture, and as the script of Rajputana as the great *bloc* of warlike Hindu states, Devanāgarī had a certain prestige,—and that was all. When Max Müller published the first volume of his *Rigveda Samhita* with Sāyana's Commentary in 1849, it was after some hesitation that he decided to adopt the Devanāgarī; and in this way he gave a very great impetus to this particular form of the Indian script in establishing it as *the* All-India Script for Sanskrit. The Indian Universities followed suit and printed Sanskrit text-books in Devanāgarī only. Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar did a great deal for the spread of Devanāgarī in Bengal. Now in 1934 the position of Devanāgarī is so important in the field of Sanskrit in India that it is hard for us to realise its comparative insignificance a hundred years ago. The establishment of Devanāgarī in tracts outside its home districts has been accomplished during the last eighty years, and it is only a reflex of the spirit of centralisation brought in by the British Imperial Government in India.

European influences were thus to some extent at work in setting up Devanāgarī for Sanskrit, but Roman Sanskrit is still maintaining a vigorous existence—in scientific works on Sanskrit Culture and Philology, written by both European and Hindu Indologists. Occasionally, serious attempts were made by both propaganda and publication of books in the Roman character, to employ the Roman script for the vernaculars—notably by Sir Monier Williams, T. W. H. Tolbort, the Rev. S. Knowles, in the second half of the 19th and the first two decades of the 20th century, but nothing tangible came out of these attempts. A standard

system of transliteration, employing a Roman alphabet supplemented by some additional letters with diacritical marks, generally with the principle of "vowels as in Italian, consonants as in English," has grown up, and this so far has been in possession of the field—most Roman printing for Indian languages being done in this alphabet, excepting in the more careful works which follow the Geneva system in transliterating Sanskrit into Roman. A translation of the New Testament, and of some books of the Old Testament are available in Roman-Urdu, besides a number of Christian religious tracts; and a Roman-Urdu weekly used to be published from Lucknow—the *Kaukab-i-Hind*. Some of the Christian Gospels, and one or two secular books are also obtainable in the Roman character in Urdu, Panjabi, Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, etc. Roman-Hindustani is taught in the Indian Army to the Indian soldiers.

Recently an Indian Government official of high scholarship and position, Mr. A. Latifi, C.I.E., I.C.S., LL.D. (Dublin), M.A., LL.M. (Cantab.), Bar-at-Law, has come forward with a proposal to adopt the Roman script in an enlarged form for Indian languages. His "All-India Alphabet" he has formulated in a pamphlet, and it has been received favourably by H. H. the Maharaja Gaekwad of Baroda, at least to the extent of being reproduced and circulated for opinion among the officials of the state under his order. (A note on this script, which its originator has also called the "Latifi Alphabet"—a name which we shall follow as it is shorter and leaves no room for ambiguity—is given as an appendix at the end of this paper.)

Three questions now arise :

[1]. Should we take up seriously the question of Romanisation of the Indian languages now ?

[2]. If so, what should be our method of doing it—how could we do it best, without any hardship and without any loss of national prestige ?

[3]. What should be the simplest and best form of Roman script to adopt as a uniform script for all Indian languages ?

These may be taken up one by one.

[1]. In the face of the Indian systems of writing like the Devanāgarī which are as complete alphabets as any, and which possess a universally admired scientific arrangement of the letters, besides being a truly national and characteristic product of Indian civilisation—a product which is the creation of the Ancient Indian ancestors of both the Hindus and the Muhammadans of present-day India,—the insistence on the Perso-Arabic script among the larger section of Urdu and Sindhi-using Indian

Musalmans for their mother-tongues would appear only to be the result of a false sense of values in their communal culture. The script has become the symbol of a religion and a culture which are thought to be antagonistic to Hinduism and everything connected with it. This is unfortunate, but the attitude of a powerful and a vociferous group of Indian Musalmans is like that. Musalman supporters of Devanāgarī for Urdu (which a prominent Hindi writer has not inaptly described as 'Musalmānī Hindī') are known, but they do not count. Few intelligent Musalmans will be found to hold the brief for the Perso-Arabic script, but fewer still among them would advocate or support the use of Devanāgarī in writing Urdu, although this would create a rapprochement to close the split of the Hindustani speech into Hindi and Urdu.

The position of the Roman script is different. The example of Turkey in adopting it has set many of our Indian Musalmans thinking. There are signs that Persia may also adopt the Roman script. A Roman alphabet for Persian is already in use; and in the musical notation of Europe—staff and tonic sol-fa—the Roman alphabet has found a strong ally in Persia. It is said that proposals for abandoning the Arabic alphabet for the Roman were already before the Mejliś, the Persian Parliament. The Turkish states under the Soviet Union have also adopted the Roman script. The Malay speech, now current among 50 millions of Malay, Javanese and other peoples, mostly Musalmans, of S. E. Asia and Indonesia, is universally written in Roman, in both the English and the Dutch spellings,—the Arabic script for Malay being confined to the million or so of Malaya Peninsula Malays. Considering its international character, and its use in a number of Muhammadan lands outside India, Indian Musalman opinion will, it appears to me, be not opposed to the Roman script, although it will stiffen against the Devanāgarī: this attitude might be illogical and anti-national, but it has nevertheless to be understood even though it cannot be appreciated.

We may now consider the position of the Hindus. With them their alphabet—the Indian system—is a precious heritage, which has served them from time immemorial, and has served them well. It has been a very good thing for them, and to abandon it, they must be convinced of something really much better. The scientific arrangement of the Indian letters, and the completeness of the alphabet for all native sounds (except in the case of some recent phonetic developments in the vernaculars) have been rightly regarded as a tangible evidence of the scientific thought and acumen of their ancestors. It is an alphabet which will conduce to the self-respect of any people: and to try to substitute a script of foreign origin, which in

India is associated with the British, would appear to be something of a sacrilege—an anti-national and anti-cultural movement of a most objectionable type: particularly at the present moment when there is considerable political unrest in the country. The national temperament among the Hindus is particularly sensitive: in the face of political subjection, our cultural autonomy is a great refuge, and the national alphabet is a strong pillar of support for that refuge. Questions of international solidarity or conformity would be unmeaning to a people who are looked down upon as helots of the empire, and whose best energy and best discipline should be utilised in strengthening its nationality: when the attitude of the nationalist leaders is that of *Sinn Fein* and *Athanasius contra mundum*, an attitude which looks askance at the internationalism of Rabindranath Tagore and is enthusiastic with the nationalistic asceticism of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

A legitimate pride in the bases of one's national culture is pardonable in any individual or nation, and the Hindu, orthodox or unorthodox, has an instinctive sense of pride in his race and culture. If he is ultra-orthodox, he feels superior to all *Mlecchas*—all foreign barbarians; and he would scorn to borrow the writing of the *Mlecchas* of Europe. The script is looked upon as an important base. And here the base is solid enough. It may have imperfections; but what human institution is perfect? On the other hand, the Roman alphabet at first sight has obvious imperfections of a far more serious type. The letters are arranged pell-mell, without any order. Why adopt chaos in place of perfect order? Then, the orthography employing the Roman alphabet with which we are familiar, namely, the English orthography, has been described as a system which is "absolutely without a conscience." We can have grave objections to a system which permits six sounds to a single letter (*e.g.*, *a* as in *cat*, *call*, *father*, *ago*, *fate*, *hare*), and uses digraphs like *sh*, *th*, *dg*, *ck* for a single sound *ad infinitum*, and has a number of silent letters (*e.g.*, *calm*, *have*, *knight*, *thought*), and permits orthographical monstrosities like *enough*=[inaʃ], *gaol*=[dʒeɪl], *psychology*=[saɪkələdʒi], *nation*=[neɪʃn], etc. Besides, it does not have letters for some of the fundamental sounds of our languages, and to represent them, as well as the various vowels, we shall have to take recourse to additional capped and dotted letters, which are ugly and tiresome for the eye and besides are not very easily procurable. Why jump into this forbidding tank, leaving the limpid stream of your national alphabet? As for the gains, namely that the Roman letters are simpler, and they make printing easier,—well, we do not feel the difficulty of our alphabets: it is an inheritance from our fathers, like our native speech; and as it may be allowed that there

are more beautiful languages, so there may be more attractive alphabets—but we need not change our alphabet, as much as we could not change our language.

Another point to consider in connexion with the Hindu's predilection for his national alphabet is its relation to certain aspects of his religion and ritual. To an orthodox Hindu (and to this category belong most of the people, barring a few advanced intellectuals among the intelligentsia), the letters of the Indian alphabet are not mere letters—they have a mystic value, particularly in Yoga and Tantric philosophy and ritual. There is the mystic theory of the *Bīja-mantras*, in which certain letters or combinations of letters are looked upon as forming the visible and audible symbols of certain aspects of the Divinity. Thus the syllable ॐ = [Om] represents the Absolute, ॐ = [Klīm] stands for the spirit of Generation or Manifestation in the Universe (*Kāma-bīja*), ॐ = [Hrīm] represents Śakti or Energy (that is, Life-force), ॐ = [Aim] represents the *Guru* or Spiritual Teacher, etc. In symbolising the Deity or certain aspects of it by means of *Yantras* or diagrams, for ceremonial worship or ritual, these *Bīja-mantras* figure—they have to be written down inside these *Yantras*. The adoption of the Roman alphabet will cut off one aspect of our religious ritual from a living contact with our daily life, which is now actually present through the Indian system of writing—and many Hindus will not contemplate this with equanimity.

The above is roughly the situation among the Hindus, making the adoption of the Roman script at first sight both impossible and unnecessary, or at the best a most difficult matter. In the face of it all, should the Romanisation movement be pushed? Would it be worth while to have the Roman alphabet?

To my mind, it will be worth it, and, with a proper understanding of the implications of Romanisation, the thing could be brought about in such a way that the national sentiment and national self-respect will be not jeopardised. But it is a matter which is not to be rushed by lightning propaganda, or by official or Congress circular or *fatwa*. At present, the Romanisation question is not one of immediate practical politics: it is still in the academic stage, and that in an embryonic form too, despite the three hundred years that some Indian speeches came under the jurisdiction of the Roman script. Let us see if there is a possibility of effecting a conversion of the intransigent Indian attitude against the Roman script—whether the question can have an appeal on its own merits. If a rapprochement is possible ideally, its practical

application should be quite feasible,—specially when the ideal is to make it a matter of gradual evolution and not to bring in a violent revolution.

A close study of the question has convinced me that our attachment to our Indian system of writing is primarily a matter of habit and sentiment. Sentiment and the force of habit are strong things in life, and we can easily forego obvious advantages, when these loom large. Sentiment, like *Bhakti* or Faith, is often blind. Tempered with Knowledge, with *Jñāna*, with proper understanding of the problems, we can have the finest intellectual and spiritual harmony :—and this should be our goal in corporate life, in which speech and writing have a paramount place. The sentiment can be properly directed, and then the gain will be immense.

Whatever alphabet we adopt, whatever might be the underlying principle, syllabic or alphabetical, and whatever might be the *shapes* of the individual letters, in our future system of writing **we must not under any circumstance abandon the scientific arrangement of the letters.** The Indian, i.e. the Sanskrit arrangement will stand in our primers and grammars—the vowels first, and then the consonants—first, the stops, aspirates and nasals following the order of the places of articulation, then the liquids and semivowels, and finally the spirants (sibilants) and the aspiration ; and these are to be followed by supplementary letters for sounds newly developed in our Indian languages, or imposed upon them from the outside. We cannot forego this order : it is a heritage too precious to lose.

This being understood, it is to be seen if the new wine of the Roman letters can be put into the old bottle of the Indian order. **It would mean in practice merely a change in the shapes of the letters.** The old scientific order will remain, and the old names will remain. There is no magic in the peculiar combination of strokes which gives us क or क़, or the Grantha or Oṛiyā or Telugu or Kannaḍa [ka]. Our current Indian alphabets are not more than a thousand years old, and consequently there is no question of an association with a hoary antiquity being sacrificed if we have [ka] and the rest of the alphabet in simpler and more convenient shapes than क or क़, etc. If there were a virtue in antiquity, then we ought to go back to the 3rd century B.C. Brāhmī—which has the double advantage of being some thousand or twelve hundred years older than the Devanāgarī, and is much simpler in formation at the same time. If we were consistent in our desire to retain historical antiquity, we would then welcome a reversion to the Brāhmī + ᳵ ᳚ (᳚) in the place of क ख ग etc,

What harm can accrue if we adopt [k], and call it, not *kay* (कै), but *ka* (क)? If we write our ग as [g], and call this [g],—not *gee* (जी) as they do in English, or *ghé* = *g* (ज) as they do in French, or *khé* = *k* (क) as they do in Spanish, or *yeh* as they say in Swedish—but simply *ga* (= ग)? If we take [h] as a simpler symbol than our ह, and call this letter [h] just *ha* (ह),—and not *aitch* (ऐच) as in English, or *ache* (= *āsh*) as in French, or *éché* as in Spanish, or *ho* as in Swedish? We would thus have the simpler Roman letters adopted for our purposes, and Indianised in both name and use. The Indianised Roman letters, simple, or, if necessary, enlarged with diacritical marks, will cease to have their English names when they are used for Indian languages, as equivalents of the Indian letters. We can even contemplate the future, when Indian children learning their English spelling, will use (at least in the earlier stages) the Indian names: they will not only not spell an Indian word or name like [Gopāl] and [Farīdpur] as जी-पी-पी-ए-एल् (*jee-o-pee-ay-el*) and एफ्-ए-आर्-आर्-डो-पी-यू-आर् (*eff-ay-ār-āi-dee-pee-yū-ār*), but as ग-पी-पा-ल (*ga-o-pa-ā-la*) and फ-अ-र-दीर्घ-ई-द-प-उ-र (*fa-a-ra-dīrgha ī-da-pa-u-ra*); but they will also spell an English word like *neighbour* as न-ए-इ-ग-ह-ब-ओ-उ-र (*na-e-i-ga-ha-ba-o-u-ra*), just as much as a French child learning English will spell it with French and not English names for the letters—as एन्-ए-इ-झ-ए-श्-वे-ओ-डि-ऐर् (*en-e-i-zhé-āsh-be-o-ū-ère*), and not as एन्-ई-आय्-जी-ऐच-बी-ओ-यू-आर् (*en-ee-āi-jee-aitch-bee-o-yū-ār*). A Spanish boy similarly is accustomed to spell the English word as एने-ए-इ-खे-आचे-वे-ओ-उ-ऐरे (*éné-é-i-khé-aché-bé-o-u-éré*), and a Swedish boy as एन्-ए-ई-ये-हो-वे-ओ-डि-एर् (*enn-é-ī-yé-ho-bé-o-ū-err*).

Our sentiments, which are legitimately in favour of the Indian system, can be met in this way: the Indian order is retained, and the Indian names are retained—only we adopt new and simpler forms for the letters; and these forms are taken from the Roman script, as it is an old and tried script which has the widest employ in the world. That in itself need not vitiate the Roman letters in our eyes. The Roman letters, again, are not absolutely new to India. Experience has shown that these can be applied with perfect success to Pali and Sanskrit and other languages. Sentiment apart, the only drawback is that we are not familiar with the script as applied to an Indian language, we are not habituated to it. Unfamiliarity is a great stumbling block, but it is not an insurmountable obstacle.

In the form in which the Roman script is proposed to be adopted below, it will be possible, without the least ambiguity, to have *all* standard

Indian sounds properly represented by means of the Roman letters *plus* a diphthongal ligature or two, eked out by some of the current Roman letters used upside down as new letters, and by modifying some of the current letters by means of a few easily intelligible symbols (point or full stop, minute mark or accent mark, and inverted comma) added to them. With about 40 symbols of all sorts, original letters and modifiers, it will be possible to do the work of the 48 simple Devanāgarī letters (together with the whole host of conjunct letters, whose number is legion): and in printing, these alone would suffice. A group of not more than 40 symbols would be all that will be required in printing not only Sanskrit, but also Hindustani (Hindi and Urdu), Bengali, Gujarati, Marathi, Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and other vernaculars, and Persian and Arabic in addition: more than ten times the number is needed now with the Devanāgarī. It must be conceded that, at least as an academic proposition, it is well worth a trial.

Everything is in a state of flux. Change is the law of life. If the Brāhmī could alter into the Devanāgarī, if a simple symbol like [+] could become [क], then the use of [k] in place of [क] can have nothing inherently wrong about it. Only, it must be admitted that in the case of [+] becoming transformed into [क], the change has been gradual—has been evolutionary; the abandoning of [क] for [k] will be abrupt. But this is an age of abrupt changes, and an abrupt change is permissible in the best interests of the society,—only when such a change is assimilable. And, as I suggest, thirty to fifty years of what I call bi-litteralism or di-alphabetism will not make the change appear so abrupt.

Taking into view the advantages of an Indianised Roman alphabet, and noting also the way along which the world is moving,—with English, a Roman-using language, becoming more and more widespread as a vehicle of World-culture, I think it will be a good thing to recommend the Roman alphabet to our country-men. Convinced that it will be a good thing, for some years our Indianised Roman might be placed before our people to enable them to make up their mind. The Roman will be kept as a side-show, as a second script beside the vernacular ones, for a number of decades, before the people finally can adopt it, attracted by its utility and its other great qualities.

For the orthodox Hindus who see some mystic force in the shapes of the Indian letters in Tantric ritual and worship, and would consider the very

idea of using the Roman script in that connexion sacrilegious, the Devanāgarī and other provincial alphabets will continue to be a matter of study and acquirement for this highly specialised purpose. The native system—preferably in the Devanāgarī—will continue to have a place in decoration and in ritualism.

As I have said before, the question of Romanisation is not one of urgent moment now. But we might start familiarising our intelligentsia with it, as both internal disharmonies—communal and provincial—and foreign influences might hasten issues; and as a great cultural problem, our educated men should be prepared as to how to receive it.

This is all that can be said about the first of the three questions broached previously. The simple and easily written Roman letters, enlarged as necessary by easily understood modifications, and arranged according to the scheme of the Indian alphabet, will give the most perfect of alphabets, as far as alphabets go in the world. The sounds of the letters (with the supporting vowel [a] in case of consonants) will be their names, as another tribute to the Indian system. Such an alphabet is worth bringing to our people.

[2]. Remembering that the Romanisation idea will continue to be one of academic interest, for some time at least, we should not rush with it from the university or the club to the market-place, pressing it upon an unprepared people. We would not recommend its immediate acceptance, supplanting as quickly as possible the old scripts. We must first of all have a well-thought out scheme, which is to meet the criticism of competent people, trained in phonetics and familiar with all the problems relating to the languages and their scripts. Dilettantism, with merely a burning zeal to lead our people to the Land of Promise, will worsen matters. A scheme like Mr. Biss's 'Typewriter Bengali' will defeat its own purpose (Mr. Biss, an Education Department Officer in Bengal, sponsored some years ago the Romanisation of Bengali through the typewriter, and he suggested spellings like [swiikaar] for স্বীকার—which in their cumbrousness recall orthographies like [yuuzhual] for *usual* which was actually proposed by an English Spelling Reform Society). When the consensus of competent opinion has decided for a particular system (and mine is offered below for consideration), some representative and responsible body should take it up and lend its support to it by propaganda.

I would not for anything start Romanisation with children beginning to learn their alphabet, particularly when the grown-ups are innocent or apathetic about it, or actually or in a latent way hostile to it. The idea must filter down from the educated groups to the masses: the parents and the grown-ups must first be literate in both Roman and the Indian script before it can be taught to their charges. The method to be followed in this connexion should be something like this:

(i) Propaganda: special literature, special journals, books and periodicals in Indian-Roman; advocacy through the press, persuading the vernacular daily press to print some columns, at least one column, in the Indian-Roman script by way of propaganda and support.

(ii) Assistance from the universities: making a knowledge of Indian-Roman at first voluntary and then obligatory for all college students—a paper or half a paper in the mother-tongue written in the Indian-Roman script being made compulsory at some period in the college stage.

(iii) Making Indian-Roman as used for the mother-tongue first an optional and then a compulsory subject in the high school stage.

The fixing up of an Indian-Roman or Indo-Roman alphabet can be taken in hand immediately; then, as enthusiasts and active workers gather, propaganda can be taken in hand. The universities and schools can be handled only when a considerable body of public opinion is in its favour, or at least is not actively hostile: that will be the index of the situation.

Sir Daniel Hamilton, a large-hearted Scotsman who made his fortune in India and Bengal, conceived of the idea of teaching the village children in his estate at Gosaba in the Sundarbans in South Bengal the Roman alphabet, and had a simple Roman-Bengali on a strictly phonetic basis devised by a committee of which the present writer was a member. This was some 12 years ago. One or two books were printed in it, and it was taught to village children in a primary school. The results were exceedingly satisfactory—the boys and girls were able to read their mother-tongue in this Roman-Bengali much quicker than the ordinary children learning it through the Bengali alphabet. Nevertheless, this was only an experimentation at the expense of the children. Outside the school-room, and the few Bengali-Roman books available, their acquirement of this alphabet remained absolutely ineffectual, and they had to learn the Bengali alphabet over again. It will be wrong in principle and practice to make a beginning with the child.

Several decades of di-alphabetism, spread of the new script among grown-up literates, and existence of some printed literature in the new script (including a number of standard books and classics in the language)—these must precede any serious attempt to begin the children's instruction in their mother-tongue with the Roman script.

I would not, again, support the use of the Roman script exclusively among a minority community living in the heart of a surrounding major community which does not use the Roman; and I would do so in the interests of the minor community itself. Take the case of the Santals in Bengal. An important non-Aryan people, they live surrounded by Bengalis, and they are everywhere bilingual. They cannot get on at all without the knowledge of Bengali, and if they can read and write Bengali they are equipped with a strong equipment in life. The Santali language is written in both Bengali and Roman. Roman-Santali will isolate the Santal from his Bengali neighbours. Bengali-Santali will automatically make him literate in Bengali, as he already speaks the language. The Santal has to live and work in a humble capacity—generally as an agricultural labourer, frequently as an independent farmer in a small way. He receives all his rent and tax receipts from his Bengali landlord in Bengali; all government and municipal notices that reach him are in Bengali. We can understand the value of a knowledge of the Bengali alphabet in his everyday transactions. I would postpone Romanisation of Santali so far as the Santal villager in Bengal is concerned to the day that Bengali is Romanised. Of course, Roman-Santali will continue to be used, as it is now, for scientific purposes; advanced Santals will, of course, be at liberty to pick up Roman-Santali at a later stage in life, to read the splendid series of Santali texts edited by the Rev. P. Boddington in the Roman script, with English translation, and published from the Institute of Comparative Ethnology at Oslo in Norway.

If we proceeded in this way, taking time, there will be very little hardship. There ought to be a reasonably long period of transition in any important matter in the life-history of a people. And there will be no loss of national prestige, as the final adoption of an Indianised Roman script will be voluntary among the people, after a sufficiently long period of transition. Our sentiments will be trained in that direction, and in the combination of the scientific Indian order of the letters with the simpler shapes and purely alphabetical employ of the Roman letters, the proposed Indo-Roman alphabet will be a powerful instrument in the spread of literacy; and the

dissemination of a knowledge of phonetics and linguistics will be made much easier than it is now. Alphabets and languages are distinct things. A change of alphabet does not mean change of the language. There are plentiful instances of the same language being written in more than one script all over the world.

[3]. I now formulate my scheme of an Indo-Roman alphabet. It is always easy to devise elaborate letters, but elaborate letters have no practical value, as when a thing is in an experimental stage we cannot persuade press-owners to spend money in getting them done, or even in buying them when they are available in the market—which is not always the case. My scheme of Indo-Roman does not go in for any capped or dotted letter: modifications are indicated by placing some special marks (which are always available in the ordinary English or Roman type cases) immediately after the letter. The main principle adopted is this: the diacritical marks are separate and detachable symbols added after the original letter, and not fixed below or above it, making new letters or types necessary. This makes printing easy. Writing is also easy, with convenient cursive forms of these symbols.

The following 27 Roman letters—

a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, æ together with the following inverted letters treated as new or distinct letters—

ɔ, ɐ, ʃ, ɥ, ɰ, ʌ (=inverted c, e, f, h, j, k, m, v)

and the following Italic forms—


d, n, r, s, t, z,

modified in some cases by the following 'indicators' (sūcaka-cihna सूचक-चिह्न, 'alāmat علامت) placed after (and in two cases before) them—

· : ' ' *

will suffice for the sounds of *all* the important languages of India, and will adequately transliterate *all* the letters of the Indian and the Perso-Arabic scripts. (For representing the pronunciation of Arabic as made by native Arabic speakers, it will be necessary to add the following two letters of Greek to the above list—namely, [θ] and [ð].)

adopted. Thus for the sound of ञ=ज, the letter [ɟ] (=inverted [f] treated as a separate letter) has been used, as if it were a sort of barred [j] with superfluous dot taken away: the Roman letter [j], which has the ञ=ज value only in English and is pronounced either as [y] or as [ʒh] in the other European languages, is reserved for other purposes. There will be no ambiguity about the value of [ɟ].

The 'indicators' (सूचक-चिह्न, ) have in the main the following values (these indicators do away with the necessity of dotted and capped letters and capital letters,—and dotted and capped types mean additional types)—

: the colon: used after a vowel, it indicates its length. A thicker style of this length-indicating sign, or some other more suitable sign, may be employed in place of the colon now suggested. It is also used after [r] when it is treated as a long vowel.

a full stop, printed upwards, is used after consonants: after [r], it indicates that the [r] is vocalised, *i.e.*, it becomes ऋ=[r̥]; after other consonants, excepting [h̥], it indicates the quality known to the Arab phoneticians as *iḏbaq*, which characterises some of the Arabic consonant sounds.

an accent or minute mark, stands for palatalisation of the preceding consonant.

stands for cerebralisation, or retroflex pronunciation, of the preceding consonant.

when preceding a vowel, indicates its nasalisation. This symbol (*candra-bindu*) is adopted from the Indian script, as it will be easily available in India: the proper nasalisation symbol for the Roman alphabet—the symbol [̃] (called the *til* or *tilde*), although preferable—will not always be available in Indian presses.

before a word will show that it is a proper name, as capital letters are omitted entirely from the proposed Indo-Roman script as being unnecessary.

Experience has shown that these indicators being at a level with the tops of the letters are easier to write than diacritical marks above and below the letters; and they are also less tiring to the eyes. Besides, dotted and capped letters demand greater attention in reading; and the dots and caps in the types are prone to get broken or become blurred quickly.

The letters of the Indo-Roman Script (Bhāratīya-Romaka Lipi, Hurūf-i Tabāḥ-i Romān-i Hindī) can be arranged thus in a tabular form, taking into note their points of articulation :

INDO-ROMAN CONSONANTS

	Bilabial	Interdental	Alveolar	Retroflex or Cacuminal (Cerebral)	Palato-alveolar or Palatal	Velar	[Uvular]	[Pharyngeal]	Glottal
Stops	p b	t d	t ḍ	t' d'	k' g'	k g	[q]		ʔ
Stops Aspirated	ph bh	th dh	th ḍh	t'h d'h	k'h g'h	kh gh			
Affricates			ts dz		c ʃ				
Affricates Aspirated					ch ʒh				
Nasals	m	n	n ṇ	n'	n'	n'			
Lateral			l	l'					
Rolled			r, r						
Flapped				r'					
Fricatives	f v	[θ ð]	s z	s' z'	s' z'	x ʒ		[h' ʕ]	h· h
Semivowels	w				y				

The above consonant letters may now be identified with their Devanāgarī and Perso-Arabic equivalents.

[p, b]=प, ब=प, ब; [t, d]=त, द=त, द; [t, d] are alveolar (danta-mūlīya) sounds, like the English *t, d*, which are heard in Assamese and some forms of Gujarati, as a substitute for both the dental and cerebral *t, d*; [t', d']=ट, ड=त, द; [k', g']=palatal stops, heard in Burmese, dialectal Gujarati, etc.; [k, g]=क, ग=क, ग; [q]=ق of the Arabic; [ʔ]=the *alif hamza* of Arabic, a sound which is found in many Indo-Aryan languages, as a substitute for [h]=ह, ह, as in Rajasthani, Gujarati, East Bengali.

[ph, bh]=फ, ब=फ, ब; [th, dh]=थ, ध=थ, ध; [tʰ, dʰ]=Assamese थ, थ and ड, ड; [t'h, d'h]=ट, ड=ट, ड; [k'h, g'h] are dialectal Gujarati sounds; [kh, gh]=ख, ग=ख, ग. It is to be noted that for these aspirates, as well as for क, ग=क, ग below, the stop+[h] is employed: this is in accordance with the ancient Indian analysis of these sounds as 'mahā-prāṇa' sounds, *i.e.*, compoundings with 'prāṇa' or breath. By using digraphs for these compound sounds we at once do away with the necessity of having single-letter equivalents for the eleven Devanāgarī letters—ख, घ, ङ, च, छ, झ, ञ, ट, ड, थ, ध, फ, भ and ढ—in our Indo-Roman script—following in this matter both ancient Indian analysis and the habit of the Perso-Arabic and the Roman.

[ts, dz] occur in Marathi, Rajasthani, Nepali, Oriya, East Bengali, Telugu, etc.

[c, j]=च, ज=च, ज; [ch, jh]=छ, झ=छ, झ.

[m]=म=म; [n]=न=न; [ɳ]=Tamil 'palatal n'; [n']=न; [n']=[n']; [n']=[n']; ([m'] = *anusvāra*, and [ɳ] = nasalisation, not in the table);

[l]=ल=ल; [l']=[ल']; [r]=र=र; [r']=Tamil 'palatal r'; [r']=[र'];

[f, v]=Indian *f* (फ, व) and *v* (व, व), bilabial spirant sounds; [θ, ð] are Greek letters, standing for the original Arabic values of the letters ط and ذ, =respectively English *th* in *thin* and *th* in *then* (these two sounds are rare for Indian languages, but are given in our Indo-Roman alphabet for the sake of completeness by including Arabic, which is a classical and sacred language for Indian Musalmans);

[s]=स=स; [z]=ज=ज; [s']=ष; [z']=the Tamil *ḷ*, or *zh*, a cerebral or retroflex *z* sound, the voiced (बोधवत्) form of ष=[s']; [s']=श=श; [z']=ज=the French *j*; [x, ɣ]=ख, ग=ख, ग; [h', ʁ]=ह, र of Arabic; [h]=ह=ह; [h']=: (visarga; an unvoiced [h], in Sanskrit);

[w, y]=semi-vowel (not spirant) व, य=व, य;

In addition, the 'lidded' (muṭṭbaq) letters of Arabic, *viz.*, ط ظ ث are to be transliterated respectively as [ṣ ḍ ṭ δ̣] when the native Arab pronunciation is intended to be conveyed, say in an Arabic quotation; when the Persian and Indian pronunciation is in mind, the above letters can be transliterated in the Indo-Roman script as [ṣ ẓ ṭ ẓ]; and [θ, ð] = ط, ذ of Arabic can similarly be rendered as [ṣ, ẓ], Italic letters, when their Persian and Indian pronunciation is to be indicated.

INDO-ROMAN VOWELS

Bilabial (Rounded)	Front (Unrounded)	Central	Back : Rounded, Unrounded	
[u]	i		u	ɯ
[o]	e		o	
[ɔ]	æ	ə	ɔ	ʌ
		a		

All the above vowels can be lengthened by putting the 'indicator' of length [:] after them, *e.g.*, [i]=short, [i:]=long; [u]=short, [u:]=long; and they can be nasalised, with the 'candra-bindu' (or 'hilāl') symbol put before them, *e.g.*, [ị], [ụ], [ụ:] [ʌ̣], [ạ]=इ, उ, अ, ए, ऋ respectively.

The symbols for the vowels as in the above table are explained and identified below:

[i]=इ, [i:]=ई, [u, u:]=उ, ऊ; [ɯ]=the final [u] of Tamil; [e]=ए, [e, e:]=short and long [e] of Dialectal Hindi, Tamil, etc.; so [o, o:]=short and long [o]; [æ]=Bengali এ in এক, ঞ in ভাঞ=the sound of a in South English *man*; [ə]=unaccented, very short अ of Hindustani, as in the second syllable of रतन=[rætən]=the English sound of a as in *ago*, *China*; [ɔ]=Bengali অ, short and long, [ɔ, ɔ:]=the English sound as in *law*; [ʌ]=Hindustani अ=English u as in *sun* or o as in *son*; this may be considered as the All-India value of the short [ʌ̣]=अ; [a]=Hindustani आ.

The above letters comprise practically all the symbols required for most of the sounds and the letters of all the important Indian languages, Aryan and non-Aryan. In the case of one or two languages, some special symbols may be necessary; they are noted in their proper place.

I now give the Indo-Roman script—the 'Bhāratīya-Romaka Lipi' as applied to individual languages.

[I] HINDUSTANI (HINDUSTHANI, HINDI)

The Devanāgarī letters give not merely the *sound-equivalents*, but also the proposed *names* of the Indo-Roman letters. In case of the aspirates, a little more elaborate naming, as suggested below, will be necessary.

VOWELS

Indo-Roman Letters		Devanāgarī Equivalents and Names in Devanāgarī
Λ	...	अ
a	...	आ
i	...	(इस्व) इ
i:	...	(दीर्घ) ई
u	...	(इस्व) उ
u:	...	(दीर्घ) ऊ
r'	...	ऋ
r:	...	(दीर्घ) ॠ
l'	...	ऌ
e	...	ए
Δi	...	ऐ
o	...	ओ
Δu	...	औ
Δm'	...	अं (अनुस्वार)
°Λ	...	अँ (चन्द्रबिन्दु)
Δh'	...	अः (विसर्ग)

CONSONANTS

Indo-Roman Letters		Devanāgarī Equivalents and Names	Indo-Roman Letters		Devanāgarī Equivalents and Names
k	=	क,	kh	=	क-पर-ह ख, क-की-साध- ह (या प्राण) ख ;
g	=	ग,	gh	=	ग-पर-ह घ, ग-की-साध- ह (या प्राण) घ ;
n'	=	ङ (कंठ्य ङ, बिन्दुवाला ङ) ;			
c	=	च,	ch	=	च-पर-ह छ, च-की-साध- ह (या प्राण) छ ;
j	=	ज,	jh	=	ज-पर-ह झ, ज-की-साध- ह (या प्राण) झ ;

CONSONANTS—*continued.*

Indo-Roman Letters		Devanāgarī Equivalents and Names	Indo-Roman Letters		Devanāgarī Equivalents and Names
n'	=	अ (तालव्य अ, पाईवाला अ) ;			
t'	=	ट (चोटीवाला ट), t'h	=	(चोटीवाली) ट-पर-ह	उ,
				ट-के-साथ-ह	(या प्राण) उ ;
d'	=	ड (चोटीवाला ड), d'h	=	(चोटीवाली) ड-पर-ह	ढ,
				ड-के-साथ-ह	(या प्राण) ढ ;
n'	=	ण (सूक्ष्म ण, चोटीवाला ण) ;			
t	=	त,	th	=	त-पर-ह थ, त-के-साथ-ह
					(या प्राण) थ ;
d	=	द,	dh	=	द-पर-ह ध, द-के-साथ-ह
					(या प्राण) ध ;
n	=	न (दन्य न) ;			
p	=	प,	ph	=	प-पर-ह फ, प-के-साथ-ह
					(या प्राण) फ ;
b	=	ब,	bh	=	ब-पर-ह भ, ब-के-साथ-ह
					(या प्राण) भ ;
m	=	म ;	y	=	य ;
r	=	र ;	l	=	ल ;
v, w	=	व ([v] before [i, e, y] ; [w] before [A, u, a, o], and after consonants ; or simply [v] could be used) ;			
s'	=	श (तालव्य श, s'	=	ष (सूक्ष्म ष, चोटीवाला ष)	
		पाईवाला श),			
s	=	स (दन्य स) ;			
h	=	ह ;			
r'	=	ड़ (चोटीवाला ङ), r'h	=	ढ़ (चोटीवाली ङ-पर-ह,	
				चोटीवाली ङ-के-साथ-ह	
				या प्राण ढ).	

In addition, for foreign sounds as introduced by Urdu, the following letters would be required :

f = फ = ف ;	z = ज = ز ;	z' = झ = ز' ;
x = ख = خ ;	ṡ = ग = گ ;	q = क = ق ;
ʃ = चलिफ़ हमजा = چ ;	p = प = پ ;	ayn = ع ;

A special note on the symbol [Δ] = च is necessary.

In Indian writing, अ is grammatically the short vowel, and आ is its long form. This was so when अ was as much an open (विहृत) sound as आ. But at least from the time of Pāṇini, short अ changed its quality, it became a close (संहृत) sound, and thus it was no longer the short of आ,—in practice though not in theory. For this संहृत अ, which is equivalent to the *u* in English *but*, the Inter national Phonetic Association has been using the symbol [ʌ]. This can be adopted for the Indian अ, and this will release [a] for आ, without making it necessary to have the length indicator [:] after the [a], which would have been unavoidable if simple [a] were used for अ. A good deal of inconvenience in having the length-indicator always after the [a] for आ is thus avoided.

For the *anusvāra*, the symbol [m̐] is put *after* the vowel, from the nature of the sound itself. Optionally, it could be rendered in Hindi by a simple [n], for which see below. The *anunāsika*, or nasalising value is denoted by putting the symbol *before* the vowel—[̣]—as a sort of warning beforehand that the vowel following is nasalised.

The Indo-Roman alphabet for Hindi stands thus, with the names for the letters being as in Hindi :

अ	a	i	i:	u	u:	r	r:	l	e	ai	o	au	Λ	Λm̐	Λh̐
	k	kh	g	gh	n̐										
	c	ch	j	jh	n̐										
	t'	t'h	d'	d'h	n̐										
	t	th	d	dh	n										
	p	ph	b	bh	m										
	y	r	l	v, w											
	s'	s'	s	h	r' r'h										
	f	z z'	x	ṣ	q										*

Where the final अ is absent in pronunciation, its equivalent in the Indo-Roman script, [Λ], is to be omitted from writing.

Before their corresponding class nasals, [n̐ n' n̐'] may be written simply as [n]; so that the letter [n] may be allowed to behave like the *anusvāra* in Devanāgarī writing, e.g., पङ्कज = पङ्कज [pan'kaj, or pankaj], पञ्चम = पञ्चम [pan'cam or pancam], तान्दव = तान्दव [tan'd'aw, tand'aw]. As *anusvāra* = [m̐] has the sound of [n] in Hindi, and is often written as न, e.g., हंस = हंस, the letter [n] consequently could be employed for [m̐] in Hindi, e.g., हंस, बंस = [hans, bans'] rather than [ham'sa, wam's'a].

SPECIMENS

(i)

जाओ, एक बार चल कर हम अपने उस पुराने देश को देखें तो सही, जो नालों के किनारे, आम के घने बागों के बीच में बसा हुआ है। जिस देश में घर-घर में चंदन के वृक्ष और दरवाजों में चंदन के किवाड़े लगे हैं। जहां सब लोग सोने के थालों में भोजन करते हैं, सोने के बरतनों में पानी पीते हैं। जहाँ घर-घर में चित्रशाला है। जहां की सब स्त्रियां चित्र-कला में निपुण हैं, और सब पुरुष चित्रों की सुन्दरता पर मुग्ध होने का हृदय रखते हैं। जहाँ घरोंके पिछवाड़े घनी बसवाड़ी है। आम और महुवे के पेड़ों की छाया जहाँ रास्तीं को शीतल और सुखद बनाये रखती है। जहां प्रत्येक कंठ से गान निकलता है। जहां की चौपालों में राजनीति के जटिल प्रश्न एक एक वाक्य से सुलभाये जाते हैं। जहां मनुष्य मात्र के जीवन का निर्दिष्ट लक्ष्य और निश्चित पथ है।

jao, ek bar chal kar ham apne us purane des' ko dekh'e to sahi : , jo nal'o ke kinare, am ke ghane bag'o ke bi:ce m'e basa hua hai. jis des' m'e ghar ghar m'e chandan ke vr'ks' aur darwaz'o m'e chandan ke kiwar'e lage h'ai. jah'a sab log sone ke thal'o m'e bhojan karte h'ai, sone ke bartan'o m'e pani; pi:te h'ai. jah'a ghar ghar m'e citras'ala h'ai. jah'a ki: striya citrakala m'e nipun' h'ai, aur sab purus' oit'r'o ki:sundarata par mugdha hone ka hr'day rakhte h'ai. jah'a ghar'oke pichwar'e ghani: b'aswar'i: hai. am aur mahuve ke p'er'o ki: chaya jah'a rast'o ko s'it'at' aur sukhad banaye rakhti: h'ai. jah'a pratyek kan't'h se gan nikalta hai. jah'a ki: chupal'o m'e raj-ni:ti ke jat'il pras'n ek ek wakya se suljhaye jate h'ai. jah'a manus'ya matra ke ji:wan ka nir'dis't' laks'ya aur nis'cit path hai.

(ii)

आज कल दुख की एक नई टकसाल खुल गई है, और वह है—जीवन-संग्राम। जीवन-संग्राम! जिधर देखिए, यही आवाज़ सुनाई देती है। इस संग्राम में आप किसी से सहानुभूति की, क्षमा की, प्रोत्साहन की आशा नहीं कर सकते। सभी अपने-अपने नख और दंत निकाले शिकार की ताक में बैठे हैं। उनकी लुधा प्रशांत-महासागर से भी गहरी है; किसी तरह शांत नहीं होती। काश! यह दिन चौबीस घंटों की जगह अड़तालीस घंटों का होता!

इधर सूर्य निकला, और उधर मशीन चली। फिर वह दो बजे रात से पहले नहीं बंद हो सकती—एक मिनट के लिये भी नहीं। नाश्ता खड़े-खड़े कीजिए, खाना दौड़ते-दौड़ते खाइए, मित्रों से मिलने का समय नहीं—फालतू बातें सुनने की फुर्सत नहीं। मतलब की बात कहिए साहब, चटपट! समय का एक एक मिनट अशरफ़ी है, मोती है; उसे व्यर्थ नहीं खो सकते। वह संग्राम की मनोवृत्ति पच्छिम से आई है, और बड़े वेग से भारत में फैल रही है।

aj kal dukh ki: ek nai: t'aksal khul gai: hai, aur wah hai—ji:wan-sangram. ji:wan-sangram! jidhar dekhie, yahi: awaz sunai: deti: hai. is sangram m'e ap kisi: se sahanubhu:ti ki:, ks'ama ki:, protsahan ki: as'a nah'i: kar sakte. sab-hi: apne-apne nakh aur dant nikale s'ikar ki: tak m'e bait'he h'ai. un ki: ks'udha *pras'ant-mahasagar se bhi: gahri: hai; kisi: tarah s'ant nah'i: hoti:. kas'! yah din caubi:s ghan't'o ki: jagah ar'tall:s ghan't'o ka hota! idhar su:rya nikla, aur udhar mas'in cali:. phir wah do baje rat se pahle nah'i: band ho sakti:—ek minat' ke liye bhi: nah'i:. nas'ta khar'e-khar'e ki:jie, khana daur'te-daur'te khaie, mitr'o se milne ka samay nah'i:—faltu: bat'e sunne ki: fursat nah'i:. matlab ki: bat kahie sahab—cat'pat'! samay ka ek ek minat' as'arfi: hai, moti: hai, use vyarth nah'i: kho sakte. wah sangram ki: manovr'tti pacchim se ai: hai, aur bar'e veg se *bharat m'e phail rahi: hai.

(iii)

निसि दिन सौनन पियूष सो पियत रहै,
छाय रह्यो नाद बाँसुरी के सुरग्राम को;
तरनि-तनूजा-तीर बन कुंज बीधिन में
जहाँ तहाँ देखती हैं रूप कबिधाम को।
कबि मतिराम होत हँतो ना हिए तैं नेक
सुख प्रेम गात को परस अभिराम को;
ऊधो तुम कहत बियोग तजि जोग करी,
जोग तब करै जो बियोग होय स्याम को ॥

nisi dina sraunana piyu:s'a so piyata rahai,
chaya rahyo nada b'asuri: ke suragrama ko;
*tarani-tanu-ja-ti:ra bana kunja bi:thina m'ai
jah'a tah'a dekhati: h'ai ru:pa ohab-dhama ko.

kabi *matirama hota h'ato na hie t'āi neka
 sukha prema gata ko parasa abhirama ko;
 *u:dho tuma kahata biyoga taji joga karaui,
 joga taba karai jo biyoga hoyā *syama ko.

[II] SANSKRIT

Sanskrit (as well as Pali and the Prakrits) can also be written in this *Bhāratīya-Romaka Lipi*—only for च and ञ it may be thought advisable to write short [a] and long [a:] (and not [Δ] and [a] as in the vernaculars). ए, औ may be properly indicated as long in Sanskrit—[e:, o:], and long and short in Pali and the Prakrits [e, e:] and [o, o:]. ऐ, औ would consequently be [ai, au] (or better, [a:i, a:u]), and not [Δi, Δu]. But to keep up an agreement with the vernaculars, it would perhaps be better, from the point of view of present-day Indians, to write Sanskrit in the vernacular way—च, ञ=[Δ, a], ए, औ=[e, o], ऐ, औ=[Δi, Δu].

If thought necessary, the *visarga* can be indicated as [h'], and the *upadhmanīya* and *jihvāmūliya* forms of the *visarga* respectively as [f] and [x]. Special symbols will have to be employed for Vedic accent—a vertical bar, ['] justified, at the top of the syllable for the *udātta*, and the grave accent ['] similarly for the *svarita*, the *anudātta* being left unmarked. For व, only [v] is to be employed; or [w], if it is intended to indicate the semi-vowel sound of व: both [v] and [w] which are equally permissible for the वल्लव in the modern vernaculars, need not be used for व in Sanskrit.

इत्येवं तेनाभिष्टुतावश्विनावजगमसुराहृतुष्वेनम्—प्रीती स्वः; एष तेऽपूपः;
 अशानेनमिति ॥ स एवमुक्तः प्रत्युवाच—नाष्टतमूचतुर्भगवन्ती । न त्वहमेतम-
 पूपमुपयोक्तुमुत्सहे गुरवे ऽनिवेद्येति ॥ ततस्तमश्विनावूचतुः । आवाभ्यां
 पुरस्ताद्भवत उपाध्यायेनैवमेवाभिष्टुताभ्यामपूपो दत्त उपयुक्तः स तेनानिवेद्य
 गुरवे, त्वमपि तथैव कुरुष्व यथा कृतमुपाध्यायेनेति ॥

Ity e:vam' te:na:bhis't'uta:v*as'vina:v a:jagmatur a:hatus' calnam-
 "pri:tau svah', e:s'a te:-pu:pah', as'a:n-ainam" Iti.

sa e:vam uktah' praty uva:ca—"na:nr'tam u:catur bhagavantau. na
 tv a:ham e:tam apu:pam upayo:ktum utsahe: gurave: -nive:dye:ti."

tatas tam *as'vina:v u:catuh'—"a:va:bhya:m purasta:d bhavata
 upa:dhya:ye:naivam e:va:bhis't'uta:bhya:m apu:po: datta upayuktas
 sa te:na:nive:dya gurave:, tvam api tathaiva kurus'va yatha: kr'tam
 upa:dhya:ye:ne:ti,"

[III] HINDUSTANI [URDU]

The Indo-Roman script for Hindi will also be suitable for Urdu. The order of the vowels as in Hindi can be retained. The consonants can be arranged as in the Urdu alphabet, as follows (the names of the letters in Urdu can for the present be applied to the Indo-Roman letters):

ا = ā; b = ب; p = پ; t = ت; t' = ٹ (مکس 'ٹ' - مرہر کلفی والی 'ٹ'); s = س;
 (جھکی موی 'ٹ'); j = ج; c = چ; h = ح (کلفی والی 'ح'); x = خ; d = د;
 d' = ڈ (کلفی والی 'ڈال'); z = ذ (جھکی موی 'ڈال'); r = ر; r' = ڑ (کلفی والی 'ڑ');
 z = ز; z' = ژ (حرکت والی 'ڑ'); s = ص; s' = ش (حرکت والا 'شین');
 t = ط (مطبق 'ماہ' - نقطہ والا 'ماہ'); z = ض (مطبق 'ماہ' - نقطہ والا 'ماہ');
 (مطبق 'طا' - جھکی موی نقطہ والی 'طوی'); z' = ظ (مطبق 'طا' - نقطہ والی 'طوی');
 q = ع; x = غ; f = ف; q = ق; k = ک; g = گ; l = ل; m = م; n = ن; v, w = و;
 h = ہ; y = ی;

kh = کہہ; gh = گہہ; ch = چہہ; jh = جہہ; t'h = ٹہہ; d'h = ڈہہ; r'h = ڑہہ;
 th = تہہ; dh = ڈہہ; ph = پہہ; bh = بہہ; etc. (کہہ پر ے کہہ; جہہ پر ے جہہ)

حرف غلہ - مل = °

SPECIMENS

(i)

قدیم اردو ادب اگرچہ زبان کی قدامت کی وجہ سے موجودہ نسلوں کے لئے شاید کچھ کم دلچسپی کا باعث بن سکے لیکن اس کے مطالعہ کے بعد اس امر کا یقین ہو جاتا ہے کہ اردو زبان اس قدر تہی مایہ نہیں ہے جیسا کہ عام طور پر سمجھا جاتا ہے۔ نیز آج سے تین سو برس پہلے بھی وہ اس کی اہل تہی کہ اس میں اعلیٰ درجہ کی شاعری کیجاتی تھی اور مشکل سے مشکل اور پیچیدہ سے پیچیدہ مسائل سلجھائے جاتے تھے۔ شاعری کی کوئی صنف ایسی نہیں جو اس خزانہ میں موجود نہ ہو۔ رزم اور بزم دونوں کی تصویریں جس خوبی کے ساتھ اس زمانہ میں دکھائی گئیں۔ بعد کے ادیبوں میں سوائے میر انیس اور میر حسن کے کوئی

دوسرا ان کی نظیر میں نہ پیش کر سکا - افسوس تو اس بات کا ہے کہ بعد کے مصنفوں نے قدیم شاعروں کی تقلید بھی نہیں کی - وہ غزل کے دلدل میں ایسے پھنس گئے کہ کسی دوسری صنف شاعری تک ان کی رسائی دشوار ہو گئی - اور اس کا نتیجہ یہ ہوا کہ حالی کے زمانہ تک ہمارے یہاں طویل اور مسلسل نظموں کا فقدان رہا - اور حالی کے بعد جب اس کا احساس پیدا ہوا تو اچھے شاعروں کی کمی ہو گئی - جو حالی کی تقلید میں اعلیٰ سے اعلیٰ ادبی کارنامے پیش کر سکتے *

qadī:m *urdu: adab agaroi zaban ki: qadamāt ki: wājḥ se maujū:da naśl'o ke lie s'ayad kuch kam dilcaspi: ka baqis ban sake, lekin us ke mut'alāḥqa ke baqd is amr ka yaqī:n ho jata hai ki *urdu: zaban is qadr tihī:maya nah'i: hai jaisa ki qam t'aur par samjha jata hai. nī:z aḥ se tī:n sau baras pahile bhi: wuh is ki: ahl thī: ki is m'e aqla darje ki: s'aqiri: ki: jati: thī: aur mus'kil-se-mus'kil aur pecl:da-se-pecl:da masafil suljhaye jate the. s'aqiri: ki: kol: s'inf aisi: nah i: jo is xizane m'e maujū:d na ho. razm aur bazm, don'o ki: tas:wi:r'e jis xu:bi: ke sath is zamane m'e dikhai: gā'i:, baqd ke adī:b'o m'e siwae *mi:r anī:s aur *mi:r h'asan ke kol: du:sra in ki: naz'ir m'e na pes' kar saka. afsos to is bat ka hai ki baqd ke mus'an-nif'o ne qadī:m s'aqir'o ki: taqlī:d bhi: nah'i: ki:. wuh ḡazal ke daldal m'e aise ph'as gae ki kisi: du:sri: s'inf-i-s'aqiri: tak un ki: rasai: dus'war ho gai:. aur us' ka nati:ja yah hu:a ki *h'ali: ke zamane tak hamare yah'a t'awī:l aur musalsal naz'm'o ka fuqdan raha, aur *h'ali: ke baqd jab is ka ih'sas paida hu:a to aoche s'aqir'o ki: kami: ho gai:, jo *h'ali: ki: taqlī:d m'e aqla-se-aqla adabi: karname pes' kar sakte.

(ii)

ای شعر - دل فریب نہ ہو تو تو غم نہیں
پر تجمہ پہ حیف ہے جو نہ ہو دل گداز تو
صنعت پہ ہو فریفتہ عالم اگر تمام
ہاں - سادگی سے آئیں اپنی نہ باز تو
جوہر ہے راستی کا اگر تیری ذات میں
تفسیر روزگار سے ہے بینیاز تو
حسن اپنا گر دکھا نہیں سکتا جہاں کو
اپے کو دیکھ - اور کر اپنے پہ ناز تو

تو نے کیا ہے بھر حقیقت کو موج خیز
 دھوکے کا غرق کرے رھیگا جہاز تو
 رہ دن گئے کہ جہوت تھا ایمان شاعری
 قبلہ ہو اب ادھر تو نہ کیجو نماز تو
 اہل نظر کی آنکھ میں رہنا ہے گر عزیز
 جو ببصر ہیں انسے نہ رکھہ ساز باز تو
 ناک اوپر ہی درا سے تیری گر چڑھائیں لوگ
 معذور جان انکو - جو ہو چارہ ساز تو
 چپ چاپ اپنے سچ سے گئے جا دلن میں گھر
 اونچا ابھی نہ کر علم امتیاز تو
 جو نابلد ہیں انکو بتا چور بنکے راہ
 گر چاہتا ہے خضر کی عمر دراز تو
 عزت کا بھید ملک کی خدمت میں ہے چھپا
 محمود جان آپ کو گر ہے ایاز تو

ay s'lqr, dil-fireb na ho tu:, to xam nah'i:;
 par tujh-pa h'alif hai, jo na ho: dil-gudaz tu:.
 sanqat pa ho firefta qalam agar tamam,
 h'a,—sadagi: se aiyon apni: na baz tu:.
 jahar hai rasti: ka agar teri: zat m'e,
 tah'si:n-i-rozgar se hai be-niyaz tu:.
 h'usn apna gar dikha nah'i: sakta jahan ko,
 ape ko dekh, aur kar apne pa naz tu:.
 tu: ne kiya hai bah'r-i-h'aqi:qat ko mauj-xez;
 dhoke ka xarq kar ke rahega, jahaz, tu:.
 wuh din gae, ki jhu:t' tha i:man-i-s'aqiri:;
 qibla ho ab udhar, to na ki:jo namaz, tu:.
 ahl-i-naas'ar ki: 'akh-m'e rahna hai gar qazi:z,
 jo be-bas'ar h'ai, un se na rakh saaz-baz tu:.
 nak u:pari: dawa se teri: gar car'ha'e log,
 mauqur jan un-ko, jo ho carā-saz tu:.
 cup-cap apne sacse kiye ja dil'o m'e ghar,
 u:ca abhi: na kar qalam-i-imtiyaz tu:.

jo na-balad h' al, un ko bata cor ban ke rah—
gar cahta hai *xiz'r ki: qumr-i-daraz tu:
qizzat ka bhed mulk ki: xidmat m'e hai chipa;
*maḥ'mu:d jan ap ko, gar hai *ayaz tu:.

[IV] PERSIAN

As a classical language, Persian can equally be written with the Indo-Roman script as employed for Hindustani (Hindi and Urdu), following the Indian pronunciation of Persian, which is archaic for the language, being based on Persian pronunciation of five hundred years ago. In present-day Persia, a standardised Roman spelling does not appear to have been generally accepted, but it will be quite easy to write Persian in its modern pronunciation in the Roman character without it being necessary to use a single capped or dotted letter.

The short [a] of Modern Persian is pronounced very much like the South English *a* as in *man*, and hence this can be conveniently represented by [æ]; the long [a:] of Modern Persian has become like the South English *au* or *aw* as in *caught*, *law* (and a frank [u:] before nasals), and this pronunciation can be well indicated by the symbol [ɔ], as employed in the alphabet of the International Phonetic Association: if [ɔ] is thought too outlandish, [a] simply can be employed instead, differentiating it from the short [æ]. The short vowels of Modern Persian can thus be written [æ, e, o], thus ب ب ب = [bæ, be, bo] (in Indian pronunciation [ba, bi or be, bu or bo]); and the long vowels of Modern Persian also can be written [a or ɔ, i, u], thus بوي بل = [ba or bɔ, bi, bu] (in Indian pronunciation [ba:, bi: or be:, bu: or bo:]), and the diphthongs as [ei, ou], e.g., بوي = [bei, bou] (in Indian pronunciation [bai, bau]). The long ي and و vowels of Modern Persian are always pronounced as *ma^crūf*, i.e., [i:] and [u:], the Indian (*majhūl*) values of [e:] and [o:] are unknown to Modern Persia; as both short [e] and short [o] will have to be used for representing the Indian pronunciation of Persian, long [e:] and [o:] will also be necessary in India. The *izāfat* and the conjunction و are frequently pronounced as short [e] and [o] in India, and they may be written as such.

SPECIMENS

(i)

شخصے از افلاطون پرسید کہ سالہای بسیار در جہاز بودی و سفر دریا کردی در
دریا چہ عجایب دیددی۔ گفت عجب ہمین بود کہ از دریا بکنارہ سلامت رسیدم۔

(Indian Pronunciation)

s'axs'e: az *aflat'u:n pursi:d ke, "salha-e bisyar dar jahaz bu:di: o safar-e-darya kardi: ; dar darya ce qajayab di:di: ?"—guft, "qajab hamin bu:d ke az darya ba-kinara salamat rasi:dam."

(ii)

Below are given two transcriptions of Persian, in Indian and in Modern Persian pronunciation—the first in Indo-Roman, and the second in what may be called Perso-Roman. It is to be noted that in India, final [n] after a long word becomes a mere nasalisation. [ə] = *nīm-fatḥah*.

کریم! ببخشا بر حال ما
که هستیم اسیر کمند هوا
نداریم غیر از تو فریاد رس
توئی عاصیان را خطا بخش و بس
نگهدار ما را ز راه خطا
خطا در گذار و صواب نما
چهل سال عمر عزیزت گذشت
مزاج تو از حال طفلی نگشت
همه با هوا و هوس ساختی
دَمِ با مصالح نپرداختی
مکن تکیه بر عمر ناپایدار
مباش ایمن از بازی روزگار

(Indian Pronunciation : Indo-Roman)

karī:ma ! ba-baxs'a-e-bar h'al-e-ma,
ke haste:m asī:r-e:-kamand-e:-hawa.
na dare:me xāir az tu faryade ras !
tu i: qas'iy'a-ra xat'a-baxs' o bas.
nigahdare ma-ra ze-rah-e-xat'a,
xat'a dar guzar o: s'awabam numa...
cehel sale qumr-e:-qazī:zat guzas't,
mizaj-e:-to az h'al-e-t'ifli: naḡas't.
hamāh ba hawa o: hawas saxetī:,
dāme: ba mās'alih' na pardaxetī:.
mā-kun takya bār qumr-e-na-paedar
mā-bas' i:mān az bazī:ē:-ro:zegar.

(Modern Persian Pronunciation : Perso-Roman)

kærîma ! bæbæxs/a-e-bær h'al-e ma,
 [kærîmo ! bæbæxs/o-e-bær hol-e mo]
 ke hæstim æsr-i kæmænd-e hæva.
 næ darîme xelr æz to færyadæ ræs !
 to i qas'lyan ra xæt'a-bæxs/ o bæs.
 negæhdaræ ma ra ze rah-i xæt'a,
 [negæhdoræ mo ro ze roh-i xæt'o]
 xæt'a dær gozar u s'ævabæm noma....
 cehel salæ qomr-i qæzizæt gozæs't
 mezaj-i to æz h'al-e t'efli nægæs't.
 hæmeh ba hæva u hævæs saxetl,
 dæmi ba mæs'aleh' næ pærdaxetl.
 mæ kon tækye bær qomr-e na-pædar
 mæ-bas' imæn æz bazi-e ruzegar.

In a simplified Perso-Roman, representing the actual pronunciation without any reference to the Perso-Arabic orthography [*s*, *s'*]=س, س', can be written simply [*s*]=same as س; [*t'*]=ط simply [*t*]=ت; [*h'*]=ح, simply as [*h*]=ه; [*z*, *z'*, *z'*], that is, ذ, ض, ظ, as [*z*]=ز; and [*x*]=خ and [*q*]=ق being both pronounced as [*x*]=خ, one symbol can be written for both—perhaps [*q*] as the more common letter would be preferred; [*q*]=ق can be ignored, also [*f*]=ف; and in scanning, the indistinct vowel which is intruded can be written as [*ə*], as it has been done above. In the modern pronunciation, [*v*] is to be used rather than [*w*]; the vowels [æ e o] are always short; [*a*]=[ɑ], as in English *law*, [*i*], and [*u*] are always long. If [æ] is thought too outlandish, simple [a] can be used for the short vowel=*zabr* or *fathah*, and [o] then can be used for the so-called long *ā*. See p. 39 for transcriptions.

A PERSO-ROMAN ALPHABET FOR MODERN PERSIAN

VOWELS

Short	...	æ (or a), e, o; ə
Long	...	a (or o), i, u
Diphthongs	...	ei, ou

CONSONANTS

		Gutturals	Palatals	Dentals	Labials
Stops	...	k, g	(k', g')	t, d	p, b
Affricates	...		c, j		
Spirants	...	x, q (or ɣ)	s', z', y	s, z	f, v
Liquids	...			r, l	
Nasals	...	(n'=n)	(n'=n)	n	m

[k', g'] are subsidiary values of [k, g], and may be optionally employed. It is to be noted that initial and intervocal [k, k', t, p] of Modern Persian are strongly aspirated, as [kh, k'h, th, ph], but this aspiration need not be indicated in writing, as much as it is not done in English.

SPECIMEN OF MODERN PERSIAN

روح بشر نیز رزنی خواهد آمد که از تماشا و کار بردن این همه وسایل ترقی
که تمدن جدید جلوهش میریزد خسته شده و خود را در میان آنها محبوس دیده -
به اطراف خود خواهد نگریست و رفتیکه از مادر خود یعنی از روح ازلی و جمالی
مطلق اثری پیدا نکرد آنوقت بنای کره و ناله خواهد گذاشت و فریاد خواهد
زد — مادر! مادر!

ruh-e bæs'ær niz ruzi xahäd amäd ke æz tæmas'a vo kar bordæn-e in
hæme væsael tæræqqi ke tæmæddon-e jædid jæluyæs' mirizæd xæste s'ode vo
xod ra dærmeyan anha mæhbus dide. be atraf-e xod xahäd nægerist, o
væqtike æz madær-e xod yani æz ruh-e æzæli vo jæmali motlæq æsæri
pelda næ-kærd, an væqt bæna-e gærie vo nale xahäd gozas't o færyad xahäd
zæd—madær! madær!

The same text in the alternative system, with [a]=short æ, and [ɔ]=long ā:

ruh-e bas'ar niz ruzi xohad omad k'e az tamos'o vo kor bordan-e in
hame vasoel taraqqi k'e tamaddon-e jadid jaluyas' mirizad xaste s'ode vo
xod ro darmeyon onho mahbus dide. be otrof-e xod xohad nagerist, o
vaqtik'e az modar-e xod yoni az ruh-e azali vo jamoli motlaq asari
peldo na-kard, en vaqt bano-e garie vo nole xohad gozos't o faryod xohad
zad—modar! modar!

[V] ARABIC (CLASSICAL)

Like Persian, Arabic is a classical language of India, although foreign to the country. Arabic quotations may occur in Urdu, and it may be necessary to write them in Roman. The Indo-Roman script for Hindustani covers Arabic in its Indian pronunciation, but to transliterate Arabic in Arab pronunciation it would be found convenient to have two letters from the Greek—[θ] and [δ], for the Arabic sounds of ط and ذ. (Failing these, an Italic [t] and an Italic [d] can be employed.) The vowels will be as follows: [a, a:, i, i:, u, u:]; the diphthongs—[ay, aw]. For consonantal ر, we should use only [w]. The Roman equivalents for the Arabic letters (consonants) would then be—

ʔ=ا; b=ب; t=ت; θ (or t)=ث; j=ج; h'=ح; x=خ;
d=د; δ (or d)=ذ; r=ر; z=ز; s=س; s'=ش; s''=ص; d'=ض;
t'=ط; δ'=ظ; q=ع; ʔ=غ; f=ف; q=ق; k=ك; l=ل; m=م;
n=ن; w=و; h=ه; y=ي.

Tanwin=an', in', un'; Tā-hā=th (or t).

SPECIMENS

(i)

فِي الْبَدْوِ كَانَ الْكَلِمَةُ رَ الْكَلِمَةُ كَانَ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ رَ كَانَ الْكَلِمَةُ اللَّهُ * هَذَا كَانَ
فِي الْبَدْوِ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ * كُلُّ شَيْءٍ بِهِ كَانَ رَ بَغِيرِهِ لَمْ يَكُنْ شَيْءٌ مِمَّا كَانَ * فِيهِ كَانَتْ
الْعَيَّةُ رَ الْعَيَّةُ كَانَتْ تَرَى النَّاسَ * رَ النُّورُ يَضِي فِي الظُّلْمَةِ رَ الظُّلْمَةُ لَمْ تَدْرِكَهَ *
كَانَ إِنْسَانٌ مَرْسَلٌ مِنَ اللَّهِ إِسْمُهُ يَرْحَنَّا * هَذَا جَاءَ لِلشَّهَادَةِ لِيَشْهَدَ لِلنُّورِ لِكِي
يُؤْمِنَ الْكُلُّ بِرَأْسِطِهِ *

fi-l-badʔi ka:na-l-kalimathu, wa-l-kalimathu ka:na qinda-lla:hi, wa
ka:na-l-kalimathu-lla:ha. ha:ða: ka:na fi-l-badʔi qinda-lla:hi. kullu s/ay(in/
bihi ka:na wa bi-ʔayrihi lam yakun s/ayʔun' mimma: ka:na. fi:hi ka:nati-l-
h'aya:wthu, wa-l-h'aya:wthu ka:nat nu:ra-l-na:si. wa-l-nu:ru yud'i:ʔu fi:l-
δ'ulmathi, wa-l-δ'ulmathu lam tudrik-hu.

ka:na [insa:nun' mursulun' mina-lla:hi' ismuhu *yu:h'anna:. ha:ða: ʔa:ʔa
li-l-s/aha:dathi li-yas'hada li-l-nu:ri likay yufmina-l-kullu bi-wa:sit'atihi.

(ii)

غَزَالٌ رَتَّلَبْ - غَزَالٌ مَرَّةٌ عَطِشٌ فَنَزَلَ إِلَى جَبِّ مَاءٍ فَشَرِبَ مِنْهُ بِهَرَّةٍ -
 ثُمَّ أَرَادَ الْطَّلُوعَ فَلَمْ يَقْدِرْ فَدَظَّرَهُ الرُّتَّلَبُ فَقَالَ لَهُ - يَا أَخِي قَدْ أَسَأْتَ فِي فِعْلِكَ
 إِذْ لَمْ تَمَيِّزْ كَيْفَ تَطْلَعُ وَبَعْدَ ذَلِكَ نَزَلْتُ *

ḡaza:lun' wa θaqlabun'. ḡaza:lun' marrathan' qat'is'a ; fa-nazala filay
 jubbi ma:fin', fa-s'ariba min-hu bi-s'arahin'. θumma [ara:da -l-t'ulu:qa
 fa-lam yaqdir, fa-naḡ'ara-hu -l-θaqlabu, fa-qa:la la-hu—"ya: [axi:, qad
 [asafta fi: fiqlika fiḡ lam tumayyiz kayfa tat'laqu wa-baqda ḡalika nazalta."

[VI] BENGALI

For Standard Bengali, the Indo-Roman alphabet as for Hindi can be employed, but as the Bengali pronunciation of অ=অ is not [ʌ], but [ɔ], this may be used in place of [ʌ]; ঐ=ই and ঔ=ঔ will then have to be written [oi, ou], or, better, [oi, ou]. But it would be better to follow the All-India system of transliteration, and equate Bengali অ with [ʌ], it being understood that in Bengali [ʌ] has the value of a more rounded sound, of [ɔ].

Colloquial Bengali অ' (i.e. অ followed by an ই, which is either lost or is weakly pronounced) and অ' (i.e. অ similarly treated) can be indicated by [ʌ] and [a] followed by a symbol [ʔ] which can be made from the note of interrogation, [ʔ], with the vertical line and the dot at the bottom broken off: [ʌʔ] and [aʔ]: of these, [ʌʔ] has the value of a frank [ɔ], and [aʔ] of a fronted [a]. This symbol can be called in Bengali ইলেক=[ilek]. Failing this special symbol, the inverted comma could be employed as a vowel-modifier. ব-ফল or subscribed [v] is denoted by [w]; and the doubling of consonants after superscribed [r]=repha is omitted: e.g., ধর্ম, কর্তব্য are to be written as [dharma, kartabya], and not with [mm] and [tt].

The Indo-Roman Alphabet for Bengali is given below.

The Bengali equivalents are to be used as names of the Indo-Roman letters, and in some cases, descriptive names, given within brackets, will be useful for young beginners (as the current descriptive names in Bengali are).

অ=অ (the final অ, when not pronounced, is to be omitted in Indo-Roman spelling); ং=অ; ঁ=ই ই; ং=ঈ ঈ; ঁ=ঊ ঊ; ং=ঋ ঋ; ঁ=ঌ ঌ; ং=঍ ঍; ঁ=ঔ ঔ; (where

in pure Bengali or vernacular words, [i] and [i:], [u] and [u:] are both allowed, for convenience [i, u] only may be used); r' = ঞ; r = দীর্ঘ ঞ; l' = ঞ; l = দীর্ঘ ঞ; e = এ; Δi = ঐ; 'o = ও; Δu = ঔ; Δ = অঁ (চন্দ্রবিন্দু); Δm' = অং (অম্বুস্বার); since the Bengali pronunciation of the *anusvāra* is identical with that of উ = [n'], this may also be denoted by [Δn'] = অঙ, অং; Δh' = অঃ; Δ' = অ-য়ে হৈলেক; a' = আ-য়ে হৈলেক; ঞ = বাঁকা এ, অ্যা;

k = ক; kh = ক-য়ে-হ (বা ক-য়ে প্রাণ) খ; g = গ; gh = গ-য়ে-হ (বা গ-য়ে প্রাণ) ঘ; n' = (মাধায়-ফোঁটা) ঙ;

c = চ; ch = ছ = চ-য়ে-হ ছ; j = বর্গীয় জ; jh = জ-য়ে-হ ঞ; n' = (কাঁধে-বাড়ী) ঞ;

t' = (টিকি-মাথা) ট; t'h = (টিকি-মাথা) ট-য়ে-হ ঠ; d' = (টিকি-মাথা) ড; d'h = (টিকি-মাথা) ড-য়ে-হ ঢ; n' = (টিকি-মাথা) মূর্ধ্যা ঞ;

t = ত; th = ত-য়ে-হ থ; d = দ; dh = দ-য়ে-হ ধ; n = দন্ত্য ন;

p = প; ph = প-য়ে-হ ফ; b = বর্গীয় ব; bh = বর্গীয় ব-য়ে-হ ভ; m = ম;

y = য; j = অন্তঃস্থ য; r = র; l = ল; w = (আনাগোনা) অন্তঃস্থ ব, ব, ব-ফলা, ওয়, -ওয়; s' = (কাঁধে-বাড়ী) তালব্য শ; s' = (টিকি-মাথা) মূর্ধ্যা য; s = দন্ত্য স; h = হ;

r' = টিকি-মাথা ড; r'h = (টিকি-মাথা) ড-য়ে-হ ঢ; ks' = ক-য়ে-মূর্ধ্যা-য-য়ে ক্ষ (থিয়) — can also be written থ্য = [khy], or থ = [kh] (in non-Sanskrit words); so jn' = জ-য়ে-ঞ = জ্ঞ, can also be written as গ্য [gy'].

(For representing dialectal East Bengali pronunciation: [ʃ] = হ of East Bengali; [gʃ, jʃ, dʃ, dʃ, bʃ] = respectively ঘ, ঞ, ঢ, ধ, ভ; [ts, dz] can be written for indicating the East Bengali values of চ and জ, and [s] for that of ছ).

SPECIMENS.

(i)

বাঁশের নলটা তাঁহার বড়ই সাধের জিনিস ছিল। এক সাহেবের সঙ্গে খানসামা হইয়া তিনি পাহাড়ে গিয়াছিলেন, সেইখানেই এই সখের জিনিসটা ক্রয় করেন। ইহার গায়ে হিজি-বিজি কালো-কালো অনেক দাগ ছিল। আমীর মনে করিতেন, নলের সেগুলি অলঙ্কার, তাই সে হিজি-বিজিগুলির বড়ই গৌরব করিতেন। বস্তুতঃ সেগুলি অলঙ্কার নহে, সেগুলি অক্ষর—চীন ভাষার অক্ষর। তাহাতে লেখা ছিল,—“চীন দেশের মহাপ্রাচীরের সন্নিকট লিং-টিং শহরের মো-পিং নামক কারিগরের দ্বারা এই নলটা প্রস্তুত হইয়াছে। নল-নির্মাণ-কার্য্যে মো-পিং অদ্বিতীয় কারিগর, জগৎ জুড়িয়া তাহার সুখ্যাতি। মূল্য চারি আনা। বাঁহার নলের আবশ্রুক হইবে, তিনি তাঁহারই নিকট হইতে যেন ক্রয় করেন, বাঁজে মেকরদিগের কাছে গিয়া যেন বৃথা সময় নষ্ট না করেন। মো-পিঙের নল ক্রয় করিয়া যদি কাহারও মনোনীত না হয়, তাহা হইলে নল ফিরাইয়া দিলে মো-পিং তৎক্ষণাৎ মূল্য ফিরাইয়া দিবেন।” বাহা হউক, আমীর যে নলটা কিনিয়াছিলেন, তাহা মনের মত হইয়াছিল,

তাই রক্ষা। না হইলে, মূল্য ফেরত লইতে হইত। যুধিষ্ঠির যে পথ দিয়া স্বর্গে গিয়াছিলেন, সেই ভূবারময় হিমগিরি অতিক্রম করিয়া, তিব্বতের পর্বতময় উপত্যকা পার হইয়া, তাতারের সহস্র-কোশ মরুভূমি চলিয়া, চীনের উত্তর সীমায় লিং-টিং শহরে আমীরকে বাইতে হইত, সেখানে বাইলে তবে মো-পিঙের সহিত সাক্ষাৎ হইত, মো-পিং সিকিটি ফিরাইয়া দিতেন। তাই বলি, ধর্ম্মে রক্ষা করিয়াছে যে নলটি আমীরের মনোমত হইয়াছিল।

b'as'er nalt'i t'ahar bar'a-i sadher jinis ohila. æk saheber san'ge khan-sama haiya tini pahar'e giyachilen, seikhanei ei sakher jinist'i kray karen. ihar gaye hiji-biji kalo-kalo anek dag chila. *ami:r mane kariten, naler seguli alan'kar, tai se hiji-biji-gulir bar'a-i gaurab kariten. bastuto seguli alan'kar nahe—seguli aks'ar, *ci:n bhas'ar aks'ar. tahate lekha chila—“*ci:n des'er mahapraci:rer sannikat' *lin'-t'in' s'aharer *mo-pin' namak karigarer dwara ei nalt'i prastut haiyache. nal-nirman-kariye *mo-pin' adwiti:ya karigar, jagat jur'lya tahar suhlyati. mu:lya carl ana. j'ahar naler abas'yak haibe, tini t'ahar-i nikat' haite jæna kray karen, baje mekar-diger kache giya jæna br'tha artha-nas't'a na karen. *mo-pin'-er nal kray kariya jadi kahar-o manoni:ta na hay, taha haile nal phiraiya dile *mo-pin' tatks'an'at mu:lya phiraiya diben.” jaha hauk, *ami:r je nalt'i kiniyachilen, taha maner mata haiyachila, tai raks'a. na haile, mu:lya pherat laite haite. *judhis't'hir je path diya swarge giyachilen, sei tus'ar-may *himagiri atikram kariya, *tibbater parbat-may upatyaka par haiya, *tatarer sahasra kros' maru-bhu:ini caliya, *ci:ner uttar si:may *lin'-t'in' s'ahare *ami:r ke jaite haite, sekhane jaile tæbe *mo-pin'-er sahiti saks'at haite, *mo-pin' sikit'i phiraiya ditæn. tai bali, dharme raks'a kariyache je nalt'i *ami:rer manomata haiyachila.

(ii)

মাটির প্রদীপখানি আছে মাটির ঘরের কোলে ।
 সন্ধ্যা তারা তাকায়, তারি আলো দেখবে ব'লে ॥
 সেই আলোটি নিমেষ-হত প্রিয়র ব্যাকুল চাওয়ার মত,
 সেই আলোটি মায়ের প্রাণের ভয়ের মত দোলে ॥
 সেই আলোটি নেবে জলে শ্রামল ধরার হৃদয়-তলে,
 সেই আলোটি চপল হাওয়ার ব্যাধায় কাঁপে পলে পলে ।
 নামূল সন্ধ্যা তারার বাণী আকাশ হ'তে আশীষ আনি',
 অমর শিখা আকুল হ'ল, মর্ত্য শিখায় উঠতে জ'লে ॥

mat'ira pradi:pa-khani aচে mat'ira gharera kole;
 sandhya-tara takay tar-i alo dekhbe ba'le.

sei alot'i nimes'a-hata priyara byakul cawar mata;
 sei alot'i mayera pran'era bhayera mata dole.
 sei alot'i nebe jwale s'yamala dharara hr'daya-tale;
 sei alot'i capala haway byathay k'ape pale pale.
 namlo sandhya-tarara ban'i, akas' ha'te as'i:s' ani'—
 amara s'ikha akula ha'lo—martya s'ikhay ut'hte jwa'le.

(iii)

সামনে এল' অসীম সমুদ্র, স্বপ্নের ঢেউ-তোলা নীল ঘূমের মত । সেখানে রাজপুত্র
 ঘোড়ার উপর থেকে নেমে প'ড়ল ।

কিন্তু যেমনি মাটিতে পা পড়া, অমনি এ কি হ'ল? এ কোন্ জাহ্নকরের জাহ্ন?

এ যে শহর! ট্রাম চ'লেছে । আপিস-মুখো গাড়ির ভিড়ে রাস্তা হুগম । তাল-পাতার
 বাঁশিওয়ালা গলির ধারে রাস্তায় উলঙ্গ ছেলেদের লোভ দেখিয়ে বাঁশিতে ফুঁ দিয়ে' চ'লেছে ।

আর রাজপুত্রের এ কি বেশ? এ কি চাল? গায়ে বোতাম-খোলা জামা, ধুতিটা
 খুব লাফ নয়, জুতো-জোড়া জীর্ণ । পাড়াগাঁয়ের ছেলে, শহরে পড়ে, টিউশানি ক'রে
 বাসা-খরচ চালায় ।

রাজকন্যা কোথায় ?

তার বাসার পাশের বাড়িতেই । চাঁপা ফুলের মত রঙ নয়, হাসিতে তার মাণিক
 খসে না । আকাশের তারার সঙ্গে তার তুলনা হয় না ; তার তুলনা, নব বর্ষার ঘাসের
 আড়ালে যে নাশ-হারা ফুল ফোটে, তারি সঙ্গে ।

•

samne elo asi:m samudra, swapner d'heu-tola ni:l ghumera mata.
 sekhane raj-puttur ghor'ar upar theke neme pa'r'la.

kintu jemni mat'ite pa par'a, amni e ki ha'la? e kon jadukarer jadu?

e je s'ahar! t'ram ca'leche. apis-mukho gar'ir bhir'e rasta durgam.
 tal-patar b'as/iwala galir dhare rastay ulan'ga cheleder lobh dekhiye b'asite
 ph'u diye ca'leche.

ar raj-putturer e ki bes'? e ki cal? gaye botam-khola jama, dhutit'a
 khub saph naly, juto-jor'a ji:rn'a. par'ag'ayer chele, s'ahare par'e, t'ius'ani
 ka're basa-kharac calay.

raj-kanya kothay ?

tar basar pas'er bar'itei. c'apa phuler mata ran' naly, hasite tar
 man'ik khase na. akas'er tarar san'ge tar tulana hay na; tar tulana, naba
 bars'ar ghaser ar'ale je nam-hara phul phot'e, tari san'ge.

[VII] GUJARATI

The Indo-Roman alphabet for Hindi will also serve for Gujarati, with the addition of [l'] = **ळ**. For **v**, [v] alone is to be used. The recursive sounds of Gujarati, like **क्व**, **ग्व**, **द्व**, **ब्व** etc., which result from the change of [h] to the glottal stop [ʔ], can be written, if thought necessary, as [kʃ, gʃ, pʃ, bʃ] etc.

SPECIMEN

આપણી ભાષામાં પુરાણોની કથા અને કલ્પનાઓને હજારો હજારોની ઘણાં કાવ્ય લઘાયાં છે, પરંતુ અત્યાર સુધીમાં કેવલ ઇતિહાસિક વસ્તુવાદ કાવ્ય જાણવામાં આવ્યું નથી। જૂનામાં જૂનું એવું વીરકાવ્ય તે કાલ્કડે-પ્રબંધ છે। આ પ્રબંધને પ્રજાની જાણમાં લાવવાનું માન પ્રાચીન-શોધ-રસિક પ્રખ્યાત વિદ્વાદ સ્વ. ડા. બ્યૂલરને ઘટે છે। જૂના સંસ્કૃત ગ્રંથોની શોધમાં એઓ રજપૂતસ્થાન તરફ ગયા હતા, ત્યાં થરાદ ના જૈન મંડાર તપાસતાં તેમની દૃષ્ટિ આ પ્રબંધ ઉપર પડી। લુગડાના બાંધણમાં બાંધેલું અને સુરક્ષિત દાબડામાં મુકીને તાઝાકુંચીવાઝા પટારામાં સાચવેલું આ રત્ન કદરદાન ભવેરી ની દૃષ્ટિ પડતાંજ તેમણે તેનું આબ જોઈ કિંમત કરી। પોતે એની નકલ કરાવીને સ્વ. નવલરામ લક્ષ્મીરામ પંડ્યા, જેઓ શાઝાપત્રના તંત્રી હતા અને જેમના ઉપર ગુજરાતી ભાષાના સારા વિદ્વાન તરીકે પોતાને પશ્ચપાત હતો, તેમની તરફ મોકલી દીધી। એકજ પ્રત ઉપરથી સંશોધન કરવું ઘણું વિકટ ધારી તેમણે લખેલી પ્રત ગેરવલ્લે ન જાય માટે કહકે કહકે શાઝાપત્રમાં છાપી।

apn'i: bhas'a-m'a puran'o-ni: katha ane kalpanao-ne hu:lavi: hu:lavi: ne ghan'ae kavya lakhay'a che, parantu atyar sudhi:-m'a keval'aitihasik vastuvai'u kavya jan'va-m'a avy'u nathi:. ju:na-m'a ju:n'u ev'u vi:r-kavya te *kanhad'de-prabandh che. a prabandh-ne praja-ni: jan'-m'a lavva-n'u man pracī:n-s'odh-rasik prakhyat vidvad-var svarg-vasi: d'akt'ar *byu:lar-ne ghat'e che. ju:na sam'skr't grantho-ni: s'odh-m'a eo rajpu:tsthan taraf gaya hata, ty'a *tharad-na *jain bhan'd'ar tapast'a temni: dr's't'i a prabandh upar pad'i. lugd'a-na b'adhan'-m'a ba'dhel'u, ane suraks'it dabd'a-m'a muki:ne tal'a-kun'ci:-val'a pat'ara-m'a sacvel'u a ratna kadar-dan jhaveri:-ni: dr's't'ie pad't'a-j temn'e ten'u ab joi kimmat kari:. pote eni: nakal karavi:ne svarg-vasi: *navalram *laksm'i:ram *pan'd'ya, jao *s'al'a-patra-na tantri: hata ane jemna upar *gujarati:

bhas'a-na sara vidvan tari:ke potane paks'apat hato, temni: taraf mokli:
 di:dhi:. eka-j prat upar-thi: sam's'odhan karv u ghan'u vikat' dharl:
 temn'e lakheli: prat gervalle na jay mat'e kad'ke kad'ke *s'al'a-patra-m'a
 chapl:.

[VIII] MARATHI

The Indo-Roman script for Gujarati will also do for Marathi. [Δ] = ञ will of course have its Marathi value—that of an unrounded [o]. The [ts, dz] pronunciation of च, ज need not be specially indicated, [c, j] alone being employed. We need not write ञ as [dny] or [dn']: the Pan-Indian [ɟn'] should do; and, as in Gujarati, [v] alone is to be employed for व. ञ should be written [mh], rather than [hm].

SPECIMEN

श्रीमद्भगवद्गीतेवर ज्ञानेश्वर महाराजांनीं जी टीका केली तिचें नांव “भावार्थदीपिका”. तीच “ज्ञानेश्वरी” या नांवाने हल्लीं सुप्रसिद्ध आहे. या ग्रंथावर भाविक लोकांची मोठी श्रद्धा आहे, हे योग्यच आहे. परन्तु माझे ह्मणणे असे आहे कीं, महाराष्ट्रभाषा बोलणारे जेवढे आहेत त्या सर्वांची या ग्रंथावर श्रद्धा असावी. तथापि असे नसण्याचें कारण ज्ञानेश्वरीची भाषा दुर्बोध आहे असें बहुतेकांचें ह्मणणे आहे. परंतु हा दुर्बोधपणा केवळ ज्ञानेश्वरीचा आहे असें ह्मणतां येत नाहीं. ज्या मूलग्रंथावर ह्मणजे भगवद्गीतेवर ही टीका आहे, तीच ग्रंथ मुळीं गूढ आहे. वेद, वेदांगे, उपनिषद, शास्त्रे, इत्यादिकांतील जे सनातन आर्यधर्माचें भांडार, त्या सर्वांचा उल्लेख या ग्रंथांत झाला आहे. हा उल्लेख करण्याचा प्रयत्न जर साधारण पुरुषापासून झाला असता, तर तो यथायोग्य दृष्टावा तसा कधींच झाला नसता. परंतु श्रीकृष्णपरमात्मा यांच्या सुखांतून ही भगवद्गीता निघाली, व ती केवळ सामान्य मनुष्यास दिली, असें नाहीं, तर निस्सीम भगवद्भक्त असा जो अर्जुन त्याला ती दिली आहे. याचा प्रसंग कोणता हे श्रीमद्भगवद्गीतेच्या पहिल्या अध्यायावरून सहज समजते.

*s'ri:mxd-bhagvad-gi:te-var *jn'anes/var maharaj'an'i: ji: t'i:ka keli,
 tic'e n'av “*bhavartha-di.pika.” ti:c “*jn'anes/varl:” ya n'ava-n'e
 hall'i: suprasiddh ahe. ya grantha-var bhavik lok'aci: mot'hi: s'raddha
 ahe, h'e yogya-c ahe. parantu majh'e mhan'n'e as'e ahe k'i:, *maha-
 ras't'ra-bhas'a-boln'are jevd'he ahet tya sarv'aci: ya grantha-var s'raddha

asavi:. tathapi as'e nāsn'yac'e karān', *jn'anes/vāri:ci: bhas'a durbodh
 ahe, as'e bāhutek'ac'e mhan'n'e ahe. parantu ha durbodh-pan'a keval'
 *jn'anes/vāri:ca ahe, as'e mhan'ta yet nah'i:. jya mu:l-grantha-var,
 mhan'je *bhagavad-gi:te-var hi: t'i:ka ahe, to-c granth mul'i: gu:d'h
 ahe. *ved, *vedan'g'e, *upanis'ad'e, s'ast're, ityadik'ati:l j'e sanatan
 arya-dharmac'e bhan'd'ar, tya sarv'aca ullekh ya granth'at jhala ahe.
 ha ullekh karn'yaca prayatna jar sadharan' purus'a-pasu:n jhala asta,
 tar to yatha-yogyā vhava tasa kadh'i:c jhala nasta. parantu *s'ri:kr's'n'a-
 paramatma y'acya mukh'atu:n hi: *bhagavad-gi:ta nighali:, va ti: keval'
 samanya manus'yas dili: as'e nah'i:, tar nissi:m bhagavad-bhaktā asa jo
 *arjun tyala ti: dili: ahe. yaca prasān'g kon'ta h'e *s'ri:mādhagvād-
 gi:tecyā pahilya adhyaya-varu:n sahaj samaj't'e.

[IX] SINDHI

The vowels as in Hindustani. The final and interior weak vowels may be fully written [Δ, i, u]. The special Sindhi recursives are to be indicated by [gʃ, dʃ, jʃ, bʃ]. Other letters to be represented as in Urdu. The Perso-Arabic alphabet of Sindhi can be thus transliterated :

α, a; b; bʃ; bh; t; th; t' (t'r); t'h; s; p; ph; j; jʃ; n'; c; ch; h'; x;
 d; dh; dʃ; d' (d'r); d'h (d'hr); z; r; r'; z; z'; s; s'; s'; z'; t'; z'; q; q; f;
 q; k; kh; n'; g; gʃ; gh; l; m; n; n'; w (v); h; y.

SPECIMEN

hikir'e man'hua-khe bʃa put'a hua. tini-m'a nand'he plu-khe oyo,
 e baba, mala-m'a jeko bhan'o m'uh'i-je h'ise ace, so m'u:khe khan'i: d'ʃe.
 j'ah'i-te hunā malu bʃinhi:-khe virahe-d'ʃino. thorani d'ʃ'i:hani-kh'a poi
 sandusi nand'ho put'u sabhuki: hathi kare hikir'e d'ʃu:rah'e d'ʃeha d'ʃe
 uthi: halio, jite p'ah'i-jo malu ajhalai-m'e vin'ay'a'i:. sabhi khapain'a-
 kh'a poi itifaq'a unhe d'ʃeha-m'e d'ʃad'ho d'ʃukaru aci: pio, j'ah'i-kare
 ho parawasi thian'a lagʃo. pan'a-khe tan'gi h'ala-m'e d'ʃisi: unhe
 d'ʃeha-je hikir'e rahandar'a-khe ji:ti:ti: kare van'i: cambir'io, j'ah'i
 p'ah'i-je bʃania-m'e suara caran'a-loi mokiliusi. xi i'e the-bhay'a'i: ta
 jeke chil'u: suara tha-khai, se jekara m'a khal: p'ah'i-jo pet'u bhary'a,
 para khesi k'ah'i bi ki:ki:na d'ʃino.

[X] ORIYA

The system for Bengali will suit Oriya exactly, with the addition of [l'] for the cerebral l. As in Bengali, [o] can be used for ৓, if required.

SPECIMEN

JAN'A-KARA dui pua thila. tan'ka madhyare je baysare sana se apan'a bapaku kahila—"bapa, mo ban't'are jeu sampatti par'iba, taha mote dia." bapa apan'a bis'ayaku semanan'ka bhitare ban't'i dela. besi dina na jaun'u sana pua nijara sarbaswa ghen'i kaun'asi du:ra des'aku cali jai, bada kheyalire se sabu ur'ai dela. tahara bis'aya-jaka sari-gala-ru, se des'are bar'a akal'a par'ila; tah'u tahara bar'a kas't'a hela. tah'ire se jai set'hara jan'e nagara-basi:ra as'ra nela. nagara-basi: taku ghus'uri-pala carai ba pa'i bilaku pat'haila. se bhokare ghus'uri-khau-thiba tas'u khai pet'a puraibaku iocha karithila. matra taha taku kehi dela nah'i.

[XI] ASSAMESE

Assamese is rather unique in its phonetic development, although it agrees most with Bengali. The Indo-Roman system for Bengali will have to be employed in transliterating Assamese: only the values of the letters in Assamese pronunciation will have to be explained.

Vowels—practically the same as in Bengali.

Consonants present a wide aberration:

[c, ch, j, jh] = [s, s, z, z] in Assamese pronunciation.

The cerebrals [t', t'h, d', d'h] and the dentals [t, th, d, dh] are both absent in Assamese, alveolar stops as in English, = [t th d dh], being pronounced.

There is a special letter ঞ = [w] which does not occur in Bengali.

শ ঞ শ = [s' s' s] when initial and when occurring singly in the middle or end of a word are pronounced in Assamese as [x] = the unvoiced velar or guttural spirant.

[XII] TAMIL

The following is the Indo-Roman script for Tamil:—

Δ; a; i; i; u; u; e; e; Δi; o; o; Δu; k, g; n; c, s', j; n'; t', d'; n'; t, d; n; p, b; m; y; r; l; v; z'; l'; r; n (nr; rr, tl).

Grantha letters in Tamil—s'; s; j; h; ks'.

The āyṭam of Shen Tamil (Old Tamil) = [x].

In Shen Tamil, it would be preferable to use only the sounds [k, c, t', t, p]—and no [g, s' and j, d', d, b].

For representing accurately the pronunciation of Modern Tamil, [ɣ, δ, v] can be used respectively for [g, d, b], and final [u] can be indicated as [u] = unrounded [u].

SPECIMENS

(i)

oru manus'anukku iran'd'u kumarar irundargal'. avargal'il il'aliyavan tagappanai no:kki—"tagappane; , astiyilenakku varum pan'gai enakkut tave:n'd'um," enran. andappad'i avan avargal'ukku tan astiyai pan'git't'uk kod'uttan. s'ila nal'alikkup pinbu il'aliya magan ellavaraiyum s'erttuk kon'd'u durra-de:s'attukkup purappat't'up po:y an'ge: dunnma:rkam ay ji:vanam pan'n'i tan astiyai az'ittup po:t't'an. ellavaraiyum avan s'elavaz'itta pinbu anda de:s'attile: kod'iya pan'jam un'd'ayirru. appoz'udu avan kuraiyu pad'at tod'an'gi anda de:s'attuk kud'igal'il oruvan id'attil po:y ot't'ik kon'd'an. andak kud'iyavavan avanait tan vayalgal'il panrigal'ai me:ykkumbad'i anuppinan.

(ii) Old Tamil

i:tal aram; ti:vinai vit't'-i:t't'al porul'; en'n'anrum
katal iruvavar karutt-ura valitt-ataravu
pat't'ate; inpam; paralai ninaint-immunrum
vit't'ate; pe:r-inpa-vi:t'u.

[XIII] MALAYALAM

The Indo-Roman alphabet for Malayalam : [A, a, i, i:, u, u:, r', r:, e, e:, o, o:, ai, au, am', ah'; k kh g gh n'; c ch j jh n'; t' t'h d' d'h n'; t th d dh n; p ph b bh m; y r l v; s' s' s h; z' l' r].

SPECIMEN

oru manus'yannu ran'd'u makkal' un'd'ay-irunnu. adil il'ayavan appano:d'u—"appa, vastukkal'il enikku vare:n'd'unna pan'gu tare:n'ame;," ennu paran'n'u. avanum mudaline avarkku pagudi-ceydu. e:re nal' kaz'iyum mumbe il'aya magan sakalavum svaru:piccu-kon'd'u durra de:s'atte:kku yatra po:yi avid'e durnnad'appayi ji:viccu tanre vastu nanavidham akkik-kal'-an'n'u. ellam celavaz'icca s'e:s'am a de:s'attil kat'hina ks'amam un'd'ayit't'u avannu mut't'u vannu tud'an'n'i. ennare avan po:yi a de:s'attile: parannamaril oruttano:d'u parri-kkon'd'u ay-avan avane tanre nilan'n'al'il pannigal'e me:ypa ayaccu.

[XIV] KANNADA

Letters as for Hindi, only short and long [e, e:, o, o:]; the special consonant sounds are [l'], and [r] and [z'] for Old Kannada.

SPECIMEN

obba manus'yanige ibbaru makkal'-iddaru. avar-alli cikkananu tandege, "tandeye:, astiyalli nanage bara-takka palannu nanage kod'u," andaga badukannu avarige palit't'anu. kelavu dinagal'a me:le cikka maganu ella ku:d'isi-kon'd'u du:ra-de:s'akke horat'u alli dundugaran-agi baduki tanna astiyannu hal'u-mad'i-bit't'anu. avanu ella vecca-mad'idu me:le a de:s'adalli gho:ravada bara un't'agi avanu korate-pad'al-arambhisidanu. aga ho:gi a de:s'astharalli obbanannu hondi-kon'd'anu. ivanu avannanu handigal'annu me:yisuvadakke tanna holagal'ige kal'uhisidanu.

[XY] TELUGU

Alphabet as for Hindi (without its letters for special Urdu sounds), plus [l'], and [r] for Classical Telugu, with short and long [e, e:] and [o, o:]. [w] need not be used; and [c, j] are to do duty for both [c, j] and [ts, dz], as [ca ca co cu] are pronounced as [tsa, tsa, tso, tsu] and [ce ci] as [ce, ci]; and similarly [ja ja jo ju]=[dza, dza, dzo, dzu] and [je ji]=[je, ji].

SPECIMEN

voka manus'yuniki yiddaru kumarulu vun'd'iri. varilo: cinnava:d'u, "o: tan'd'ri; astilo: naku vacce: palu yimm'"-ani tan'd'ri-to: ceppin-appud'u ayana variki tana astini pan'ci pet't'enu. konni dinamulaina taruvata a cinna kumarud'u samastamunnu ku:rcukoni du:ra de:s'amunaku praya:n'amal vel'l'i tana astini durvyaparamu-valla pad'u-ce:senu. adanta vrayamu-ce:sina taruvata a de:s'amandu pedda karuvu kaligin-anduna atad'u yibbandi pad'a-sagenu. appud'u atad'u vel'l'i a de:s'asthulalo: vakaniki lo:badiy-un'd'e-nu. atad'u pandulanu me:put'aku tana polamulalo:ki atani pampenu.

[XVI] AUSTRO-ASIATIC (KOL)

The Kol (Munda) speeches (of which Santali and Mundari are representatives) have the following vowels: [i, e, æ, a, ɔ, o, u]. Vowel-length need not be indicated, as it depends on some special speech-habits of the languages. There is no [Δ] in Kol; [æ, ɔ] are for open or low e and o. The neutral vowel of Santali, ɜ, also need not be indicated, as it is a modified form of [a] under the influence of other contiguous sounds. But if required, it could be rendered as [a']. The consonants are: [k, g, n; c, j, n'; t', d', r; t, d, n; p, b, m; y, r, l, w, s, h], plus the aspirates [kh gh, ch jh, t'h d'h, th dh, ph bh, r'h] as in Santali, and the "checked stops" [k' c' t' p'], (or [g' j' d' b'] for Mundari) wherever they occur. (The value of the indicator ['] after these consonants, [k c t p + ' = k' c' t' p'] is not that of a

palataliser as in the cases of [s' n' z'], but in the Kol speeches it serves to indicate that the stops are not exploded.)

SPECIMEN : SANTALI

mit' hor'-ræn barea kor'a hopon-kin tah'æ-kan-tæ-a. ar un-kin moto-ræ
 hud'in'/io'-do apatæ metad-e-a, "æ baba, in'ræ par'aok'/menak'-ak'-reak' bakhra
 dæn-æm-ka-tin'-mæ." ado aldari-tæt'-æ (or a'ida'ri-tæt'-æ) hat'in'-at'-kin-a.
 khan-ge thor'a din tayom uni hud'in' hopon-do sanam-ak'-ko sam'ao-ka-
 tæ mit't'æc' san'gin' disom-tæ-y-æ calao-en-a, ar ond'æ-do luca-lamot' din
 t'alao-tæ tah'æ-kan-tæ-ak'-æ tahas-nahas-ket'-a. ar sanam-ak'-ko-e ubla-
 d'ubla-ket'-tæ-khan ona disom-ræ mit'-tæc' at' akal hoy-en-a, ar uni-do ræn'-
 gæjok'-æ æhop'-en-a. khan-ge sæn-ka-tæ ona disom-ræn mit'-t'æn rayot-
 t'hæn-æ læot'ha-y-en-a, ar uni-do ac'-ak' d'oht'a-jaega-tæ-y-æ kol-kad-e-a
 sukri gupi.

NOTE I.

For tone-languages like Tibetan, Burmese, and other Tibeto-Chinese speeches, special tone-marks will have to be devised. The ['] accent-mark being already used as an 'indicator' to denote a sound-quality, it may be omitted from the list of tone-marks. A thick line, slanting, like [/] or [\], and a curved line like [⌒] or [⌒], and similar other lines, placed before the syllables, might be employed for the purpose.

NOTE II.

The Indo-Roman script, as proposed above, may be forthwith employed for scientific purposes, in transcribing Sanskrit and other Indian languages, as well as Persian and Arabic, in Indological and other oriental publications. The systems of transliteration in vogue now, the standard or official Geneva system included, require a number of dotted and capped letters which only a limited number of presses in India possess. The result has been that the printing of an article with Sanskrit or other words and passages in Roman transcription, or of a book in Roman Sanskrit or Roman Hindustani, remains an expensive thing. With Indo-Roman, any press will be able to print these efficiently and cheaply. Will not orientalists and learned societies take note of this, and support Indo-Roman or something on its lines? That will be a very helpful step for the dissemination of the Roman script in India.

APPENDIX

THE LATIFI ALPHABET.

Mr. A. Latifi in his "All-India Alphabet" has presented a system of Romanisation before the Indian public. Here is a reproduction of what he offers,—the symbols he suggests, and his own notes on them :

The Alphabet is as follows for Urdu:

A b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A E I U t d ð h ð q r t g

More symbols will be added if required for other languages, but the following additional ones for Gujarati, Bengali, and Punjabi have already been devised:

æ o ɔ ŋ l

Of these letters A, E, i, and u, are used for the short vowel sounds of the English words *but*, *men*, *pin*, *put* respectively. A, E, i, and u, are used for the corresponding long vowels as in *father*, *mane*, *peel*, and *fool* respectively. o is always long.

o, æ, ɔ represent the vowel sounds in *molest* (short o sound), *bad*, and *ball* respectively. These are for Bengali.

c, v, and x are only used in English and foreign words not naturalized in the Indian language concerned. Such words should be spelt as in the original language and not phonetically.

b, f, g (as in *gun*), h, j, k, l, m, n, p, r, s (as in *soft*), w, y, and z (as in *zone*) represent the same sounds as in English. d and t represent the corresponding softer sounds in the Indian languages, e.g., in *darwázá*, *tamáshá*.

ŋ and l represent the Gujarati ળ and લ.

The following table explains the use of the remaining consonants:

Consonant	Devanagari	Urdu
2	ख	ک
3		گ
4	घ	غ
5	श	ش
6	भ	ب
7	क	پ
8	ङ	ت

Consonant	Devanagari	Urdu
g	घ	گ
dh	ध	دھ
th	ढ	دھ
d̄	ड	ڈ
h	घ	ه
o	ठ	تھ
l	ट	ت
ph	फ	ف
r	र	ر
t	द	د
z		ح
g		غ
q		ق

In the cursive a short vowel is made long by putting the accent ' over it. This accent is not necessary over the end vowels in some languages, e.g., Urdu, where they are always supposed to be long.

The sign : represents in print and in ordinary script the nasalization of the vowel it follows. In the cursive and in fast script a short vowel is nasalized by the tilde ~. It is nasalized as well as lengthened by the sign ^ over it in substitution for the lengthening accent or stroke.

The sign ^u over a consonant in the cursive and in fast script indicates that the consonant is doubled. This sign corresponds to the *tashdid* in Urdu.

Punctuation marks are the same as in English.

Mr. Latifi's alphabet can be criticised on the following points :

(i) It does not appear to be based on a proper analysis of the phonetics of the Indian languages. Mr. Latifi quite unnecessarily follows the native Indian system in having distinct letters for the aspirates, instead of the simpler device of using the combination—unaspirated consonant + [h] (although some of his new letters, e.g., those for घ, ध and ढ, are really ligatures of [t+h], [d+h] and [the symbol for ड+h]); thus he has found it necessary to provide for 11 additional characters.

(ii) It has a number of quite new and unfamiliar letters which make a page printed in it look like being in quite a different system of writing (e.g., the symbols for घ, ढ, ड, ध, ठ, ट, फ, ड़, द़). The use of the numerals for speech sounds (e.g., 2=ख, ५, kh; 3=ज, zh, z'; 4=च, छ, c; 5=श, ष, sh, s'; 6=भ, ६, bh; 7=म, ७, mh; 8=ह, ८, ch; 9=, ९, gh) will lead

to very great confusion : *e.g.*, Latifi system, [4Λ2nΛ] = चखना, اُکھنا = [oakhna] in Indo-Roman ; [5o6Λ] = ओभा, اُوبھا = [s'obha] ; [7Λ2mar] = ऋखमार, اُرخمار = [ṛhakhmar] ; [1540 mē: 5er5Ah bad5Ah hue] = میر شاہ بادشاہ مرہ = ۱۵۴۰ میں شہزادہ بادشاہ مرہ = [1540 mē: *s'ers/ah bads/ah hue], etc.

(iii) The distinction between some of the letters representing quite different sounds is very minute indeed, and some clear diacritical or indicating sign, with a fixed or clearly established function, would be preferable : *e.g.*, the symbols for ङ and ञ, ष and ण, ड and ढ, ख and ह. Compare also the script forms for ढ and ढ, which are very similar.

(iv) Foreign words not naturalised may be indicated in their original Roman spelling, but then such words must always be written or printed within inverted commas. There is no point in keeping both [c] and [k] for the [k] sound, and [x] for the compound consonant sounds of [ks, gz]. English and other naturalised foreign words should be written in their Indianised forms. (*Calcutta* is an Indian word, and in Urdu it should be [Kalkattā] = [*kalkattā] ; English *January*, *February*, *ticket* etc. should be written in their Hindustani forms, as [Janwarī, Farwarī, ṭikaṭ]).

(v) The use of a symbol like the تشدید (*tas'did*) of the Perso-Arabic script on the top of a consonant to represent the lengthening or doubling may be recommended as conducing to economy of time and space in writing, but it is to be objected to for two reasons : it is against the alphabetical principle of the Roman script, and it will necessitate the use of a number of capped letters in printing. If economy of space and time were required, the length mark [:], used after vowels, can be used after consonants also, as the so-called "double consonant" is really a long consonant.

(vi) It will not be a practical proposition for the simple reason that at an experimental stage the printing presses will not (unless compelled to do so) provide themselves with unfamiliar types not necessary for printing English and other known languages. The lay public, already averse or apathetic to the much more familiar Roman letters, will be actively hostile to the dozen and more unfamiliar and ungainly letters devised by Mr. Latifi, and to the use of the symbols for the numerals for speech-sounds : and the scientific public will have its objections to the arbitrary creation and employment of letters and numerals in it.

The Latifi alphabet follows a good principle in eschewing the capital letters. It would be better, however, to follow the International Phonetic Association in employing [:] for the long quality of sounds, rather than for

nasalisation, which the Latifi alphabet proposes; for nasalisation, the universally employed *tilde* [~], or failing that, the Indian *candra-bindu* [°] would be a better symbol, and it should be used before the vowel letter, to warn the reader before-hand that a nasal vowel follows.

The specimens of Urdu, Hindi and Gujarati given by Mr. Latifi in his alphabet are quoted below, first in the original alphabet, then in the Latifi alphabet, and finally in Indo-Roman (in the *bharati:ya-romaka lipi, or h'uru:f-i tahajji:-i *romani:-i *hindi:) as suggested by me. The differences in principle and in practice will be apparent from a comparison of the two systems.

URDU TEXT

میں سنہ ۱۸۶۳ء میں پیدا ہوا تھا۔ اور ہرش سنبھالنے کے بعد سے ۳۰ جنوری سنہ ۱۸۸۲ء تک اپنی لڑکپن کی عمر گھر کے کام کاج کرنے میں بسر کی۔ ۱ فروری سنہ ۱۸۸۲ء کو میرے ایک ہم عمر درست نے مجھے ہندوستان لی سیر کرنے پر آمادہ کیا۔ لیکن چونکہ یہ کام روپیہ بغیر نہیں ہو سکتا تھا اور یہ سفر اپنے والد کی بغیر مرضی کے تھا۔ اس لئے میں نے اپنے بیروباری سیٹھ داس مل سے اپنے بھائی صاحب کے تھیکے کا ہالہ کر کے مزدوروں کو دینے کے لئے کچھ روپیئے مانگے۔ جب مجھے روپیئے مل گئے تو میں نے اس غرض سے کہ میرے رشتہ داروں کو میرے سفر کا صحیح راستہ نہ معلوم ہو بہت سے لوگوں سے پوچھا کہ تمہیں پشاور سے کچھ منگوانا تو نہیں ہے؟ جس پر کسی نے سوغات کی درخواست کی اور کسی نے کچھ بھی نہیں منگوا یا۔

بہ ہر حال ہم لوگ رات کو اپنے گھر سے روانہ ہو کر صبح خیر آباد پہنچے۔ اس وقت تک ریل دریائے اٹک سے اُس پار تھی۔ اور پشاور تک نہیں پہنچی تھی۔ میں سوائے کلکتہ کے اور کسی شہر کا نام نہیں جانتا تھا۔ اسٹیشن پر پہنچ کر جب بابو سے کلکتہ کا ٹکٹ مانگا تو اس نے کہا کہ کلکتہ کا ٹکٹ ایک دم یہاں سے نہیں مل سکتا۔

The same in the Latifi Alphabet

MAE: SAN 1863 ME: paيدا hUA HA AOR HO5 SA:6ALNE
 KE BA'D SE 30 JANUARY 1882 TAK APNI LATAKPAN KI
 UMR GAR KE KAM KAJ ME: BASAR KI. 1 FEBRUARY, SAN
 1882 KO MERE EK HAM UMR DOST NE MU7E *hindustan
 KI SAER KARNE PAR AMADA KI, LEKIN 4U:KEH YEH KAM
 RUPAE BAGAIR NAHI: HO SAKTA HA, AOR YEH SAFAR
 APNE WALID KI BAGAIR MARZI KE HA, IS LIE MAE: NE
 APNE BEOPARI SE6 DAS MAL SE APNE 6AI SAHIB KE
 6EKE KA BAHANA KARKE, MAZDURO: KO DENE KE LIE
 KU8 RUPAE MA:GE. JAB MU7E RUPAE MIL GAE, TO MAE:
 NE IS GARAZ SE KEH MERE RISTEDARO: KO MERE SAFAR
 KA SAHIH RASTA NA MA'LUM HO, BAHUT SE LOGO: SE
 PU8A KEH TUMHE: PE5AWAR SE KU8 MA:GWANA TO
 NAHI: HAI? JIS PAR KISI NE SAOGAT KI DAR2AST KI, AOR
 KISI NE KU8 6I NAHI: MA:GWAYA.

baharhal HAM LOG RAT KO APNE GAR SE RAWANA
 HOKAR SUBAH 2AIRABAD PAHU:4E. US WAQT TAK REL
 DARYA-C-AZAK SE US PAR HI AOR PE5AWAR TAK NAHI:
 PAHU:4I HI. MAE: SIWAE CALCUTTA KE AOR KISI 5AHR
 KA NAM NAHI: JANTA HA. STATION PAR PAHU:4 KAR JAB
 BABU SE CALCUTTA KA TICKET MA:GA TO USNE KAHA KEH
 CALCUTTA KA TICKET EK DAM YAHA: SE NAHI: MIL SAKTA.

In Indo-Roman

m'AI SAN 1863 (*qis'vi:) m'e paيدا hUA tha aur hos' s'albhalne ke baud
 se 30 *janwari: 1882 tak apni: lar'akpan ki: qumr ghar ke kam-kaj karnem'e
 basar ki:. 1 *farwari: san 1882 ko mere ek ham-qumr dost ne mujhe *hindu:-
 stan ke sair karne par amada kia, lekin c'u:ki yih kam ru:paye baqair nah'i: ho
 sakta tha, aur yih safar apne walid ki: baqair marz'i: ke tha, is lie m'AI ne
 apne byopari: set'h *das-mal se apne bhai: s'ah'ib ke t'heke ke bahana karke
 mazdu:r'o ko dene ke lie kuch ru:paye man'ge. jab mujhe ru:paye mil gaye,
 to m'AI ne is qaraz' se ki mere ris'tedar'o ko mere safar ka s'ah'i:h' rasta na
 maqlu:m ho, bahut se log'o se pucha ki tumh'e *pis'awar se kuch m'agwana
 to nah'i: hai? jis par kisi: ne sauqat ki: darxast ki:, aur kisi: ne kuch bhi
 nah'i: m'agwaya.

ba-har-h'al ham log rat ko apne ghar se rawana ho kar s'ubah' *xairabad
 pah'uce. us waqt tak rel darya-i-*at'ak se us par thi:, aur *pis'awar tak
 nah'i: pah'u:ci: thi:. m'AI siwae *kalkatte ke aur kisi: s'ahr ka nam nah'i:
 janta tha. ist'es'an par pah uc kar jab babu: se *kalkatte ka t'ikat' man'ga
 to us ne kaha ki *kalkatte ka t'ikat' ek dam yah'a se nah'i: mil sakta.

HINDI TEXT

मच्छरोंका एक झंड उड़ता हुआ अपने मार्ग में चला जाता था, उन में
 से एक मच्छर ने देखा कि एक सिंह आखेट करते करते दौड़ते दौड़ते वहुत

थक कर भारी नौद में अचेत सो रहा है। तब उसने पुकार के सब मच्छरों से कहा, “अरे भाइयो ! देखो ! वह सिंह सोता है ; इसको मैं ऐसा मारूंगा कि वह दुखदाई लहलुहान हो जावेगा ।” यह कह, बड़ी शूरता कर सिंह की पंख पै चढ़ डंक मार उड़ गया, और ऐसा घमंड करने लगा जैसे उसने बड़ी शूरता का कर्तव्य किया । पर मुड़के जो देखा तो सिंह हिला भी न था, तब उसके मरने का अनुमान करके और मच्छरों से कहा, “जो सिंह मर गया हो तो मैंने वन को दुःख और भय से छुड़ा दिया । अरे मित्रो ! देख लो ! तंदवा जिस से डरता है, वह मेरे डंक से गिर गया ; अब हम शूरता करके सब अपने बैरियों को मारके हटा देंगे ।” ऐसी ऐसी लंबी-चौड़ी हो कर रहे थे और विजयके मनोरथमें लग रहे थे कि इतने में वह अचेत सिंह नौद से जाग पड़ा और अपना आखेट दंढ़ता चला गया ।

The same in the Latifi Alphabet

MA48ARo: KA Ek 7u:d urta hua apne MARGME: 4ALA
jata hA. UN ME:SE Ek MA48AR ne de2A ke Ek si:h
A2Ee karte karte dAorte dAorte bahut hAKKAR
bArI nI:d ME: A4Et so raha hAE. tab us ne pukarke
sab MA48ARo: SE kaha, “ARE bAIyo! de2O! wah
si:h sota hAE; usko MAE: AISA MARu:ga KE wah
du2dayI lahuluhan ho jawega.” yah kah, bArI
surta kar, si:h KI pu:8 pAE 4At dA:k MAR ur gAYA,
AOR AISA gAMA:d karne laga jaise usne bArI surta
ka kartab kiya. par murke jo de2A to si:h hila bI
nA hA; tab uske MARNE ka ANUMAN karke AOR
MA48ARo: SE kaha, “jo si:h mar gaya ho to MAE: NE
ban ko du2 AOR bAy SE BUyA diya. ARE Mitro! de2
lo! te:dua jis SE darta hAE wah MEre dA:k SE gir
gAYA; ab hAM surta karke sab apne bAIRIyo: ko
MARKE hAcA dewe:ge.” AIsI AIsI lambI 4AurI hI kar
rahe hE AOR KE wIjAE KE MANORah ME: lag rahe hE
KE itNE ME: wah A4Et si:h nI:d SE jag pAYA AOR
apna A2Ee du:dta 4ALA gAYA.

In Indo-Roman

macchar'o ka ek jh'u:d' ur'ta hua apne marg m'e cala jata tha, un
m'e se ek macchar ne dekha ki ek sim'h akhet' karte-karte daur'te-daur'te
bahut thak kar bhari: n'i:d m'e acet so raha hai. tab us ne pukar ke sab
macchar'o se kaha, “are bhaiyo ! dekho, wuh sim'h so raha hai ; is ko
m' ai aisa mar'u:ga ki wuh dukhda: lahu luhan ho jawega.” yih kah kar,
bar'i: s'u:rta kar, sim'h ki: p'u:ch pai car'h d'an'k mar ur' gAYA, aur aisa
ghaman'd' karne laga jaise us ne bar'i: s'u:rta ka kartab kiya ; par mur'ke

jo dekha to sim'h hila bhi; na tha, tab uske marne ka anumana kar ke aur machhar'o se kaha—"jo sim'h mar gaya ho to m'ni ne ban ko duh'kh aur bhay se chur'a diya. are mitro! dekh lo, t'eduwa jis se d'arta hai wuh mere d'an'k se gir gaya; ab ham s'urta kar ke sab apne bairiy'o ko marke hat'a dew'ege." aisi; aisi; lambi;-caur'i; hi; kar rahe the aur bijay (vijay) ke manorath m'e lag rahe the ki itne m'e wuh acet sim'h n'i;d se jag par'a aur apna akhet' d'h'u:r'hta chla gaya.

GUJARATI TEXT

સારો પવન જોઈને પછી અમે બોરનેઓ બેટમાથી નિકળ્યા, પણ આગળ ચાલતાં તોફાન લાગવા માંડ્યું, કેટલાક દહાડાલગી તો અમારું વહાણ ઉઠ્ઠતુંજ રહ્યું । ફેવટે પવન નરમ પડ્યો, અને દરીઓ જરા ધીમો થયો, ઇટલે વહુ ફેટે અમે એક મચ્છવો હવકાં ખાતો દોઠો । દૂરબીનમાંથી જોયું તો કેટલાંક માણસ મારા બાપે દોઠા, અને દુઃખની નીશાનીનો વાવટો ચઢાવતાં હોય એવાં જણાયાં । તેથી અમે અમારું વહાણ તેની તરફ લઈ ગયા । પણ દરીયાની ભારે કોઝોને લીધે ત્યાં પહોંચીને તે મચ્છવામાંહિના લોકોને અમારા જાજપર લેતાં ઘણો વાર લાગી । તે પર પાંચ માણસ હતાં । તેમાં માત્ર એક જળનેજ બોલવાની સુધ્ધી હતી ।

The same in the Latini Alphabet

SARO PAWAN JOINE PA8I AME BORNEO BET MA: NI
NIKA'YA, PAN AGAL 4ALTA: TOFAN LAGWA MA: DYU:
KE'LAk DAHA'DA LAGI TO AMARA: WAHAN U8ALTA:J
RAHYU: SEW'ETE PAWAN NARAM PADYO, ANE DARYO JARA
DHIMO HAYO, ETLE BAHU SE'ETE AME EK M8WO DABKA:
ZATO DI8O. DARBIN MA: HI JOYU: TO KE'LA:k MANAS
MARA BAPÉ DI8A:, ANE DU2NI NI5ANI NO WAW'EO
4ADAWTA: HOY EWA: JANAYA: TEHI AME AMARA:
WAHAN TENI TARAΦ LEI GAYA, PAN DARYANI BARE
8OLONE LI8E TYA: PAHO:4INE TE M8WA MAHE:NA
LOKNE AMARA 7A7PAR LETA: GANI WAR LAGI. TEPAR
PA:4 MANAS HATA:, TEMA: MATR EK JAN NEJ BOLWANI
5UDDH' HATI.

In Indo-Roman

saro pawan joine pachi: ame *borneo bet'm'athi: niki'ya. pan' agal'
calt'a tofan lagv'a m'ad'y'u. ket'lak dahad'a lagi: to amar'u vahan'
uchal't'uj rxy'u. chev't'e pawan naram pad'yo, anedari:yo jara dhi: mo
thayo, et'le bahu chet'e ame ek machvo d'abk'a khata di:t'ha. du:rbi:n
m'athi: joy'u to ket'l'ak man'as mara:bape di:t'ha, ane duh'khni: nis'ani: no
vav't'o cad'havt'a hoy ev'a jan'ay'a. tethi: ame amar'u vahan' teni: taraf
lai gaya. pan' dariyani: bhare chol'one li:dhe ty'a pah'oci:ne te machva
m'ahena lokone amara jfaj par let'a ghan'i: var lagi: tepar p'ac man'as
hat'a. tem'a matr ek jan'ney bolvani: s'uddhi: hati:.

A ROMAN ALPHABET FOR INDIA

BY
SUNITI KUMAR CHATTERJI

ERRATA

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
5	8	-बॉ-म-न	ब-बॉ-म-न
22	28	· : / , *	· : / , ° *
28	24	when proceeding	° when preceding
29	19	lu ɹ ɹm' ɹh'	lu °ɹ ɹm' ɹh'
30	19	ki:sundarata	ki: sundarata
36	31	izāfat	izāfat
38	4	kæmænd-e	kæmænd-i
38	26	zabr	zabar
40	16	Tanwin	Tanwin
40	29	mīna-lla: hī' ismuhu	mīna-lla: hī' ismuhu
42	3	ɹ=बै	°ɹ=बै

RELIGION AND MAGIC : BEING AN EXAMINATION OF THE VIEWS OF FRAZER, MARETT, LEUBA AND SWANTON ¹

BY

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Though the close association of religious ceremonies with magical rites and practices may be one of the established facts of anthropology, yet there are many who will not allow that religion has anything to do with magic in the strict sense, or that the magical as such ought to rank as religion properly speaking. According to some (*e.g.*, Frazer), magic and religion are mutually exclusive and incompatible, so that the magical is devoid of strict religious significance and meaning, while the religious in the strict sense has nothing magical about it. There are others, however, who while distinguishing between religion and magic in their developed forms, will yet acknowledge a certain distant relationship between them : according to them, both religion and magic spring from a common root or source, but the common ancestry does not prove a common or identical nature in their developed and fully evolved forms (*cf.* Marett). There are others again who will recognise magic as an element within a primary religious complex of many factors, the different forms of religion, animistic, polytheistic, etc., being, according to them, differentiations out of the primary complex through shifting emphasis and specification (*cf.* Swanton). It

¹ Read before the Calcutta Philosophical Society on the 31st of January, 1935. Dr. W. S. Urquhart presided.

will be our task in the present paper to examine some of these more important positions with a view to arrive, through constructive criticism, at a fresh conclusion such as will be relevant to the facts and agree with the available evidence regarding religion and magic.

I

In Chapter IV of Vol. I of the first part of the "Golden Bough" (Third Edition), Sir J. G. Frazer, discussing the question of Magic and Religion, observes that while magic is "next of kin to science," religion is antagonistic to magic as well as science. There might be, Frazer admits, cases of magic in which "the operation of spirits is assumed," but these, he adds, "are only exceptional," being cases of "magic tinged and alloyed with religion." The fundamental conception underlying both magic and modern science, Frazer observes, is "a faith, implicit but real and firm, in the order and uniformity of nature. The magician does not doubt that the same causes will produce the same results," that his magical act "will be attended inevitably by the desired results." The magician, he adds, "supplicates no higher power," and "yet his power, great as he believes to be, is by no means arbitrary....He can wield it only as he strictly conforms to the rules." But "the fatal flaw of magic lies," according to Frazer, "in its total misconception of the particular laws which govern the sequence" (of events), in other words, in "mistaken applications of one or another of two great laws of thought, *viz.*, the association of ideas by similarity and the association of ideas by contiguity in space and time." The laws of association, legitimately applied, "yield science; illegitimately applied, they yield magic, the bastard sister of science."

If magic is thus "next of kin to science," it is differentiated from religion in that the latter involves "a belief in powers higher than man and an attempt to propitiate or please them." Hence, according to Frazer, while religion consists in the theoretical belief in higher supernatural beings and the

practical effort to win their favour through propitiation and worship and thus "clearly assumes that the course of nature is to some extent elastic and variable," both magic and science, on the contrary, rest on the belief in a rigidly fixed constitution of the universe which admits of no modification of its inherent laws. Hence religion is "directly opposed to the principles of magic as well as science."

Though religion is thus antagonistic to magic as well as science, yet, Frazer adds, "this antagonism seems to have made its appearance comparatively late" so that it is legitimate to suppose "an earlier stage" in which "the functions of the priest and the sorcerer were often combined." It however by no means follows that this fusion is quite primitive. "The conception of personal agents" being "more complex than a simple recognition of the association of ideas," we may reasonably suppose an Age of Magic as everywhere preceding the appearance of religion proper. Lastly, Frazer suggests that when magical methods proved abortive, men resorted to religion and its methods of propitiation.

With reference to Frazer's views we must observe, in the first place, that the so-called antagonism of religion and magic is an unproved assertion without foundation in reason or experience. As a matter of fact, even supplication is not without belief in laws and in a fixed constitution in the beings whose favour is sought. Without such belief, and without real faith in the effectiveness of one's appeals, the very motive to prayers and supplications would cease to exist. This is clearly proved by the insistence on rituals and ceremonies which is a special characteristic of almost every religion. Such insistence is nothing but a demand to abide by the rules, *i.e.*, to proceed on right lines instead of the devious and uncertain paths that lead nowhere. Even the courtier and the sycophant have to abide by the rules: they can please their patrons only by a careful observation of their patrons' moods and humours and making the best of every suitable opportunity that offers itself. It is the

same with the gods as with their human ectypes who are held to be made in the gods' images : the gods are not arbitrary, lawless beings any more than are their human imitations and the votaries in approaching them with their petitions and prayers must choose the most favourable opportunity and the really effective and suitable methods for the purpose. As a matter of fact, even advanced religions like Christianity do not always conceive of the Divine Personality as an arbitrary will that is above all laws. If we turn to the controversies of the mediæval theologians, we shall find that one of the principal questions at issue between the Thomists and the Scotists is that of the relation between the Divine Reason and the Divine Will. The Thomists, we know, repudiate the Scotistic view of an arbitrary Divine Will and insist on the inherent rationality of the Divine Personality which even the Divine omnipotence cannot overpass.

Secondly, the view that religion is always some kind of prayer to a higher being hardly bears examination in the light of the empirical evidence. Prayer is a two-term relation : it involves a being who prays and a being who is prayed to. But religion is not necessarily a two-term relation in every case. It may be a one-term relation, *i.e.*, a relation of self to self such as we have in Buddhism, Jainism and Śāṅkarism; it may again be a two-term relation such as we have in Christianity, Islamism and other forms of monotheism; and it may also be a many-term relation such as we have in the different forms of polytheism, Indian, Egyptian and Græco-Roman.¹ To say that religion must always be a relation between a finite being and some higher being or beings is to deny that Buddhism, Jainism and Śāṅkarism are religions. It has no doubt been contended (by Father

¹ A critic has taken exception to my use of the term 'one-term relation.' My reply is, I am only describing a certain type of religious experience, and not philosophically justifying it. 'The use of the term 'one-term relation' makes the view easily intelligible and any philosophical objection that may be raised to such a view of relation will equally apply to the incontestable fact of 'self-consciousness' however we describe it. Nor is 'one-term relation' a paradox of my invention. Every student of Indian Philosophy, with some idea of the *svatūpasambandha* of the Naiyāyika will readily understand what I mean.

Schmidt, *e.g.*,)¹ that Buddhism, at least in its earliest form, is philosophy rather than religion strictly speaking, but this is a view so manifestly at variance with the historical evidence that it hardly requires special refutation.

Thirdly, we must observe that religion is not invariably a form of praying or beseeching: as a matter of fact, it may be quite as much a form of compelling or coercing the gods as a form of worshipping or praying to them for favours. This is virtually confessed by Frazer himself as he proceeds to illustrate what he calls the "confusion" or "fusion" of religion and magic in primitive and advanced religions, past and present. The Vedic religion, we know, was not merely hymn-singing but also sacrificial and coercitive, and the religion of the Brāhmaṇas was almost wholly a form of compulsion through sacrifices and incantations. This also holds good of the Egyptian and the Babylonian religions and it is worth noting that the passage which Frazer himself quotes from Professor Weidemann in this connection itself testifies to the magical character of these religions in unmistakable terms. "The whole doctrine of magic," says Professor Weidemann, "formed in the valley of Nile, not a part of superstition but an essential element of religious faith, which to a great extent rested directly on magic, and always remained closely connected with it." To say that in all this we have nothing but a confusion of the religious with the magical is to prejudge the question in accordance with one's private beliefs rather than to solve it in the light of the actual evidence of experience. The problem at issue is whether magical rites can, in certain circumstances, acquire also a religious significance and value, and it is hardly a proper way of dealing with it to say that religion and magic being negatively related, all cases of the one being taken as the other must be regarded as cases of confusion and false identification rather than of real identity or essential kinship. We may as well define

¹ Cf. "The Origin and Growth of Religion," by W. Schmidt (Methuen & Co.), p. 2.

man as a two-legged being of erect posture and of brown, yellow or white colour and so deny humanity to the blacks as failing to come up to the requirements of our definition. Frazer's mistake lies in supposing that religion must necessarily be some kind of propitiation of a higher being—a view neither self-evident nor empirically proved any more than the view that humanity must necessarily show itself in one or other of three different colours and in no other.

Fourthly, Frazer's suggestion that religion must have arisen through the failure of an earlier magical method of dealing with nature is also a mere assumption without foundation in fact. A necessary corollary of Frazer's view will be the disappearance of magic with the appearance of the gods, or at least a gradual decline of magic with the progress of religious consciousness and belief. But this is very far from being the actual case. As Andrew Lang points out, if we take the case of civilized Japan, we find that side by side with an increasing belief in magic we have also intense religious faith and belief in gods. Further, as both Leuba and Marett point out, Frazer's theory credits the savage mind with far greater intelligence than it actually possesses and does not sufficiently recognise the strength of an inherent will-to-believe inspite of actual evidence to the contrary. Even the civilized modern man with all the advantages of a good education and an accurate knowledge of the scientific laws is not altogether devoid of belief in the magical and the miraculous. Moreover Frazer does not show why the failure of magic should not facilitate the discovery of true scientific laws through a more careful observation of nature and its behaviour. The method of prayer and supplication is not the only alternative to the magical method of compelling nature. The scientific control of nature through a correct knowledge of its laws is another alternative which was equally open to the savage to exploit when his magical methods proved unavailing. Frazer gives hardly any reason for an original partiality for religion when the more closely allied method of science was equally at the disposal of the

primitive magician. As a matter of fact, if Frazer's theory is to be credited, there is far greater likelihood of ineffective magic developing into science and the scientific methods of effective control than into the uncertain, and perhaps also in the majority of cases, no less ineffective, methods of religious propitiation and prayer.

II

While, according to Frazer, magic is "next of kin" to science, and religion is antagonistic to both magic and science, according to Dr. Marett, magic and religion are blood-relations being two different but allied forms of supernaturalism. Science, however, is different both from magic and religion, being positivistic and naturalistic. "Magic and religion," says Dr. Marett, "belong to the same department of human experience. Together they belong to the supernatural world, the x-region of experience, the region of mental twilight" ("Anthropology," p. 209, Home Univ. Lib.). At the same time, there is, according to Dr. Marett, a great difference between magic proper and religion. Magic, according to his view, includes "all bad ways, and religion all good ways of dealing with the supernormal—bad and good, of course, not as we may happen to judge them, but as the society concerned judges them" ("Anthropology," pp. 209-11).

According to Dr. Marett, therefore, there are two kinds of magic, white and black, and while white magic is indistinguishable from the religion of the primitive savages, black magic is distinct from religion and is marked off as magic proper. "Sometimes indeed the people themselves do not know where to draw the line between them," but there is nevertheless a clear recognition even by savages that witchcraft is bad and that in so far as it "consists in leaguering oneself with the powers of evil in order to effect selfish and anti-social ends," it is not religion but black magic. Religion, in other words, is a salutary way of dealing with supernormal powers, while witchcraft which is

magic proper uses supernormal powers for achieving antisocial and individualistic ends.

While religion and magic are thus allied in so far as they both deal with the supernormal, science is different from both in that it deals wholly with "the work-a-day world, the region of normal, commonplace, calculable happenings" ("Anthropology," pp. 210-11). The gulf between religion and magic is, therefore, not so wide as that between science on the one hand and religion and magic on the other. The development of religion from magic, in other words, is a continuous and unbroken process, but there is nothing to prove a similar evolution of science from magic as Frazer's theory would postulate. "There was no sensible breach of continuity," says Dr. Marett, "between the godless kind of wonder-working rite...and the kind in which the intermediation of gods is involved" ("Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion," p. 134), and the term religion may very well be extended so as "to cover both stages of...an organic development" (*ibid*).

According to Dr. Marett, therefore, religion and magic presuppose an earlier magico-religious prius out of which both have emerged in their developed forms. Secondly, primitive magic (of the white type) as a salutary way of dealing with supernormal powers for achieving beneficial, tribal ends is indistinguishable from religion, while magic proper is magic directed towards individualistic and antisocial ends. Thirdly, the magico-religious way is distinguished from the scientific in that it deals with the supernatural as distinguished from the natural world with which science deals. Fourthly, Dr. Marett contends, the so-called arrogance of magic as distinguished from the submissiveness of religion is a mere appearance, the dramatic enactment of rituals being responsible, according to him, for the impression of self-sufficiency and arrogance. If however we probe into the inner feelings of the actors, a dictatorial mood by no means becomes obvious.

We confess we cannot agree with Marett's view that

religion must needs be supernaturalistic in every case. It may be that most religions have the supernatural rather than the natural sphere of experience in view. But this is hardly a sufficient ground for generalising it into a principle and making it the differentiating character of religion. As a matter of fact, there are naturalistic positivistic religions just as there are religions of the supernatural. Not to mention Comte's positivistic Religion of Humanity, the religion of the modern scientist is in many cases a rationalistic naturalism without even a shadow of the supernatural or the mystical. It is possible that mystery plays a more important part in primitive religion than it does in religion in its advanced forms. But primitive religion is not the only religion in the world, and it is hardly sound logic to define religion in terms of what is at best true only of its early phases.¹

Secondly, to credit the savage mind with a comprehension of the supernatural or supernormal is more than what the facts of the case really warrant. As Durkheim rightly points out, some idea of nature as a system is a necessary presupposition of the comprehension of the supernatural. The savage may have a keen vision and in many respects a much finer sense-perception than we have. But this by itself proves no idea of nature as a system anymore than the long-range vision of the eagle or the kite, or the extraordinary sagacity of dogs proves that these creatures have a consciousness of nature as an ordered whole.

¹ It has been argued that in defining religion we must proceed with the typical, i.e., the usually accepted cases in the first instance, and from these work back to those that are on the border-line. Comtism being a border line case should not therefore be considered as relevant for the purpose. My reply is that the typical cases are only a provisional starting-point for a working definition: the working definition, unless revised and recast in the light of the border-line evidence, loses all scientific value. Nor are there any typical, commonly accepted cases to go upon as far as religion is concerned. Within Christianity, for example, we have so many churches and schisms, each standing by its own articles of faith as the essence of true Christianity and attacking the rivals as preachers of false Christianity, that it is madness to seek an agreed basis of what Christianity is. This is also true of Hinduism, Islamism and other historical religions. Thus 'common acceptance' reduces itself to 'acceptance by those who profess it.'

An instinctive, infra-logical sense of the natural is hardly what we mean by the consciousness of a natural order, and if the savage religion is to be described as the opposite of the naturalistic, scientific consciousness, we should call it infra-naturalistic and infra-logical rather than super-naturalistic and supra-logical.

Thirdly, Dr. Marett's views about the two kinds of magic, salutary and the opposite, also show some confusion of the religious and the tribal or social. Magic directed to tribal or social good, Dr. Marett tells us, is religion with the primitive savage. Magic for anti-social ends, on the contrary, is not religion but witchcraft. The evident suggestion here is that the social character of the magic in the former case makes it religion, while the lack of it in the latter deprives it of religious character or value. But this, we hold, is to confound the religious with the social and moral. The tribal magic is religious not because it is tribal or social : it is religious because it produces a sense of harmony with the powers that count, with reality, in short. The reason why tribal magic alone is valued is that the savage has hardly any self other than the tribal self. His tribal magic reconciles his tribal self with reality and so becomes religion (that binds). It is not the tribality of the magic in question that makes it religion ; it is rather the unity with reality that it effects, the sense of restored harmony with the universe. Through this consciousness of recovered unity the savage feels one with reality through his tribe. The universe is on the side of his tribe, and therefore he as one with his tribe is no longer an insulated, solitary individual with nothing but his own individual resources to draw upon. He can now count on the whole universe, on reality itself with which he has made peace through his tribe. If he cannot look upon the individualistic magician with equal approval or esteem, it is because he is not accustomed to thinking of himself or of any one else as an atomistic, private individual. He is therefore disposed to think of the individualistic magician as a dangerous abnormality, as

a lunatic, in short, who is lost both to himself and his tribe. He is, in the primitive estimation, a tribicide as well as a suicide and his activities certainly call for public disapproval, if not also forcible restraint.

Fourthly, Dr. Marett's view of an undeveloped magico-religious stage as prior to religion proper carries with it the implied suggestion that developed religion is altogether different from magical compulsion though both religion and magic might have emerged out of an undifferentiated common source. In his "Faith, Hope and Charity," he declares it to be "a common place of anthropology to contrast the religious man who has learnt to say 'Thy will be done' with the magician who says 'My will be done,' " and he tries to make out the case for the religious character of primitive tribal magic by observing that its arrogance is a mere appearance, the real attitude being one of submission rather than of self-sufficiency. This, we must say, is to save the magical character of primitive religion by taking away everything that is magical about it. Dr. Marett is evidently anxious to make out that primitive magic is a dramatic form of propitiation which is mistaken by the superficial observer as a form of compelling. In other words, he subscribes to the anthropological commonplace as he calls it that religion must necessarily be some kind of propitiation of a personal being so that primitive magic is religion only as a subtle form of propitiation through dramatic enactments. But this, we must say, is an anthropological superstition no less than an anthropological commonplace, and if we be permitted to use Dr. Marett's phraseology we should call it "a questionable piece of history " as well that will not bear a moment's examination in the light of the historical evidence. We have already referred to the Egyptian and the Babylonian religions and we have also noted the magical character of the Vedic religion and the religion of the Brāhmaṇas. It may no doubt suit certain preconceived views to deny the religious character of these historical religions but it is neither sound logic nor good history. As we have

already pointed out, religion may be not merely a blend of magic and prayer, it may also be almost wholly one or other of these, or again something which is neither prayer nor magic but an experience altogether different from both. Just as life manifests itself in a wide variety of forms ranging from the invertebrate to the vertebrate, and from anthropoid apes to men and the different races and subraces of men, so religion may realise itself in an indefinite variety of forms without either exhausting or completely losing itself in any single type or form. We may have religions of compulsion and religions of propitiation as also religions of contemplation and religions of mystical absorption just as we may have life in the insects and life in lower animals and life in men and perhaps also life in superhuman beings to be.

One last criticism we must offer before we leave Dr. Marett and discuss other views. Notwithstanding what he says in various places about an undeveloped prayer-magic complex as a rudimentary religion, Dr. Marett definitely votes for the propitiation-conciliation view of religion in its developed and advanced forms. But this, we contend, is not only to deny the religious character of Buddhism, Jainism and Śāṅkarism which are not praying religions but also to differentiate religion from magical compulsion in a way not borne out by the actual facts. Prayer, no doubt, involves a submissive beseeching attitude of self-abasement in the majority of cases, but prayer may also pass over into a form of forceful spiritual appeal which is hardly distinguishable from compulsion. In other words, just as spell may through a series of intermediate stages transform itself into the begging, beseeching attitude of prayer and supplication, so also may prayer through a graded series of intermediate forms pass over into the compelling, dictatorial attitude. An invitation, we know, is a shade more insistent than a mere request, and some invitations are hardly distinguishable from commands that must be obeyed. The 'must' of magic thus does not generically differ from the 'may' of prayer. Religious legends,

we all know, abound in stories of earnest prayers that have at last compelled the attention of the gods and forced them to intervene for their votaries' sake. It hardly stands to reason to argue that such legends were mere imaginary constructions without a basis in actual experience. We should rather say that the so-called opposition of magic to religion is itself an anthropological superstition that is manifestly at variance with the facts of experience. When, *e.g.*, Durkheim tells us that "the marked repugnance of religion for magic" and "the hostility of the second towards the first"¹ are sufficient reasons for drawing a clear line of demarcation between magic and religion, he is only repeating the pet phrases of orthodox anthropology forgetting that he himself stressed the magical character of the Vedic sacrificial religion in an earlier part of his important work (*cf.* "Elementary forms of Religious Life, pp. 34-35"). What religion has opposed is not magic as such, but only such magic as it does not sanction or recognise as spiritually effective for its purposes.

III

In some respects similar to Dr. Marett's, but also differing from it in many essentials is the view of religion and magic expounded by Mr. J. H. Leuba in his "Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion." Leuba, like Marett, holds that the scientific-mechanical attitude is a great deal farther removed from the magical and the religious than these latter are from each other. Unlike Marett, however, who makes religion consist in an emotion which he describes in Freudian phraseology as being essentially ambivalent in character, Leuba makes it consist mainly in a form of behaving or responding to a specific object. According to Leuba, in other words, religion is more than mere belief being essentially a specific practical reaction to the believed object. Hence the differentia of religion ought to be sought

¹ "Elementary Forms of Religious Life," by E. Durkheim, p. 43 (Eng. Trans.).

in the type of practical reaction it evokes rather than in the theoretical belief which evokes the reaction in question. Now, according to Leuba, we may distinguish three different types of behaviour or practical reaction towards experience. These are :—(1) the mechanical, (2) the coercitive or magical, and (3) the anthropopathic. Of these mechanical behaviour, the real precursor of science, is distinguished from the anthropopathic by the absence of any reference to personal beings. Moreover, it involves the practical recognition of a fairly definite quantitative relation between cause and effect. Magic is distinguished (a) from mechanical behaviour by the absence of any recognition of quantitative relations, and (b) from anthropopathic behaviour by the absence of the use of personal means. The anthropopathic type of activity is characteristic of men's dealings with men and other sentient beings and also of men's dealings with the gods. It is this type of activity that distinguishes the religious attitude. When anthropopathic behaviour is directed not to the secular relations of men with their fellowbeings but to the relations of men with the gods we have religion.

Even animals, according to Leuba, are capable of the mechanical and the anthropopathic types of activity. A dog does not behave to a man or a piece of bone in the same way. Also animals show some sense of the quantitative relations of cause and effect. When a monkey jumps from one branch of a tree to another it shows some instinctive sense of the distance to be cleared and the amount of energy to be put forth for the purpose. Animals however are incapable of magical behaviour and also of the religious type of anthropopathic activity. Both magic and religion involve a capacity for reacting to absent and unperceived objects. Moreover, in both religion and magic the results may be deferred without impairing in any way the activities which are directed towards the achievement of the results. Generations after generations of men, for example, will go through time-wasting magical and religious rites even in the absence of the expected or desired results. It is otherwise,

however, with the mechanical type of activity, at least with such mechanical activity as animals are also capable of. Such activity is sustained by the results, and the failure of the results has the effect of gradually weakening and finally eliminating the activity itself. Besides, animal behaviour, whether mechanical or anthropopathic, has reference to the present and the actually perceived, animals being incapable of reacting mechanically or anthropopathically to absent and unperceived objects.

As regards the question of relative priority Leuba agrees with Frazer in supposing a phase of magic as the precursor of religion proper. He, however, rejects Frazer's explanation of the priority as being due to the comparative simplicity of the associative process underlying magic. Magic, Leuba contends, involves not merely associated ideas but also the reflective consciousness of the associated ideas as causally related to one another. Magic, though preceeding religion, does not, however, disappear with the appearance of religion. On the contrary, when religion arises, it combines with it and thereby adds to its complexity. But the combination never becomes a complete fusion: "Magic and Religion combine, but never fuse."

Hence, according to Leuba, there is no undifferentiated magico-religious prius of religion proper as Dr. Marett thinks. On the contrary, there is according to him, as according to Frazer, a phase of pure magic as the forerunner of religion as anthropopathic dealing with the gods or higher beings. At the same time, magic is more closely allied to religion than to science. The latter is a form of mechanical-quantitative reaction which has reference only to present objects and depends on verification in experience. Both magic and religion, on the contrary, refer to absent and unperceived objects and are independent of verification in experience.

In criticism of Leuba's views we must observe, in the first place, that the distinction he draws between religion and magic is unhistorical and arbitrary. Religion is not necessarily anthropopathic, though it may be so in the majority

of cases. Not to mention mystical religion and the historical religions of the Buddhists and the Jains, we have religion without theistic beliefs amongst many of the present-day scientists. That belief in a personal being is a necessary element of religion in every case is an anthropological superstition which even Leuba's acute psychological mind is not able to get over. Nor is there any such gulf between Religion and Magic as Leuba's qualifying observation that they "combine, but never fuse" would appear to suggest. That magic may not only combine with religion but also become an integral part of it is abundantly proved by the historical religions of the Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas as also by the numerous magico-religious practices which still survive even in advanced monotheistic religions of the present day. Nor is magic always either black or profane magic as Leuba's remarks about a combination without fusion would appear to imply. The Egyptian and the Babylonian religions in their vital part are nothing but magical control of the deities: propitiation is only the outer husk, the inner core of these cults being magical coercion of the gods who may even be magically chastised in case of rank disobedience. Magic as such need not be the essence of a religious experience, nevertheless it may yet be the only form in which religion manifests itself at certain levels of civilization or culture. Religion, in its inner character, is neither supernaturalism nor naturalism, neither magic nor science, though it may take one, or other, or some, or all of these forms. Religion, in fact, is an experience of reconciliation or restoration—an experience of recovered unity or harmony after one of estrangement or separation. Whatever effects this is religiously effective and deserves to be recognised as religion. If magic effects it, it is religion, just as propitiation, when it achieves the same end, is also religion. Even naturalistic, positivistic science may be religion in this sense, if it succeed in removing the sense of estrangement from reality and restoring the disturbed harmony. Magic may no doubt be profane or secular in certain cases. For example,

when it is directed towards the achievement of relative ends irrespective of their ultimate reality-value, we have profane or secular magic. When, however, magic is used for the higher end of restoring harmony with reality, when it reconciles the individual or the clan or the tribe with a wrathful and alienated universe, when, in other words, it restores the group or the individual to its lost status, it is religion and nothing else.¹

IV

A fourth view, and in many respects widely differing from the above three, is the theory of religion and magic expounded in his article on "Primitive Religion," by Mr. J. R. Swanton in the "American Anthropologist," 1924. "The writer's experience with primitive religion," says Swanton, "would indicate that it cannot be attached to a few objects, phenomena or emotions. Death, dreams, a thunderstorm, an eclipse, the sun, the grizzly bear may excite peculiar religious interest, specialised as it were out of a general religious attitude, but it cannot, therefore, be concluded that any one, or a few, of them were points of departure for the religious attitude as a whole...The religious attitude itself is evidently one of those primary human factors which cannot be tied down to an origin as specific as even the common experience of death and dreams." The attempt

¹ The question has been raised whether a state of pure consciousness such as the Śaṅkarites postulate can be called an experience of reconciliation. The objection has been anticipated and answered by the "Veāntaparibhāṣā." We are told that in this case the reconciliation is only reaffirmation through the cancellation of an illusory alienation. We have an analogous case in the correction of an illusion. The rejection of the snake is negation of what itself is not, and the affirmation of the rope is only rediscovery or reaffirmation of what always is. So is it with the realisation of pure consciousness. Another objection that has been raised is that reconciliation entails a difference of value, i.e., a lower uniting itself to a higher. The answer is, this is not at all necessary. We may have reconciliation of equals as well. Nor is the value concept essential to the idea of reconciliation. In monistic systems, separation can never be real or existential. Hence reconciliation is self-affirmation through negation of an illusory alienation. The alienated self is simply unreal and cannot be described as a positive *lower* self. But in theistic systems like Christianity, the alienation can be a real separation or fall, and reconciliation will be restoration or reinstatement through the overcoming of the real separation.

to do so, according to Swanton, is an example of the particularistic error. The same error vitiates the attempts of anthropologists to derive the religious forms or types in a fixed order of succession from a supposed original fundamental form or type. "It has been a favourite occupation of theorists," says Swanton, "to arrange" the different types "in a time sequence, under the assumption that they were introduced into the religious complex successively." As a result of this we have Tylor's Animism, Spencer's Ancestor-Worship Theory, Franzer's Magic Theory, Andrew Lang's All Father Theory, Durkheim's Social Ceremony Theory, etc., "each of which may be supported by evidence from some tribes—and confuted by evidence from others." With a theory to establish, one can easily select such of the tribes as most primitive as corroborate and support one's case, and then it is easy matter to find only survivals of it in other parts of the world. But the real fact is that we nowhere find *only* animism, or *only* ancestor-worship, or *only* magic, or *only* ceremonies. Rather we find everywhere traces of all these with greater emphasis on some and a lesser emphasis on others. Hence "instead of viewing the religious complex as constructed of parts successively introduced, we might rather consider them as simultaneous manifestations of the religious sentiment, showing greater differentiation here and more specialisation there, but properly a unit." Selecting a few only of the objective beliefs out of the numberless concepts and emotional attitudes entering into religion we may imagine, according to Swanton, a religious complex like the following :—

1. Belief in magic (mana, orenda, etc.).
2. Belief in anthropomorphic beings who never lived as men (gods, nature-spirits, etc.).
3. Belief in a hierarchy of these beings according to the gradation of their powers culminating in the conception of a supreme deity (germinal monotheism).
4. Belief in beings of human origin with supernatural powers (demi-gods, saints).

5. Belief in disincarnate souls of the dead (ancestor-worship).
6. Belief in embodied souls specially gifted with reference to things supernatural (priests, prophets, shamans).
7. Belief in souls embodied in human beings generally.

In so far as one or other of these is specially stressed and the rest are overlooked, we get manaism, polytheism, animism, monotheism, saint-worship, ancestor-worship, sacerdotalism, etc. But closer examination will always reveal traces of the other elements in every case. This is true both of primitive and advanced religions. In monotheistic Christianity, *e.g.*, we have the polytheism of the trinity besides the angels as the mediators between God and men. Moreover, Christianity does not ban homage to the saints and it positively prescribes belief in dead souls. If it does not expressly sanction magic, it recognises a special sanctity as attaching to the material remains of devout and holy people. In the same way Islamism in spite of its uncompromising monotheism allows beliefs in spirits or jinns, a profound reverence for Mahomet and the saints, and the use of magic. In China, again, a relatively lofty worship of Heaven exists side by side with spiritism and ancestor-worship. Hindu religions likewise are a blend of worship and magic, of belief in a supreme deity and beliefs in lesser deities. Lastly, the primitive cults also show the idea of a supreme deity as a sky-god or sun-god along with belief in numerous animistic beings, in shamans, in magic, etc.

Swanton concludes with a protest against the indefinite use of the term 'animism,' Marett's term 'animatism' being, in his opinion, in no way an improvement. According to him, the objects which evoke religious emotion in primitive man "always contain a human element." Therefore the terms 'animism,' 'animatism,' etc., are not sufficiently specific. For the same reason the magical object is also not strictly a religious object. The true religious object is a being of human mentality, but the

magical object is worked like a machine and is not endowed with human mentality. There is no doubt that primitive savages worship animals and plants and not merely human beings, but even when animals and plants are worshipped they are worshipped only as incarnations of human minds in plant or animal forms. Thus the principle holds good that nothing can be a religious object which is not endowed with human mentality. Swanton closes his article with the observation that "aside from pure magic, the religious attitude towards natural phenomenon consists in the ascription of a human element to them."

As regards Swanton's views we must admit that they are an advance on the other three we have considered, being more comprehensive and more in keeping with the actual facts of religion and magic. But we must also say that these intrinsic merits of his position are to a great extent diminished by internal contradictions and other deficiencies of a grave character. Swanton, *e.g.*, contradicts himself in so far as he recognises magic as an element of the religious complex while denying to it all religious significance as he does in his closing remarks. On page 361 he tells us that "primitive religion includes numerous factors such as magic, supernatural beings,...a world occupied by the souls of the dead," etc., but on page 365 he tells us that "aside from pure magic, the religious attitude towards natural phenomena consists in the ascription of a human element to them." As a matter of fact, "Belief in magic (mana, orenda, etc.)" occupies the first place amongst the elements he enumerates as constituting the religious complex (p. 362), and yet he categorically excludes all magical objects from religion as lacking in human mentality (p. 364). Thus he makes religion both inclusive and exclusive of the magical art.

Besides, Swanton's insistence on the presence of human mentality in the religious object is a gratuitous assumption not called for by the actual facts. There is nothing to prove that the object of religion must necessarily be a being endowed with human mentality in every case. The religion of the Brāhmaṇas

is a religion of sacrificial acts and there is hardly any ground for the assumption that the sacrifices have reference to a personal being, not to speak of beings of human mentality. The impersonalism of the Sāṅkarite religion is also a religion of pure consciousness without reference to any higher personality with a human mentality. The same holds good of Buddhism and Jainism which deprecate all appeals to higher persons and gods. Lastly, many mystics, ancient and modern, will repudiate every interpretation of their superconscious experiences as communion with a higher person or persons.¹

What is true in Swanton's view is that religion is not restricted to any single form or type of manifestation. Swanton's mistake however arises from the confusion that the religious experience must presuppose some sort of *complex* or intermixture of different elements. The real fact is, all religious experience is one of peace and restored harmony—harmony recovered after a state of temporary alienation and isolation. This experience may be achieved in various ways and through a wide variety of means. Whatever achieves it, whatever realises the end of harmony or unity with the ultimate reality is religion and nothing short of religion. This does not mean that there must be in every case a religious complex of the different ways and methods of realising religious experience as Swanton would appear to suggest. It is quite possible that an undifferentiated confused blend of different elements might have preceded the differentiation in *some* cases. But it is not at all necessary that this should be so in every case. The really important factor in religion is the religious end, *i.e.*, the experience of reconciliation or restoration, and the different ways of realising this end might have defined themselves with the progress of human intelligence and experience. What therefore would be an effective way or method at one stage might prove ineffective and crude at a higher and

¹ According to the author of the article on Mysticism (Buddhist) in the "Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics," mysticism may be personal (as in Christian, Muhammadan and Bhāgavat mysticism) or impersonal (as in Neo-Platonism and Vedānta).

more advanced stage. If magic should achieve the religious purpose at a certain level of civilization, it does not follow that it should be considered sufficient or effective at higher levels. Thus instead of supposing an original blend or confusion of the different ways, we must rather assume the gradual emergence of new and unexplored ways, the opening up of paths and bye-paths along with the progress of human knowledge and experience. Hence we see no inherent opposition between religion and magic as most anthropologists do. We hold, on the contrary, that magic not only may be religion in some cases, but may also be the only form in which religion manifests itself in certain levels of the human intelligence. All that we deny is that magic can suffice for the religious purpose at all stages and levels of evolution and progress. As a matter of fact, we not only find magical religion superseded in course of time by other forms conformably to the growth of the human intelligence, we also observe the same process of supersession and displacement in every form and variety of religion, Christianity not exempted. Looking back to the past, *e.g.*, we find that just as ghost-and-ancestor-worship has gradually usurped the functions of the still earlier religions of magical coercion or compulsion, and just as the ancestors themselves have given way in course of time to heroes, demi-gods and even nature-spirits, so has an emergent polytheism been itself submerged in the higher Tritheism of Christianity and the stricter monotheism of Islam. Nor has transcendent theism been the last and final phase. We have not merely mystical religions at the present day but also naturalistic religions of pure science without the theistic belief in a transcendent Deity—faith in the universe itself as the immanent deity beyond which there is nothing but pure nothingness. These are some of the modern substitutes of Christianity, and it is nothing short of a wilful disregard of the facts to say that they are not considered to be effective for man's religious needs conformably to the present state of his knowledge. A necessary corollary of our view, therefore, is that neither magic, nor animism, nor

theism, represent the last or final phase, that any one or more of these might be the only religion for particular levels of human culture, but that no one, not even the so-called highest religion represents the goal or the highest phase any more than the actual present achievements of science represent the last and the final phase of advancing scientific knowledge. What is permanent and enduring in religion through all the different stages of evolution is the experience of recovered unity or harmony, but the concrete form which this experience takes in different times and circumstances varies with varying human capacity and the state of actual human knowledge.¹ It follows also from our view that there are no true and false religions in an absolute sense, that every religion is true relatively to its proper time and circumstances and that a true religion becomes false when called upon to fulfil the religious need at a level to which it is intrinsically unsuited. In this sense we may speak both of a magical religion and a magical superstition—of the former in so far as it serves the religious need at a comparatively low level of culture, and of the latter in so far as it survives at higher and more advanced cultural planes. But this is true not merely of magic but also of higher and more developed forms of religious experience. No religion in fact, not even the naturalistic religion of the modern scientist, such as is professed by Julian Huxley, the biologist, can be the highest and the final phase. As a matter of fact even scientists themselves are now coming to recognise the inadequacy of the so-called religion of pure science. Eddington, Arthur Thomson and many other modern scientists frankly confess to the fragmentary and symbolic character of the scientific world as

¹ It has been urged against the above view that it does not apply to nihilistic Buddhism and its conception of *nirvāṇa* or annihilation as the essence of religious experience. But *nirvāṇa* as a religious concept means the negation of empirical being. Empirical being is restless becoming and therefore unceasing conflict and pain. Negation of this conflict is peace, i.e., quiescence, and so answers to the religious concept of harmony. As Śākyamuni declines to make any further positive statement, it is impossible to say whether the negation involves also any positive realisation. Later interpretations however conceive it as a positive happy state, i.e., as one of unity with reality.

necessarily pointing to a reality beyond science. Religion, according to them, is not science and scientific symbolism but a mystical over-science that reaches beyond all symbolism.¹

Before we bring this somewhat long survey to a close it is essential that we define our views as regards the concept of *mana* and its relation to magic and religion. We must say at the outset that we find ourselves unable to accept Dr. Marett's view of *mana* as he explains it in the chapter on "Spell to Prayer" in his monumental work, "The Threshold of Religion." It would appear from Dr. Marett's analysis of the question that "developed magic" always involves an element of projectiveness as distinguished from "rudimentary magic" which is not projective strictly speaking. Developed magic, in other words, involves not merely the conscious sundering of the symbol from reality but also a make-believe or a projective will-to-believe that the symbol is the reality it symbolises. The magician's projective will, in short, builds a bridge from symbol to reality. That faith here is sustained inspite of obvious conflict with experience is explained by the fact that it brings relief by providing an outlet for surcharged emotion. The projective belief, in other words, is cathartic as compared with unbelief which brings no relief, and this is the secret of its self-maintenance inspite of the delusiveness and unreality attaching to it. But there is, Dr. Marett adds, more than a subjective 'faking' in some cases, especially in magic practised by one person on another. The symbol here acts suggestively on the victim and so effects the reality which it symbolises. The wish-fulfilment, in other words, passes over into a real fulfilment and so gathers support through objective confirmation. "Developed magic" is therefore "a more or less clearly recognised pretend-

¹ The constituents of experience according to Eddington, are :—(a) *Mental images*. These are in our minds, and not in the external world. (b) *The counter-part of our sense-experience*. It is in the external world and is inscrutable. (c) *Pointer-readings* which science connects with other pointer-readings. (a) is constructed out of (b), and (c) is abstracted from (b). (b) is given in mystical religious experience. Thus science completes itself in religion.

ing which at the same time is believed to project itself into an ulterior effect," and Dr. Marett adds, "magic practised by man on man...may very well have been the earliest form of developed magic." Further, Dr. Marett rejects Frazer's view that "magic is the savage equivalent of our natural science." If magic should be called science at all, it should be called 'occult,' and not natural science. For the imperative 'must' of magic, Dr. Marett contends, connotes something altogether different from natural necessity: it signifies the authority of a projective act of will as distinguished from the necessity of causally-linked facts, the force, in other words, of a "spiritual projectile" that acts non-naturally as distinguished from the natural power of a physical cause. Moreover, since the consciousness of this supernatural power comes through the exercise of a projective will, it is only natural for the savage to construe it on the analogy of his own suggestive will as a sort of will-force or psychic energy that acts non-naturally. Thus the savage comes to regard magical power or *mana* as the equivalent of his own will-power, i.e., as the psychic force of an authoritative suggestion. This becomes evident when we consider the fact that developed magic usually takes the form of spells and incantations. Words have influence only on conscious personal beings and if spells and incantations are the usual forms of developed magic, the energy which they are supposed to release must be the force of an authoritative suggestive will believed to act coercively on another. The power which effects the magical end is thus a reflex of the magician's own projective will, the psychic force of an authoritative suggestion that paralyses and completely subjugates the victim's will. It is through spell as active will dominating and compelling a passive will that magic, through a gradation of stages, passes over into prayer.

Now while the brilliant suggestiveness of the above analysis is certainly beyond question, the same, we contend, cannot be said of the veridical quality of the psychological construction which has been based on it. It may no doubt be true that in

the majority of cases magic takes the form of spells and incantations and it is also possible that in some cases where magic takes the form of spells and incantations there is some idea of an active will suggestively coercing a passive will. It is far from being the case however that this is invariably so in cases where spells and incantations are used. 'The mere use of the imperative 'must,' we contend, no more proves a dual personal relation than the use of it by a medical man with reference to his curative drugs proves that he takes them for conscious beings under an obligation to carry out his orders. The oral 'must,' we hold, does not necessarily imply any responsive will acting obediently to a suggestive will that controls and regulates it. The use of the imperative 'must' in many cases means nothing else than that the right instrument has been selected and that having regard to the rightness of the selection or choice the happening of a certain result is inevitable under the circumstances. It is not at all necessary that the selected instrument should also be conceived as a personal will-force like the agent who makes the selection any more than it is necessary for the physician to assume that his selected drugs must also possess a responsive will-to-cure conformably to his own insistent wish for the recovery of his patient. The 'must' of a spell thus may mean nothing more than that the right thing has been done and that therefore a certain result is bound to follow. It does not as a rule imply that the selected means is a psychic will-force or conscious energy that effects or realises the result like a human being consciously realising a purpose. It is no doubt possible that spell in some cases may also take the form of a dual personal relation between a will that controls and a will that is controlled or coerced, but it need not be so in every case as Dr. Marett would have us believe. Sure, Dr. Marett qualifies his statements later on by the tentative suggestion that magic need not always take the form of an active will dictating to a passive will, but the suggestion comes rather late after a complete theory of prayer developing from pure

magic through its primary form of spell as practised by man on man. As a matter of fact, Dr. Marett's mistake arises from his confusion of two different ways of tackling supernatural agencies both of which are common amongst primitive savages. He fails, in short, to distinguish between the magical manipulation of an impersonal supernatural energy and the invocation of spirits and spiritistic agencies where the appeal is to conscious will-force or psychic energy. The latter alone involves a dual personal relation while the former which is magic proper as distinguished from spiritism or occultism involves no such dual relation. The failure to distinguish between these two radically distinct attitudes towards the supernatural is, we hold, responsible for the conception of *mana* or magical power as a psychic energy or conscious will-force. As there is nothing in the *mana*-idea to necessitate the conception of a dual personal relation except in the special case where ends are sought to be realised through spiritistic agencies we see no reason for subscribing to the personalistic view of it as a conscious will-force responsively correlated to the force of the magician's will. As we have said, *mana* is not necessarily a conscious energy, not even when supernatural power is resorted to for coercing spiritistic agencies and ensuing their obedience to the magician's desires. When the spirits are approached by methods other than those of compulsion or dictation, we have no doubt something analogous to prayer. But when the spirits are sought to be coerced or forced, we may suppose either the direct action of an active will influencing a passive will, or a coercion of the latter through the intermediation of a released impersonal energy of the non-natural sort. That the released supernatural energy should be conceived as a sort of conscious will-force in every case is a gratuitous assumption which Dr. Marett's examples do not bear out. *Mana* or magical power, we contend, may very well be an impersonal energy without prejudice to its function of a supernatural agency, though in special cases it may also take the form of "a spiritual projectile" or released

will-force. The only essential element in the *mana*-concept is that of an energy that acts non-naturally and effects result in a mysterious way contrary to the methods of natural causes. It is not at all necessary that this energy should also be conceived analogically to our will-power as a sort of supernatural psychic energy or force. It has no doubt been argued that the conception of an impersonal unconscious force acting supernaturally is beyond the capacity of the primitive savage and that if the savage mind should be conceived on the analogy of that of the civilized child, it should be credited with an original bias towards personification rather than with any idea of an unconscious force controlling things. Our reply to such arguments is that since even animals hardly fail to evince a sense of the difference between the inanimate and the living, it is far from improper to assume a somewhat clearer perception of the difference in the case of human beings at the pre-civilization stage. Nor should we forget that personification involves some idea of a person and therefore by implication involves also the correlative idea of the impersonal or unconscious. Therefore, the personifying capacity in the savage no less than in the civilized child necessarily involves a correlative depersonifying, dehumanising capacity entailing the ideas of the unconscious and the impersonal. It may be said, however, that the primitive mind answers more nearly to the infantile consciousness of civilized peoples than to the comparatively advanced and differentiated experience of a child that has outgrown the infantile stage. Even, then, we contend, there is no ground for supposing a *mana* as the savage equivalent of an authoritative will-force that acts non-naturally. If the savage mind is to be regarded as the prototype of our undifferentiated infantile consciousness, it must be as little capable of a clear idea of personal will-force as of an unconscious, impersonal energy. Analogically, therefore, to the undistinguished ideas of our infantile consciousness the savage idea of *mana* will be nothing else than that of an undifferentiated cosmic energy which is below all distinctions of the personal

and the impersonal. This, we hold, is nearer the truth and more nearly answers to the real situation than the conception of *mana* as conscious will-force or as unconscious physical energy. *Mana*, in short, stands, in our view, for that undifferentiated cosmic energy which is the primary source of all ideas of force as physical, psychic or moral. The authority of a moral imperative no less than the force of will-suggestion and the compulsion or causal efficiency of mechanical energy are differentiations of the primitive idea of *mana* or magical power as an efficient neutral energy that may be controlled through appropriate means.¹

¹ The Mīmāṃsaka views of *Apūrva* as the connecting link between present sacrifices and their future results reflect the same process of development and differentiation. *Apūrva* literally means without a *pūrva* or antecedent in experience. Hence it is a non-natural or supernatural power or agency which operates towards the bringing about of the sacrificial result. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas conceive it as a supernatural energy released by the sacrifice. The Prābhākaras give a different interpretation. *Apūrva*, according to Prābhākaras, is the inherent authority of a sacrifice as morally obligatory. As the authority is independent of its actual accomplishment in experience, it is *apūrva*, i.e., without its precedent in experience. Thus within the Mīmāṃsakas themselves we have a transition from the *magical* view of *Apūrva* as supernatural energy to the *moral* view of it as the intrinsic validity or authority of a sacrificial imperative.

THE SELF AND THE IDEAL

By

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CHAPTER I

Metaphysics and Ethics.

Philosophy aims at the knowledge of reality that can be attained by rational thinking. The data for such thinking are supplied by the facts of experience. This implies that the reality, which philosophy seeks to know, must be intimately related with the facts of experience. If it were not so related, there would be no rational way of arriving at a valid knowledge of it.

Philosophy cannot by any device make us acquainted with a supersensible reality which suffers no connection with the data of everyday experience. Whenever it claims to bring to us the vision of such a transcendent reality and make us see the light which is nowhere seen on sea or land, we have reason to suspect that it is making this claim on the strength of an illegitimate alliance with mysticism. Mysticism may have its own use and is, perhaps, the only thing needful and sufficient for certain temperaments. But the intellectual need of our spirit which it has always been the avowed object of philosophy to supply cannot be satisfied by the deliverance of mysticism.

True philosophy, therefore, no less than science, is empirical in its spirit and temper. Experience in its demand to be systematised calls into being all our intellectual activity and it is experience again which to us is the only possible

field where the results of such activity can be verified and validated.

If metaphysics is led to the conception of a non-empirical principle, it finds its justification in the necessities of the explanation which the facts of experience demand. The metaphysician cannot establish the reality of such a principle by dogmatic assertions based on personal intuition or scriptural revelation. He can maintain its claim to reality only by showing that the facts of experience require for their explanation the existence of such a principle. Philosophy, therefore, though necessarily empirical in its beginning, does not need to be so in its results also. The ultimate view of reality which it comes to form and maintain need not be that of an object which can be given among other given objects in any form of experience.

Now, experience for us does not consist simply in the perceptual knowledge of the physical world with its sensible qualities. Our moral experience is as surely part of our experience as our experience of the physical world. The facts of the moral world come to us with as much force and authority as the facts of the physical world. It is incumbent on philosophy therefore that it should take account of these facts and find a satisfactory explanation for them. A philosophy, which will satisfy the demands of reason, must, besides fulfilling other conditions of sound thinking, find room for the facts of the moral life in its scheme of reality. If it does not take note of them or leaves them unexplained, it will betray its inadequacy as soon as we are brought face to face with any of these facts.

Philosophy therefore should work in friendly alliance with ethics as well as with other sciences. Just as it is aided in its metaphysical construction by the facts established by the positive sciences, so should the facts and principles of morality established by ethics be of help to it. A study of ethics should in all circumstances help us to secure a good ground

on which we can build our metaphysical theories. In any event a metaphysical theory, which agrees with the conclusions of ethics and so satisfactorily explains the facts of the moral life, receives thereby a further measure of empirical verification and is thus more likely to be true than the one which simply ignores, or is at variance with, the verdict of moral consciousness.

Metaphysics depends in this way upon ethics but ethics also depends upon metaphysics for the justification of its ultimate principles. The facts of the moral life, of course, are there and cannot be denied. Metaphysics can do nothing to alter them. But moral consciousness itself will lose much of its authority if metaphysical considerations do not support it. If it is shown that our moral consciousness has nothing for its object which can be supposed to have a place in the scheme of reality, we shall be led to think that in paying homage to our moral ideal, we are simply worshipping a phantom of our imagination. And from the moment we are led to this belief, constituted as we are, the dictates of moral consciousness will cease to have, over us, any rational authority. This will mean the complete overthrow of ethics as a valid science and of morality as a rational course of conduct. A sound ethical theory should, therefore, have at its back the support of a sound system of metaphysics which will be able to defend it against the attacks of all destructive criticism.

It may be objected that we are involving ourselves in a sort of circle when we say that ethics should be the basis of metaphysics and at the same time assert that metaphysics should be the basis of ethics. There is of course a relation of mutual dependence between ethics and metaphysics but this relation is not such as to involve the fallacy in question. If metaphysics were supposed to depend on ethics for the very same thing for which ethics is supposed to depend on metaphysics, the supposition then no doubt would have been

fallacious. But what we have upheld does not involve this supposition. We have maintained that ethics as a detailed study of an important aspect of experience supplies the philosopher with materials out of which he constructs his metaphysical theories; whereas an ethical theorist does not look to metaphysics for a supply of his materials, but for the speculative justification of the principles which he believes he has established on the basis of materials derived directly from experience. The services which ethics and metaphysics render to each other are not of the same sort and are never illegitimate in any sense. They only vindicate the unity and systematic character of all valid knowledge.

While what we have said above does not in any way seem to us to be either extraordinary or objectionable, some recent writers have denied that metaphysics can have anything to do with ethics. Mr. Bertrand Russell, for instance, believes that "the ethical and religious motives in spite of the splendidly imaginative systems to which they have given rise have been on the whole a hindrance to the progress of philosophy, and ought now to be consciously thrust aside by those who wish to discover philosophical truth" (*Mysticism and Logic*, p. 98). In his opinion the ethical element which has been prominent in many of the famous systems of philosophy is one of the most serious obstacles to the victory of scientific method in the investigation of philosophical questions. In his desire to see the methods of science successfully applied to the field of philosophy, Mr. Russell exhorts us to make our minds ethically neutral. "The view of the world taken by the philosophy derived from ethical notions is never impartial and therefore never fully scientific" (*ibid*, p. 109). Therefore if philosophy is to be scientific it should pay no heed to moral considerations.

The methods of science, so far as possible, may very well be utilised in the field of philosophical investigation. We may readily recognise the sovereignty of facts and the objecti-

vity of truth. But the scientific method itself, of which the keynote is the impartial consideration of all relevant facts, requires us to take due note of the facts of the moral life. When these facts are not denied, philosophy, however, rigidly scientific in its method, cannot afford to ignore them.

To say that metaphysics should be based on ethics is not to say that metaphysics should grant any legislative force to our own wishes in matters of truth. It is merely to say that philosophy, which works on the basis of experience, should not ignore the fact of moral consciousness.

Moral consciousness is there and it cannot be left as an irrational surd. It has to be dealt with and explained. Moral ideas are there and they will always force themselves upon the attention of all sincere thinkers. Metaphysics may justify these ideas as giving us a clue to the nature of ultimate reality or may condemn them as wholly illusory. But to shut its eyes against them without an examination is a piece of irrationality which philosophy, unless it forgets itself, will be loath to earn to its credit.

Mr. Russell says that the scientific philosophy "aims only at understanding the world and.....cannot take account of ethical notions without being turned aside from that submission to facts which is the essence of the scientific temper" (*ibid.*, p. 109). But what are we to understand by the word 'world' here? The world we know is not the world of physical forces merely but it includes the elements of life and consciousness as well. We cannot, therefore, be said to understand the world in the true sense if the elements of life and consciousness are omitted from it. But when we come to take account of the fact of consciousness we cannot ignore that aspect of it which we call moral. We are to submit to facts but why should not the impartial student of philosophy view the facts of the moral life with the same loyal submission with which he is advised to regard all other facts?

Moreover, can we really succeed in denuding the world of all ethical attributes? The world which in relation to the human spirit is to be neither good nor evil nor a mixture of both has yet to be found, and is not certainly the one with which we are acquainted. Mere operation of physical forces may not be considered either good or bad. But a situation in which a play of human wills is concerned and the happiness and misery of human beings are involved cannot be regarded with moral indifference. It is not possible to regard the cruel oppression of the weak by the strong, the wilful suppression of truth and the propagation of lies by designing persons, and similar other facts, as neither good nor evil. We know that such facts are part of the world in which we live, and they cannot be ignored by a serious thinker who is bent on giving a rational account of the world in all its dominant aspects. If these facts cannot be properly characterised without the application of moral attributes, then the world, of which they form part, cannot also be made entirely free from moral characteristics. It seems evident, therefore, that a philosopher cannot truly understand the nature of the world if he takes no account of ethical notions.

The philosopher either understands what is meant by good or ought, or he does not. If he does not, and thus pretends to have no moral consciousness at all, his talk about ethical notions will be quite meaningless inasmuch as he has no proper understanding of them. He cannot therefore warn himself or others against the infection of such notions. If, however, he understands the meanings of these terms, we can only suppose that he has learnt them from his own experience. If his understanding is real he must be able to point out some specific facts of his experience to which these terms can be significantly applied. This means that he has what is known as moral consciousness. And even if we suppose that he once had it but does not have it now, still moral consciousness as an historical fact has to be taken note of and accounted for.

This is of course a highly hypothetical case. As a matter of fact we find that moral consciousness as a rule is present in all persons. And we do not think that there can be a form of consciousness which, not being wholly illusory, signifies nothing in reality. Prof. A. E. Taylor admits that "for constructive metaphysics ethics is of the highest importance" (*The Problem of Conduct*, p. 48). But he appears to deny that ethics can be or should be based on metaphysics. He denies that ethics alone is concerned with what ought to be as distinguished from what is, the subject-matter of the natural sciences.

It is generally thought that ethics, unlike the natural sciences, does not deal with what is but with what ought to be. It is a normative science, 'a science not of facts but of ideals.' "And you cannot learn what ought to be by observation and experiment upon the empirical course of events in a morally defective world like our own, where what ought to be is most commonly just what does not exist." The ideal or what ought to be, presupposed in ethics, can neither be proved nor disproved by a study of empirical facts. It is only by a metaphysical analysis that we can establish the reality of such an ideal and thus validate all moral judgments.

Against this view Prof. Taylor holds that it is not the peculiar distinction of ethics that it deals with what ought to be. He says that in a sense "all science, in so far as it is real science, is concerned with what ought to be." (*ibid*, p. 53). Logic deals with the ways in which we ought to reason. The science of aesthetics has much to say as to the way in which certain perceived contents ought to affect the emotional side of our nature. So again the medical man may say, "There ought to be altered light reflexes along with the symptoms of this patient, but hitherto I have failed to find them." And just as what ought to be is determined in science by a close study of what is, so should it be in ethics. By studying the

actual moral life of different people we should determine the moral ideal or what ought to be.

This view of Prof. Taylor seems to us to be fundamentally wrong. In the first place it seems that the meaning of 'ought' even in such normative sciences as logic and aesthetics is not the same as what we understand by it in ethics. Whoever has any real feeling of oughtness, understood in the ethical sense, experiences a sense of loyalty to an ideal from which he cannot swerve without feeling himself degraded in his own estimation. If a person fails to do what he knows he ought to have done, he feels himself condemned in his own mind. But this we do not find in the case of aesthetic insensibility or logical error. If the presented perceptual contents do not affect us emotionally in a way they ought to, we do not feel ourselves condemned. However glaring our logical blunders may be, they will never occasion the same feeling of compunction which always follows upon the conscious commission of an act of moral delinquency.

The ethical ought is obligatory on all men. There is no such obligation involved in the logical or aesthetic ought. We feel in ourselves a call to become moral, in a sense in which no one ever feels that he ought to be a perfect reasoner or an appreciator of beautiful objects.

Even if it is granted that the meaning of 'ought' is the same in all normative sciences, it seems utterly unreasonable to suppose that the term 'ought' bears the same meaning in the natural sciences also. When a scientist says that a particular phenomenon ought to be different from what it is, all that he can possibly mean is that the phenomenon in question is in conflict with some general principle which he may have previously formulated. If the observation of the present fact is correct, then, for aught we know, the generalisation itself stands condemned and requires to be modified. The general principles of science in the light of which some particular phenomena are declared to be different from what

they ought to be, are tentative and hypothetical and so lack the absoluteness of a moral ideal.

When we have seen that the natural sciences do not deal with what ought to be, we can easily understand how the other contention of Prof. Taylor that we can derive our knowledge of what ought to be from a study of positive facts, falls at once to the ground. By an observation of such facts we may be able to formulate some empirical law which will simply tell us what the facts are but never what they ought to be. A study of the moral life of different people may contribute to our moral culture in a way. It may provide us with inspiring examples or make us acquainted with facts that will excite our moral indignation. But this is possible only when we have got an ideal already in our mind. Approval or disapproval of an act always implies a standard of judgment which cannot be derived from the act judged. We think therefore that for ethics as the science of the ideal or the good, an examination of the actual moral life of different people is not of any very real importance, though it may be highly useful to the student of some other social sciences.

Prof. Taylor admits that ethics is very important for metaphysics and that there is plenty of good and useful work to be done by "Metaphysics of Ethics." But he objects to inverting 'the real order of dependence between the two branches of enquiry' and making the "Metaphysics of Ethics" the beginning instead of the end of an examination of morals. It appears that, in his opinion, we can pass from ethics to metaphysics, but not from metaphysics to ethics; ethics is useful for metaphysics, but metaphysics is not so for ethics.

We feel, however, that if it is admitted that we can pass from ethics to metaphysics, then it must also be admitted that we can pass from metaphysics to ethics. In the case of real knowledge we can pass either way from one member of a relation of dependence to another. The relation of cause and effect is a case in point. The effect depends upon the cause

but our knowledge of the effect certainly helps us to determine the nature of the cause. So if we can pass from ethics to metaphysics, we should be allowed to perform the backward journey from metaphysics to ethics. If our moral experiences are of use in constructing sound metaphysical theories, these theories in their turn should help us to understand and interpret those experiences. Metaphysics must pay back in its own way the value of what it receives from ethics to the enrichment of the latter science.

If ethics and metaphysics stand for systems of knowledge, they must have their proper places in the larger system of human knowledge and there is no reason why a speculative thinker, in his free movement in the sphere of knowledge, should not pass from one province of knowledge to another and note their inter-relation.

Ethics is not a descriptive science and it need not be content with a description of the moral life of different people in the world. As Kant pointed out long ago, there is a rational part of it. It must consider such questions as the validity of moral judgments, the nature of the moral ideal and others of a like nature. If it is to deal adequately with these questions, it will find itself faced with many metaphysical issues; and they can be settled satisfactorily only when ethics has availed itself of the services of a sound system of metaphysics.

Prof. G. E. Moore also is of opinion that the supposition involved in metaphysical ethics that ethics can be based on metaphysics must be fallacious (*Principia Ethica*, p. 115). In his opinion metaphysics can have no logical bearing whatever upon the answer to the fundamental ethical question 'what is good in itself?' That this is so follows at once from the fact that 'good' denotes an ultimate unanalysable predicate (*ibid*, p. 140). The most important source of the supposition that metaphysics is relevant to ethics, according to Prof. Moore, is the assumption that good must denote some real property of things. This assumption he further traces to the

erroneous "logical doctrine that all propositions assert a relation between existents."

What Prof. Moore has succeeded in proving seems to be that goodness as such cannot be expressed in terms of some other category. The notion of goodness like the notions of truth and beauty is an elementary one and cannot, therefore, be analysed into concepts more elementary than itself. But what we are concerned with in ethics is not simply the abstract notion of goodness which, being admitted to be ultimate and unanalysable, must be supposed to be either a thing of common possession and therefore requiring no further elucidation, or, else, something which cannot be taught at all. We want to know what is good and that which is in fact good cannot wholly be composed of goodness only, not only because we can never find anything which is nothing but goodness, but also because if it consisted of goodness only, it would be impossible to make it the subject of a significant judgment. A judgment always makes some discrimination of elements and it cannot operate when it is left with goodness only. Theoretical ethics studies the nature of good in general and seeks to determine what conditions a thing must satisfy in order that the predicate 'good' may be applied to it. It is not concerned with the concrete particular nor with the abstract universal, but with what may be called the concrete ideal which forms the rational standard of all moral judgments. Ethics does not give us a list of particular good things; no science ever deals with particulars in this way. And the universal in this case, being an ultimate, unanalysable concept, cannot and does not need to be further determined by a science. Ethics may help us to understand the general nature of the ideal standard of goodness. The science of ethics is possible because there is such a standard. We would not otherwise be able to make any rational judgment of moral values, but would have to depend in our consideration of ethical questions upon vague impressions, or at best upon so-called intuitions, which by

themselves will never yield a systematic body of certified knowledge. All our ethical judgments are judgments of value and all valuations imply some standard by means of which things are valued. A thing is called good not only because it appears to be intuited as good, but also, and specially, because it satisfies our ideal of goodness. The apparent intuition in many cases need not be denied, but we should not forget that many things appear to be intuitive even when we arrive at them as the result of much rapid and unconscious thinking. Our intuitive appreciation of the goodness of an act gives us only the subjective assurance of some objective conditions which the act satisfies and is therefore called good.

We shall not here consider the question whether or not there is anything outside the realm of existence. All propositions may or may not assert the existence of some thing or other. But can we assert goodness or badness unless in connexion with existing things? Would anything be either good or bad unless it existed? "The mere concept unless realised in fact is neither good nor evil : it is only as so realised, or on the assumption of its realisation, that it is called either" (Sorley—*Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 77). Even if we somehow believe that 'good' is something which only subsists, we have still to explain how it happens to be predicated of existing things. We cannot say that the predicate belongs to one world and the subject to another. In that case their union would not be possible and the judgment would palpably be false. When we say 'This is good,' if our judgment is correct, 'good' becomes one with 'This.' So even though one may suppose that 'good' lives in the world of ideas, one cannot ignore the fact that for a time at least it takes its place in the world of existence. We cannot therefore believe that 'good' as such needs to fall wholly outside the world of existence.

We have yet to consider a very important objection against our contention that ethics should have a basis in

metaphysics. It may be said that metaphysics as an enquiry into the nature of reality is after all a science of what is. It is like the natural sciences concerned with facts. Ethics on the other hand is admittedly a science of what ought to be. How can a science of facts be of any help to the science of ideals? When we have seen that we cannot pass from what is to what ought to be, how can we maintain that metaphysics can supply ethics with any rational basis?

Metaphysics no doubt studies fact; but among the facts it studies there is the fact of moral consciousness. Our ideals form part of this fact, and in studying this fact, metaphysics is obliged to study the nature of our ideals.

Moreover the ideal in some sense is; and if metaphysics is the science of what is, it cannot ignore the ideal which also is. The existence of the ideal is never hypothetical; it is very positive and is felt to be so whenever we are moved by it to any serious activity. It is effective in bringing about changes which cannot fail to be recognised even by the positive sciences. When many of our actions, *i.e.*, facts, are determined by our ideal, it would be a mystery if the ideal were not at all connected with the world of facts.

The opposition between what is and what ought to be is not absolute. At many points they meet and mingle and become one. Do we not find in many works of art that the touch of the master's hand has been as it ought to be? Do not the lives of saints give us instances where the heroes of unflinching charity conducted themselves in a way that was perfect? This only shows that the ideal may also be real. There is no reason, therefore, why the ideal, because it is ideal, should not also be somewhere real. The vision of the ideal that comes to us in moments of spiritual exaltation may, after all, be the reflection of Supreme Perfection which is eternally real. What is not yet from the point of view of our present experience may be found, when viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*,

to be eternally present. Our ethical ideal may as well be metaphysically real.

Our present purpose is not to build up a system of ethics on some metaphysical basis. And so we shall not be concerned very much even if the question, whether metaphysics can be of any use to ethics, is not decided conclusively in our favour. What we propose to do in this book is to bring out the metaphysical implications of moral consciousness. Starting with the fact of moral experience we wish to ascertain speculatively the scheme of reality which is presupposed by it. We may remain content with what Prof. Taylor has granted us when he has admitted that for constructive metaphysics ethics is of the highest importance. Ours is an essay in metaphysical construction and we hope we shall not be wrong in making the fact of moral consciousness the basis of our essay.

CHAPTER II

The Validity of Moral Judgments.

We have seen that the fact of moral consciousness cannot be denied. This fact finds expression in some recognised forms of judgments, such as 'This is good,' 'This is not good,' 'I, ought to do this,' etc. And Philosophy can deal adequately with moral consciousness only when it has found articulated expression in such judgments. So long as it remains in the vague state of some undefined feeling, Philosophy cannot properly make any use of it for the purpose of construction or criticism.

When we come to consider moral judgments, the question of their validity naturally arises. It cannot possibly be maintained that the moral judgment belongs to a class of judgments to which the concept of validity is not applicable. Our moral judgments as judgments are like any other judgments, whether of science, mathematics or logic. Just as these other judgments are valid or invalid according as their form and content represent or do not represent the true state of things, so should also the moral judgments be valid or invalid in the same way. Whoever asserts "This is good," if his words are significant, means clearly that the proposition expresses a particular fact which cannot be expressed by saying "This is not good." That is to say, if the former proposition is valid, the latter is not so. If both of them could be indifferently valid or invalid, or if they were neither valid nor invalid, then any of them might be asserted on any occasion. In fact there would be no reasonable ground for

asserting either of them on any particular occasion. The chief characteristic of a judgment is its truth or falsehood and so a judgment can escape being either true or false only by refusing to assert anything at all and thus by rendering itself utterly insignificant.

The question of the validity of moral judgments is specially important for our present purpose. When we insist that metaphysics should take note of the facts of the moral life and give proper explanation for them, we have to guarantee that these facts are genuine facts; we have to show that our moral judgments are valid judgments. If moral consciousness proves to be an illusion, though a very powerful and widespread one, we cannot legitimately ask metaphysics to give an adequate explanation for it.

It may be said that even an illusion has to be accounted for. But what metaphysical explanation can we give of an illusory phenomenon? We may try to describe it in various ways. We may say, for instance, that it is the appearance of a thing which is not there (*asat-khyāti*), or that it is the non-appearance of a thing which is there (*akhyāti*), or that it is the external appearance of a thing which in reality we have got in our mind (*ātma-khyāti*), or, again, that it is the appearance of a thing as another (*anyathā-khyāti*). But these are only more or less adequate descriptions of the phenomenon from different points of view. None of them is from the viewpoint of metaphysics a genuine explanation of illusion. An illusion by definition has no proper place in the heart of reality; it is a false appearance not grounded in fact. But the metaphysical explanation of a thing consists in finding a proper place for the thing in the scheme of reality. If any such explanation were possible in the case of an illusion the illusion itself would become real and lose its illusory character. We may try to explain how in a particular case we came to have the illusion we actually had. But our having the illusion was not itself an illusion and therefore it can be

explained. My seeing of a snake in the place of a rope, as a psychological fact, cannot be denied. A psychologist may be able to find out the causes which gave rise to my seeing. This is possible because my seeing was not illusory. Illusoriness precisely belongs to the object seen and this cannot be explained; because the object as seen being not there cannot be related to any fact in the real world.

The fact of our experiencing the particular mental state, which we call moral consciousness, is undeniable. But it is possible to doubt whether there is any objective ground for our experience. One may even think that our moral consciousness is as baseless as our seeing of an illusory object which is not there. In that case we cannot rightly demand a metaphysical explanation for the facts of the moral life. Such a demand is compatible only with the assurance that the validity of our moral judgments is beyond question.

The validity of moral judgments is closely connected with their objectivity. In fact there can be no determination of validity without some reference to objectivity. If a judgment is valid, it is so because the character of the thing judged is in accordance with the assertion made in the judgment. It can never be the case that a judgment is valid because the person judging wishes it to be so, or because he entertains a particular feeling towards it. 'I wish this' is a judgment whose validity, no doubt, depends on my actually having the wish; but the wish here in question forms part of the judgment itself and to make the judgment valid no further wish, directed upon it, is either necessary or sufficient. Our mental life is so complex that in its concrete functioning no element in it can be absolutely separated from all the rest. So an element of feeling may be present whenever we make a valid judgment or know a judgment to be so. But the element of feeling itself can never be the sole or the essential ground on which the validity of the judgment may be said to depend. What determines the validity of a judgment is the nature of

the thing judged, and if this fails, then, however strongly we may desire that the judgment should be valid and however sincerely we may feel that it is so, our desire and feeling will never make the judgment really valid. Prof. Moore has conclusively proved that "To predicate of an action that it is right or wrong is to predicate of it something quite different from the mere fact that any man or set of men have any particular feeling towards or opinion about it" (*Ethics*, p. 244). To say of an action that it is right is not the same thing as to say that some one is pleased with it. This seems to follow from the very form of the judgment. The judgment that an action is right has a different subject and a different predicate from the judgment that some one is pleased with the action. When their difference is so pronounced, they cannot in any sense be identical in meaning. The fact that some one is pleased whenever an action is right is not and need not be denied; but the fact that a person is pleased is not the same thing as the fact that an action is right. When we find that there is no subjective reference in our moral judgments it appears safe to conclude that they are essentially objective.

What is clear beyond doubt from Prof. Moore's discussion of moral judgments is that such judgments do assert some objective trait or character—that they are not merely the expressions of personal thoughts and feelings. But even when we recognise the objectivity of moral judgments in this sense, we may not yet be convinced that they are objectively valid. Because what is asserted to be there may not really be there. Mere assertion of a thing is no proof of its real existence. The conception of its being other than our thoughts or feelings does not itself show that it must necessarily be something in fact. So although a moral judgment may assert something which is not identical with any of our mental facts, it does not thereby make itself valid. If the asserted thing does not exist—and there is no proof in the judgment itself that the thing

must exist—the judgment will be as false as any judgment made under the influence of an illusion. It is easy to understand that a moral judgment asserts some thing as objective. But it is more difficult to establish that the thing in question is really objective. People have raised serious doubt about the real objectivity of moral attributes. We shall consider here some of the arguments which deny real objectivity to moral attributes and, therefore, to all moral judgments.

What is objective, it may be said, is not private to any individual; it is equally recognised by all intelligent beings. But it is notorious that people in the world widely differ from one another in their moral judgments. If rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, were some real characteristics of things, they should be equally recognised by different people in the world. One of Prof. Moore's arguments against the subjectivity of moral judgments is that if they were subjective then different moral judgments could be made without contradiction about one and the same action. But the fact that contradictory judgments are really passed upon one and the same action seems to show that these judgments are subjective.

Now, what is objective is, no doubt, under ordinary circumstances, generally perceived in the same way by different people; but there are cases in which what is admittedly objective is still seen differently by different persons. A round penny appears elliptical to a person who looks at it from a particular angle of vision and if two persons judge differently that it is round and that it is elliptical, that does not show that their judgments are subjective. It shows that even objective characteristics are not perceived in the same way by different persons. Nobody can contend that the shape of a physical thing is not an objective property. The fact that two persons differ in their judgments about one and the same thing does not show that their judgments are equally true or equally false. It only shows that both of them

cannot be true ; and when the judgments are contradictory, it further shows that one of them must be true. And in the case of two contradictory moral judgments, whichever is true, will unquestionably establish the objectivity of moral attributes. The fact that different moral judgments are made about one and the same action does not show that there is really no contradiction between them nor that the persons who make the judgments do not feel themselves to be contradicted by one another. If the words used in the judgments are significant, the contradiction between them cannot be denied. The point in Prof. Moore's argument is not that contradictory judgments are not passed upon one and the same action but that they should never be recognised as contradictory if they were subjective. The fact that they are recognised as contradictory and are felt to be so shows that they are not subjective.

It may be argued that since we are unable to know for certain which of the judgments is true, it is better to treat them both as equally true. And this is possible only when we consider them as subjective.

Now to treat them as subjective in order to get out of the difficulty presented by their apparent contradiction may be very convenient, but this can scarcely be considered the right way of dealing with the matter. When we are presented with two contradictory judgments, we may be unable to decide which of them is true and the best that we can do is to withhold our judgment upon them. But we can never be justified in thinking that both of them are true or that they are subjective, especially when the persons making the judgments do not feel like making only statements about their personal likes and dislikes.

The meaning and intent of our moral judgments are never subjective in any sense. When, for instance, we say that to murder an innocent child is wrong, we never mean simply that we are displeased with the act. Our displeasure at the

act, if committed, may be there but, over and above this and principally, we mean that the act itself is wrong and its wrongness cannot absolutely be translated in terms of our or anybody else's feelings towards or thoughts about the action. To say that moral judgments are subjective is to say that they are all false. If an action itself is neither right nor wrong, then to say that it is right or wrong, is certainly to make a false statement. But can we treat all our moral judgments as false? We have seen above that we cannot conclude the falsity of all moral judgments from the fact that there are contradictory moral judgments about one and the same action. But even if we suppose for a moment, although the supposition would not be right, that we get nothing but falsity whenever there is contradiction, we shall not be obliged to believe that moral judgments as such are false, for when two contradictory moral judgments are made, the contradiction lies in the particular predicates used and not in their nature as moral judgments, since it is agreed that both of them are moral judgments. When about one and the same action there are, for instance, two contradictory judgments of the forms 'This is right' and 'This is wrong,' we may as well say in each case 'This has got a moral property.' And when we do so, the alleged ground of falsity being no longer present, the substituted judgment cannot be treated as false.

The falsity of moral judgments is sometimes sought to be deduced from the fact that primitive man never made any such judgments, that our moral experience is the product of our social life. But the fact that primitive man never made any moral judgments only proves that he lacked the knowledge of what is right and what is wrong. From his lack of knowledge we cannot infer the non-existence of all moral properties. We can never argue that because mankind in its infancy failed to be conscious of the moral properties of things, therefore these properties were not and are not there, even though it perceives them clearly in its present developed

state. The validity of our advanced knowledge is never affected by the consideration that we were devoid of such knowledge when we were children. Our social life may have quickened our moral perception; it has also contributed towards the development of our intelligence. But because our intelligence and moral sense have been things of social growth, it does not follow that our knowledge acquired through them is false. It has rightly been pointed out that even science has developed under the pressure of our social life, but no body ever questions the findings of science merely on this account.

We see therefore that we have so far found no conclusive reason to think that our moral judgments are all false. But let us suppose that for some reason or other one is persuaded to think that they are all really false. To say that all our judgments are false is to say that the moral experience of mankind is the product of an all-pervasive illusion. Can such an opinion be justified? We have seen that we cannot be led by any arguments, so far considered, to the conclusion that our moral judgments are all false. Let us now consider whether the opinion that moral experience is all illusion can at all be consistently maintained. It sometimes so happens that although there are no positive arguments to prove a particular conclusion, there are also no arguments to prove it to be false. We have found no conclusive arguments which can prove that all moral judgments are false. We shall now attempt to show that there are arguments which make such a conclusion untenable.

Nobody ever maintains that all moral judgments that any one may pass on any thing on earth must be true. What is sought to be maintained as beyond all question is that there are some moral judgments which are absolutely true. The proposition "Some moral judgments are true" can be held to be false only when its contradictory proposition "No moral judgments are true" is held to be true. And it can be main-

tained only when one believes that our moral experience is all illusion. If there is a single instance in which a thing can be truly taken as right or wrong, good or bad, then it will not be true that no moral judgments are true. In order that it may be true that no moral judgments are true, there should not be any thing in the world which is really right or wrong, good or bad. In moral experience we take things to be right or wrong, good or bad. If therefore it is a fact that no moral judgments are true, then in moral experience we have got a type of experience in which things are taken to be what they are not. In other words moral experience turns out to be a mere illusion. This, however, is a position which, we shall presently see, cannot consistently be maintained.

There is a general consideration against moral experience being all illusion. All illusions that we know of in life are for particular individuals and last only for a time. We do not know of an illusion which lasts for the whole life of a man and affects the life of all mankind. This consideration renders the possibility of moral experience being all illusion very doubtful. Moreover an illusion is not known as illusion so long as one is still under the illusion. So if a person were justified in thinking of moral experience as illusion he should be free from the illusion; that is, he should be devoid of all moral consciousness. Such a person however is very difficult to find in the world.

In illusion one always takes a thing for what it is not, that is, for something other than what it really is. Now the thing for which a particular thing is mistaken in illusion must have already entered into the experience of the person before he has the illusion. When a person mistakes a piece of rope for a snake, it must be conceded that he knows what a snake is. If he had no previous knowledge of a snake, it would be impossible for him to have the illusion of a snake. When he is absolutely ignorant of what a snake is and when no snake

is actually present before him, nothing would succeed in producing in him the illusion of a snake.

It may be contended that although some knowledge of the illusory object is necessary before one has the illusion, that knowledge also may be of an illusory kind. But if the previous knowledge necessary for the present illusion were itself an illusion, that illusion would require for its explanation some antecedent knowledge which must not itself be an illusion, otherwise it would give rise to an infinite process. So it seems beyond doubt that in all illusions some real knowledge of the illusory object is always presupposed. We find therefore that some genuine moral experience is absolutely necessary in order that there may be the illusion of moral experience. The very possibility of illusion demands that all should not be illusion. If all moral experience were illusion there would be no illusion of moral experience, since the genuine moral experience which is necessary for the illusion is supposed to be absent. The inherent self-discrepancy of the position lays bare the absurdity of the hypothesis that all moral experience is illusion.

We shall arrive at the same result even when we look at the question from a slightly different point of view. If the judgment 'This is good' is false, then by mere immediate inference we know that the judgment 'This is not good' must be true. Whoever believes that no moral judgments are true believes that all judgments of the form 'This is good' are false. He believes therefore by implication that the judgment 'This is not good' must be true. If I say 'This is good' you can prove me to be wrong and my judgment to be false only by asserting with truth the contradictory judgment 'This is not good.' But your assertion of the proposition 'This is not good' means that in your opinion the predicate 'good' is irrelevant in the present case. This also shows that you know some cases in which the predicate 'good' is relevant. In those cases however the judgment 'This is good' will be

perfectly true and it cannot therefore be maintained that no moral judgments are true. If you maintain that you do not know of any case in which the predicate 'good' is relevant, then the question will arise: How did you come to have any idea of good, seeing that all our ideas refer to their factual counterparts in experience? If you have never in your experience come across any thing which is good, it will be impossible for you to have any idea of good. And if you have no idea of good, you cannot significantly assert 'This is not good' nor can you decide whether in a particular case the predicate good is relevant or irrelevant.

In any case whether one affirms or denies the proposition 'This is good' he cannot altogether deny that he has got some idea of good. Our question now is whether the idea of good, which is undeniable, can be a mere idea without there being any thing in fact which corresponds to this idea.

In the case of feeling we can say that the feeling of pleasure is pleasure, but in the case of ideas, we cannot say that the idea of a thing is the thing itself. The idea of a horse is not a horse nor is the idea of square itself square. An idea always refers to some thing of which it is the idea and which is different from it. So if we admit that we have the idea of 'good,' 'good' must be supposed to have a being of its own which is not identical with the being of the idea. This being so, we are compelled to admit that there is some thing which is good. And so the judgment 'This is good' cannot always and everywhere be false.

It may be objected that we have many ideas for which there are no corresponding things in the world. For instance we have the idea of a golden mountain, but there is no such thing in reality. Why cannot our idea of good be one of such objectless ideas?

The idea of a golden mountain is a complex idea of which the simpler ideas of gold and mountain are constituents. This idea is possible because there are gold and mountain in the

world. But the idea of good is a simple idea and it is explicable only if there is something which is really good in the world.

Lastly it may be objected that although we have got the idea of 'good' it is the idea of a predicate, adjective or universal. Merely to have the idea of good is not to have the idea of something which is good. Merely to know an adjective is not to know the substantive which it qualifies. So from our mere idea of good we cannot deduce the truth of the proposition that something is good.

What we have said already about the previous objection will apply against this objection also. Unless we have got the experience of something which is good, it will be difficult to have the idea of good. Even those ideas, which are supposed to be *à priori* in the sense of not being derived from experience, acquire significance for us when they are applied to objects of experience. If the idea of good is significant it is because it is applied to experienced objects which are good.

Moreover we cannot think of a predicate which is not applied to any subject nor of an adjective which does not qualify any substantive. There cannot be any universal which does not characterise some particular. An adjective is an adjective because it qualifies some substantive. The essence of a predicate lies in its applicability to some subject. There is no universal under which no particular is subsumed. So our very idea of good as an adjective, predicate or universal, implies that there is something which is good.

We find therefore that we cannot deny objectivity to moral predicates and so have no reason to think that there is any thing in moral judgments as such which will make them invariably false.

CHAPTER III

The Objectivity of Value.

We have tried to show that there is no reason to think that our moral judgments as such are invalid. Some moral judgments there must be which are absolutely true, although all moral judgments may not be so. If the judgment 'This is good' is a true judgment, as we contend it should be in some cases at least, then 'good' should signify some characteristic of the thing, which is asserted to be good, quite independently of the attitude one may take up towards it. But is anything by itself either good or bad without any relation to a judging subject whose wishes or purposes it either fulfils or thwarts? To say that a thing is good is to assign certain value to it. But can a thing by itself have any value? Is not its value always for some one and under some circumstances? If it be so, then the value of a thing cannot be supposed to reside in the thing itself. It seems to be borrowed from some extraneous relation which the thing bears to our needs and desires. Value on this supposition cannot strictly be called objective and if value cannot maintain its objectivity, our ethical judgments, which are also judgments of value, cannot then be supposed to be objective. With the loss of objectivity, the validity or truth of moral judgments again seems to disappear and consequently the claim of moral consciousness to receive metaphysical explanation seems hard to maintain. In spite of our strenuous efforts to uphold the objectivity of moral judgments, the doubting mind does not appear to be set quite at rest. We shall therefore try in this chapter to exhibit

clearly, as far as we can, how and in what sense we think values can be objective.

A few words at this place about the relation of value to goodness, truth and beauty, which are generally supposed to be the three fundamental forms of value, may prove helpful in our present discussions.

A thing has value when and only when it can legitimately be called good. If it cannot be called good, we do not understand how it can still be supposed to have any value. So, for us, goodness and value seem to be identical.

But if value is goodness, we cannot then suppose that truth, beauty and goodness are the three fundamental forms of value in the same sense. For just as we can say that value means goodness, we cannot say, in the same way, that it means truth or beauty, obviously because truth, beauty and goodness being different concepts, to say of a thing that it is good is not to say that it is true or beautiful; but to say that a thing is good is to say, as we have seen, that it has value. So it appears that truth or beauty is not value in the sense in which goodness is. What is true or beautiful may have value because of its truth or beauty but its truth or beauty is not its value. To judge a thing to be true is to judge simply that it is true; we can assign value to it by a further judgment based on the consideration of its truth. But to judge of a thing that it is good is to assign value to it by the very same judgment. We think therefore that truth or beauty has value but goodness itself is value.

It may be said that when goodness is supposed to be a form of value, it is used in the more restricted sense of moral goodness and although goodness in general may be identical with value, moral goodness is only a species of it co-ordinate with beauty and truth. But we are obliged to maintain, even if we admit that non-moral things can be good, that when we predicate moral goodness of a thing, we assign by the same judgment value to it. When we have found a thing to be

morally good, we need make no advance in our thought to discover that it has value. But when we have found a thing to be true, we may just stop there without being able to understand that it has value. It seems clear to us that judgments of truth are not judgments of value. Every moral judgment however is a judgment of value. The way of looking at things which makes us see the truth of a proposition is essentially different from the way in which we look at a thing in order to find out whether it has value.

In any case, goodness or moral goodness seems to us to be the essential form of value, if not the only form of real value. We may very well remain indifferent to many propositions which we know to be true. A beautiful object may be recognised as such, but one may still pass it by. And even if he fails to find in himself any emotional reaction, which is called appreciation following upon the intellectual cognition of beauty, we do not think he will thereby become an object of general condemnation. He is simply unable to enjoy a kind of pleasure, that is all; but for aught we know, he may still be a good man. One cannot however remain so indifferent to a moral question without lowering himself in his own estimation as well as in the estimation of others. We are called upon, as we have seen, to be moral in a sense in which we are not required to be seekers after truth or appreciators of beauty. We do not mean to assert that truth and beauty have no value and are not valued by men. What we mean to emphasise is that their value does not appear to be so primary and fundamental as that of morality. The value of morality is felt with a directness and urgency not associated with the value of truth or of beauty.

We are however not directly concerned here about the value of truth or that of beauty but having admitted that a moral judgment is a judgment of value, we want to determine if, and in what sense, values as such can be objective. In the philosophical literature of recent times the conception of

value has been brought much to the foreground. People have contended that in our notion of value we have got 'a clue to the ultimate nature of reality.' It is even asserted that this has been the fundamental contention of all idealistic philosophies since Kant's time. But whoever wishes to make any metaphysical application of the concept of value must be sure that its objectivity is beyond question. If it be only a subjective fancy, without a basis in fact, it is vain to seek in our notion of value 'a clue to the ultimate nature of reality.' In point of fact those who have given any metaphysical treatment to the problem of value have generally upheld that value is non-subjective in its character. Let us consider here the views of some of these writers on this point and see what light we can gain from them for the solution of the problem we have proposed to ourselves in this chapter.

The view of Prof. Moore in this connexion seems to be very definite. In his paper on the "Nature of Intrinsic Values," he has made a distinction between the objectivity and the internality of values. In his opinion those who are opposed to the view that values are subjective, do not simply mean to maintain that they are merely objective, since they are equally opposed to a view which gives an objective interpretation of values. The evolutionary view of goodness, according to which to be better is to belong to a type which tends to be favoured by the struggle for existence more than another, is essentially objective. But yet all those who object to a subjective view of goodness and insist upon its objectivity would object just as strongly to this interpretation as to any subjective interpretation. So it seems what they mean to maintain is not simply that values are objective but that they are intrinsic. "To say that a kind of value is intrinsic means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it and in what degree it possesses it depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question." Goodness in the evolutionary view will not be intrinsic, since it clearly depends

on circumstances and the law of nature. We see therefore that the intrinsic value of a thing depends exclusively on its intrinsic nature and is in no sense borrowed from its relation to any other thing, conscious or unconscious, human or divine. Is the intrinsic value of a thing, then, like its intrinsic property, seeing that the intrinsic property of a thing also depends solely upon its intrinsic nature? So far as their dependence upon the intrinsic nature of the thing goes, they are no doubt absolutely alike, but we should be wrong if from their similarity in this respect, we were to infer identity in all respects. Prof. Moore recognises some difference between them, although he finds it difficult to explain precisely in what that difference consists. He has however been able to draw a distinction between them which appears to be quite clear and intelligible but which seems to invalidate the whole conception of value as intrinsic. He is of opinion that the intrinsic properties of a thing can describe its intrinsic nature in a sense in which predicates of value cannot. "If you could enumerate all the intrinsic properties a given thing possessed you would have given a complete description of it, and would not need to mention any predicates of value it possessed ; whereas no description of a given thing could be complete which omitted any intrinsic property" (*Philosophical Studies*, p. 274).

Now if the intrinsic properties of a thing can completely describe its intrinsic nature without mentioning a single predicate of value, then it is difficult to understand in what sense values can be intrinsic to the thing. When all the intrinsic properties are given, the whole thing seems to be entirely exhausted and nothing is left over to which value may be attached. Value cannot at least be supposed to reside in the thing. If it were inherent in the thing, no description would be complete in which it was not counted. And since a description of a thing may be complete without mentioning any of its supposed intrinsic values, one

may venture to think that these values are not intrinsic in any intelligible sense. When we can know a thing exhaustively in terms of the intrinsic properties among which value has no place, we can safely assert that value does not form any part of the thing. It may be that the question whether a thing possesses or does not possess any particular value is determined solely by the intrinsic nature of the thing, but so long as we are ready to admit that value does not enter even in our fullest knowledge about the thing we cannot maintain that it has any being in the thing. And if it is not there in the thing, then metaphysically speaking, it is not objective in an ordinary sense. If the thing really has the value we ascribe to it, why should we not then find it in the thing? The fact that we do not find it there irresistibly suggests that in all probability it does not exist in the thing taken by itself.

It cannot be supposed that it is not necessary for value to appear in our descriptive knowledge, that it will be sufficient if we can find it in our appreciative knowledge. For this will make value dependent on our appreciation, which is not certainly a part of the intrinsic nature of the thing to which value is ascribed, and as such, value will cease to be intrinsic. It may be suggested that although the intrinsic value depends for its being solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing, it may still depend on our appreciation for its being discovered or known.

But it is a fact admitted on all hands that only disinterested enquiry succeeds in determining the true nature of any object. True knowledge is that knowledge which is not coloured by any subjective interest. When disinterested knowledge fails to discover any value in a thing we cannot still persist in saying that it is there. If we find that the value of a thing arises whenever our knowledge is interested or appreciative, have we then no grounds to suppose that it depends on our interest and is not therefore intrinsic?

Prof. Mackenzie too has argued against the purely objective view of values. He has criticized the view of Prof. Moore that value or good resembles yellow in being a purely objective characteristic and has shown that criticism cannot affect our perceptual judgments while our judgments of value are substantially modified by it, "If what I see is yellow, it is vain to try to convince me that it is anything else. You may convince me that it is only because my eye is jaundiced that it appears to me as yellow. It remains true however that it presents itself to me as yellow. Now, it does not appear that a similar contention applies to good or value. You may convince me that what I think good or beautiful is not really good or beautiful" (*Ultimate Values*, pp. 122-23). Our appreciation depends on our cultural training. Some may even prefer Pope to Keats whereas the verdict of enlightened criticism is entirely different. A play of Euripides, which is a thing of beauty to competent judges, may not appear particularly attractive to the average school boy. A change in the subjective attitude seems to bring about a change in the object of appreciation. Hence it appears that we cannot remain content with a purely objective interpretation of value. But the subjective interpretation of value appears to be no more satisfactory. Value in this interpretation is supposed to lie not in the object but in the subjective feeling of pleasure. But to be pleased we must be pleased with something. Pleasure without any object would be quite meaningless. We ascribe value to that which we like or with which we are pleased. But although it may be true that value does not appear unless we like something, it is no less true that it is not our liking that we like. "Thus we seem to be led away from the purely subjective conception of value, just as we were led away from the purely objective one" (*ibid*, p. 135). So the correct view about value according to Prof. Mackenzie is that it has both an objective and a subjective aspect. Let us try to understand this position.

Value is here clearly supposed to have two aspects—one subjective and the other objective. But what is it itself? Now a thing cannot be separated from its aspects. If a thing really has some aspects and if none of them is borrowed from our way of looking at it, these aspects must be then considered as part of the thing itself. If however the aspects are only our ways of looking at the thing, then the thing cannot properly be said to have them. Now if value really has these aspects (subjective and objective), it must itself be characterised by the nature of these aspects. That is to say, value itself must be both subjective and objective. But what can we make of this statement? Our ideas of subjectivity and objectivity are fundamentally different from each other and they cannot both be applied to one and the same thing without giving rise to a contradiction. A thing cannot in the same sense be called both subjective and objective. If either of the predicates is applied to it, the other is hereby excluded. We can only suppose that value is partly objective and partly subjective. But the trouble is that we are not acquainted with any such metaphysical hybrid. Value appears to be a unique and simple notion and in it we cannot distinguish two parts residing in two different and mutually exclusive hemispheres. In our judgments of values we do not refer some part of value to the mind and some part of it to the object. We refer it wholly to the object.

At the same time no one can ignore the difficulties which Prof. Mackenzie has pointed out and which one has to meet if one is to take either the subjective or the objective view exclusively. These considerations perhaps led Prof. Alexander to think that value belongs neither to the subject nor to the object but to an amalgam of both. "There is no truth nor, goodness nor beauty in reality by itself." Facts are true only in relation to the mind which believes them. Things are good so far as they can be used to subserve our purpose. A landscape is beautiful only for a contemplative mind.

"We have values or tertiary qualities," he says, "in respect of the whole situation consisting of knower and known in their compresence. Strictly speaking, it is this totality of knower and known, of subject and object, which is true, good or beautiful. The tertiary qualities are not objective like the secondary ones, nor peculiar to mind and thus subjective like consciousness, nor are they like the primary qualities common both to subjects and objects. They are subject-object determinations" (*Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 238). It seems very clear that Prof. Alexander does not regard values as objective in the ordinary sense of this term but it is not so clear, although he is sure to repudiate the suggestion, that he is not inclined to a subjective point of view. When the whole sphere of thought and existence is divided into subject and object without leaving a remainder, and value is seen to have no objective existence, it seems but natural that it should be referred to the subjective side. If a landscape in and by itself has no beauty and if beauty, to be beauty, must always be felt, then it appears safe to conclude that beauty is only a mode of our feeling, falsely ascribed to an outside object. Prof. Alexander is very definite that pleasantness is no property of sugar, because the pleasure which sugar gives me is only an affection of myself; but he thinks that our "appreciation of the beauty of a poem, while it carries with it all kinds of sensible pleasures, though it is itself a pleasing act of mind, is a reaction to some thing in the poem itself." But cannot our pleasant experience of the taste of sugar be interpreted in terms of a reaction to something in sugar itself? There must be, of course, something in the poem itself which determines our experience or appreciation of it as a thing of beauty. But is the appreciation, which is in this case another name for our experience of beauty, anything but a mental reaction, even though it is a reaction to something in the poem itself? If this be not subjective because it is determined by something in the

object, then pleasantness also may not be subjective, since our experience of pleasure is determined by the object. If, on the contrary, pleasantness is only subjective, may not one then think that beauty also is subjective?

What Prof. Alexander has expressly said is that value belongs to the amalgam of subject and object, that is, to a whole in which subject and object are both included. But this goes directly against the evidence of our experience. We do not value a picture in conjunction with a contemplating spectator. We attach value, rightly or wrongly, to the picture itself and not also to the person who looks upon it. It may be that the picture comes to be recognized as valuable only through my appreciation, but the value, if there is any value at all, belongs to the picture itself and not to the-picture-with-myself or the myself-with-the-picture. The appreciator sets value upon things and not also upon himself in the same act.

Prof. Alexander speaks of the compound whole of subject and object to which strictly speaking value belongs. But it is very much to be doubted whether there can be a real compound whole in which subject and object may enter as constituent elements. If the whole universe is divided between subject and object, then the third something which is to be a compound of them both is not only non-existent but unthinkable: since if we could think of it, it would forthwith become an object and would not remain the whole of subject and object.

Even if we admit that there is such a whole, we have still to ask: In what sense does value belong to it? It cannot belong in an ordinary sense to a thing which is never valued. And we have already seen that no body ever values the whole of subject and object but only a part of it, namely, the object. Prof. Alexander seems to recognise this fact. He says that in each such whole we can distinguish on the one side the object of value and on the other the valuing

subject. Value here seems to belong in different senses to different parts and in no sense perhaps to the whole. The subject only evaluates things and the work of valuation is no doubt his; but there is a distinction between valuation and value. There is no dispute about the metaphysical character of valuation which is psychical and belongs to the subject. But we want to know whether value which we assign to objects is really objective and our problem will not be solved if we are simply told that it appears whenever the subject and the object come together in a particular fashion.

Dr. Turner in his book on the *Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation* has accepted value as an ethical criterion and he recognises that 'without objectivity Ethic has no meaning' (Hartmann). He is anxious therefore to give an objective interpretation of value, but he is conscious at the same time that 'value is at first experienced in and through some mode of gratification,' that there is 'some direct connection between every actual satisfaction and true value.' In a word he recognises the fact that we generally assign value to that which satisfies our desire. But he thinks that this fact has some profound objective implication. "From such an essentially objective point of view desire is seen to imply some incompleteness and satisfaction (on the other hand) its removal; and in correspondence with this value—again as objective—takes the general form of the power or capacity to confer some measure of realisation or completion" (p. 147). Satisfaction, which appears to be the basis of valuation, means the removal of incompleteness implied by desire and value as objective properly belongs to that which contributes to wholeness.

In his view of value as objective, Dr. Turner seems to have followed Bosanquet, according to whom also the whole is the ultimate criterion of value. Bosanquet is of opinion that "positive pleasure and all satisfaction.....depends on the character of logical stability of the whole inherent in the

objects of desire and that what in this sense is more real, that is, more at one with itself, and the whole (*e.g.*, free from contradiction) is also the experience in which the mind obtains the more durable and coherent satisfaction and more completely realises itself" (*The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 298-99). The whole is the supreme standard of value. It is always the unit by which the value of a thing is judged but it is not itself ever estimated by anything else.

Now a thing will be ordinarily called a whole if there is no structural deficiency in it. But it is possible to conceive of a thing which has no such deficiency in it but which nevertheless is positively evil in its tendency. Far from making it good, the wholeness of a thing of this nature will only aggravate its evil character.

But we shall be reminded that the wholeness which is the supreme standard of value is not the partial, relative wholeness of particular, finite things, but the wholeness of the ultimate reality. Such a criterion however is properly applicable only in the case of the whole. But the whole is supposed to be neither good nor evil. We value everything else by it but it is not itself valued. If this is so, then it appears there is no value in the world. The whole has no value, because it is the criterion of value and there is no other criterion by which its value may be determined. The parts also cannot have any value because being only parts, they can never satisfy the criterion of wholeness which is the standard of value.

It may be said that what has value is not the whole but that which contributes to the whole. There is a distinction between wholeness and contributoriness to wholeness; the former belongs to the whole, but the latter, which is properly the meaning of value, belongs to parts.

We do not know if this distinction is always clearly made and maintained. But even when this distinction is made, we do not think we have made any appreciable advance towards

the solution of the problem. Everything that exists must have a place in the whole and make its own contribution to it. So contributoriness to the whole is a characteristic which belongs equally to all things in the world; and if this were the sole criterion of value, everything would have the same value. But to attach equal value to all things is to value nothing at all. It cannot be said that what makes greater contribution to the whole will be for that reason considered as more important: for we have no means of determining the greatness of any contribution. Contributoriness to the whole, which is present in the case of every contribution, cannot itself determine the greatness of any contribution. We must find out some other principle to determine the greatness of a contribution. Evidently that contribution to the whole will be greater in which the character of the whole is more adequately represented. We again come to wholeness as the criterion of value. And this criterion, we have seen, is not easy to apply nor is it sufficient to bring out the special significance of value.

These writers recognise also a close connexion between satisfaction and value. But satisfaction has always reference to our needs and desires. If one does not feel the pain of want, of whatever sort it may be, one will not also feel the pleasure of satisfaction. But different people have needs of very different character and satisfaction seems entirely to be a personal matter. In fact we find that different people find satisfaction in different things and, consequently, widely differ in their valuation of them. A defaced postage stamp has no value for ordinary people but it may have a very high value for a stamp collector. So it seems that if we connect value with satisfaction which appears in every case to be personal, we shall never succeed in discovering any objectivity in value. A thing of value may and indeed does satisfy us in some sense. But the fact is that it satisfies us because it has value and not that it has value because it satisfies us. Our being

satisfied with anything may sometimes serve us as the test, but is never the meaning, of its value. Bosanquet admits that a man may be satisfied when he is drunk but he contends that his satisfaction is not satisfactory. But how are we to understand—and who is to determine—whether anything is satisfactory? Can we define satisfactoriness without any reference to satisfaction? Will any thing be satisfactory if it does not satisfy anybody? In order that I may understand any thing to be satisfactory, is it not enough that I should be satisfied with it? If satisfaction is not to be a criterion by which the satisfactoriness of a thing may be judged, why should we call it satisfactory at all? Moreover, as Prof. Alexander points out, satisfactoriness is not a quality residing in things which they have over and above their primary and secondary qualities.

We are glad to have the weighty support of these distinguished writers in favour of our view that real value is objective. But we do not feel sure that their treatment of the subject has secured to value an objectivity which is absolutely obvious. On the other hand, however, there are no conclusive arguments to show that value is subjective. To say that value is subjective is to say that things have no value at all. This would render our very consciousness of value a thing of inexplicable mystery.

It is sometimes said that value depends on our appreciation, that the value of a thing consists in its being appreciated by us. A thing left to itself has no value. It gets value when it is appreciated; our appreciation gives it its value, and appreciation is subjective.

But although it may be admitted that we find value whenever there is appreciation, it cannot be determined whether we appreciate a thing because it has value or it has value because we appreciate it. Simply from the conjunction of value and appreciation, we get no clue whatever as to the validity of either alternative.

To appreciate is not to create value but simply to be conscious of it. When we appreciate things we are not conscious of any production or generation of value which either goes out to objects or remains hovering over the field of consciousness. It is true that appreciation requires that there should be a subject who appreciates ; but no less does it require, as Prof. Mackenzie has pointed out, that there should be some object to be appreciated. But even if appreciation be wholly subjective, one is not bound to accept that value also is subjective, inasmuch as no one ever thinks that value is identical with appreciation or that it is appreciation which has value. It is the value of a thing that is appreciated ; but appreciation itself is not the value. Just as there is a distinction between a thing which is seen and our seeing of it, so is there a like distinction between value which is appreciated and our appreciation of it. In any case it cannot be said that our appreciation gives value to things. We do not first appreciate things and thereupon become conscious of their value, but our appreciation itself is the recognition of the value which is in them. Our common sense view is that things themselves possess the value we recognise in them ; it is not simply borrowed from our appreciation.

If value is objective, it may be asked, why should different people attribute different values to one and the same thing ? But the fact that different values are attributed to one and the same object does not prove that values are not objective ; it only shows that our judgments of value differ from one another and that they cannot all be equally true. When a person at a certain level of culture finds new values in things which are not perceived by his less advanced contemporaries, we are not to think that the values, which he finds, are created by him or that they are only the reflections of his cultured mind. Culture does not endow men with some magic power to change the true aspects of things. It only gives them a truer insight into the essence of things.

If it were otherwise, if culture only perverted the native faculty in us to see things as they are, the only sensible course for us to follow would be to keep ourselves as far away as possible from the pernicious influence of culture and education. Our common belief is not that we only acquire new illusions by means of culture but that our view of things is broadened and deepened by it, is made clearer and truer and therefore more trustworthy. If the judgment of an uneducated rustic about any particular object does not agree with the judgment of a cultured individual about the very same object, the only possible conclusion from this is not that both the judgments are equally true or that the judgment of the rustic is the true one. If both the judgments were to be taken as true, then we should have reason to think that the judgments in question are only the statements of the personal feelings of the persons who have made the judgments. But we can more reasonably suppose that only one of the judgments is true and that it is the judgment of the man of culture rather than that of the rustic which is likely to be true.

Our judgments can properly differ only when they are made about a common object, but if they are only the transcriptions of our personal feelings, they cannot rationally give rise to any discussion or dispute. In fact if values were subjective, there would be no genuine criticism of art or poetry. We should then leave the sphere of knowledge behind and wander aimlessly in the land of mere opinion where there is nothing either true or false determined by any objective criterion, but only personal feelings to be given out in the erroneous forms of objective judgments.

We have already seen why we cannot say either that values are both subjective and objective or that they are only subject-object determinations. We have just seen the difficulties which prevent us from regarding them as subjective. The only alternative that we can adopt is that values are

objective. But the sense in which we take them to be objective may not be the sense in which the term objective is understood by naive realism or ordinary common sense. Nevertheless we shall try to show that our meaning of the term objective is in no way illegitimate or unusual.

We have seen that the arguments urged against the view that values are objective are not quite conclusive. So if one were to maintain that the value of a thing resides in the thing itself quite independently of what anybody may feel about it, we do not know how he can be refuted. But while we cannot by arguments prove that the value of a thing is not objective, just as its properties are, our idea of value seems to be such that we cannot regard it as residing in things taken by themselves, quite in the sense in which their properties lie inherent in them. Even such distinguished Realists as Prof. G. E. Moore and Prof. S. Alexander do not think of value quite in the same way as they would think of the intrinsic properties of things. Prof. Alexander expressly says that there is no value in things taken by themselves. It is well to recognise the element of truth contained in their treatment of value, although we fail to be satisfied with their solution of the problem. In what sense then is value objective if it is not to be found in things taken by themselves?

We know that things in the world are related to one another and most, if not all, of their so-called objective properties only express the relations in which they stand to other objects. They have these properties because they are related to other things and if they were left to themselves, that is, if they were not related to any thing at all, they would not have these properties in any intelligible sense. Let us take an example. We may very well describe some men as fathers. This description of a man as a father is of course never exhaustive; but it is nevertheless a description. We suppose that he has the property of fatherhood. Now the property of fatherhood is by no means subjective.

The man who says that so and so is a father does not thereby only express an attitude of his mind towards him but he speaks of a character which the latter actually possesses. But the man who is called a father is a father because of his special relation to another person who is his son or daughter. He would not be a father if he were not so related. If he were alone in the universe we could not think of him as a father. It is no use saying that if a man is really a father, he is so even when left alone in the world. This only means that when we have conceived him in a particular relation, we cannot at the same time think of him as out of the relation. But it is impossible to think of a man as a father without relating him at the same time to somebody else who is outside of himself. We conclude therefore that fatherhood is a property which is no doubt objective but which nobody in the world would possess if he were left wholly to himself. It is relative but not subjective.

We should therefore modify our idea of objectivity. By objective we should not understand only these aspects of things which can be found in them taken by themselves, but also those other real aspects which they come to acquire and exhibit by being related to one another. The characteristic which a thing possesses by virtue of its relation to some other thing is not less truly its own than the characteristic, if there be any, which it possesses by itself. The idea of objectivity which we are here trying vaguely to define is not altogether new or strange. It is in this sense that fatherhood is objective, that truth is objective. Nobody would ever say that truth is not objective. But we know that truth is not a property of things nor of ideas taken by themselves. Our ideas without any reference to any thing outside them would be neither true nor false. They are true because and in so far as they are in correspondence with facts. Nobody can say that truth is not a characteristic of anything at all or that it can be the characteristic of anything taken by itself.

Our conception of truth as the property of ideas in correspondence with facts is, I think, strictly objective.

Our idea of objectivity should therefore include all those aspects of things which can be defined by their relation to other things that have objective existence. Here by objective existence we understand that sort of existence which is not identical with the existence of a mental state ; that is, a thing can be supposed to have objective existence when its existence is not identical with the existence of a mental state. Now truth as the property of ideas in correspondence with facts is objective because it is defined by the relation of ideas to facts whose existence is not identical with the existence of some mental state. If on the contrary truth were defined as the property of anything that is simply felt as true, it would not at all be objective, inasmuch as it would then be defined by the relation of something to some feeling which is a mental state.

It is precisely in this sense that the objectivity or the subjectivity of value should be understood. We have seen that value does not reside in things in themselves. It is evidently a characteristic which some things exhibit when they are viewed in relation to some other thing. If we think that things have value only in relation to our desire or satisfaction, our view would be subjective, inasmuch as desire or satisfaction is only a mental state. Such a view however has been found to be quite unacceptable.

We think that in every judgment of value some ideal is implied and a thing is considered valuable in so far as it realises or approximates to the ideal. The ideal may not be present in the mind of the judging subject in the form of a fully developed picture, but it is something which every one of us must presuppose in order that he may be able to give a rational account of his judgments of value. The metaphysical implications of such judgments need not, as Rashdall points out, be "more apparent than any other metaphysical

truths which are nevertheless no less really implicit in the ordinary thoughts of ordinary persons." If there is no ideal whatever to be realised in life, we do not understand why anything then should appear to us either good or bad. We need not anticipate here all that we have to say about the ideal. We wish here only to maintain that no judgment of value is possible without a standard of value and the ultimate standard of value is the ideal in relation to which alone things can and do appear as good.

If that ideal exists only as a mental state, then our judgment of value based upon it will never be objective. In every judgment of true value we feel that the ideal is not simply a mental image or picture which we have arbitrarily formed in our mind, but that it has got a being and authority which it is impossible for us to grant to a mere mental state. Our judgments of moral values at least are such as can never be taken as less than objective. If the moral predicate 'good' is to be understood as objective, it must be so understood in reference to some ideal which is itself objective. Our moral judgments imply, and reveal to us, an ideal that cannot be ignored. The profound sense of loyalty that every genuinely moral agent feels as due to this ideal would be simply impossible and altogether unintelligible, if the ideal were a mere mental state.

CHAPTER IV

The Ideal.

We have seen in our last chapter that the objectivity of value depends on the objectivity of the ideal which is implied in all judgments of value. We have also seen that all our moral judgments cannot be absolutely false. That something is good must absolutely and indubitably be true. Now if the judgment "That is good," understood in a moral sense, must be true, at least in some cases, then the objectivity of moral values has to be accepted as a fact. If, then, values are objective, even in some cases, the ideal, which determines such values, must also be objective. This conclusion can be avoided only if one supposes that our judgments of value do not imply any ideal, or that the ideal implied by them is only a subjective ideal. We have already said something to show why we think that our judgments of value do imply some ideal and that the ideal implied by them cannot be a subjective ideal. We shall now attempt here to reinforce our previous arguments by emphasising certain facts which appear to us to be quite indisputable.

First of all let us see what consequences would follow if one were to suppose that there is no reference to any ideal in our judgments of value. This position may be interpreted in two different ways. This may either mean that when something is judged to be good there is no reference whatever to any thing outside the thing (which is judged to be good) or that there is such a reference but the thing referred to is not in any sense the ideal of which we are speaking here.

Now if we suppose that there is no reference whatever to any thing outside the thing which is judged to be good, then we shall have to accept the position that a thing can be good in and by itself. But a thing in and by itself does not show goodness as part of its intrinsic property, which would surely have been the case, if the contention that a thing in and by itself can be good, were right. We never find goodness lying side by side with the intrinsic properties which a thing judged to be good is found to possess. When we know that a thing is completely exhausted if all its intrinsic properties are given, among which goodness is not one, it is easy to understand that goodness does not fall within the being of the thing taken by itself. We have seen all this in considering Prof. Moore's position with regard to intrinsic values. If we still hold fast to the view that any thing can be good in and by itself we shall be reduced to the absurd position of supposing that goodness is intrinsic or part of the nature of a thing even when it is not an intrinsic property, although intrinsic properties exhaust the whole nature of the thing. In plain words, we shall have to think that there is goodness in a thing even when it is not found to be there.

If any one maintains that when he looks at a table and finds it to be good, he finds it to be so quite in the same sense as he finds it to be oblong, we do not know how we can refute him. We can only ask him to be honest with himself and more rigorous in his self-examination. But if he still persists in saying that he discovers goodness in the table absolutely in the same sense as he finds a particular shape in it, we must content ourselves with saying that we do not consider it to be a fact. A table as a physical thing consists of the form and the material we find to be there. The entire being of a table is completely exhausted when the form it has and the material of which it is made are given. Nothing seems to be left over which can specifically be described as goodness. It may be said that a table cannot be just a table ; it must

be either a good table or a bad one. But we think that a table by itself must be just a table and nothing more. It may be called either good or bad according as it serves or does not serve the purpose for which it is made. But the purpose surely is extraneous to the table itself. We find therefore that whenever any thing is called good there must be some reference to something outside the thing which is called good.

Now even if it is granted that in a judgment of value there is some reference to something outside the thing which is judged to be good, we cannot at once conclude that the admitted reference is to some supersensible ideal ; we can, one may imagine, think with more plausibility that the reference is to our felt needs and desires or to our pleasures and pains or even to our mere intuition of goodness. That is to say, one may think that a thing is called good (i) because it fulfils our desire, or satisfies our need or (ii) because it gives us pleasure and saves us from pain or (iii) because it is simply felt or intuited as good. Let us examine these alternatives one by one.

There is perhaps some distinction between needs and desires. A student negligent in his studies may be in need of some rebuke from his teacher but he may not desire it ; on the other hand he may desire things which he does not need. But here the need for rebuke is not determined by the student himself. If he himself felt the need, he would have desired it ; and when one desires any thing the thing desired certainly appears to be really needed by him. In any case, if we ignore for the present the larger question of whether or not we have in fact any needs at all which are not purely the products of our desires, we have to admit that all our needs express themselves in the form of desires. If a rational self-conscious being feels no desire for any thing, we cannot say that he has any need at all. It is perhaps possible in theory to become aware of needs which have not yet given rise to any conscious desire. But in point of fact it is very

difficult, if not impossible, to dissociate any felt need from an incipient process of desire. So for our purpose it would perhaps be best to consider in this connection only the claim of desire to determine the goodness or badness of things.

It is not within my competence to undertake a detailed and accurate analysis of the phenomenon of desire ; and perhaps this is not absolutely necessary for our present purpose. So leaving that highly interesting and useful task to competent psychologists, we shall only touch upon some salient points which seem to be involved in any instance of desire. We find that whenever a person desires any thing he posits something in idea and feels in himself an inward urge for making it actual. That is to say, in order to be able to desire any thing, we must have some idea of the thing to be desired and it must not yet be a fact present before us. The conflict between fact and idea produces a tension which appears in all cases to be the essence of desire. We have no instance of desire if we simply conceive something in idea, for the actualisation of which our soul does not put forward any demand however faint. We have simply an idea or imagine something and there the matter ends. We find that no conflict ensues or makes itself felt simply on the occurrence of any chance idea. The thing conceived in idea must assume for us the aspect of goodness before we can rationally demand that it should exist. And when no such demand is there, there is no conflict which is the essence of desire. We see therefore that it is not the presence of a mere idea, which is not yet a fact, that accounts for, or is the meaning or the essence of, desire. The thing conceived in idea must be understood as good before any rational demand can be made for its existence. The truth of this statement is further evidenced by the fact that nobody ever demands the existence of a thing which he understands to be positively evil.

If our analysis is so far correct, then we find that a thing must be, or appear to be, good in order that it may be the

object of any desire. Desire is here seen to depend upon goodness and we cannot make goodness depend upon desire. When we find that a thing must be understood as good before there can be any desire relating to it, it is very clear that the thing must be understood as good quite independently of any desire that may follow upon such understanding. So the supposed reference to desire in our judgments of value seems wholly chimerical.

It may be suggested that our analysis of desire is not correct and that it is not necessary that a thing should be understood as good before it can be desired. But in that case it would remain altogether incomprehensible why we should demand that something should exist or be ours when nothing is understood as regards its value. That we may be wrong—and so open to correction—in our understanding any thing as good is quite intelligible; but that this understanding as the basis of all rational desires should not be there, is a position which we do not comprehend.

Even if we suppose that all our desires are irrational, we cannot understand that a thing should be good merely because it is desired. If a thing is originally devoid of all goodness it is inconceivable why it should suddenly be endowed with this characteristic when simply a demand has been put forward for its existence or for our possession over it. If this were a correct position, it would make all our judgments of good and bad wholly irrational. Moreover if we were to maintain this position we should suppose that to be desired is to be good. But it appears that the meaning of goodness can never be the meaning of being an object of desire. If "to be good" really meant "to be desired" there would be no distinction between good desires and bad desires and no one would ever have any cause to regret that his desires are wicked because they fly to things which are not good. For, when our desire is the only source of goodness—when it is the only agency to spread goodness over things—

there can be no question whatever about its goodness and we should not think that any thing can be evil when it is once touched by our desire.

It may appear that by supposing that a thing need not be good when it is desired, we are going against our former position that a thing must be understood as good before it can be desired. But it is not so. We still maintain that an implicit understanding of the goodness of a thing must logically precede all our rational desires directed towards it. But the understanding may very well be wrong. It is sufficient for a desire to ensue that a thing should appear as good, even though in fact it may not be so. So from the fact that a thing is desired we cannot say that it is good, although we do say that it must have appeared to be good to the person who desired it. But when "to be desired" is taken to mean "to be good," a thing must be good when it is desired. This is a position which we do not accept.

Let us see if our opponent fares any the better when he tries to understand goodness in reference to our pleasure and pain; *i.e.*, when he thinks that a thing which gives us pleasure is good and that which gives us pain is bad. It may be admitted that what is good must satisfy us in some sense and satisfaction is a variety of pleasure by whatever name it may be called. But the question here is whether the meaning of goodness can be equated with that of pleasure or pleasantness and whether anything is good solely and simply because it gives us pleasure. It is easy to understand that goodness and pleasure are not synonymous, that the meaning of goodness is not the meaning of pleasure. Even if we grant that pleasure is a good, it cannot be maintained that pleasure is the good.

It is sometimes said that what men seek to realise in this world under the name of good is really pleasure only. But as many writers have pointed out, nobody ever makes pleasure as such the object of his endeavour. We strive after things

which are concrete in their character and when we are successful in our efforts, pleasure may follow as a consequence. The fact that we never seek to do things which are positively and absolutely painful in their effects only shows that pain as such is not a good, or, at most, that an element of pleasure cannot be altogether eliminated from our notion of the ideal or the good. But it does not prove that we really take good and pleasurable to be identical. Even if it could be proved that all people in the world are seekers after pleasure, it would by no means follow that pleasure is the good. For the good is what we all ought to realise, and no idea about it can possibly be obtained from a consideration of what we do actually seek to realise in the world. Even the supporters of the theory that pleasure is the good have found it necessary to distinguish between pleasures and pleasures. The pleasures of mind are supposed to be better than the pleasures of sense. But pleasures themselves cannot thus be evaluated if pleasure is supposed to be the basis of valuation. Some criterion other than mere pleasure must be used to judge of the goodness or badness of pleasures. Moreover pleasure only indicates how we are affected by a thing. It says nothing of the worth of the thing by which we are thus pleasantly affected. We see therefore that pleasure cannot bring out the distinctive element of worth which is essential to our notion of goodness. What gives us pleasure is simply pleasant. We do not understand why we should—and how we can—add the further determination of goodness to describe what is merely pleasant. What is pleasant may happen in some cases to be good also. But the logical identity of these two concepts can never be established.

If we accept either desire or pleasure as the criterion of goodness, we shall involve ourselves in hopeless subjectivism. As we have already pointed out, desires and pleasures are purely personal and we cannot, with certainty, say beforehand what will be desired by a particular person or with what thing he will be pleased. What is desired by me may not be

desired by you and what pleases me very much may be positively unpleasant to you. So, with pleasure or desire as our criterion, we shall never be able to decide whether a particular thing is either good or bad. We shall have to admit that it may be both good and bad according as there are persons to be pleased and displeased by it. This will however make all rational discussions about these matters impossible. We shall be irretrievably lost in mere subjectivism and shall never attain to that measure of objectivity which is the essence of all science and truth.

It may be urged that there is nothing to make a thing good except our feeling or intuition that it is so. There is no doubt about the fact that some things are felt or intuited as good. And the only warrant for calling them good is the fact that we feel them to be so. We then come to the position that a thing is good because it is felt to be so. We do not know whether this view is held by any philosopher; but let us discuss it at least as a theoretical possibility. The view we want to discuss here is not whether goodness can, or cannot, be directly felt or intuited, but whether, when a thing is good, it is good simply because it is felt to be so. We want to ascertain whether the goodness of a thing depends solely upon its being felt to be good, when we know that it is neither good nor bad in itself.

It is certain of course that a thing must in some sense be felt to be good in order that we may have some presumption to think that it is good. But it does by no means follow that it is good solely and simply because it is felt to be so. It would be very curious if the intuition or the feeling by which we apprehend goodness of things were also the ground which lent goodness to them. When a thing by itself is not good, it must be viewed in relation to some other thing before it can be known to be good. But the other thing in question can never be the intuition itself which apprehends the goodness of the thing. For that in relation to which any thing is called good

must logically precede our recognition of the thing as good and also fall within the view which recognises such goodness ; and our act of knowing or feeling any thing to be good can never precede itself nor be viewed by itself. Moreover the danger of subjectivism which we have noticed above attacks us here with even greater force. People differ widely in their feelings and intuitions and if a thing could be good simply by being felt to be so, any thing might be good and no intelligible discussion would be possible between two different persons on this subject. The fact that any thing and everything is not and cannot be felt to be good at our will only shows that there are objective determinations to which we must remain loyal.

We have now considered the different alternatives which were suggested, in preference to the ideal, as supplying the other term in relation to which things might be judged to be good, and we have seen that none of those alternatives is satisfactory. When these alternatives fail and there is no other in the field besides the ideal, we can, it seems, safely assert that it is the ideal which determines the goodness of things. It may be argued, possibly, that although we are not now able to think of any other alternative, there may be some other alternative which truly accounts for our judgments of value. But to argue in this fashion is to take shelter under ignorance, and unless we are told what the other possible alternative is, we cannot profitably give any serious consideration to the suggestion.

Moreover the ideal appears so clearly to us to be the ultimate measure of all our judgments of value that we think we shall be justified if we now turn our whole attention to it, and try to define and defend our position.

It is true that the term ideal is one of the vaguest in all philosophical literature. It has been used with high appreciation as well as great disparagement by writers of different schools. Sometimes it is equated with the thinnest abstraction of the human mind and sometimes it is found to supply

the bed-rock of ultimate reality. But inspite of this vagueness and uncertainty in the use of the term, we think that with proper qualification it can be made to serve a very useful purpose. In fact it should be the basis of a true idealism that will concern itself not so much with mere ideas but with the best in human life and thought. It is in this way that true idealism—the philosophy of the ideal—can come to its own and make itself significant.

It will generally be admitted, I think, that all rational beings do make and can understand the distinction between what is and what should be. And everybody expresses his sense and understanding of the ideal in his judgments of what should be. We appreciate and call a thing good because it is as it should be. We condemn another because it is not what it should be. Such appreciation and condemnation unmistakably imply in our mind the presence of some standard in the light of which things are appreciated or condemned. If there is no such standard, what justification can we have for calling any thing either good or bad? It may be true that sometimes things appear to us to be good for which we cannot at the moment assign any satisfactory reason. But it does not mean that there is no such reason. Sometimes we feel that certain arguments are wrong without being able to point out the exact fallacies in them. But it does not mean that the fallacies are not there or that our feeling that the arguments are wrong can be taken as the true reason for which they should be rejected as false. Common people always pass judgments of truth and falsehood without ever being conscious of any standard of truth. But this cannot prove that there is no standard of truth or that no standard is implied by their judgments. Even so, when we fail to find out and define the standard by which we have estimated the value of a thing we cannot say that the standard is not there. So we take it as established that there is some standard by which the excellence, worth or value of things is determined.

This standard of worth or value is what we mean by the ideal. The ideal is the standard of value and the actual has worth in so far as it embodies the ideal (*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 7, p. 87). Our general ignorance of the ideal does not prove the absence of the ideal; it only proves the general lack of wakeful consciousness in us, as Plato would say. Whoever permits himself to think how things should be as distinguished from what they are, and makes any judgment of the form—"This is good" or "This ought to be done"—must admit that there is some ideal. We all make such judgments and there should be a practical unanimity about the presence of the ideal in our thought. There can be—as indeed there are—differences of opinion only about the content or the concrete nature of the ideal. We shall try in the following pages to explain as far as possible our notion of the ideal. But in the meantime let us remove certain misconceptions about it.

Our view of the ideal at present is very comprehensive. We do not mean that because we are using the term ideal, it should therefore be taken at once as something very spiritual. Whatever we may say of the ideal later on, at this point we are only maintaining that the ideal is the standard of goodness and virtue.

It is sometimes supposed that the ideal is only personal and therefore subjective. What is ideal to me may not be ideal to you. People are known to cherish and follow different ideals in life; and this is possible only if the ideal is something personal and subjective.

This is an old objection now put in a new form; and in answer we can but repeat what we have already said. We have taken the ideal in the sense of the standard of value and if value is objective, as we have maintained it is, then the standard by which it is judged must also be objective. It is impossible for us to determine any thing objective by a purely personal standard. The sense of objectivity is ineradicable

from our judgment of value, and so, unless we are hopelessly mistaken in this, the standard by which such value is determined must also be equally objective.

Now if the ideal is objective, how is it that different people seem to have different ideals? Our answer to this question is that the ideal is only conceived differently by them. The fact that the ideal is differently conceived by different people does not make the ideal itself different. We differ from one another in our insight into the truth of things; and according to the light that is given us, we conceive the ideal with different degrees of adequacy. But there is no doubt in our mind that it is the same ideal, the Best, that we are trying to envisage in our thought and embody in our life.

But, it is sometimes asked, where is the ideal? Is it not an exaggerated fancy or, at best, an exalted vision of your mind? Does not the ideal exist wholly in a subjective medium? And is it not thereby infected with subjectivity? These questions appear legitimate enough at first sight but in fact they proceed from a misunderstanding of the nature of the ideal. If the ideal were a mere vision of fancy, psychical in its character, we should never have the right or authority to condemn any thing in the light of the ideal. It is inconceivable that we should think that anything is good or evil, deserving of praise or blame, merely because it satisfies or does not satisfy our subjective fancy. We feel that the world as well as we ourselves ought to conform to the ideal. But if the ideal were only a vision it would be utterly incompetent to make this extravagant demand on us and the world. What reason can we have for demanding that the world should fashion itself after the pattern of an imaginary picture? It is because the ideal is not a mere fancy but reality in its urge to recover itself that we feel justified in demanding that the world should be as the ideal is. The vision of the ideal may be there but the vision as a psychical phenomenon is not the

ideal. That which is reflected in the vision is the ideal and that is far from being psychical or subjective. The sense of the ideal is the highest grasp or reach of reality through the medium of human consciousness and it carries with it the insistent demand that the world as it is should be remodelled into what it ought to be.

Some people say that the ideal is only a product of social habit or custom or even, perhaps, of public opinion and so it is illegitimate, they argue, to make any metaphysical use of the ideal and to think that some transcendental reality is represented in it. We are obliged, however, to dissent from this view. We think that the ideal can never be the product of social habit or public opinion. By habit we understand some settled tendency or practice. A certain way of behaviour by constant repetition may become relatively easy and persistent. A good part of what we are or do may be put to the credit of individual and social habit. Habit has made easy what was once difficult. it has made relatively permanent what used to take place only now and then. But although habit can explain in this sense what we now are, it cannot explain in any sense what we ought to be, and our ideal is what we ought to be. If we have no idea of 'ought' it is strange to suppose that we shall acquire it merely by habit. Even the animal world is subject to the influence of habit but habit surely has not supplied them yet with a sense of the ideal.

The Society may induce or coerce me to do certain things with the threat of punishment or the hope of reward. I may in my actions be susceptible to the subtler influences of public opinion also. But I can never be made by these means to think any thing good unless I myself recognise it to be so. You can force my action by some means or other, but you can never by any means force an ideal upon me unless I freely choose it. The flesh is in bondage but the spirit is free.

We may even grant that we are sometimes influenced by others in thinking of the ideal in a particular way. But this

does not detract anything from the absoluteness of the ideal as such or from the unconditional character of our recognition of it. It does not make the ideal dependent in fact upon public opinion nor does it reveal the fact that we think of the ideal as so dependent. The ideality of the ideal is never borrowed from public opinion ; it is beyond the touch of all corruption. Only the particular colours which it assumes in our eyes may be rightly or wrongly supposed to be there. If we are right in our thinking of the ideal in a particular way, we are fortunate ; if we are wrong, we ourselves are at fault. We may be helped to, or hindered from, a correct understanding of the ideal by an intelligent or a perverse public opinion. We submit therefore that although people living in a community may influence one another in their thought about the ideal, it is not proved thereby that the ideal itself has no character of its own or that it is simply a product of social habit or public opinion.

We then assert that the ideal must be posited before any thing else is posited in the moral world. Our moral world consists of all those thoughts and actions which imply the conception of the "good" or "ought." We recognise this world and maintain it in existence by every one of our moral judgments. The moral world may even be so defined as to be made co-extensive with our whole life so far as it is rational. Life is nothing if it is not continuously active ; and all activity, so far as it is rational, is directed towards the achievement of some result which is conceived or felt to be good. All our actions are meant to bring about certain changes in the existing state of things and if the proposed change is not viewed as a good, why should one try to realise it at all ? So either we must say that our actions are all irrational or we have to admit that we assume something to be good and then try to realise it by our actions. Even when there is nothing better or higher than simple food and drink, which we seek to obtain, we must recognise them as good before we can rationally

direct our action towards securing them. Food and drink may not be good in themselves, but they are good because they support life, and life is viewed as good by most of us. When the scientist, or the artist, is after truth, or beauty, for its own sake, he feels and knows that he is trying to realise something which is of supreme value. Thus it appears that the moral world is not a secluded area to which only some distinguished individuals are allowed to make their occasional visits. It is on the contrary the common possession of all rational beings and seems to pervade the whole sphere of our thought and activity.

Even if we limit the extent of the moral world to those thoughts and actions only which have clearly and specifically to do with our conception of the good, the existence of this world remains as incapable of being doubted as the fact of our own existence. If the moral world is to be there, the ideal must also be there. The ideal gives meaning and significance to all our judgments of value. We cannot call anything either good or bad, if there is no ideal by which such characteristics are determined. And if there is nothing good or bad, there appears to be no reason why we should try to accomplish anything in the world—why at all we should think, act or live. We must either abandon ourselves wholly to the necessary and blind operations of the laws of nature and thus make ourselves free from all complicity in its work, or we must understand and posit something as good and try to realise it in the world. If we are to open our lips and raise our hand on our own initiative, and, if we are to be rational, it must be in the interest of the good, however imperfectly that good may be conceived by us. If we are to approve of anything or condemn anything we must necessarily assume something in the light of which condemnation or approval may appear rational.

It may be said that the standard, which determines our judgments of value, need not itself be somewhere real. It

should suffice for our purpose if the standard can be described in objective terms. When, *e.g.*, we judge that a particular figure is a circle, we do not think that the standard of circularity is first real in an ideal circle and is then realised in the figure before us. We simply mean that the figure before us possesses the property of circularity which is objective in the sense that it can be described, as it has been done by Euclid, in objective terms.

In answer to this objection it has only to be pointed out that the value of a thing is not like the property of circularity which can be found in the circle itself and does not refer us to anything beyond it. When we speak of the value of a thing our attention is not exclusively confined to its positive characteristics; we are forced to think of some ideal element which is realised in it and but for which the thing would not have any value at all.

It is certain that in some sense the ideal is. Our whole moral life would have to be denied if the being of the ideal were to be denied. But the being of the ideal does not merely follow, in theory, as a deductive conclusion, from the fact of moral experience; it can, we believe, be even empirically found to be present in the consciousness of all rational beings. If anybody seriously and honestly asks himself whether there is anything which is really good in itself, anything, at least, on account of which things are good or bad, we believe he will find in himself a clear answer in the affirmative. If the question takes a practical turn and he is asked to define what that thing is, he may hesitate and fail to give a definitive answer with confidence. But he will never take his failure to define the ideal offhand in a satisfactory manner as amounting to his denial of its reality. If he takes time and is persistent with his questions, he will be able, we think, to formulate some notion of the ideal which he really follows in his life and conduct. That he may not be quite correct in his thought about the ideal is

readily admitted but that he will feel that some ideal is there and will have some idea about it, if he is really earnest in his self-examination, is equally undeniable.

Just as it is true that the ideal must be real in some sense, it is also true that the ideal does not exist as an actual fact. Not only is it a fact that the ideal does not exist in the sense in which the physical world exists, but it is also demanded by the fact of our moral experience that the ideal should not exist in this sense. If we examine and exhaust all the phenomena of the sensible world, we shall never discover our ideal among them. Even if we think we have found our ideal in the natural world, it will forthwith lose all its ideality and become just a fact or an event like any other in the world. If the ideal as such could wholly be precipitated into a fact, just present before us, all our moral life would come to an end. There would then be nothing to attain to or aspire after, and a sort of moral deadlock would certainly ensue. But as a matter of fact we find that moral experience is there and it implies that the ideal has yet to be realised. If we were what we ought to be and if the world were also what it ought to be, the characteristic difference between 'ought' and 'is' would not be there and we should have no duty to perform either with regard to ourselves or with regard to the world. The main impetus to moral activity comes from the fact that we are not what we ought to be. In this fact lies the root of all moral experience. We find therefore that the ideal is never an accomplished fact; it demands to be made actual but it is not so already. The ideal is always ahead of us, never behind, or just in front of us.

But here is an apparent contradiction. We urge that the ideal must be real in some sense but we are also obliged to admit that the ideal is not real as a fact. How is it then real at all?

When the question is raised about the reality of the ideal we should try to ascertain what sort of reality we really

want for it. We should also ascertain whether a thing is unreal simply because it is not a fact among other facts and does not occur as an event in the series of events which make up the natural world.

In the first place it appears that if we restrict the sphere of reality only to those entities which occupy space and occur in time, we shall fail to give a satisfactory account of our experience. We cannot give an account of experience without introducing the ideas of relation, quality and universal, and they do not appear to be simple members of a spatio-temporal series. However we may try to explain these terms they do not certainly appear to stand for things which are simply the complexes of space and time. Relations and qualities do not exist in space and time in the sense in which substances do. A rose may exist here and now. But redness is not confined to any particular space or time nor can we think that it is spread over all space and time. Similarly relations and other universals do not seem to be explicable wholly in terms of space and time. We are not concerned at present to establish or to deny the reality of these entities. All that we mean to assert just now is that for those who are convinced of the reality of these entities, reality cannot mean mere existence in space and time.

If we define reality as existence in space and time, if, that is, we think that alone to be real which exists in space and time, we shall have to say that space and time themselves are not real, for space and time do not exist in space and time. Although it may be admitted that space and time are for us the dominant aspects of reality it need not follow that they are the only or the highest aspects of reality.

We therefore conclude that it is not absolutely certain that all that is real must form part of a spatio-temporal system. We admit that the ideal is not a fact among other facts of the world. But these facts in their exclusive particularity are not the only things that have a title to reality.

What is necessary to give meaning, coherence and intelligibility to these facts must be at least as real as the facts themselves. The rational elements in facts are not simply the fabrications of an arbitrary fancy nor are they tyrannically imposed on some foreign material. They must be seen on the other hand to be the informing spirit of the facts without which the facts would be nothing. The categories and the ideals of experience are not therefore to be banished altogether from the realm of reality or confined within the region of subjectivity only. So if the facts of the moral life require, as we have seen they do, for their explanation, the conception of an objective ideal, we must then admit (so long as we cannot deny the facts themselves) the validity of the conception and the consequent reality of the ideal. The fact that the ideal is not to be seen at any particular space or time does not prove that it is unreal ; it only shows that the ideal as ideal cannot be caught in the network of space and time.

Moreover the sort of reality that belongs to the world of facts is utterly incompatible with our conception of the ideal. Finitude and change are the two indispensable characteristics of all facts of the natural world. These are in a way the products of their spatio-temporal character. The facts as they come to us exclude one another. The being of each particular fact is limited by that of every other fact and this limit can never be transcended by the particular fact so long as it remains what it is. Again all facts are transient and evanescent in their character. There is perpetual change everywhere. It is because our vision is very dull that we seem to find permanence where there is only continuous change. There is a sort of unstable equilibrium reigning supreme in all facts, in consequence of which none of them can remain exactly itself for two successive moments. Nothing comes to stay ; nothing in the world can maintain itself in being against the forces of disruption which are inherent in it. Everything tends to disappear as soon as it is ushered into existence.

We want to realise and be one with our ideal. But if the ideal were condemned to finitude and invested with a repellent character, which is the mark of all finite things, we do not know how we could still look upon it as our ideal. We want to be taken up into the ideal but if its nature were such that it would keep us always at an arm's length, it would never be our ideal. If the ideal lacked the principle of self-maintenance, like the facts of the natural world,—if it were to vanish as soon as we got it in our grasp—it is doubtful whether we would then think of it as ideal and strive after it. It is no use trying to reach a point where we cannot maintain ourselves and are sure of an immediate fall.

When we find that we cannot be satisfied with an ideal that has only the reality of the natural world, it should not be a defect in the ideal that it does not possess the reality of this sort. We are speculatively certain that the ideal must be real, as we have no reason to believe that the sense of objectivity, associated with our judgments of value, is altogether, and in all cases, illusory. And although the ideal does not possess the reality of the natural world, we are not obliged to say that the ideal cannot be real ; for reality is not exclusively confined to this world only. We therefore, assert that the ideal is real. In this we have only followed the lead of the famous idealistic argument which says that what must be and may be certainly is.

CHAPTER V

The Ideal as the Good.

We have seen that our moral judgments imply some ideal. And as we cannot deny validity to all moral judgments, and as validity is not intelligible without objectivity, the ideal implied by the valid moral judgments must be objectively real. We have also seen that although the ideal may not be real as a fact in the external world of space and time, there is no reason to suppose that it is unreal, because reality does not belong exclusively to what appears in space and time but it belongs also, and perhaps in a higher sense, to what goes beyond them. But although the assumption of an objective ideal is rendered necessary by the nature of our moral experience the ideal, we are obliged to admit, is still very vague. We know that it is there but we do not yet clearly know what it exactly is. Let us try therefore to determine the nature of the ideal a little more closely.

We have tried to maintain that things are not good in and by themselves, but are so only in relation with the ideal. The nature of the relation between the things, which are called good, and the ideal, which in fact seems to be the ground of their goodness, has been variously conceived. It is said for instance that a thing is good because it realises the ideal, or because it reflects, approximates to or participates in, the ideal. We are aware that realisation, reflection, approximation and participation are different concepts ; but we think they are each meant to express some unique relation which must hold good between a particular thing and the ideal

before the thing can properly be called good. The idea of realisation, though widely used in Philosophy, is apt to be misleading, because it suggests the present unreality of the ideal to be realised. Approximation appears primarily a spatial concept, sometimes used even in connection with a temporal relation. But when a thing is supposed to approximate to the ideal, there is surely no reference to space or time. Similarly it is possible to find out some inadequacy in the notions of reflection and participation. All these concepts, however, though different from one another, seem to agree in one point. Each of them points to some unity or identity between the terms which are related by it. Reflection or participation is not possible unless there is identity in some respects. Approximation in time or space does not of course express any identity, but when there is an approximation in essence (which seems to be the meaning of approximation used in connection with the ideal) partial identity appears surely to be intended. The realisation of the ideal means the actual embodiment of the ideal in life and conduct: and this is possible only when we become one with the ideal. So however inadequate or different may be the expression which each of these terms gives to the intended relation between a thing, which is good, and the ideal, the essential character of the relation is not very much in doubt. Identity, partial or entire, seems to be the essence of the relation which a thing must bear to the ideal in order that it may be properly called good.

What, then, is the ideal? If things become good by being identified with the ideal, it is but natural to suppose that the ideal is the supreme good. If the ideal lends goodness to things, which appear rather indifferent when regarded in and by themselves, if things are good in so far as they represent or reflect the ideal, it appears reasonable to regard the ideal as the very embodiment of goodness itself.

In another way, too, we seem to be led to this conclusion. When the goodness of a thing is not directly seen, it is natural

to ask why it is good. In answer we may be told that it is good because it is essentially related to something which is good. But if we repeat our question and enquire about the reason why that something is good, either we shall have the same answer repeated, *i.e.*, we shall be referred to something else as the ground of the goodness of the thing in question, or we shall be told that the thing is itself good, *i.e.*, is good not because of something else but because of itself. We cannot have recourse to the former alternative more than a number of times. We cannot go on saying that *a* is good because of *b*, and *b* is good because of *c*, and so on indefinitely. We must come to some *x*, *y*, or *z* which is good because of itself, that is, which must contain in itself the ground of its goodness. That which is unconditionally good and is the condition of the goodness of all other things is the ideal. About anything else we may ask why it should be considered good, but in connection with the ideal such a question does not seem to arise at all. We cannot think of the ideal except as good. Nobody can maintain and pursue an ideal while thinking at the same time that it is not good. Even an altogether unworthy and wrong ideal must take on the appearance of good before it can be elevated to the rank of an ideal. To Satan bent on revenge upon the Almighty in Heaven, evil itself appeared as good before it could be made the object of his constant pursuit.

Here we have got some positive knowledge about the ideal. We have tried to maintain that we cannot say rationally that a thing is good unless there is an ideal which is realised in it. The ideal is the basis of anything being good. But when we know that the ideal is the basis of goodness we do not know that the ideal itself is good. Ideality and goodness, though inseparable, are not synonymous. So we think that in knowing that the ideal is good, we have made some advance in our knowledge about the ideal.

Goodness then is an essential characteristic of the ideal. But what is goodness? To this question, we confess, it is not

possible to give a satisfactory answer. Goodness, being an ultimate and elementary concept, cannot be analysed into any thing simpler than itself. If it is to be understood, it must be understood without any definition. If some one has no idea of goodness, no one can ever communicate it to him by means of words, gestures or any other symbols. On this point we agree with Professor Moore who says that good is an unanalysable concept. So when we say that the ideal is good, we must be understood without any further explanation or not be understood at all.

But does not the statement that good is a simple unanalysable concept contradict our thesis that whenever anything is judged to be good, there is a reference to the ideal? For if good is a simple unanalysable notion, it ought to be grasped intuitively and at once without any extraneous reference.

To this objection it may be replied that the reference to the ideal is not contained in our very notion of good as such. In order merely to understand what goodness is we do not need to fall back upon our notion of the ideal. In fact we start with our judgments of good and bad; and they would not be possible if we did not know beforehand what good or bad is. We do not say that the very meaning of goodness is not intelligible to us unless we know what the ideal is. On the contrary we think if we had no idea of good, we should have no clue whatever to the nature or being of the ideal. But although the meaning of goodness is quite intelligible by itself without any reference to the ideal it is not intelligible how anything by itself can be good without such a reference. The simple notion of good is no doubt applied to things but when they are seen not to contain the ground of goodness in themselves we are led beyond them to the ideal. We find the implication of the ideal in our judgment of good which is not identical with our simple notion of good. It is not the idea of goodness itself but that of something being good

which has the implication of the ideal. Such an implication is not, I hope, contradicted by the simple unanalysable character of our notion of goodness.

Our idea of goodness in its simple unanalysable character agrees with our idea of truth. Coherence or correspondence may be used as a criterion of truth. If there is coherence or correspondence, we may know that there is truth. But the meaning of truth is never the meaning of coherence or correspondence. This is evident from the fact that there is a standing dispute among philosophers as to whether truth should be defined as correspondence or as coherence. The disputants invariably use the term truth and must have a common understanding of it. If, for some, truth itself were identical in meaning with correspondence and, for others, with coherence, then no dispute would arise. The dispute is possible because while there is a common understanding or idea of truth for all, this idea is sought to be explained or characterised differently by different people. If the very meaning of truth were coherence (or correspondence), then whoever would speak of truth would understand coherence (or correspondence) by it and no dispute should arise as to whether truth should mean coherence or something else.

But although truth is a simple quality of our ideas or judgments, yet from an idea or a judgment being true, we draw the implication that there is some reality which is different from the idea or the judgment which is true, because we find that an idea or a judgment by itself can be neither true nor false. The implication of a transcendent reality, which is reflected or presented in the idea, is on a par with the implication of the ideal which is realised in the thing we judge to be good. From the fact that an idea is true, although an idea by itself cannot be true, we draw the implication that there is some reality which is realised or reflected in the idea which we judge to be true. From the fact that a thing is good, although it cannot by itself be good, we draw the similar

implication that there is some ideal which is realised in the thing which is judged to be good.

We have said that in knowing the ideal to be good, we have made some advance in our knowledge about the ideal. But it seems that in making this advance we have involved ourselves in a fresh contradiction. We held that a thing could not be good when taken by itself. It is good only in relation to some thing else which is the ideal. We are now saying that the ideal is good. But if our former contention is right, then the ideal, in order to be good, must be related to some other ideal. And that ideal must either be not good or be related to some other ideal and the process cannot be stopped until we come to an ideal which cannot be called good in the proper sense of the term. But when we speak of the ideal we mean the ultimate ideal and it is easy to see that there cannot be any higher ideal to which it may be related in order to be good. Thus we seem forced to admit either that our former contention is not right or that the ideal as ideal is not good at all.

It is better to admit the element of truth in this objection. The ideal is not good quite in the same sense as anything else in the world is good. A thing in the world is good in so far as it realises or participates in the nature of the ideal. Its goodness is in a sense borrowed goodness. But the ideal is good in its own right. So there seems to be an intelligible distinction between the goodness of a natural thing and that of the ideal. (By a natural thing we do not necessarily understand a physical object but any thing, fact or event, including life and conduct, which can form part of the scheme of the natural world.) We may answer the objection by saying that the condition of being related to the ideal in order to be good has its scope confined to things that happen or exist in the world and does not extend to the ideal which contains in itself the ground of its goodness. Even without this qualification, it is, I think, possible to defend

our position, that the ideal is good, without falsifying our former contention that nothing can be good unless it is related to the ideal. We held that a thing could be good only by being related to the ideal and the essence of the relation, however differently expressed, was found to be a form of unity signifying partial or complete identity. A thing is good to the extent it becomes one with the ideal. The degree of its goodness depends on the degree of completeness with which it is identified with the ideal. Now this identification becomes absolute when we come to the ideal itself. So if there is anything which is absolutely good it must be the ideal. The requisite relation to the ideal (in order to be good) is found in the relation of identity which subsists between the ideal and itself. We think therefore that there is no inconsistency in supposing that the ideal is good, even on the hypothesis that nothing can be good without being related to the ideal.

Some philosophers think that the idea of goodness is self-discrepant and as such it cannot be applied to anything that claims to be real. It is supposed that we 'speak of the good, generally, as that which satisfies desire.' But "A satisfied desire is, in short, inconsistent with itself. For, so far as it is quite satisfied, it is not a desire; and so far as it is a desire, it must remain at least partly unsatisfied." (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 410.) And "in any case, apart from this, there is implied the suggestion of an idea, distinct from the fact while identified with it. Each of these features is necessary and each is inconsistent with the other. And the resolution of this difference between idea and existence is both demanded by the good and yet remains unattainable" (*ibid*, p. 410). But, as we have seen the satisfaction of desire is not the essence of goodness. So even if there is any self-contradiction in the idea of a satisfied desire, it will not affect our view of the good. But the supposed contradiction in the idea of a satisfied desire appears more verbal than real,

It is not the essence of desire that it should never be satisfied. And so when a particular desire is actually satisfied there should be no harm in speaking of the desire as satisfied. Otherwise nobody could speak of his task as done, seeing that a task is no longer a task when it is done. There would be self-contradiction in the idea of a satisfied desire if desire denoted a fixed state of a static universe and satisfaction also as a permanent condition were sought to be asserted of it. But we know there is no such implication in the idea of desire or in that of satisfaction. If it is not contended that the nature of a desire is such that it can never be satisfied, there should be no objection to the idea of a desire being satisfied. When a desire is actually satisfied, we may use some other name to denote the state of things and may not speak of it as a satisfied desire for fear of self-contradiction, but the fact itself cannot be denied.

It is no doubt true that a distinction between fact and idea is implied when we speak of the good and it is also true that there should be some identity between the two. A fact or an idea, by itself, is neither good nor evil. But the fact should be seen to embody the ideal held in idea before it can be recognised as good. There is difference because the fact itself is not the idea ; and there is identity because the idea should be seen as realised in the fact. But this identity and difference between fact and idea should not be considered a mark of self-discrepancy inherent in the notion of goodness. For neither the difference nor the identity is absolute in this case. As Bradley himself has taught us, identity in difference is an intelligible conception, and we have an instance of it here. The fact is not merely and absolutely different from the idea nor is the idea absolutely identical with the fact. The ideal as such is not wholly realised in the actual but it does not mean that it is not realised at all.

Further, identity and difference between existence and idea is the common feature of all our knowledge of real

objects. The fact of the existence of a thing is different from the fact of its being known by us. Even if one supposes, as some idealists do, that things do not exist without being known, still it cannot be maintained that their being is identical with our knowledge of them. For being and knowing are two different concepts and they cannot be simply identified without giving rise to hopeless confusion. If we have any real knowledge, the thing known must not be a mere idea but must have a self-existence distinct from the idea which we come to entertain about it. If the thing were a mere idea, it would then be a case of fancy or imagination and would not constitute real knowledge. Again if our knowledge is true, then the thing known must be given as one with the idea which is our knowledge about it. Thus we have some identity between fact and idea. So either we must give up all knowledge of reality and, with it, Philosophy which is a branch of it or we should not make identity and difference between fact and idea a special objection against our knowledge of the good.

Contradiction has been sought to be found in the idea of goodness also on the ground that as we are finite and so necessarily imperfect, it is not possible for us to reach the ideal perfection in the pursuit of which goodness consists. "Goodness," it is said, "since it must needs pursue the perfect, is in its essence self-discrepant, and in the end unreal" (*ibid*, p. 122). The ideal, to be worthy of our pursuit, must needs be perfect and it is also a fact that we are finite and imperfect. Otherwise there would be no need of striving after the perfect ideal. But is finitude the last word about us? And is the infinite ideal only a transcendent Beyond? Are we not rather finite—infinite in our character, as Bosanquet has said? And do not the roots of perfection lie already hidden in our hearts? How otherwise can we have the heart to pursue an ideal which is never to be reached by us? Is the nature of the ideal such that it cannot be touched by our

thoughts and deeds? Is it not, on the contrary, increasingly coming within the grasp and achievement of the best among us? We shall say more on this point when we come to consider the nature of the self and its relation to the ideal. For the present we can only say that the supposed contradiction would be there if our finitude were a standing and eternal fact and goodness implied our self-transcendence without there being any movement or process in the world. If we were absolutely fixed in our finitude and if our ideal were a transcendent Beyond, then it would be a contradiction to suppose that there can be any gradual approximation (in which goodness consists) between two such fixed and utterly opposed facts. But when this is not the case, the idea of goodness may not be wholly self-discrepant and unreal.

Bosanquet, too, is of opinion that the whole cannot strictly be called good, although it is the standard of all goodness and value. "Strictly you do not value it ; you value all else by it." (*The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 310.)

It may however be replied that if the necessary condition for having any value is that a thing should be capable of being judged by the standard, we think this condition may be fulfilled even in the case of the standard itself. For the standard may be judged by itself. If to be good it is necessary for a thing to be whole, and if nothing else is required for the purpose, then it is impossible for us to deny that the whole is good, because we cannot assert that the whole is not whole.

In this connection it is important to realise the sense in which the ideal is said to be the standard of value. It is not a standard in the sense in which the standard yard is a standard of measurement. If a piece of cloth is to be measured by the standard yard it must be able to contain the standard length a number of times. If it falls short of a yard, it cannot be measured by the standard yard. But this is not so in the case of the ideal. The ideal is not contained wholly in any of

the things that are judged by it. Still we use the ideal as the standard in our judgments of value. Things are good to the extent they approximate to the ideal. The ideal marks the limit of goodness which things in the world approach with various degrees of closeness. The limit is reached in the ideal itself. And so the ideal should be considered good in an unqualified sense.

While we are considering the ideal as the good, it would be desirable if we could profit by the light which the Platonic Philosophy throws on the question ; for the notion of the good appears to occupy a central place in that system of thought also. From what I have been able to understand of the Philosophy of Plato, it seems clear that much of what he says of the good applies without any reservation to our notion of the ideal which we are trying to expound here.

The good, according to Plato, is 'the end of life' 'the cause of things being understood, and also the source of the being of everything in the world' (*Nettleship*, p. 230). The ideal, too, is, as we contend, the end of life, and we shall try to show in the sequel that it is also the ground of intelligibility and of the being of things. So far there appears to be a complete agreement between our notion of the ideal and Plato's idea of the good. But if we inquire into the further characterisation of the good as given or suggested by Plato, we shall find that the good does not give a final and satisfactory picture of the ideal as conceived by us. According to some scholars the good is identified with God in Plato's Philosophy. If it is so, it will naturally come to be considered in our next chapter where we shall be concerned with the ideal as God. But it is, I think, now-a-days believed by competent authorities that the good is not a person but a principle and our idea of God is such that he cannot be conceived except as a person (*Burnet*). The good is only a methodological principle which gives unity and order to the world of ideas (*Stewart*). It is in a sense the idea of ideas. Just

as it is the idea of beauty which brings out the essence of all beautiful objects, so is the idea of the good present in all other ideas and constitutes their inmost essence. But it is not simply the logical universal under which all other ideas are to be subsumed. The conception of the good is more teleological than logical (Windelband). But the teleology of the good is not the teleology of the subjective human mind. The end signified by the good is not simply the object of some human desire nor is it simply that which comes at last (Nettleship). The end of anything is not any purpose of man or God which it can be made to subserve, but that which it can become in the fulness of its being. The end of man is the ideal man. The end of anything is the ideal that can be reached by it. Now all ideas are perfect in their own spheres. Perfection is therefore shared by all ideas, and since the good is the idea of all ideas, it comes to mean perfection itself (Stace). The good may mean more than what is simply common to all ideas, but if it is taken in the sense of perfection, it is at least intelligible why the good should be the end of life.

But we cannot realise something which can never be in us. We can only bring to fruition that which lies hidden in our nature. So in order that we may be able to realise perfection, we must already be in possession of potentialities which make for perfection. But as the idea of perfection is not already defined for us, we do not know what it is precisely that constitutes the essence of perfection. When then we know that we can only develop that with which we have been endowed, we come to the conclusion that the end of our life is the development of all our natural faculties. But we know we have powers and tendencies for good as well as for evil, and if we are to develop them all equally without discrimination, we shall make no advance towards perfection. It is no use telling us that we should strive after perfection or realise the good, because so long as we do not know exactly

what perfection is, we cannot intelligently direct our efforts to any particular end.

If, as Natorp suggests, the good is the principle of organisation and maintenance, we get a more definite content for our idea of the good. And we seem to understand better how we can make it the end of our life. We shall be working for the good when we work for harmony and order. Whatever may be the ultimate nature of the ideal, it must exclude disharmony and disunion. We also feel that we are nearing our ideal to the extent we are able to establish harmony and order in our own life and in the world. On this interpretation we can better understand how the good, besides being the end of life, is the principle of intelligibility in things as well as the ground of their being. A fact is intelligible only when it can be seen to be in harmony with other facts, only when, that is, a relevant place can be found for it in the organised whole of experience. When a thing cannot be filiated with any other thing in the world it remains unintelligible. We know that things in the world are related with one another; their being is not intelligible without such relation. A thing is what it does and what it does is always expressed in a series of reciprocal relations with other things of the world. Just as a hand would not exist as a hand if it were cut off from the body of which it is an organic part, so would any other thing be entirely different from itself if it were dislodged from its proper place in the orderly scheme of the universe. The system or the ordered scheme of the world sustains every thing in its being. Thus we see that the good as the principle of organisation is the ground of the intelligibility of things and of their being, just as it is also the end of life.

But this does not solve all difficulties. There are different senses in which a thing may be said to be the end of life, and we do not know precisely in what sense the good is the end of life. Is it the end of life in the sense that we do as a matter of fact aim at realising it in life, although we may

not at all be able to realise it actually, or in the sense that it is being actually realised in life, although we may or may not consciously aim at it? Is it, again, the end of life in the sense that we ought to aim at its realisation? Even though what we ought to realise may happen to be what is actually being realised, the distinction in meaning can scarcely be missed. The good cannot be wholly identical with the ideal unless the term good includes in its meaning that which ought to be realised. But the good represented simply as the principle of order and harmony does not seem to mean that which ought to be realised in life. What necessity is there that we should try to bring about order and harmony in our individual lives or in the world? Mere order sometimes proves killing to our souls. If nobody found any satisfaction in the harmonious ordering of things, it is very doubtful whether any one would ever consciously aim at it. So it seems that the principle of order merely as such does not explain why it should be made the end of life.

It is usual to think that a thing is explained when its proper place in the order of things has been found or pointed out. But the order which our intellect finds out is only a late discovery in the growth of our knowledge. For intelligibility something more primitive is necessary than mere order. If to begin with we do not know at all what a particular thing is, we shall never be able to ascertain whether it fits in with other things of the world. An unintelligible something can never be known to be in any intelligible relation with anything else. A thing must first come within our consciousness, must by itself be somewhat intelligible, before its filiations with other things can be asserted or disputed. It appears therefore that for intelligibility things should possess some more elementary characteristic than that of simply belonging to an order.

It is also doubtful whether mere orderliness can be the ground of the being of things. A thing must be before it can belong to an order or remain outside of it. 'To be' does not mean 'to be in order.' In order to understand what it is to be in order we must first understand what it is simply to be. When we know that a thing is, we do not at once know that it is in some order. But having known that it is, we proceed to find out its connections with other things. If to be were to be in some order, then, when we know that a thing is we should also know its connections with other things and no separate effort should be necessary to discover such connections. Things are there and they may very well be, as indeed they are, in some order; but their being is not identical in meaning with their being in some order. 'Being in some order' is a further determination of 'being' and it can be posited only on the assumption that there is some being to be so determined. Such being provides ground for there being any order but the order itself cannot be supposed to be the ground of being as such.

It is very likely that what Plato sought to express by the idea of the good is essentially identical with what we are trying to think of under the form of the ideal. But the good as characterised by his interpreters does not seem to give a final and satisfactory notion of the ideal.

CHAPTER VI

The Ideal as God.

We have contended that the ideal must be real, because the validity of moral judgments cannot otherwise be justified. Now, one of the easiest ways of conceiving the ideal as real is to suppose that it is fully realised in some being. The name God may conveniently be given to such a being. We human beings have all our characteristic drawbacks. None of us is perfect. We cannot say that the ideal is fully realised in any one of us. On the contrary our idea of God is such that it is never associated with any moral imperfection. God is generally thought of as all-wise, all-powerful and all-good. It is possible to think, as some writers have actually thought, that there are limitations to his power and even to his knowledge. But it is not possible to impugn his goodness without at the same time falsifying our idea of God. His goodness must not suffer any limitation ; he must be all good, perfect, if he is to be God at all. It thus appears very easy to identify the ideal with God.

It is not our intention to give here an independent proof for the existence of God. But having previously shewn that the ideal is real, we are now trying to identify it with God. Still we cannot help remarking that God conceived as the ideal is the only real God, that can be found and found to be satisfactory. The ontological argument is now-a-days regarded by many as fallacious (Cp. C. D. Broad's article in the Hibbert Journal, Vol. XXIV, p. 43). The cosmological and the teleological arguments also are not very conclusive. They

proceed upon an examination of external facts. These facts can be explained by some other fact of the same order or by a principle which is inherent in them and has its being only in them. The hypothesis of God can legitimately be used for the explanation of these facts only if we propose to degrade God to the level of natural phenomena. However far we may go back in a causal series we shall always find some member of the series and shall never get out of it. We can get out of the series to God only by a big jump; but the jump is neither warranted nor necessitated by the series of facts examined. The first term of the series, if there be any first term, must fall in a line with the rest of the terms and cannot claim a status superior to that of the rest.

A designer is necessary only when a thing is unable to fashion itself. For the growth in shape and proportion of a banian tree we do not constantly require the services of a master architect. We know that the whole thing is prefigured in the seed. If we started with formless matter we should require some external hand to put it into definite shape. But if it itself has the form and the tendency to give rise to other forms, the services of a moulding hand are absolutely superfluous. We should require the hypothesis of God if we supposed that in the beginning there was mere matter without any form and character. But it cannot be proved that the universe was ever in a state of this sort. The universe is always in a determinate state. It has always a definite character which is determined by its previous states and which again determines in its turn the state that follows. The process is absolutely continuous and no time or place can be found where we can introduce the designing hand of the Providence.

If God is any thing, he is spiritual, and a spiritual principle cannot be found in a non-spiritual medium. The external world is sometimes supposed to be the manifestation of some spiritual principle. But the spirituality of the

external world as revealed to our senses is not so clearly manifest as the spirituality of the selves that we are. So if there is God, we must look for the evidence of his being rather in our own selves than in the external world. However unworthy we may be in our everyday thoughts and deeds, we seem to come in touch with the divine in our sense of the ideal. In us there is nothing higher than our sense of the best. Here, if anywhere, we must look for the revelation of the reality of God to us. It is with a rare insight that Prof. Pringle-Pattison has said that "The presence of the Ideal is the reality of God within us" (*Idea of God*, p. 246). We know that God is the embodiment of perfection and we also know that the ideal embodies perfection in itself. It is easy therefore for us to think of God as the ideal or of the ideal as God. We have found that the ideal must be objectively real. So there cannot be any question about the reality or existence of God conceived as the ideal.

We have said that God conceived as the ideal is the only God that can be found satisfactory. The cosmological and teleological arguments, even if they are successful, can only prove a highly powerful and clever God. That God, however powerful and clever, need not be a God of goodness. And no being can be worthy of our love and worship unless it possesses the attribute of goodness in its perfection. The ingenious creator of the world might be there, but there would be no reason why we should love and worship him. He might inspire us with awe and wonder, but he would never fill us with reverence. Such a God would never satisfy our religious sentiments. It cannot be supposed that we might be induced to love God in the hope of some reward or out of fear of some punishment. For love actuated by such selfish motives would be no love at all. It cannot also be argued that we should be grateful to God for the things he has given us to enjoy, because one does not usually feel any gratitude for things he has never asked for, especially when he finds that the things for

which he asks are not granted to him. Such considerations however do not arise at all when we come to think of God as the ideal. The ideal simply because it is the ideal, the source and ground of all worth and goodness, demands our love and devotion. We do not require any reason to be given for our worshipful attitude towards it. Our heart goes out spontaneously in love and worship to a being whom we recognise to be no other than our ideal. Thus in our sense of the ideal we have got a proof and evidence of God which can nowhere else be found.

Some modern writers have been led, like ourselves, from a consideration of the moral world to the idea of God. All these thinkers are deeply impressed with the objective validity of morality and they are convinced that the ideal implied in morality must have objective existence. We are glad to have the support of these writers for our fundamental position that the ideal must be objectively real. We perfectly agree with them in so far as they think that morality cannot be made wholly rational without some religious or metaphysical background. Our difference with them begins only when they try to define the nature of that background and its relation to the ideal. A brief consideration of the views of some of these writers on this subject may help us to elucidate our position as well as to explain where and how we differ from them.

Dr. Rashdall is anxious to secure objective reality to the ideal. He realises that it cannot exist in material things or in the mind of this or that individual. But 'it cannot exist nowhere and nohow but in a mind.' It requires therefore the mind of God. "The belief in God," he argues, "is the logical presupposition of an objective or absolute morality." "Our moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind of God." (*The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 212.) Dr. Rashdall does not seem to think that God himself is the ideal. He only says that the

recognition of the existence of the moral ideal implies a spiritual source of Reality whose idea it is. (*Ibid*, p. ix.)

It appears that according to Dr. Rashdall the mind of God is necessary to give reality to the ideal. The ideal is real; but, he says, it can be real only in a mind. And so a divine mind is required. But why should it be so? If we are persuaded that the ideal must be real, why can we not suppose that it is real by itself and on its own account? We have already tried to show that although the reality of the ideal may not be of the same order as that of any fact in the world of mind or of nature, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot be real.

Even if we suppose that the ideal exists somehow in the mind of God, we shall find it very difficult to understand the relation between the ideal and the divine mind. (1) Does the divine mind add only awareness to the ideal which is already intelligible by itself as ideal? (2) or is the very being of the ideal as ideal constituted by its being in the divine mind? (3) Does the ideal exist as an ideal in the mind of God? (4) or does it exist there merely as a real idea?

(1) If the presence of the ideal in the divine mind means only the addition of awareness (on the part of God) to it, then so far as the being of the ideal is concerned it seems to be unaffected by such presence or absence. If the ideal has a being of its own, its objectivity is already guaranteed and cannot be improved upon by the fact that God or any one else is aware of it.

(2) To be in the mind of God does not mean to be the ideal. So it is not possible that the ideality of the ideal should be constituted by its being in the mind of God.

(3) When we suppose that the ideal exists in the mind of God as an ideal, *i.e.*, as something still to be achieved or realised in fact, very little seems to be gained by the supposition; for the ideal exists as ideal in our minds as well. When we think that the ideal is only ideal to us, we may suppose that it

is real somewhere, *i.e.*, in the mind of God. But if it is merely ideal even there, the very reality of the ideal seems to be in danger.

We have to suppose therefore that the ideal is real in the mind of God.

(4) Now if it is to be real in the mind of God, it can be real only as an idea. How otherwise can anything be real in any mind? But the ideal is real as an idea even in our minds; and if its objective reality is not secured by its presence in our minds in the form of an idea, the situation is not likely to be altered very much by the presence of the ideal in the divine mind in the same form.

Moreover by enclosing the ideal within the mind of God Dr. Rashdall seems to have made the ideal quite unavailable for us. Ordinarily we have no means of knowing directly what is present in the mind of others. We may infer from visible acts or facial or other bodily expressions what is going on in the minds of our neighbours. But as we do not see the face of God and do not think that he has a visible body, we should be unable to know what is there in the mind of God. So if the ideal existed solely in the mind of God, we should be unable to know that it is there and what it is like. We should have no sense of the ideal and it would be impossible for us to make any attempt to realise the ideal in our life and conduct. The ideal must reach out to us in some sense before we can be drawn towards it. But this would not ever be possible if the ideal existed only in the mind of God. Dr. Rashdall does not think that the divine mind is only a comprehensive unity of individual minds. If it were so, then what is present in the divine mind might at the same time be present, at least partially, in individual minds. But Dr. Rashdall makes a real distinction between the divine and the individual mind (*ibid*, Vol. II, p. 242). If we hold to this distinction and understand the divine mind after the analogy of the human mind, it is incomprehensible how what is

present exclusively in one mind, even though it be the mind of God, can be operative in other minds as well. If however we are not to understand the divine mind after the fashion of the human mind, we shall not understand what it is and the assertion that the ideal is real in the mind of God will remain equally insignificant.

It may be objected that morality expresses itself in our conduct; and so the moral ideal is not a person but a course of action. And while it is possible for the ideal course of conduct to be represented in the divine mind in will or in idea, it is not possible for God himself to be that ideal simply because God is a person and not an act.

The objection overlooks the fact that an act as such is neither moral nor immoral. It becomes so only when it expresses the character of some personality. Acts are important for moral consideration because our character can find expression only in volitional acts. But ultimately the moral judgment is not passed on acts as such but on the person who performs the acts. It is we who are primarily moral or immoral, our acts are so only secondarily; we want to be moral and our ideal cannot simply be a course of action. It must be a character and personality which we wish to become. The degree of our moral advance is to be judged not so much by what we do as by what we come to be. So the moral ideal cannot be an idea in the mind of God or a course of action represented in idea in the divine mind but must be a personality who may be no other than God himself.

Prof. Sorley is another writer who has been led from a consideration of moral values to the idea of God. He has argued with great force for the objectivity of value, and has tried to establish the objective reality of the moral ideal. He has been impressed, however, with the apparent incongruity between the world of values and the world of causal relation. But he recognises at the same time that both the worlds must find their proper place in a harmonious scheme of reality.

He thinks that the desired unity between the physical and the moral world is supplied by the hypothesis of a divine mind whose purpose that goodness should be realised is being fulfilled in the world. It is one of the main contentions of Prof. Sorley that goodness, especially moral goodness, can be realised only in persons. Now, if man is to realise goodness in the highest sense, he must be free. "Mere correctness of behaviour is not a realisation of that high value of which man is capable; which requires its free choice and attainments." But his freedom implies that there is the possibility of his doing wrong also. It is true that "the world as a causal system displays such apparent indifference to the standard of good and evil." But the world cannot be explained from its present appearance only. The final issue, the end which it is made to subserve, should also be taken into consideration. And it is found that "even in its incongruities with the unchanging moral order, the world of nature may be regarded as a fit medium for the fashioning and training of moral beings" (*Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 504). This may be supposed to be the end or purpose of the universe. We find that nature is subservient to the moral order, and this means that it has got at its back 'intelligence and the will to good as well as the ultimate source of power.' This involves, in short, the acknowledgment of a supreme mind or God as the ground of all reality.

Professor Sorley does not think that the view he has propounded 'can strictly be proved or demonstrated.' But he appears to think all the same that he has given a synoptic view of the universe which should be philosophically satisfactory. On certain important points we are in whole-hearted agreement with him. When he argues "that the value or goodness actually achieved in personal life implies as its ground or condition a standard or ideal of goodness" (p. 499), and further contends for the objective reality of that ideal we are glad to have his support for one of our main theses. When

again he speaks of God as the supreme worth and says that whenever there is intrinsic worth in the world we may see a manifestation of the divine (p. 467), we find absolutely no reason to dissent from his view. But when he speaks of the divine purpose and says that it is revealed in the world, his words are not quite intelligible to us.

The meaning of purpose (in divine reference) as well as its relation to the ideal has remained rather obscure in Prof. Sorley's writings. Purpose in the sense of a felt want cannot be attributed to God, because God who is conceived as the ultimate ground of all reality cannot be supposed to have any deficiency in his being and cannot therefore feel a real want.

A purpose is not intelligible without some content or object which is purposed. What may be the object of divine purpose? We may suppose that the object of divine purpose is that there should be perfect beings in the world. But since there are no perfect beings, as is admitted by Prof. Sorley himself, we have to admit that the purpose of God, understood in this sense, is completely thwarted. The purpose of God should therefore be understood in the light of what is found consistent with the present order of reality. So Prof. Sorley has suggested that the fashioning and training of moral lives, which is permitted by the natural world, even in its incongruities with the unchanging moral order, is the purpose of God. But if the purpose is a real element in the heart of reality, an essential factor in our conception of God, then we should think that the training of moral beings is co-eternal with the being of God. The purpose being eternally present in the mind of God, the fashioning and training of moral beings should go on eternally. But is not the idea itself preposterous that there should be eternal doing of a thing without its ever being done? Fashioning or training has no meaning unless some thing is actually fashioned or trained. So it appears that the divine purpose cannot be

understood exclusively with reference to the process only. But if we wish to understand it in reference to the product, if, *i.e.*, we think that perfect moral beings are the object of divine purpose, we find that the purpose is not fulfilled in the world. Moreover it would not then be true to say that the fashioning of moral lives is the purpose of God.

These are some of the difficulties in understanding purpose as a subjective correlate of some thing which has yet to be accomplished. To avoid these difficulties we may try to understand purpose objectively as an end which is realised in a thing that admits of growth and development. In this sense treehood is the purpose of the plant which gradually grows out of a seed into a tree. When viewed in this light the divine purpose will be seen to be identical with the moral ideal which is being realised in this world. The ideal is not something which is purposed by God but it is itself the purpose. When the ideal is thus identified with the divine purpose we should have no objection to saying that the purpose is being realised in the world. But if by purpose in this connection we understand nothing else than the ideal, there is no special advantage in speaking of it as the divine purpose. Moreover Prof. Sorley does not appear to think that the divine purpose is identical with the moral ideal itself.

Prof. Sorley has not made it clear whether there is any essential relation between goodness and the purpose of God. He does not seem to hold that goodness depends on the purpose of God, that a thing originally neutral in its character becomes good when it is purposed by God. He thinks that it is the purpose of God that goodness should be realised in the world. But when goodness is made part of the object of divine purpose, it appears clear that goodness as such should be intelligible quite independently of such purpose. For if goodness meant what is purposed by God, then instead of saying that it is purpose of God that goodness should be

realised in the world, he should have said that God purposes that 'x' should be realised, and 'x' would have appeared as good because it formed the object of divine purpose. Moreover when we know that the divine purpose is directed towards goodness the virtual independence of the two concepts, goodness and divine purpose, becomes at once clear. Now it is the nature of goodness as such that it should be realised in the world. If anything presents itself as good to us, we spontaneously feel that it should be realised. Our understanding of anything as good is identical, or at least coincident, with our feeling that it should be realised. Nothing seems to be gained by the addition of the clause, 'It is the purpose of God.'

Prof. Sorley has vigorously maintained the objective reality of the ideal. But he has not made it clear where, how and in what sense the ideal is real. The ideal is not real anywhere in the material world. If it is to be real it must be real in man or God or in a third something outside both man and God. But it cannot be real in man as no man is perfect. The third something may be supposed to exist in the manner of a Platonic idea. But this has not been hinted at by Prof. Sorley; so we think that according to him the ideal can be real only in God. The only question that has to be decided is whether the ideal is real as an idea in the mind of God or is identical with God himself. In considering Dr. Rasdall's theory we have seen that the ideal cannot simply be an idea in the mind of God and we think Professor Sorley too cannot support the position that the ideal is only an idea in some mind. The objective reality of the ideal for which he has argued with so much force cannot be sufficiently guaranteed if the ideal is real only as an idea. Moreover Professor Sorley thinks that goodness can be realised only in persons. So the ideal of goodness, if it is to be real at all, must be real only as, and in, a person. And the easiest way of conceiving this person is to think of him as God.

We see so far that if the ideal is real there is no harm in identifying it with God. Instead of supposing that there are two supreme entities, God and the ideal, we think there is only one such being whom we call either God or the ideal. This supposition has the advantage of comparative simplicity. But when we have identified the ideal with God, can we say that we have solved our problem? Can we give a satisfactory explanation of our moral consciousness on the hypothesis that the ideal is identical with God? Again, although we vaguely suppose that we have made some advance in our knowledge of the ideal when we have found it to be one with God himself, do we in fact know where and how it exists? The nature of the ideal as well as the manner of its being does not at once become clear even when we have given the name God to it.

Now when we know that God is the ideal of goodness, that in him the acme of perfection has been reached, we understand why we should love and worship such a being. But however much we may worship God in whom the ideal is real, there does not appear to be any necessity why we should ourselves be good. God's being the ideal does not at all explain the obligation that lies on us to realise the ideal in our lives. The sense of obligation is an essential factor in our moral consciousness. We are never genuinely moral unless we feel that there is an unescapable obligation on us to be morally good. And this sense of obligation cannot be explained simply by the fact that the ideal is God. God may be perfect but this fact does not seem to have any relevance for the morality of men. God may be good, but why is it necessary for men to be so?

It may be said that if the fact that God is the ideal explains why we should love and worship him, it also explains why we should try to be good ourselves. We cannot truly love and worship goodness without feeling at the same time strongly inclined to be good ourselves. If anything is

conceived as the ideal, it means that it demands to be fulfilled in our life.

We do not deny the fact that the ideal demands to be fulfilled in our life. We recognise that there is a sense of obligation which every one of us feels to realise the ideal. We start from this empirical fact of the moral consciousness and seek for an adequate explanation of it. But we contend that this fact is not sufficiently explained by the hypothesis that the ideal is real and is real in a being who is different from us. We all feel drawn towards the ideal and the adequate metaphysical explanation of this fact is not that the ideal is real in God if we understand God, as he is generally understood, in the sense of a being who is different and distinct from us. The very conception of the ideal carries with it an urge in us to fulfil the ideal and we are persuaded that this fact must have some very profound metaphysical implications. And our present contention is that all these implications are not found, and can never be summed up, in the saying that God is the ideal. If the ideal is to be my ideal, if it must be a bounden duty on my part to realise the ideal, then the relation between myself and the ideal must be more intimate and close than what is granted to exist between men and God. We have already said that God is generally conceived as distinct and different from men. God is no God unless he can be loved and worshipped. But if I am to love and worship God, he must be an other to me. This otherness or externality with regard to men seems to be an essential characteristic of Godhead. If I am simply merged in God or God is merged in me, God remains no God for me.

We may be reminded that we are supposing without justification that deism and pantheism are the only possible alternatives with regard to God. We may be told that there is the third alternative of theism which enjoys the merits of both deism and pantheism without falling a victim to the defects of either. Deism as a philosophical theory has long

ceased to be maintained by any serious thinker. But there are still many powerful writers who believe in God and distinguish their theism from deism and pantheism. Ward for instance writes: "For pantheism God is the immanent ground, of the world, for deism he is the transcendent ground, for theism he is both" (*The Realm of Ends*, p. 234). Professor Sorley also has argued in favour of theism. But this theism is to be distinguished both from deism and from pantheism. Many other writers have followed the same course. There is nothing wrong in the belief that a satisfactory view of theism should be free from the defects of both deism and pantheism. But we are inclined to think that the desired synthesis of immanence and transcendence is not easy of accomplishment and the view of theism which we get in philosophical writings is scarcely distinguishable from what is known as pantheism.

Theistic writers speak of the world as the creation of God. But they take the word creation in a technical sense. Causation, transeunt or immanent, is foreign to their notion of creation. Creation does not mean for them a change in some material which was already in existence nor the bringing into existence of something which was not there. We are not even to think that creation means a change in God himself. But we are to understand by creation the dependence of the world on God. "To say that the world depends on God is tantamount to saying that could God cease to be the world too would cease to be, or that if the world should cease to be, it would be because God had ceased to be. In other words God is the ground of the world's being, its *ratio essendi*." (*Ibid*, p. 234.)

In two ways we may try to think that the world depends for its being upon God. Either, we may think, the world was brought into existence out of nothing by God or it forms part of the being of God. In the former case we can say that if God had not been there, the world would not have come into existence. In the latter case also it would be

legitimate to say that should God cease to exist the world would also cease to exist. There does not seem to be any other way in which we can think that the being of the world depends on God. But these, however, are the theories of deism and pantheism which are sought to be avoided by the supporters of theism.

Ward has specified the relation of dependence between God and the world by saying that could God cease to exist, the world would cease to exist also. But how do we know it? The hypothetical nature of the statement shows that it can never be verified. When we form part of the world, the experiment, which can prove conclusively that the world does really cease to exist on the cessation of God's existence, can never be witnessed by us. When we start with the reality of both God and the world, it is impossible to justify or prove to be false, empirically, the sort of relation that is asserted to subsist between them. We may try to do so by means of thought only, that is, we may examine our ideas of God and the world and see whether they are such as to imply the asserted relation between them.

We can rationally say that the world would cease to exist if God had ceased to exist when and only when we know for certain that the being of the world is included in the being of God. If the being of the world went beyond the being of God even by an inch, then to that extent the world would remain even when God had ceased to exist. If the world is to disappear with the disappearance of God, then the being of the world must be included in the being of God. The world must in that case be wholly immanent in God. If theism can accept this position it can hardly find any fault with pantheism.

It may be said that although the world is immanent in God, God is not wholly and simply immanent in the world. He is, in theism, both immanent and transcendent, and not simply immanent as in pantheism. But this position of theism,

we are persuaded, cannot strictly be maintained. If God is immanent, it is difficult to understand how he can be also transcendent. By the immanence of God we understand that God exists in the world. How can God so understood fall also outside the world and be transcendent?

It may be said that God is 'more than the world and goes beyond it and so to that extent he may be supposed to be transcendent. But in this supposition it is only a part of God which is transcendent and a part immanent; and God as such is neither immanent nor transcendent. When we suppose that the being of God not only fills the world but also falls outside of it, we conceive God as consisting of two parts one of which falls within the world and the other remains outside it. It is only by applying the name God alternately to these different parts that we can say that God is immanent as well as transcendent. But if godhead belongs to the part which falls within the world, God is immanent but not transcendent. If it belongs to the part which goes beyond the world, God is transcendent but not immanent. But if by God we are to understand the whole constituted by these parts, we cannot truly say that he is either transcendent or immanent simply because no whole can ever as a whole remain outside or fall inside any of its parts. We find it impossible therefore to reconcile with regard to God the idea of immanence with that of transcendence.

The difficulties of the theistic position that God is both transcendent and immanent are felt by all serious and honest thinkers (*cf.* Prof Alexander, *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXV, No. 2). Even Ward must have felt these difficulties. But he proposed to get rid of them by his hypothesis of intellectual intuition. By availing himself of the Kantian theory of the passivity of sense and the activity of understanding, Ward constructs the idea of intellectual intuition by doing away with the passivity of sense perception and the discursiveness of intellectual synthesis. He writes: "But now we are to

imagine our sensory and passive perception replaced by an active, intellectual position or discursive synthesis by an original thesis or intuition. The Being to whom this intellectual intuition belongs will be creative, its objective experience will contain nothing that is merely given to it, but only what is ultimately posited by it; its objects will not be phenomenal but noumenal, not independent manifestations of an Other but the creation of itself." (*The Realm of Ends*, p. 235). "In intellectual intuition all real difference between being and knowing, thought and thing, seems to have vanished" (p. 235). While contrasting intellectual intuition with absolute or complete knowledge Ward has further elucidated the idea by saying that absolute or complete knowledge would leave the things themselves still independent as regards their existence, and so would fall short of this intellectual intuition wherein, it is supposed, they are not merely known but whereby they exist (p. 346). This intellectual intuition appears to be a sort of creative knowledge by which things are not merely known but maintained in existence.

But how does it solve the problem of immanence and transcendence? Ward thinks that it solves in the following way. The creative knowledge, which constitutes the being of things and by which God knows them, is not after all God himself, and so God is transcendent to it. But as it is God's knowledge and is ever sustained by him, he must be supposed to be also immanent in it. In his own words, "God is transcendent to it, for it is not God, but his utterance and manifestation; and yet because it is his utterance and because he ever sustains it, he is immanent in it, it is continuous creation" (p. 240). The opposition between transcendence and immanence is sought to be relieved in this way and they are supposed to exist in God in harmonious union.

The world is supposed to be the creation of the Divine Being. But creation must mean either actual creation in

the ordinary sense of the term or an illusion of the Divine mind or simply a modification in the Divine Being. We cannot think of a fourth alternative. When God sees the world as different from him (for theism makes a distinction between God and the world), the world must either be actually there or it must be an illusion. If the world is to be there, it must be created by him in the ordinary sense, since God is supposed to be the ultimate source or ground of everything. If this view is not accepted, we can only suppose that in fact there is no world at all but only a false appearance of it. This view will raise its own crop of difficulties and is not of course accepted by Ward. The only other way in which we can think of creation is that it is a modification in the Divine Being itself, and not an actual precipitation into existence of an external object. But this is a pantheistic view of creation which finds no favour with Ward.

Let us however suppose that somehow God's knowledge constitutes the being of the world. But we shall see even this supposition does not reconcile divine immanence with divine transcendence. Ward says that 'God is transcendent to it, for it is not God but his utterance and manifestation.' The divine knowledge which constitutes the world may not be God himself, because God is more than his knowledge. His knowledge is only a part of his being. But can we have any adequate conception of God if we separate him from his knowledge? If we are to understand him aright, should we not think of his knowledge as essential to his being? If God is to be understood as inclusive of his knowledge, how can we think of him as transcendent to it? The being of God, we are persuaded, rises up to his 'utterance and manifestation.' If they are essential in his being he cannot be supposed to fall in any way outside of them. So we conclude that the analogy of creative knowledge will not help us out of the difficulties which we have discussed above and which must have been felt by Ward himself and to which indeed he also has made some reference.

Professor Alexander has frankly recognised that strictly speaking transcendence cannot be reconciled with immanence. So he writes in a recent article in the *Hibbert Journal* to which we have already referred "that transcendence and immanence are not reconcilable, that God cannot be, as Ward suggests he can be, at once the immanent and the transcendent ground of the world. If God is co-extensive with the world, he does not transcend it. If he transcends it he is not immanent in it." (*Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXV, p. 257.) He recognises however the merits as well as the defects of both transcendence and immanence, of theism and pantheism. He has therefore tried to retain the merits of both by attempting a sort of reconciliation between them. For religious consciousness it is essential, he thinks, that God should be different and distinct from the worshipper ; otherwise he cannot be properly loved and worshipped. So the strong point of theism is that it has conceived God as transcendent. But if God always remains aloof from the worshipper, how can he ever be united with him in love ? And without such union with God no religious consciousness can be satisfied. So for religion pantheism or the theory of immanence has the special merit of guaranteeing the substantial unity of the worshipper with God. If, therefore, our idea of God is to be a satisfactory one it should be such as to combine in itself both transcendence and immanence. But we have seen that transcendence and immanence are not strictly reconcilable. So Prof. Alexander suggests that God may be transcendent in one respect and immanent in another. "God is immanent in respect of his body but transcendent in respect of his deity" (*Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 396). The world of space and time is the body of God, and so God is immanent in the world ; but he does not thereby destroy the individuality of the beings contained in it, as is the case with ordinary pantheism. But God's deity, being the next higher quality to mind, is not yet anything actual in the world. It is something towards which the world is moving and which will

appear in course of time. In respect of this quality, *viz.*, deity, God is transcendent to all the finites which now make up the world, inasmuch as they all occupy a level below deity. All the finite beings of the world form the body of God and so he is immanent in them : but as they do not share the distinctive quality of deity, God is transcendent to them.

The difficulties of this position, despite its great merits, seem quite obvious. Although a distinction has been made between God and deity, it will have to be granted, we think, that God is God only when he is possessed of the distinctive quality of deity. A God without deity is no God at all. Professor Alexander himself has admitted in his book that his notion of God is predominantly theistic. If this is so there does not appear to be any real immanence of God as such in the world. And the jest of a friend of his, to which he has referred in his article, who said that 'the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is to exist a million of years hence,' seems quite justified. Prof. Alexander thinks that the jest is a misconception, "For the universe as straining towards deity is a present reality. And the universe so conceived is God. It is the actual existence of deity which belongs to the future." But if deity is the distinctive quality of God as he seems to have admitted in his book, then God is properly God when and only when he has this quality ; and if that quality is to be actual only in the future, we have then to look forward to the future for the actual being of God. The universe as straining towards deity may be a present reality, but it can scarcely be called God seeing that it lacks the characteristic quality of deity. The universe as tending towards deity is an embryonic God who has yet to realise himself. Our religious consciousness demands a real God with actual deity. A God in the making can neither evoke nor satisfy our religious sentiments.

However Prof. Alexander's view, inspite of all its defects, is highly suggestive. According to his theory the

universe is straining towards deity. In our terminology we should say that the world is moving towards the realisation of the ideal. He says that deity will be actual in the future. The history of the world so far is only preparatory to the last act of the cosmic drama in which deity is to make its appearance. We believe that, although a fuller realisation of the ideal in the world of space and time (appearance of deity) may take place in the future, the ideal (deity) must be a present reality in some sense as drawing the universe towards itself. There must be a level or plane of existence in which deity must be real even now. At least there must be a sense in which we should be able to say that deity is a present reality. Unless this is so, deity will not be able to inspire the movements of history towards itself. The tendency or straining of the world towards deity will be meaningless unless we grant that deity has been operating in some sense even from the beginning.

Although we do not accept Prof. Alexander's way of reconciling transcendence with immanence we think he has very aptly brought out the merits of both the theories and has thereby shown that God and man should be so conceived as to make their unity consistent with their difference. It appears to be one of the main tasks of Philosophy to show how this can be possible.

We have found in this chapter that so long as we understand God as transcendent, as simply different from man, godhead cannot be a satisfactory description of the ideal, because it cannot explain the necessity that we ourselves should realise the ideal. The ideal must be my ideal. It must not simply remain aloof from, or ahead of, me, but it must penetrate down to my inmost being and subdue me perfectly to its sway. Then and then only can it be truly and completely my ideal. So it seems that a more adequate view of the ideal will be one in which the being of the aspirant after the ideal, *i. e.*, of the moral agent, is taken up into that

of the ideal itself. That is to say, if the ideal is God, we must at some point be one with him. But as this is not satisfactorily guaranteed by ordinary theism, which cannot get beyond the transcendent view of God, we have to conclude that there is some inadequacy in our notion of the ideal as God.

Moreover the word God does not bring any very definite meaning to most of us. We may abstractly discuss about the transcendence or immanence of God. But his godhead cannot consist in mere transcendence or immanence. He may be supposed to be the creator and sustainer of the universe. But we do not think that merely in this capacity he can be regarded as the ideal. We may say that highest perfection is realised in him, that he is all-good. But we do not know wherein his perfection or goodness consists. There may be a being called God and he may be one with what we are trying to think of as the ideal. But our knowledge of the nature of the ideal as such is not very much advanced when we say that the ideal is God unless we know what constitutes the ideality of God. The term God does not universally give rise to only those ideas which may clearly be seen to be the characteristics of the ideal. So the term God has to be further defined before any identification between God and the ideal may be considered quite satisfactory.

CHAPTER VII

The Ideal as the Absolute.

We saw in our last chapter that although God may be regarded as the ideal, the conception of the ideal as God is not finally satisfactory. God is ordinarily regarded as transcendent. He is different from the man who worships him. But God so conceived can scarcely be the ideal which we seek to realise in our own life. If God is to be the ideal, he must be seen to be in much closer union with man, and it is considered as one of the great merits of modern philosophy that some of its most brilliant exponents do not regard God as separated from man. The union of God with man has been found to be so very essential that it is asserted that there would be no God if there were no man. God separated from man and man separated from God are supposed to be mere abstractions. "God then becomes an abstraction if separated from the universe of his manifestation just as finite subjects have no independent subsistence outside of the universal life which meditates itself to them in a world of objects." (*The Idea of God*, p. 214.) But when we begin to speak of God in this way, it is evident that God of religion is slipping out of our hands and the absolute of philosophy is taking his place. God and the absolute may not be two distinct principles; and many philosophers have made no distinction between them. God postulated by religion when adequately considered may be seen to become one with the absolute which philosophy affirms. So when we find that the ideal cannot be identified with God we may still hope that we shall be satisfied

with the view that the absolute is the ideal. We are led to this view not only by the consideration that God, which was regarded as the ideal in our last chapter, is found, on closer examination by many philosophers, to be one with the absolute, but also by the fact that some very influential thinkers have expressly identified the ultimate reality or the absolute with the supreme good or the ideal (Cp. McTaggart *Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 96). We shall, therefore, examine here some of the modern theories of the absolute and see whether the absolute described by them can really be identified with the ideal.

In his book *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation* Dr. Turner set to himself a task which is very similar to ours. He sought to find out the philosophic basis of an essential aspect of our moral consciousness ; and in doing so, he had to take his stand on a system of metaphysics which in his opinion underlies the entire fabric of our moral experience. We too are trying to explore certain metaphysical principles which in our opinion are necessary for an adequate explanation of moral experience.

Dr. Turner is of opinion that "the ultimate basis of every element of value lies in the whole which expresses and realises itself therein" (p. 219). "Good, perfection, value can have no conceivable origin or criterion except the whole" (p. 269). We have defined the ideal as the ultimate basis and standard of value ; and Dr. Turner thinks that the whole is the ultimate basis and standard of value. So in his opinion the whole is the ideal.

The line of thought presented by Dr. Turner is not peculiarly his own. His views in the main are the views of Hegelian idealism. His doctrine is specially akin to the doctrine of Sir Henry Jones whom he seems to have followed more or less closely. Sir Henry Jones has laid especial emphasis on the moral life of man and has made it abundantly clear that no sane philosophy can afford to ignore such a

vital part of our experience. He too believes that things can be rightly valued when they are "regarded in their relation to the self-justifying whole." Both Sir Henry Jones and Dr. Turner have described the whole almost in identical terms ; and so it would perhaps be best for us to consider their views together.

It is supposed to be one of the strong points of the idealistic theory, which is upheld by these writers, that the absolute according to it is not a distant universal having no commerce with the particulars of the world of fact. The absolute, they say, realises itself in and through finite particulars. Their absolute is not a static absolute which knows no movement or change but a dynamic one, being real in particulars and in change.

But if finite particulars are only finite particulars—and they cannot be other than what they are—how can the absolute be real in them ? In finite particulars only finite particulars can be real. There does not appear to be in them any room for the reality of something which is utterly different from them. When we look at finite particulars, *i.e.*, at those facts which are conceived as finite particulars, we can find only finite particulars. Having conceived them as finite particulars, we cannot at the same time think of them as the embodiment of the absolute and infinite. If we are to see the absolute and infinite in them we shall have to lose sight of their finite particularity ; that is to say, they will no longer exist as finite particulars for us. We cannot, therefore, say that the absolute is real in finite particulars. The absolute can be real only in itself and not in something else which is opposed to it.

It may be said that our knowledge of facts as finite particulars represents only a first view of things which is never quite adequate. An adequate knowledge of them would require us to see in them the embodiment of the absolute and infinite.

But if facts are not truly known when they are conceived as finite particulars, the only possible conclusion is that they are not in reality the finite particulars we thought them to be. We shall have to admit that they are not finite particulars. If this is so, then it is meaningless to say that the absolute is real in finite particulars, because the finite particulars in which the absolute is to be real are not there.

It may be maintained that just as a whole is real only in its parts, although the parts as parts are never the whole, the absolute is real only in finite particulars, although finite particulars as such are not the absolute.

But even this way of looking at the matter does not solve all our difficulties. When it is said that the absolute is real in finite particulars just as a whole is real in its parts, what seems to be meant is either that the relation between the absolute and finite particulars is similar to the relation between whole and parts, or that the absolute is actually a whole of which finite particulars are the parts. Both these alternatives, however, seem hardly tenable.

The relation between whole and parts is a particularly intimate relation. It is such that neither of its terms can be thought away from the other. We cannot think of anything as a part without thinking at the same time of a whole of which it is a part. Whole and part are never intelligible apart from each other. But although it is asserted that finite particulars have no independent reality apart from the absolute and that the absolute is not really apart from the particulars, our idea of finite particulars does not appear to be such that we should be unable to think of finite particulars without thinking of the absolute quite in the same way as we are unable to think of a part as part without thinking of the whole of which it is a part. By finite particulars we understand the particular facts of our experience, such as chairs and tables we see or pleasures and pains we feel. Many intelligent people are well acquainted with these facts but they do not

betray any knowledge of the absolute. They seem to have quite an intelligible idea of what a chair or a pleasure is without being under the necessity of knowing anything about the absolute. They know that these are finite particulars but they do not know that there is an absolute standing in a necessary relation to them.

We conclude therefore that the relation between the absolute and finite particulars is not strictly similar to the relation between a whole and its parts.

Let us now see if we can consistently maintain that the absolute is actually a whole composed of finite particulars.

In order to know that a thing is a whole, we must have a unified idea of its parts. If we are to know that the absolute is a whole, we must know the particular facts under the form of a unity. But the particular facts in their nature are absolutely endless. We can never come to an end of them. The procession of facts runs from the beginning of time to the end of it; and nobody can see to the end of time. It is impossible, therefore, for us to know all these facts and view them under the form of a unity. So we cannot know the absolute and cannot assert that it is a real whole.

It is also said that the absolute is real *in* and *through* the particulars. But some obscurity, if not confusion, of thought seems to lie hidden in the phrase 'in and through.' 'Through' implies instrumentality; it indicates the way, whereas 'in' shows the final resting place. The two ideas seem to be somewhat incompatible. When it is said that something is real through '*x*' we understand that the reality of the thing is to be found beyond *x*. When it is said that the thing is real in *x*, we understand either that the thing itself is *x* or that it is to be found in *x*. But when it is asserted that the thing is real *in* and *through* *x*, we are invited to think of the thing as at once in *x* and outside of it. This involves us in self-contradiction. We do not know how this contradiction is evaded by those who say that the absolute is real in and through finite particulars.

It appears to us that in the opinion of these writers the absolute cannot be real anywhere outside the finite particulars of their experience; but in experience they only find finite particulars and do not really see the absolute. This incongruence between theory and experience has given rise in them to an unconscious hesitancy of thought which finds expression in the somewhat vague phrase 'in and through.'

The position we have so far considered is that the absolute is real in finite particulars, But, it is supposed, there is no static absolute and there are no fixed particulars. There are movement and change everywhere. So the absolute cannot already be a finished product or an accomplished fact. It is therefore supposed to be realising itself in the world process. This idea of the absolute realising itself in the world is a fundamental tenet of the type of idealism to which both Sir Henry Jones and Dr. Turner are committed.

But this way of conceiving the absolute raises certain questions which cannot easily be answered. If the absolute is anything then reality in the highest sense must belong to it. That is to say, if we are to think anything of the absolute we must think of it as real. But if the absolute is real, already and always, we cannot then speak of it as realising itself. That which is yet in the process of realisation cannot properly be said to be real already in the fullest sense. It is only coming into being. This suggests that it will attain the culmination of its being sometime in the future, at least in what we must now understand as future. This means that the absolute is not yet wholly real; otherwise it would not be spoken of as realising itself. But this militates against our very idea of the absolute. The absolute must be real in its own right and it should not seek the adventitious aid of the world process to make itself real.

On the other hand if the absolute is already real as it seems it should be, it is difficult to understand why it should unnecessarily duplicate itself in the world. If the absolute

is already real and if it also realises itself in the world, the realisation of the absolute in the world cannot but be viewed as a duplication of the absolute. And for this duplication no reason can be found. So if we say that the absolute is realising itself in the world, we must believe either that the absolute is not yet real or that it is unnecessarily duplicating itself in the world. Both these alternatives seem equally unsatisfactory.

It may be said that we have created these difficulties for ourselves by starting with two wrong suppositions. First, it may be objected, we have without justification separated the absolute from the world process and, secondly, we have supposed that the absolute is something to appear at the end of the world process. If we do away with the separation between the absolute and the world process, then the question of the unnecessary duplication of the absolute in the world would not arise at all. And if, further, we think that the absolute is not something to emerge as the result of the world process, but is the process itself, then we shall have no reason to complain of the present unreality of the absolute ; because the process runs from past to future and is always present.

But if we do away with the distinction between the absolute and the world process, our idealism will be indistinguishable from crass naturalism. What is in reality there, we shall have to think, is the world process only and nothing seems to be gained by applying the name absolute to it. If there is to be any distinction between idealism and naturalism, then, it appears that the absolute cannot simply be identified with the world process.

If we suppose that the absolute is the process itself and not something which is being evolved in the process, then we cannot say that the absolute is realising itself in the process. For it is absurd to say that the process is realising itself in the process. If it is true that the absolute is

realising itself in the process, then, the process itself cannot be the absolute. The process is the process. It is just what is there and it does not need to realise itself in a further process.

But the difficulties of the position that the process is the absolute do not end here. In the first place, it is difficult to understand how a process by itself can be anything at all. And when we have raised a process to the position of the absolute it is evident that there is nothing else to determine its nature or character. But a process, as distinguished from something which is undergoing the process, is a mere abstraction. If, however, we grant that there is something in process, that something must be distinguishable and different from the process as such. If the process were the absolute, if it were all that exists, then the process would not even be known as a process. A process, which is nothing but a series of movements and change, cannot be known as such unless there is something which is not wholly involved in the process but maintains itself in its self-sameness throughout the whole process. In order to understand that there is a process it is necessary that there should be something or somebody who can be conscious of the different stages of the process which are different from one another. If he himself were involved in the process, if, that is, he himself suffered change in being, he would be unable to say that there has been a change. And without such information we can by no means assert that there is a process. We see therefore that for the being of process as well as for our knowledge of it as a process, it is necessary that there should be something which is not wholly involved in the process itself. In other words we can never say that a process can ever be the absolute.

It may be objected that we have conceived the process too abstractly. There is no such thing as mere process without something which is in process. The absolute is in process and the absolute is not simply a name for mere change. The absolute is permanent in the midst of change. When we

take a process concretely we find that it includes that which is in process. And something can be said to be in process only because it persists through the change implied by the process.

But however concretely we may take the process in which the absolute is made real, we are afraid we cannot overcome the difficulties we have already pointed out. Even in its concretest form a process cannot get rid of change and movement. And if we identify the absolute with the world-process, we cannot by any means save it from the inevitable fate of change. But what sort of absolute will it be if it suffers change? If the absolute itself becomes different from moment to moment, it will scarcely deserve the name of the absolute.

Attempts may be made to get out of this difficulty by supposing either that there is change *in* the absolute but not *of* the absolute or that the absolute remains permanent in spite of change. The first alternative supposes that the absolute itself does not change although there may be change within it. The second alternative means that the absolute changes, but instead of losing itself in change it maintains itself through change or in spite of it. To us both these alternatives appear equally objectionable. A change within the absolute which will not result in a change of the absolute seems inconceivable. A whole is constituted and determined by its parts. A change in the parts means a corresponding change in the whole. We cannot think that the absolute would remain the same if everything within it were different. The absolute cannot be conceived after the fashion of a hard shell which remains unaffected by the changing contents enclosed within it.

The other alternative has also to meet similar difficulties. It is very well to say that the absolute is permanent in the midst of change ; but it is very difficult to discover what is permanent in the series of change which constitutes the process of the world. If nothing can actually be found to be

permanent, we have no right to assert that there is anything which remains permanent in the midst of change and can, therefore, be described as the absolute.

Even if we suppose that the absolute remains permanent through change, we have still to ask whether absoluteness belongs to it in so far as it changes or in so far as it remains permanent. From our previous discussions it is evident that we cannot regard it as the absolute in so far as it changes. The absolute is itself only in so far as it does not change. Now, if a process is always bound up with inevitable change and if the absolute as such cannot change, it is difficult to imagine how any process can ever be given the status of the absolute.

It may be said that although a process means a series of change, the series itself does not change. The process, which is the absolute, has got an identity about itself that cannot be mistaken. It does not become other than itself. So if changelessness is a condition of anything being the absolute, there is no reason why a process should be unable to fulfil this condition.

Or it may be said that although the world process is not the absolute in so far as it changes, it is also not the absolute merely in so far as it remains permanent. It is the absolute because it combines in itself both permanence and change. As Sir Henry Jones says, a process implies sameness as well as change (*A Faith that Enquires*, p. 239).

Now it is no doubt true that even a change must be what it is. It cannot be something other than itself. It is also true that a series of change may not itself suffer any further transformation, although it is not inconceivable that there should be a change in a series of change. When we have conceived of the complete series of change as constituting the whole world process, we need not predicate further change of the series. But when everything is said about the identity of the process, the difficulties of regarding it as the absolute still do not disappear. First, there is no such thing as a

standing process. As we have already said a process utterly lacks the principle of self-maintenance. One part of it must disappear before another part can make its appearance. Reality for a time or mere passing reality belongs to its parts and the process as a whole can nowhere and at no time be actually found. A process in the last analysis is only coming into being and passing out of it; and this can never be accepted as a fit characterisation of the absolute.

As for the contention that the absolute combines in itself both sameness and change, we have only to say that this is more easily said than conceived. It is easy to say that the absolute remains the same, although there is change in it; but it is difficult to understand how it can be so. If by change we should understand what is opposed to permanence, then it appears impossible that we should be able to ascribe them both to one and the same thing. The absolute can remain the same only on the condition that it should not change. It is impossible that it should change and also remain the same.

Sir Henry Jones says: "After all, the many are the different forms of the one" (p. 239). But it is not easy to understand how that which is one in being can at the same time be many in form. We do not suppose that there can be any possible separation between the form and the being of things. A thing cannot indifferently take on any form which will not touch its being. The many can be the form of the one only when multiplicity has penetrated to its very root and destroyed its unity.

We do not suppose that Sir Henry Jones or any other great writer on the subject does not realise these and other difficulties which are inherent in the position that the absolute is in process. In fact Sir Henry Jones has himself referred to some of these difficulties. But he believes that they can be solved. After referring at one place to the fact, "that process within a whole—the process of growth for instance—is possible, when process of the whole would be unthinkable"

he says, "The difficulty is real, but it is not insuperable" (p. 298). The difficulty of regarding the absolute as in process may be more explicitly stated in his own words. "The parts or element of a whole may appropriate its environment and grow by means of it; but for the whole or absolute there can be no environment, nothing by reference to which it could change." How is this difficulty to be overcome? Jones thinks it can be overcome if we conceive the absolute after the analogy of self-conscious beings. "Self-conscious beings are capable of changes purely from within." There may be a transition from one experience to another and fuller experience and this transition may be achieved without reference to any external environment.

But the cases of self-conscious beings, such as men, and of the absolute are not exactly alike; and so what is possible in the case of men may not be possible in the case of the absolute. Even though some change is possible in the life and experience of a self-conscious being, it cannot be proved that he owes this change wholly to himself. For he cannot be completely isolated from the world and we cannot decide how much he owes to himself and how much he receives from the world. Even when we find that there is no reference to any external environment, we cannot be sure that there is no reference inwardly to something which goes beyond him. Man is not related simply to the external world but he is also inwardly linked on to the larger life of the whole. We cannot think that despite his physical relation to the rest of the world, man is spiritually a windowless monad closely shut up within the four walls of his being against the inflow of all spiritual influence. Both inwardly and outwardly he is bound up with that which goes beyond him and by no mechanism can he be inwardly insulated. So when we find any change in him which is not due to the influence of external circumstances, it is open to us to suppose that it is due to his greater appropriation of the larger life of the whole. But in the case

of the absolute there is nothing that goes beyond it and so any process of the absolute would be unthinkable. The dissimilarity between the case of self-conscious human beings and that of the absolute is admitted by Jones himself. He is not sure how much of what is true of human experience can be true of the absolute experience. He further admits that the sort of transition we have in attaining greater knowledge cannot evidently be ascribed to the absolute, since the absolute possesses all knowledge from the beginning and no expansion of, or addition to, it is ever possible. But he still attributes process to the absolute and makes it participate in infinite process. Such participation, however, even if it were possible, would inevitably result in the fall of the absolute from its infinitude and perfection.

It may be objected that in repudiating change of the absolute, we are advocating the principle of a static absolute. But the question is whether the absolute can be anything but static. To move or to change is to show oneself in a state of unstable equilibrium and this should be considered a defect in what claims to be absolutely perfect. We have heard much, almost too much, about the dynamic activity of the absolute. But such characterisation of the absolute in terms of dynamism and activity has failed, we must confess, to bring any enlightenment to us. All activity is directed towards the removal of some want or the fulfilment of some purpose or the overcoming of some obstacle. But all this appears clearly impossible in the case of the absolute. The absolute cannot have any deficiency or want in it nor can there be anything opposed to the absolute which it may try to conquer. If the absolute is perfect, as it seems it must be, then we fail to understand how it can be or why it should be active. We are one with Bradley in holding that nothing perfect can really move. All activity or movement gives proof of some inner discord. We believe that the absolute can be at peace with itself. The restlessness of activity must be incompatible

with the fulness of being which the absolute possesses. We do not hesitate, therefore, to confess that the absolute in which we can believe must be an absolute of static perfection.

It appears absurd to us that what is absolute and perfect should yet be liable to change. Sir Henry Jones says: "It looks obvious that what is perfect cannot change except for the worse" (p. 358). But he still thinks that the universal process does not come to a stop with the absolute but involves the absolute in its never-ceasing course. We cannot, however, get rid of the obvious fact that what is perfect, if it were to change, would change only for the worse; for since perfection is not susceptible of further improvement a change in what is perfect must indicate a fall from the state of perfection.

It is supposed that movement from perfection to perfection is possible and is a fact, although it is admitted that "A movement from perfection to perfection looks like a logical impossibility" (p. 359). Sir Henry Jones adduces, in favour of this supposition, the instance of human life at different stages. He says that a child may be perfect as a child and a grown-up man may also be perfect as a grown-up man although there is a movement in the life of a man from childhood to manhood.

But can perfection be conceived in this narrow fashion? If to be perfect is to be perfect as something or somebody, then there would remain little meaning in perfection as such. Following the principle, which seems to underlie the above supposition, we might as well say that a thief may be perfect as a thief and if he later on becomes a saint, *i.e.*, perfect as a saint, we should be able to say that in his case too there has been a movement from perfection to perfection. Anything at any stage cannot but be appropriate to the stage which it occupies and if we suppose this to be its

perfection then we have emptied perfection of all its signification.

The perfection of childhood is not the perfection of manhood. But when one contends that there can be no movement from perfection to perfection one means that there is a definite meaning of perfection which does not change from stage to stage. If perfection had different meanings at different stages or in different contexts, there would not be even the appearance of a problem in the supposition that what is perfect may yet be liable to change. The problem is there because by perfection we understand one definite state or quality which is such that no further improvement upon it is possible, conceivable or desirable. Understood in this sense perfection seems to debar the possibility of all movement. What is perfect cannot change even for the worse. For what is liable to change for the worse is certainly inferior to that which does not change, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as absolutely perfect in view of the fact that there is something which is better and has, therefore, a better title to perfection.

It is at least certain that by perfection we should understand one thing and one thing only, whatever that may be. If this is so, there does not seem to be any possibility of ascertainable movement from perfection to perfection. To move from perfection to perfection is the same thing as to remain always in perfection.

Convinced perhaps of the difficulties of his position Sir Henry Jones seeks to improve his position by adding "Besides, may not the process once more rather than either of the stages be the true object of judgment and the divine mode of existence?" (P. 360.) But if the whole process is the object of judgment and is pronounced to be perfect, if, that is, perfection belongs only to the whole process, then, too, there cannot be any movement from perfection to perfection; because the process must include all stages and we cannot

conceive of a further stage which may be perfect and to which the process may move.

Thus we see that the idea of the absolute given by the writers now under consideration is far from strictly consistent and as such it seems to have a very meagre title to reality. Improbable as the reality of such an absolute is, it is even more improbable that it should be the ideal of goodness or the standard of value. When we regard the absolute as a whole of finites we find that it includes everything in the world at different levels of existence. Such a whole, however, is equally present in everything or in nothing at all, and so everything would have the same value or nothing would have any value at all, the positions being strictly indistinguishable from each other. If we take the absolute, not simply as a whole which may even be static, but as something which is a process, the difficulty of regarding it as the ideal becomes greater still. A process is a changing something. If the absolute, which is supposed to be the standard of value, were to change, there would be no fixity or finality in our judgments of value. The standard being liable to variation, the judgments must inevitably vary and so what is regarded to-day as good may not be so regarded two days hence. This will put an end to all serious thinking about the matter.

Professor A. S. Pringle-Pattison is another writer who has treated of value and the ideal; and in his writings we have found some very valuable suggestions about the nature and being of the ideal. He too has upheld that "The Standard or principle of value must be found in the nature of the system as a whole" (*The Idea of God*, p. 223), "that the nature of reality can only mean the systematic structure discernible in its appearances, and that this must furnish us with our ultimate criterion of value" (p. 325). He likes to designate the ultimate reality by the name of God, and God in his view seems to stand for God of theism as well as for the absolute of philosophy. Professor Pringle-Pattison has

been mainly responsible for drawing pointed attention to some of the drawbacks of the absolutistic philosophy of Hegel. He has, however, been on the whole a sympathetic critic of absolutism ; he has sought to ' correct ' rather than ' reject ' absolutism altogether. But his proposed corrections seem to have resulted in laying his own theory open to many serious speculative difficulties.

Professor Pringle-Pattison has dwelt upon the abstractness of the view which regards God as separated from the world. God must be viewed always in relation with the world and the relation is that of creation. " God is known to us as creator of the world, we have no datum, no justification whatever, for supposing his existence out of that relation " (p. 310). But the idea of creation tends to pass into that of manifestation, not the making of something out of nothing, but the revelation in and to the finite spirits of the infinite riches of the divine life.

Let us try to understand what all this means. Professor Pringle-Pattison speaks the language of Hegelian idealism when he says that God is manifested in the world—that divine life is revealed in the life of finite spirits. He uses the theistic term ' creation ' but when creation is understood in the sense of manifestation, the idea of activity connected with creation disappears and the original idea of creation seems to be altogether lost. For manifestation seems to be part of the being of God ; if he is there he must needs be manifested. It does not require any special activity on the part of God to manifest himself. It is bound up with his being. So when we say that God manifests himself in the world, we mean that he exists through it. It is also contended that the world has no independent existence. It exists through God. As professor Pringle-Pattison himself has expressed " in more abstract philosophical language, the infinite in and through the finite, the finite in and through infinite—this mutual implication is the ultimate fact of the universe as we know it " (p. 315).

The alleged implication of the finite by the infinite and of the infinite by the finite seems to give rise to many difficulties. Professor Pringle-Pattison seems to say that the infinite is real in and through the finite, and the finite is real in and through the infinite. We have already remarked upon the difficulty of conceiving the same pair of terms in relations of 'in' and 'through.' Difficult as it is to conceive how the infinite is real in the finite as well as through the finite, it is more difficult to understand how both the finite and the infinite are to be real through each other. If the finite implies the infinite in the sense that the finite cannot be real without the infinite, the infinite cannot imply the finite in the same sense. If the finite cannot be real unless the infinite is there, if, that is, the infinite must be real before the finite can be real, then we cannot in the same sense say that the infinite cannot be real unless the finite is there, *i.e.*, the finite must be real before the infinite can be real. When we say that the infinite is real through the finite and the finite is real through the infinite and also speak of their mutual implication, we appear to mean that the implication in both cases is absolutely parallel. And this makes the position unintelligible. If by the proposition that the finite is real through the infinite it is meant that the prior being of the infinite is necessary for the being of the finite, the proposition that the infinite is real through the finite should mean that the prior being of the finite is necessary for the being of the infinite. (Priority in both cases may be understood as logical.) But if this is so, we can obtain neither the finite nor the infinite; because in order to obtain the finite, we must first get the infinite, but in order to obtain the infinite, we must get the finite, which we have not yet got.

It may be said that we obtain the infinite and the finite together and at once. But if this be the case, we have no right to assert that the one is mediated by the other. It seems

absolutely certain that there must be something which enjoys unmediated existence. If everything exists through something else, *i.e.*, has to be mediated by something, we inevitably get either an infinite regress or a manifest self-contradiction.

It is supposed that God is revealed or expressed in the world. Now, God cannot be separated from his revelation. He is what he reveals or expresses himself to be. We have no reason to think that he can be anything else. If the being of God is expressed in the world, the world becomes identified with God. The only choice before us is between naturalism and pantheism. If godless naturalism proves revolting to our theistic frame of mind, the only other alternative in the light of this theory is to suppose that everything in the world is saturated with the being of God. If the divine life expresses itself 'in and through' everything in the world, everything becomes either a mode of the divine or an instrument for its manifestation. In either case we are completely relieved of all responsibility in life and we lose all chance of achieving any goodness in the world, because we become either merged in the divine being or become only powerless tools in its hands.

No one has argued more forcefully than Professor Pringle-Pattison against the pantheistic view of the world which leads to such consequences. But we do not see how these consequences can be avoided by Professor Pringle-Pattison himself if he insists on maintaining that the being of God is expressed in the world and that we are created by him in the sense that he has manifested himself in us. In order to avoid these consequences Professor Pringle-Pattison claims substantive existence and individual independence for us. But he has failed to show how our 'creaturely dependence' on God can be reconciled with the measure of independence which is claimed for us. It is impossible to say where we determine ourselves and where we are determined by God ;

we cannot draw a line between our activity and the activity of God in us. If God reveals himself in us, all that we do or are should redound to the glory of God and we should neither be held responsible for our worst sins nor be given credit for our best actions. Our independence and activity cannot be reconciled with our dependence on God and the activity of God in us. Professor Pringle-Pattison seems to recognize this fact and therefore he pronounces it to be incomprehensible "how the measure of individual independence and initiative which we enjoy is compatible with the creative function or the all-pervasive activity of the divine." But he still maintains "in whatever sense or in whatever way our thoughts and actions form part of the divine experience, we know that it is a sense which does not prevent them from being ours. We are agreed that no speculative difficulties could override this primary certainty" (p. 391). It may be primary certainty of moral consciousness that our thoughts and actions are ours but the metaphysical theory consonant with this certainty is not certainly that the divine experience also consists of such thoughts and actions. So long as we assert them both, the primary certainty of normal consciousness and the theory of divine immanence, we cannot but be involved in self-contradiction. 'No speculative difficulties' may 'override this certainty.' But so long as these difficulties are there, philosophy cannot be said to have performed its task properly for us. The true task of philosophy is not to create speculative difficulties but to solve them, and the philosophy which ends with them has very little to recommend itself for our acceptance.

Apart from these difficulties, we find that the nature of the absolute described by Professor Pringle-Pattison is really incomprehensible. In fact he himself has admitted that it is so. "The true revelation of the divine must be sought," he says, "in the systematic structure of finite

experience as a whole'' (p. 221). But finite experience is distributed in innumerable finite centres and we can form no idea of the whole which should take up in itself all finite experiences. At another place he has said that "the universe is to be thought of, in the last resort, as an experience not limited to the intermittent and fragmentary glimpses of this or the other finite consciousness but resuming the whole life of the world in a fashion which is necessarily incomprehensible save by the absolute itself " (p. 390). It is not simply the manner, in which the absolute resumes the whole life of the world in itself that is incomprehensible; the nature of the absolute thus constituted is also incomprehensible. It has been said that "the standard or principle of value must be found in the nature of the system as a whole." But when the nature of the system as a whole is found to be incomprehensible, we do not understand how it can be used as the standard.

CHAPTER VIII

The Ideal as the Absolute (continued).

In modern times no two writers have done more for the advancement of the philosophy of the absolute than Bradley and Bosanquet. There are some minor differences of detail and emphasis in the views of these two celebrated writers; but in the main they uphold the same view of the absolute. It will be convenient for us to consider their views together. For our purpose the difference between their views is not at all important and we shall assume that it does not exist.

We have already referred to Bosanquet's view that the whole is the ultimate standard of value (as well as of reality). We do not know if the idea of value was very important for Bradley. But this much is certain that he definitely connected value with satisfaction and also held that what did not satisfy us completely could not be ultimately real. If the absolute is ultimately real, it must be completely satisfactory and to us possessed of supreme value. It is the absolute, therefore, which can be the ultimate standard of value. Whether this is so or not, our first concern is to find out what the absolute is according to these writers and then we shall examine whether the absolute described by them is likely to be real and can serve as the ideal.

Bradley says, "Reality then is one and it is experience" (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 530). "The universe is one in this sense that its differences exist harmoniously within one whole beyond which there is nothing. Hence the absolute is, so far, an individual and a system." Bradley realises that if we stop short with this description of the absolute, we shall be left with something formal and abstract, and so he goes on to say :

“ When we ask as to the matter which fills up the empty outline we can reply in one word that this matter is experience.” “ We perceive on reflection that to be real, or even barely to exist, must be to fall within sentience. Sentient experience in short is reality and what is not this is not real ” (p. 144). “ Being and reality are in brief one thing with sentience.” “ Our conclusion, so far will be this, that the absolute is one system, and that its contents are nothing but sentient experience ” (pp. 146-47). Bosanquet too speaks of reality as a consistent unity (*Logic*, Vol. II, p. 213), ‘ as absolute experience.’ (*The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 250). The ultimate reality is the absolute experience which includes and transmutes all finite experience in a harmonious whole. ‘ The general formula of the absolute, I repeat, the transmutation and rearrangement of particular experiences, and also of the contents of particular minds by inclusion in a completer whole of experience is a matter of everyday verification ’ (p. 373).

Bradley makes a distinction between reality and appearance. And this distinction is implied in the writings of Bosanquet also. Consistency or harmony is the test of reality and so if there is contradiction in anything, it cannot be said to be real. It is a fundamental faith of their philosophy that reality must be without self-contradiction. Bradley has examined various categories of ordinary thought, such as substance, quality, relation, etc., which we certainly employ in our attempts to understand the world, and he condemns them all, because the searching light of his dialectic has discovered to him that they are all infected with inherent self-contradiction. But even though they are appearance, they are not mere nothing, altogether unreal. They are real at least as appearance. There must be some core of reality in all appearance, otherwise there would be no appearance at all.

Bradley himself writes: “ Appearance without reality would be impossible ; for what then could appear? And

reality without appearance would be nothing, for there is certainly nothing outside appearance. But on the other hand Reality (we must repeat this) is not the sum of things. It is the unity in which all things, coming together, are transmuted, in which they are changed all alike, though not changed equally" (pp. 487-88). But if reality is in appearances, what becomes of the distinction between appearance and reality? Again, is there reality in all appearances, that is, are all appearances equally real? These difficulties are sought to be solved by the doctrine of degrees in truth and reality. There is no such thing as mere appearance. Appearance means only less of reality. Nothing is absolutely devoid of reality. There is more or less of it in everything. Some appearances are more real than others, although nothing except the absolute is absolutely real. "The absolute is each appearance, and is all, but it is not anyone as such. And it is not all equally, but one appearance is more real than another. In short, the doctrine of degrees in reality and truth is the fundamental answer to our problem. Everything is essential and yet one thing is worthless in comparison with others. Nothing is perfect, as such, and yet everything in some degree contains a vital function of perfection" (p. 487). The absolute is therefore the all-inclusive unity which comprehends and transforms all things into a harmonious whole. That which suffers less transformation in becoming an element of the absolute is more real than that which suffers more (p. 364). Everything has to be changed but nothing is to be lost.

The massive and acute intellects of these writers have left their permanent mark on the thought and language of British philosophy. While going through their works no one can help being impressed by the depth and breadth of their philosophic insight. But in spite of these merits, their philosophy as a whole seems to suffer from a certain lack of coherence. They seem to have allowed themselves

some amount of looseness in thought and expression, and it seems to have produced the inevitable effect of obscurity and confusion. At any rate their view of the absolute and its appearances presents to us certain difficulties which we do not find it possible to overcome.

It is sometimes said that the doctrine of degrees in truth and reality is one of the most important contributions that Bradley has made to modern philosophy (Pringle-Pattison). We have, however, utterly failed to comprehend the truth of this doctrine. It is of course not true that all writers on philosophy are agreed about the value of this doctrine. In fact many writers, who are not in sympathy with the philosophy of the absolute, propounded by Bradley and Bosanquet, have subjected this doctrine to adverse criticism. We do not propose to undertake an elaborate consideration of this doctrine here, but we shall only try to state our main difficulties with regard to it.

In the first place, our ideas of truth and reality do not seem to be such as can possibly admit of any degrees. If anything is either true or real, it appears that it must be so wholly. We cannot conceive of a half-way house between truth and falsehood, between reality and unreality. Bradley admits that "the absolute, considered as such, has, of course, no degrees; for it is perfect, and there can be no more or less in perfection" (p. 359). But do we not understand truth and reality also after the manner of perfection? If we do, then should we not say that there can be no more or less in truth and reality? Let us take the question of reality and omit the consideration of truth; for our enquiry is mainly metaphysical. Bradley has made a distinction between reality and existence. He says: "Existence is not reality, and reality must exist" (p. 400). "Existence is, in other words, a form of the appearance of the real" (p. 400). He seems to have restricted the meaning of existence to the sphere of so-called appearance. Hence his use of the term existence

appears to be altogether technical. For us the meanings of existence and reality do not seem to be different from each other. A thing cannot be said to be real, if it does not exist; and if it is real, it must also exist. At least if a thing is to be real, it must be there; and if it is not there, it cannot be real. To be there does not necessarily mean to be in space or in time or in both. To be there simply means to be in fact, whether in space and time or out of them. If this is the ordinary meaning of reality, we can at once see that there can be no degrees in reality. To be there and not to be there do not seem to allow any middle path between them. If anything is real, *i. e.*, is there, it must be there utterly and absolutely. It is even conceivable that a thing should at once burst into being, but we cannot think of any gradual approach to it.

If we are to find out the true character of 'anything, we must examine it where it is found in an unadulterated form. We cannot find out its true character where it is mixed up with something else. Now, reality in its purity is to be found only in the absolute; everywhere else it is mixed up with appearance. But in the absolute, it is admitted, there are no degrees. We seem to be justified, therefore, in concluding that in reality as such there are no degrees.

There can be more or less of a thing which admits of quantitative measurement. But our idea of reality does not seem to be such that it can admit of such measurement. Reality means the quality of being real. To be real never means to amount to a quantity. How is the reality of a thing to be measured by anything else? (A thing cannot be measured by itself.) Its reality is wholly given in, and consists entirely of, the fact of its being. There may be various signs by which we may try to determine whether a thing is real. Our knowledge about it may be adequate or inadequate. But its being must always be sufficient unto itself. We may measure its length and breadth of which there may be more or less;

but its being or reality must always be absolute and unfathomable. If, therefore, reality does not admit of any quantitative measurement, it appears meaningless to say that there can be more or less of it.

If there is nothing which is absolutely real, nor anything which is absolutely unreal, everything must be said to be both real and unreal, a manifest self-contradiction. You may say, if you like, that a thing is real in one sense and unreal in another. But for the sake of clearness, we have every right to demand that you should define your senses and stick to one sense only in one universe of discourse. Having done so, try if you can think of one and the same thing as both real and unreal. If you cannot say that a thing is real and unreal in the same sense, then it is evident that it must be either real or unreal, *i.e.*, there can be no degrees in its reality.

It is sometimes suggested that when a thing is to the west of another, it is truer to say that it is to the north-west or south-west of the latter than to say that it is to the east. But from the point of view of truth, it is as wrong to say that it is to the north-west or south-west as to say that it is to the east. The thing is as unavailable in the south-west as in the east, and it is wrong to say that one statement is truer than the other.

So we find that the doctrine of degrees in truth and reality is itself full of many difficulties and so it cannot be used to solve the difficulties which arise from the problem of reality and appearance. It is said that 'the presence of reality in all appearances is the last word of philosophy' (p. 551). But if there is reality in all appearances, what becomes of the distinction between reality and appearance? If reality is present in a part of appearance, then the part in which reality is present being real, it will not be true to say that reality is present in all appearance. We can only say that it is present in what is real. In order that reality may be said to be present in all appearance, it is necessary

that it should be present not only in the 'real' part of appearance but also in the 'appearance' part of it ; that is to say, it must be present in the whole of appearance. But when reality comes to be present in the whole of appearance, how can it fail to transform appearance into reality and thus obliterate the distinction between reality and appearance ? The same consequence seems to follow if we take the following statements seriously : "Appearance without reality would be impossible, for what then could appear ? And reality without appearance would be nothing, for there is certainly nothing outside appearance" (p. 487). If neither reality nor appearance can be anything without the other, how are they to be separated ? They must both be always in indissoluble union with each other. We must even go further and say that they should be identified. For if there certainly is nothing outside appearances, reality, if it is anything, can be found only within appearance. But even within appearance reality cannot be found only here and there, it should be found everywhere and throughout all appearance. If there is no reality in any part of appearance then to that extent appearance without reality would be possible. But we are told that appearance without reality is impossible. We have therefore to conclude that every fibre of appearance is penetrated through and through by reality. When we further know that there is no reality outside appearances, the conclusion becomes irresistible that appearance is the only reality that is there.

On the other hand when the distinction between reality and appearance has been made, we feel that appearance should never have the status of reality. Bradley has rightly taken non-contradiction to be the test of reality. We can never believe in a standing contradiction in fact. Reality must always be reconciled to itself. We cannot say that reality is and is not, is something and something else at the same time. Our intellect cannot stand self-contradiction and

Bradley has rightly denied the title of reality to whatever he found infected with self-discrepancy. He has condemned all such aspects of things to appearance. Now, if appearance means that which involves self-contradiction (it is on this ground that anything is called an appearance), and if non-contradiction is an ultimate and valid criterion of reality, then we do not know how we can escape the conclusion that appearance is utterly unreal.

It is said that appearance is real at least as appearance, it is not a mere nonentity. If it were nothing, how could it appear? But, we confess, the statement, that appearance is real as appearance, is incomprehensible to us. If to be real is one thing and to be appearance quite another, then it appears impossible to combine the two notions together and say that something can be real as appearance. This is as good as to say that a cow as a horse may be there.

If appearance must be something in order that it may appear, why should you not call it real? If you decide that it is not real (because it does not satisfy the test of reality) and still cannot get rid of the appearance, the only possible conclusion is that the appearance is an illusion, having no ontological connexion with reality.

It is sometimes said that appearance is not mere appearance. But the distinction between appearance and mere appearance is almost meaningless. To be really an appearance is to be a mere appearance. In order to be distinguished from mere appearance something 'more' is presumed to be there. But what is 'more' is not precisely contained in the idea of appearance as such. Appearance therefore must be mere appearance.

In Bosanquet's view a part taken as the whole would be an appearance, and since the part is there, it may be contended, the appearance cannot be wholly unreal. But even in this view, we venture to think, an appearance cannot but be absolutely unreal. When a part is taken as a part, the

part so taken is not certainly an appearance ; it is real. " Everything is real so long as you do not take it for more than it is " (*Principle*, p. 240). The part becomes an appearance when and only when it is taken as the whole. But where is this monster of a part as a whole to be found ? The part which is there is the part as part. It is not an appearance. But the part as the whole, which is an appearance, can nowhere be found in fact. It is simply not there.

When we take the part as the whole we are certainly committing a mistake. The real object in this wrong knowledge is the part which is there and it is not an appearance. That which is an appearance is the erroneous object which is attributed to be there without being there in fact. The erroneous object has no being in reality and we cannot say that it is real in any sense. There is an object in fact and there is an object in knowledge. In right knowledge both of them are identical, but in wrong knowledge the object in knowledge fails to achieve its identity with the object in fact. What is appearance is simply the object in knowledge which claims to be real with no power to fulfil its claim.

Appearances, they say, cannot be thrown overboard. Where are they to go ? They must somehow be retained in the absolute.

Appearances, when taken up into the absolute, must either remain what they are or they must become different. If they suffer absolutely no change, then the absolute becomes merely a hotch-potch of appearances. And this is not the view of Bradley and Bosanquet. In their opinion appearances in becoming elements of the absolute, are modified, transformed or transmuted. But if they are necessarily to be transformed when they become part of the absolute, we cannot say that appearances as appearances are retained in the absolute. Nobody can say how far a particular appearance has to be changed before it can fit into the absolute and nobody can therefore guarantee that an appearance in the process of

transformation will not lose its proper character. If appearances are necessarily to be changed in being taken up in the absolute, they must cease to be appearances when they are made elements of the absolute. So long as they are appearances, they are liable to change and no further change will be necessary when and only when they have ceased to be appearances. This is what seems to be required by the doctrine that appearances are transmuted in the absolute. Now if appearances lose their proper character, it cannot be said that they are retained as appearances in the absolute. And if appearances are not retained as appearances, there is no sense in saying that they are retained at all.

In order to attain reality a thing should be so altered as to be made free from its 'appearance' character. If it is wholly made up of appearance, it seems reasonable that it should wholly disappear. So long as we suppose that the world possesses the self-discrepant character of appearance only, we cannot help thinking that it will altogether vanish in the absolute. The statement, therefore, that appearances are retained in the absolute seems to express a wish and not a truth, even according to the theory we are now considering.

Thus we find that we should either identify appearance with reality or condemn it as wholly unreal. Bradley and Bosanquet seem to have done both. The explanation of this fact is probably to be found in the indefinite nature of appearance as such. These great philosophers reduced themselves to the paradoxical position of supposing both that reality lives in appearances and that appearances are not reality, because, we think, they lost sight of the fact that appearance as appearance has no metaphysical character. By a metaphysical character we mean the character of being real or unreal. An appearance as such is neither real nor unreal. In true knowledge it is real ; in illusion it is unreal. When a rope appears as a rope we have no reason to disbelieve the fact

that the appearance of the rope is identical with its reality. But when a rope appears as a snake, the appearance is certainly a false one. The snake as it appears is absolutely not there. It is no good saying that the snake exists in the forest or is there in the mind of the percipient subject in the form of an idea. The snake in the forest or in the mind forms no part of the appearance which is just in front of us. And as qualified by the time and the space, the appearance has nothing to substantiate itself. We say therefore that the illusory snake does not exist. But in illusion as well as in veridical perception the appearance as appearance is the same. An illusory snake as well as a real one presents the same appearance to us. As appearance the one appearance is as good as the other. But although, as appearance, there is nothing to distinguish one appearance from another, ontologically there is the greatest difference between an illusory appearance and a real one. In real appearance we find what is really there; but in illusory appearance there is only a vain claim to *be* something which *is not there*. Without some fundamental difference one appearance cannot be distinguished as illusory from another which is real. When we grant this, it becomes easy for us to understand that an appearance as appearance cannot possess any definite character. Some appearances are real, others are unreal; and since there is nothing common between reality and unreality, we cannot say that appearances as appearances are anything at all. From the fact that there is an appearance we cannot assert either that it is real or that it is unreal. It may be real or it may be unreal. So when philosophers speak of appearance, they seem to think of it sometimes as real and sometimes as unreal; and since from the nature of the case an appearance does not possess a definite character, they do not seem to keep one definite sense in their mind and are perhaps unconsciously led to make assertions of very different import with regard to appearance.

It has been said that outside appearances there is nothing and so it is suggested that the absolute lives in appearances. We find ourselves confronted with appearances only, and so the absolute, if it is to be anything for us, must be constructed out of appearances. The appearances have, as it were, to be compounded into the absolute. But how is it possible? If appearances are in every case infected with self-discrepancy will not the absolute, made out of them, be vitiated by the same defect? You cannot construct a self-consistent whole out of self-discrepant materials. It is said that by mutual supplementation the appearances cure themselves of their self-discrepancy and thus constitute a consistent whole which is the absolute. But if the supplementation is to be effective and if it is to remove their self-discrepancy, it can do so only by depriving them of their own character. That is to say, in being supplemented by one another, the appearances must cease to be appearances. This, in fact, has been suggested and implied by the writings of Bradley himself. Our contention is that, if it must be so, we have got only a negative idea of the absolute in which appearances are absent and it is then vain to say that the absolute lives in appearances or to suppose that appearance must have a place in the absolute.

Bradley speaks of the absolute as a system. So far as we can understand it, a system is intelligible only as a whole of interrelated parts. There must be in a system different elements co-ordinated to one another. The multiplicity of such co-ordinated elements seems essential to the being of a system. Unless the absolute becomes a bare manifold or shrinks into a point, two things seem to be important to constitute its systematic character. (1) There must be some difference of elements in the absolute, and (2) the elements in their turn should be so related to one another as to constitute a unity. We do not know how else we can conceive the character of a system. But if a system must always be a system of inter-related elements and if we are to conceive of the absolute

only as a system, it seems certain that there must be relations within the absolute. This will, however, at once destroy the character of the absolute and reduce it to appearance. For the idea of relation, according to Bradley, involves self-contradiction and if relations enter into the constitution of the absolute, the absolute itself will suffer from the self-contradiction and thus reduce itself to an appearance. The different facts of the world, it is urged, cannot simply fall away from reality. But they can find room in the absolute when and only when some elemental differences are left in the character of the absolute. But to provide for difference is to provide also for relation and if relation means self-contradiction it cannot be got rid of even by the absolute.

Bradley has tried to facilitate our conception of the absolute by referring us to the immediacy of feeling which in his opinion is relationless. We do not feel inclined to believe that the absolute can be of the nature of an immediate, relationless feeling. In the first place, we do not know of any feeling which is really relationless. Even if we grant that the absolute is really of the nature of an immediate feeling, which is relationless, we are at a loss to understand how any metaphysical use can be made of such an absolute. We shall never be able to connect the homogeneous unity of a relationless feeling with the varied multiplicity of our experience. It is very difficult to see that an absolute of this sort is really the basis of the facts of our experience. These various facts of the world can never be traced back to the absolute or evolved out of it. The philosophy, which builds itself upon or ends with such an absolute, will not be able to function properly, inasmuch as it will fail to render any reasonable explanation of our experience. Bradley himself has admitted that "why there are appearances and appearances of such various kinds are questions not to be answered" (p. 511). In other words Bradley seems completely to give up the idea of explaining our experience. Our

experience is presumably confined to appearances and we do not know why there should be any appearances at all, far less why there should be such appearances as we experience in our daily life. We are not asking why reality should be what it is. This question may well be quite illegitimate. But the question, why there should be appearances, if in truth there is only reality, appears quite legitimate and this remains unanswered. We find no reason why reality should go so far out of itself as to present itself as appearance. There does not seem to be anything in reality, as it is conceived here, which can account for the fact of appearance as well as for the sort of appearance that we see in the world.

Bradley seems to be most consistent when he disclaims all real knowledge of the absolute. He says: "Fully to realise the existence of the absolute is for finite beings impossible. In order thus to know we should have to be, and then we should not exist" (p. 159). The knowledge of the absolute as absolute must be the full knowledge of it. Any partial knowledge of it can be derived even by looking at an appearance, since the appearance is also supposed to be partially real. If the absolute is to be known it must be known fully. We cannot say that we know the absolute and also admit that we know it only partially. To know the absolute in part is to know only appearance. But here it is expressly said that we cannot know the absolute fully. This should mean that we cannot know it at all. It has been realised that to know the absolute fully we should not exist. But if we cannot know the absolute so long as we exist, we cannot also know it when we do not exist. The conclusion seems inevitable that knowledge of the absolute is impossible for us. We cannot know it truly so long as we (appearances) are there; we cannot of course know it when we are not there. Agnosticism seems to be the only legitimate conclusion of Bradley's philosophy.

Bosanquet has laid more stress on the positive than on the negative side of the absolute and instead of referring us

to immediate feeling, he has referred us to higher forms of experience, to art, morality and religion, for an insight into the character of the absolute. But even he does not seem to have solved our difficulties. It is not enough for us to know that the absolute is a whole, a system or an individual, unless we know what whole, system or individual the absolute is. The belief, that there is some system in the world, may be there; it may be explicitly held or only implied by all our activity of thought. But the system that is actually there is really known only when all its constituent elements are known and are known as forming the system. So the absolute can be known only when all its elements are known as constituting a harmonious whole. But it appears impossible that all the facts of the world should be known by any finite mind at any time. It appears even more so that they should actually be known as harmonising with one another. We find contradictions in our life and thought. All our activity, theoretical and practical, is directed towards the removal of these discrepancies either in life or in thought. If we had attained to a realisation of the harmonious whole which is one with the absolute, there would be no further activity and movement. It appears therefore that at least in our present state it is not possible for us to know the absolute as a completely harmonious system.

Bosanquet has referred us to our higher experiences for evidence of his absolute. But even from these regions we do not seem to obtain an adequate idea of the absolute. It is no doubt true that some balance or harmony of material has to be achieved in all works of art. And we may believe that the type of a harmonious whole which we meet with in works of art represents the nature of the absolute. But we cannot know that the absolute is really a harmonious whole especially when our experience presents us with disjointed and mutually conflicting facts.

Morality concerns itself with good and evil. The distinction and opposition between good and evil are vital to

moral experience. But we are told that such opposition is transcended in the absolute which is beyond good and evil. It appears impossible therefore that we should get a clue to the character of the absolute from moral experience. As for religion, there too we have the opposition between God and man, between perfect and imperfect wills. God and man may be reconciled to each other. But the reconciliation as a fact does not come out in religious experience. The object of such experience does not seem to be God and man reconciled to each other, but God alone who has to be understood as exclusive of man and who cannot therefore be the whole or the absolute. Bosanquet himself does not believe that religion is the proper field for the realisation of highest metaphysical truth. We have therefore to conclude that the veil of our ignorance about the real nature of the absolute is not lifted even by the best advocates of absolutism.

We see thus that the theory of the absolute advocated by Bradley and Bosanquet is beset with many difficulties. It is highly improbable that such an absolute should at all be real. If the absolute cannot be real, we cannot look upon it as the ideal, because the ideal must be real. Even if the absolute be real, it cannot serve as the ideal, for we have seen that its nature is incomprehensible and is really unknown to us and what is unknown and incomprehensible cannot be used as the standard and basis of our judgments of value.

CHAPTER IX

The Ideal as Absolute Existence, Knowledge and Bliss.

It is customary for us to speak of things as better or worse than others. This presupposes that there should be some ideal best in the light of which things may be judged as better or worse. When we say that a thing is better than another, we mean that the one represents or realises the ideal more adequately than the other. If such judgments are to be true, and we cannot think that all such judgments are false, we have to admit that the ideal must be real and fixed. If the judgment 'A is better than B' is true, if, *i.e.*, A is really better than B, then C or the ideal, the degree of 'nearness' to which determines the superiority of A to B, must be real. The judgment in question expresses a relation between A and B but it implies also a relation between A and C. The judgment can be true only on condition that the implied relation between A and C is there. And the relation between A and C can be there only if C is at least as real as A. If C were wholly unreal, a mere nothing, we could not talk of a real relation between A and C. No such relation can subsist between a real term and a term which is not so. The ideal, C, which is implied in all judgments of comparative value, has therefore to be real whenever such judgments are true.

When we say that the proposition 'A is better than B' is true, we mean that it is true for everybody and at all times. It cannot be true for some and not true for others or true only occasionally. There is no private ownership in the realm of truth. The fact that some persons may not be acquainted with any particular truth does not make the truth less true for them. In fact 'for me' or 'for you' is always to be considered as an irrelevant addition when we are speaking of truth. Our

acquaintance with or ignorance of a particular fact does not affect in the least the truth or the falsehood of the proposition which seeks to express the fact. It is true that we cannot rationally assert anything about a fact with which we are not acquainted, and unless some assertion is made, there cannot be any truth or falsehood. But if the truth of an assertion strictly consists in the agreement with fact, it is easy to see that our acquaintance with the fact forms no part of such agreement. If we do not know the fact we may not be able to judge that the agreement is there. Our acquaintance with the fact is necessary for our judging that the agreement is there, but not for the actual being of the agreement. Whether a proposition or a belief is known or not known to be true by this or that individual is a matter of history ; but the truth or the falsehood of a proposition is certainly not a matter of history. If a proposition is true, it is always true. Space and time may qualify the terms of a proposition ; but its truth is never qualified by them.

If a moral judgment is to remain in its truth the same throughout all time, the ideal or the standard which determines its truth must also remain the same. If the standard or the ideal wholly disappears or suffers any change, our moral judgments would become correspondingly different. What is good to-day would become bad to-morrow. But we are never prepared for such a contingency in the moral world. When we sincerely think that a particular thing is good, we believe that it is always so. Many of the moral judgments of mankind have no doubt changed in course of history and what we are now considering as good may, in some cases, be found afterwards as not good. But this only shows the present imperfect nature of our knowledge of moral truths. This can never indicate any changefulness in the moral truths themselves. The fundamental judgment that what is good (and is not simply considered to be good) is good at all times and places must remain unaffected by the accidents of human knowledge. If

moral truths are immutable in their nature, the standard or the ideal which determines such truths cannot be regarded as liable to change. We have already argued that the ideal must be real. We now find that it should not be subject to change. We therefore conclude that the ideal is real in such a way that it never falls off from its reality.

That which undergoes any change suffers on that account some fall from itself, *i.e.*, from its being or reality. If a thing remains what it is, we do not know how we can say that it has changed. It changes because, and in so far as, it cannot remain itself and is forced to become different from what it is. This shows that a thing changes only when it fails to maintain itself in its self-existence. Its change must mean some fall from its reality. But because a thing is now real, it does not follow it will always remain so. It may suffer change and thus cease to be real. The things of the world of sense enjoy a sort of evanescent reality. They are there for a moment and in the next they pass out of existence. The being of the world, as known to us, passes every moment into non-being. Over against this passing reality of the world, there shines the eternal reality of the ideal which has attained, or is, itself so completely that there is never a fall from its reality. Such changeless existence is what we may call absolute existence (*sat*). By absolute existence we mean the sort of existence which suffers no change. The ideal is absolutely real (*sat*) in the sense that it is perfect in the enjoyment of its own existence, and there is nothing within or beside it to disturb the equilibrium of its being or to move it away from itself.

From other considerations too we are led to the idea that the ideal must be real in this sense. If the ideal means anything for us, it must be that towards the realisation of which we direct all our rational efforts. So from the nature of the case the ideal can only be such as can never be dissociated from the idea of reality. What we are trying to realise can

never be a state of unreality or an empty void. On the other hand what we seek to realise must be in the first place a form of being which is in some sense fuller than what we at present enjoy. The ideal is *ex hypothesi* the highest form of perfection, and since there can be nothing higher than the highest, when the ideal is once reached nobody can rationally desire to move away from it. As we have already argued, the ideal can never be subject to a state of perpetual unrest. The ideal must be capable of giving final rest and lasting peace to our spirits. The notion of an ideal which is ever being realised but is never to be realised fully seems unsatisfactory. Unending voyage on a shoreless sea may fascinate certain spirits, for whom mere activity is an end in itself. For us an activity has meaning only as a means to an end which in principle must be attainable. When the final end of our life and being is reached there is no scope for any further activity. The end cannot be finally satisfactory if it were to change its character as soon as we reached it. The ideal must therefore be not only a form of reality but it must be a form of reality which is unchangeable in its nature. Its reality must be perfect in the sense that it is absolutely free from any tendency towards self-disruption or non-being.

In concluding to the reality of the ideal from our very notion of it, we are not necessarily repeating here the old ontological argument in its common acceptance. Kant is generally supposed to have given the final quietus to this argument by showing that we cannot rationally pass from the idea of a thing to its reality. To have merely the idea of three hundred dollars is no proof that they are actually there in one's pocket. There may be some difference of opinion as to what the ontological argument should be taken to mean. But if it means only an illegitimate passage from the idea of a thing to its reality, our argument for the reality of the ideal does not surely commit this error. It is true that we cannot assert that a thing is real simply because we happen to have

some idea of it. But when we argue that the ideal must be real we do not merely say that it must be so, simply and solely because we have the notion of the ideal in our mind. We are led to the conception of the ideal by the logic of the facts which are indisputable. The notion of the ideal is not a chance idea, which we may or may not have, like the idea of three hundred dollars or of a mountain of gold. It is not necessary for us to entertain these ideas explicitly nor are they implied by any fundamental form of our experience. But the notion of the ideal is a necessity for us. We cannot pass through moral experience and make judgments of value without thinking of the ideal as the standard of perfection. If we are obliged to think of the ideal, and must think of it as real, the conclusion seems inevitable that the ideal is real. The ontological argument may be so interpreted as to mean the reality of the thing we are obliged to think of as real. Our argument is not different from the ontological argument understood in this form. And we believe when the ontological argument is interpreted in this way, it is quite unassailable. Those who believed that the idea of the most perfect being is a necessary idea and that the most Perfect Being cannot be thought of except as real, were, it appears to us, quite justified in holding that the most Perfect Being is real. What is disputable in their argument is the assumption that the idea of the most Perfect Being is a necessary idea. If we concede that the idea is a necessary one and if we also grant that the most Perfect Being cannot be thought of except as real, we do not know how we can resist the conclusion that the most Perfect Being must be real. We have tried to eliminate the disputable element by showing that the notion of the ideal is rendered necessary for us by the facts of moral experience.

We may say that the ideal is absolutely real. But we do not adequately describe the ideal merely by saying that it is absolutely real. Undisturbed continuance in being may work in us as a biological urge: but merely as such it cannot assume

the character of the ideal. It is possible to conceive that a thing may ever continue to be what it now is and thus satisfy our definition of absolute reality ; but, for all that, it may eternally remain in blind stupor. It may exist but it may not realise that it is real. A piece of stone suffers less palpable change than a softer or more brittle substance. If we can somehow eliminate the element of change from a piece of stone, it will not thereby be changed into the ideal. The piece of stone may be real ; but, so far as we know, it is absolutely blind ; it does not see its own existence. Its reality is, as it were, foreign to itself. Some people have even gone so far as to say that we realise its existence and thus give it its reality. However that may be, it is certain that mere changeless existence, unintelligent in its nature, has no fascination for a rational mind. The ideal is what we rationally desire to be ; and there does not seem to be any reason why we should desire to lose ourselves in the abysmal darkness of mere being, unenlightened by any spark of intelligence. What we desire for ourselves and claim for our ideal is enlightened reality, that is to say, a reality which is conscious of itself and is thus realised in and for itself.

It is not sufficient for the ideal to be absolutely real, if absolute reality is not also associated with absolute knowledge. The ideal must have absolute knowledge as well as absolute existence.

By absolute knowledge (*cit*) we mean knowledge which is essential to the being of things and to which nothing in reality is external. Our ordinary knowledge does not seem to take hold of the being of things which we know, and they seem to maintain a sort of externality to our knowledge. If things were wholly immanent in our knowledge, their being would be constituted by it, and they would not exist outside our knowledge, and so there would be no room for error. But our knowledge very often turns out to be false, and we believe that things exist even when they are not known by us.

The being of things and our knowledge of them do not coincide and so there is room for ignorance and error. Absolute knowledge is not knowledge of this sort. knowledge is not really knowledge if it is not true, and that knowledge alone is absolutely true which is not separable from the being of things known. My knowledge of a pain which I feel is never wrong, because my pain has no being apart from my knowledge of it, and my knowledge of it is one with its being.

Again our knowledge is limited, because it does not extend to all things. There are many things in the world which we do not know. But for absolute knowledge nothing is unknown and all that exists falls within it.

Such absolute knowledge also helps us to understand the fact of our knowledge. We need not labour the point that our knowledge is limited and subject to error. This presupposes that there are things outside our knowledge, that these are not immanent in our knowledge but are transcendent to it. But are they transcendent to all knowledge or knowledge as such? If they are transcendent to all knowledge they become mere indeterminate things in themselves. All determinations fall within knowledge and when we suppose that there are things outside all knowledge, we make them quite indeterminate and cannot say what they are and whether they exist at all. This will make all real knowledge impossible, and we shall never understand how the unintelligent things submit themselves to the forms of subjective thought and become known by us. On the contrary, if we suppose that there is a knowledge which is the informing principle of all things in the world and from which the being of things that exist can never be separated, then we can more easily understand that in knowing anything we merely identify ourselves with this knowledge and appropriate it according to our capacity and in our degree.

Why should the ideal be characterised by absolute knowledge? We have seen that the ideal has absolute existence,

in the sense that it is immutable and eternal. But this view of the ideal is not quite satisfactory, because unconscious existence cannot be accepted as a desirable state by rational beings. Will it not be enough if the ideal has knowledge only? What need is there that it should have absolute knowledge? If knowledge is required in the ideal, it must be knowledge in the true sense, that is, it must be knowledge which can never be wrong. Such knowledge is absolute knowledge which is not separable from the being of things known. Moreover, when we recognise that knowledge is desirable in itself, we cannot be content with partial or limited knowledge. Limited knowledge is partial blindness. Such knowledge is incompatible with the nature of the highest ideal. Therefore the knowledge which characterises the ideal must be absolute knowledge as we have explained it above.

The knowledge of the ideal must at least coincide with its own being if it is to be truly conscious of itself; we shall later on see that whatever exists does so by participating, however momentarily, in absolute existence, and so the knowledge which characterises the ideal is not mere self-consciousness of the ideal but is a consciousness from which nothing that exists can be separated. The knowledge of the ideal is coincident with absolute existence and if absolute existence gives being to everything else, then the knowledge of the ideal must necessarily coincide with the being of all things that exist. If anything is real, it must realise its being in this knowledge. Nothing real, therefore, will fall outside this knowledge and so it will be absolute knowledge in our sense of the term.

But even though the ideal is absolutely real and has absolute knowledge, its ideality does not seem to be fully expressed by these terms. It is no doubt a great thing to be absolutely real; and it is a greater thing to enjoy such reality with perfect knowledge. But the most important thing for us about the ideal is not that it is absolutely real and knows

itself to be so, but that it is the basis of abiding satisfaction. The ideal is ideal to us and deserves our ceaseless pursuit, not only because it guarantees permanent existence and full knowledge, but specially because it promises ultimate satisfaction. The ideal will not be an ideal to us, in spite of its reality and knowledge, if it fails to satisfy us completely. (*Cp. Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 7, p. 87.) We are inspired by a desire to realise the ideal because we believe that there will be, for good, an end to all our sufferings when we have once reached the ideal. We believe that it is the ideal and the ideal alone which can guarantee perfect and ultimate satisfaction to us. It seems therefore necessary that there should be an element of ultimate satisfactoriness about the ideal. This element we can call 'bliss' (*ananda*) or perfect peace. By 'bliss' we do not mean any pleasure which disturbs the equilibrium of our mind. All pleasures of sense are associated with such disturbance; they arise out of some mental excitement and are followed necessarily by some reaction. Such pleasures cannot be ultimately satisfactory. They can at best lead us from one state of unrest to another. Lasting satisfaction cannot be derived from them, because they are of the nature of temporary events which bring for a time a sense of elation to our spirits but leave a longer trail of uneasy depression or of thirsting vacuity. That satisfaction is likely to be permanent which arises from, or, rather, is one with, a sense of equanimity and poise and thus expresses the self-sufficiency of being that comes with the attainment of perfection.

Perfect satisfaction is only the other side of perfect being. The state of unrest, in which most of us pass our earthly existence, is a sure indication of the fact that we have not attained to perfect being. We are not satisfied with our present condition. What we are does not appear to be quite sufficient for us. So we want to do or get things which we think will contribute to our ampler existence. We want

to be better than what we are. If we could be satisfied with what we are, *i.e.*, with our present being, we should not then run after anything in the world. There should be no provocation for any further activity. But since we are not satisfied with what we are, rightly or wrongly, our present being appears defective to us. We are active and always seek to achieve something which we believe will result in a greater enrichment of our being and will thus remedy the shortcoming of our present existence. It is with this belief that we pursue riches and power; we think they will make us greater than what we are. In reality of course any extraneous accretion cannot result in a greater enrichment of being. And unless we grow inwardly, our external possession will only make us worse or at best leave us where we are. But however misdirected our activity may be, there is no denying the fact that an urge or tendency towards greater being is always working in us.

It may be argued that we are never satisfied or dissatisfied simply with ourselves, but always with something which is different from us. So dissatisfaction should not be taken as an indication of some lack of being in our own selves.

But if things are merely different from us and are not in any way related to us, we do not know how we can be either satisfied or dissatisfied with them. A defect which is not mine (in any sense) can never spur me on to any activity for its removal. I can have no desire to achieve things which will make no difference to me or will be credited to the account of somebody else. I cannot work for fame or wealth if it is simply to be there to be possessed indifferently by you or by me. I wish myself to be famous or rich and engage myself in appropriate activity. I want to be great by making these things part of my own being. We may very well be wrong in supposing that any or all of these things or some others will be the sure remedy of our present discontent.

But there is no mistake in the diagnosis that discontent, which is at the root of all our activity, is the expression of some defect in our being. There is something lacking to us. We do not seem to be sufficient unto ourselves. We are not complete and therefore do we seek for things of the world to fill up the void within ourselves.

Fullness of being then is synonymous with perfection which alone is the ground of ultimate satisfaction. Although we have distinguished the idea of satisfaction from that of being, ultimate satisfaction cannot remain indifferent to perfection of being. When being is perfect or complete in itself, it becomes one with perfect satisfaction which is never disturbed and to which no further addition can be made. Similarly with knowledge. We have distinguished satisfaction from knowledge, but ultimate satisfaction cannot be divested of all knowledge. In fact we cannot speak of satisfaction or dissatisfaction where there is no knowledge nor any possibility of it. Stocks and stones, which are not generally supposed to be conscious, are also not supposed to possess any capacity for satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Satisfaction means conscious satisfaction. We have said that satisfaction results from the attainment of greater being, but if such attainment is not also attended with full knowledge, no satisfaction will follow. We have seen that knowledge is inseparable from existence, so that defective knowledge would mean a defect in being. If therefore, ultimate satisfaction results from the perfection of being and is essential to it, it is evident that it must also be attended with perfect knowledge. We have thus arrived at the idea of the ideal in which being, knowledge and satisfaction become one with one-another. It is not a complex synthesis in which these different aspects of being, knowledge and satisfaction are present in their distinctness. But it is a unity which may wholly be regarded from our points of view either as absolute being or as perfect knowledge or as ultimate satisfaction

(which is the same thing as perfect peace). For analytic thought the ideal may reveal these aspects as well as others which we yet do not know; but to the ideal its satisfaction is not different from its knowledge or being. This is our vision of the ideal. It is *Sachchidananda*. It is difficult for us to conceive any higher ideal than that of ultimate satisfaction with perfect knowledge guaranteeing absolute existence.

The ideal thus conceived may no doubt be worthy of our passionate pursuit. It may indeed be one which we do actually pursue in our daily life. But we do not yet understand why it should be a duty for us to pursue the ideal. The sense of obligation which is associated with our pursuit of the moral ideal does not seem to be explained by the view of the ideal we have tried to present in this chapter. Again our moral life is a life of social intercourse. We do not usually think that a man could be moral or immoral if he were left alone in the universe to run the solitary course of his life. The moral ideal comes into operation when men come into contact with one another; and it seems that the moral ideal can be realised only in social life. But the view of the ideal we have so far formulated does not seem to forbid the possibility of its being realised privately and individually. Indeed there have been men in India who purposely cut themselves away from all social life and tried to realise the ideal simply by means of inward discipline and individual enlightenment. The realisation of the ideal has not been with them a social venture but a private enterprise. Were they right in their procedure? Can we really think that the view of the ideal so far developed, represents truly the moral ideal?

We have contended that the ideal is real. But if the ideal is already real, what need is there that it should also be realised by us?

The last question may be answered by saying that although the ideal is real in itself, it is not real in us who try to

realise it in our lives. As the ideal is already real, it is not trying in vain and without meaning to realise or reproduce itself in us. But as we are still far away from the ideal, we may legitimately try to reach the ideal and realise it in our lives. The realisation of the ideal in us need not mean, or result in, an unnecessary reproduction or duplication of the ideal in us. It may mean our becoming one with it.

But this and other questions cannot satisfactorily be answered without some knowledge of the self and the world. We must now try to study the nature of the self and the world in a few succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER X

The Self.

Nothing can be affirmed, denied or doubted unless the self is there, for affirmation, denial or doubting, being a conscious activity, will always presuppose a conscious subject. As Descartes said, we can doubt everything else, but the doubter cannot be doubted.

We cannot say that there is no doubting self but only a doubt about the self. For if doubting could support itself without a doubter, it would itself become the self. It is possible perhaps to suppose that there may be a radical doubt which is directed not only to the self but also turns upon itself. I may not only doubt that I exist but may also doubt that I doubt that I exist. I do not know whether such absolute scepticism is psychologically possible, but I am not sure that there would be any serious logical flaw in this position. It would possibly be threatened by an infinite regress. But when nothing is sought to be positively asserted, the regress may be allowed to run its course. Or we may suppose that there is a doubt which makes itself as well as its original object its object. We must only take care that nothing is positively asserted, not even the fact of doubting itself. But in such radical scepticism everything would be absolutely uncertain. Our logic would be paralysed and thought would become silent in absolute suspense of all judgments. To avoid this predicament we have to suppose that such radical scepticism is not possible for thought and so it is not acceptable to philosophy. If nothing else is certain, the being of doubt must at least be certain. And the existence of doubt

as an attitude of the mind will at once put the existence of the conscious subject beyond all question.

Our arguments have so far proved that if there is to be any consciousness, the conscious subject or the self must be there. And since it is impossible to deny that there is consciousness, it cannot but be admitted that the self is there. The being of consciousness is indubitably proved by the very fact that we are conscious. It might appear that if the being of consciousness could be proved by the fact that we are conscious, the being of the self might as well be proved by the same fact, because we cannot be conscious unless we are there. But although we believe that the being of the self is given in the fact that we are conscious, the being of the self is not so indubitable as that of consciousness. It is impossible to deny that there is consciousness, but it has been found possible in the history of philosophy to deny the existence of the self. One may deny consciousness as a pervasive character of all mental states, it may not be granted that consciousness is the differentia of all that is mental. But in no case can it be upheld that there is no consciousness at all. On the other hand it is possible to maintain that there is no such thing as the self. When we say that we are conscious, all that we really mean or should say is that there is a consciousness of a particular form. So instead of saying that X is conscious, Y is conscious, etc., we should merely say that there are consciousnesses of different forms. It appears then that if this alternative interpretation of the fact, on which we took our stand, is accepted, our position that the self is there is not strictly proved. All that we are obliged to say is that there is consciousness, but that the self is also there remains yet doubtful.

But can we really think that there can be any consciousness if there is no one to be conscious? The very form of the term consciousness implies that it is an abstract quality which requires for its reality and support a concrete subject

that can be conscious. We can at best think of consciousness as a state ; but if it is to be a state, there must be some one whose state it can be. A state by itself is nothing, it must always be a state of something or some one. And the being which has consciousness as its state or quality is the self.

It may be objected that we are being misled by the form of language and traditional ways of thought. The form of the term consciousness no doubt suggests that it is an abstract quality and has therefore only a dependent reality ; but in fact consciousness may not require to be propped up by some other entity. It may exist by itself without being supported by some conscious self. In experience we never find the self. Our mental life consists of the different acts of the mind which we may call acts of consciousness or simply cognitions. The self cannot be discovered in these cognitions, and it cannot of course be found outside of them. So the natural conclusion is that there are only cognitions and the self in fact does not exist.

Obviously, to such conclusions we cannot give our ready assent. The acts of consciousness or cognitions may make up our mental experience, but such acts of consciousness are possible only because there is a self. The cognitions must be real somewhere, and it seems obvious that they can be real only in some self. If we endow them with self-subsistence, it will be difficult to distinguish from them what we understand by the self.

Our different cognitions have different particular contents. It is obvious that the self is not a particular content. No one ever understands the self in this way. So we should not expect to find the self in any of our cognitions. Again, the self is real only in its acts of consciousness. If there were no cognitions, no acts of consciousness, nothing could ever establish the existence of the self. Consciousness is the only evidence for the being of the self. It is impossible, therefore,

to find the self outside of, or unrelated to, all acts of consciousness. But even though the self is not a content of any cognition and is not found outside all cognitions, it does not follow that the self is nothing or that it does not exist at all. The self is the basis of all consciousness and cannot therefore be found in or outside any act of consciousness. It must be found in indissoluble union with it.

Moreover, how can we know that there are only cognitions? Each cognition is sufficient only unto itself. It can tell us only about itself. There is no cognition which comprehends other cognitions as well in their true nature. So if there were only cognitions, the theory that there are cognitions only would not arise at all. Because it presupposes an acquaintance with several cognitions and this would not be possible if it were a fact that there are cognitions only. In any particular cognition we have only an awareness and the content of the awareness. That there have been, are and will be cognitions other than itself cannot be vouchsafed by any particular cognition. The supposed fact that the past cognitions impart to their successor some trace of their being, by means of which the latter can understand that there have been other cognitions, appears to be a myth. For in the present cognition we do not find any content with the characteristic mark of pastness. Whatever is found in any cognition can speak of its present being only ; but that it is the trace or after-effect of some past cognition is not directly given in any actual cognition. We see clearly therefore that the supposition that there are only cognitions (and no self) is significant only when there is an acquaintance with more than one cognition. As this cannot be effected by any cognition, we cannot think that the supposition is true. The self is the only entity which can have direct acquaintance with several cognitions and so the self would be necessary to make the very supposition significant which attempts to deny its existence.

Even Bradley who is so sceptical about the ultimate reality of the self finds himself constrained to admit "That selves exist is indubitable" (p. 104). He looks upon the self as something which is given and in a sense most certainly exists. But he adds that it is too full of contradictions to be the genuine fact (p. 75). If the existence of the self is indubitable, what else is required to justify the statement that the self is a reality? If you think that the self is too full of contradictions to be real, you have no right to assert that the self exists. Existence cannot violate the law of non-contradiction. If what is contradictory could exist, the law itself would not be valid. The fact that the law is universally recognised as valid clearly shows that there cannot be any existence which is full of contradiction. Either the thing itself would not exist or the supposed contradiction, which we seem to discover, in our understanding of the thing would not be there. And if the existence of the thing is indubitable, then doubt can only be thrown on the veracity of our defective analysis which pretends to discover contradictions in an indubitable fact. The elusive phrase 'in a sense' is not of much help in this connexion. It cannot be said that the self is not real because it exists only in a sense. For the sense in which the self exists can never be a sense which will deprive the self of its selfhood. If the sense is so extreme that it requires us to understand the self as not-self, there is no meaning in saying that the self exists in a sense. We can significantly say that the self exists in a sense only when the sense, however restricted, still leaves the self a self. Otherwise it should be clearly and indubitably declared that the self does not exist.

We have so far argued that it is impossible to deny the existence of the self. But our arguments as well as the conclusion can be significant only when there is a direct apprehension of the self. If we have no such direct awareness of the self, we are not likely to understand what is exactly meant by

any argument which seeks either to prove or to disprove the existence of the self. For any such argument will have the term self as one of its constituents, and if we do not know the self, we shall not understand the significance of the argument as a whole. It cannot be said that we may have an indirect knowledge of the self. For even what is known indirectly must at least have constituents which are capable of being known directly; and selfhood being a simple quality must be known directly or not be known at all. In knowing the quality of selfhood directly we must know the self also.

We have previously defined the self as the conscious subject. But what it is to be a conscious subject must be known by each one of us directly in himself. There is no other way of knowing what a conscious subject is. We can never directly find anybody as being conscious. We may truly believe or infer after the analogy of our own selves that others are also conscious. But their consciousness is not a thing of direct apprehension to us. We must first directly know ourselves as conscious subjects and then and then only can we speak of others as conscious.

McTaggart has argued with great force in his article on 'Personality' (*Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 9) that there can be no real knowledge of the self by description. The self must be known, if it is to be known at all, by acquaintance or direct awareness. If the self were known merely by description, it would be impossible, he has argued, to know or judge that I am aware of any particular awareness or of anything else. We are certainly aware of many things in the world directly; so there are occasions when I can undoubtedly say that I am aware of something, say, of X. I know very clearly then and truly judge that I am aware of X. Now, if I know that I am aware of X, I must know the 'I' which is a constituent of the judgment. If it is allowed that 'I' is known directly, then our contention is granted and we need not pursue the discussion any further. If, however, it is maintained

that 'I' is known indirectly or by description, we have to ask : what is the description by which we get an appropriate knowledge of 'I' ? We may try in the first instance to describe 'I' in this case by saying that it is that which has the awareness of X. Now a description in order to serve its purpose, at least in the present case, must be exclusive. But when we say that 'I' is that which has the awareness of X, we do not know whether there are not other entities which are also aware of X. If there are, as we believe there must be, our description will not be exclusive and so it will not serve its purpose.

We may try to improve this definition by saying that 'I' is that which has this awareness of X. It is commonly believed that the particular awareness which I have of a thing is not the same awareness which others may have of it. If this belief is correct, then of course the present description is exclusive in that it applies to one person and to one only. But even by this description we get only some person who has this awareness of X. But our 'I' in the judgment 'I am aware of X' is not some person who has this awareness of X, but it is the person who has the awareness and also judges 'I am aware of X.' The person who judges must be the person who is aware. Although we may have two descriptions corresponding to these two functions, we should never be entitled to say that they apply to one and the same person if we derived our knowledge of the self from descriptions only. If on the contrary we suppose that I know myself directly it is easy to understand that in being acquainted with the self, we become acquainted also with some of its characteristics. " And if I perceive it to have the character of being aware...and also perceive it to have the characteristic of making this judgment, I am justified in holding that it is the same person who is aware and who makes the judgment " (*Ibid*, p. 775).

We are in substantial agreement with the above position but it raises certain difficulties which require to be considered

here. When we say that the self is directly apprehended, we seem to mean that there is a consciousness in which the self is an object to itself. If we knew nothing of the self, it would be impossible for us to say anything of the self significantly. We should then be unable to assert the truth or falsity of any proposition which contained 'I' as one of its constituents. But we are perfectly clear about the truth of many propositions in which the term 'I' is used. This makes the conclusion obvious that we have some knowledge of the self. And so if by object we understand that which is known and if, also, it is found that the self must be known to us in some sense, then we cannot but admit that the self can be and is an object to itself. Self-consciousness is generally accepted as a fact, and the belief that it is a fact has given hope and relief to many a philosopher in his moments of intellectual perplexity. Yet there have been thinkers who deny that the self can be an object to itself. And although some of them are not disposed to deny that self-consciousness is a fact in some sense, they deny that self-consciousness or the self has any consistent meaning.

If we are assured of our own existence, and if nobody can say that he does not exist, then self-consciousness as a fact should be taken for granted. I know without the shadow of a doubt that I am. But how can I assert this fact unless I know *myself* as existing? Self-consciousness has therefore to be accepted as a fact. Our only problem is to understand this fact consistently in the face of certain logical difficulties which we shall presently consider. If we cannot solve these difficulties we shall have to suppose either that self-consciousness is not a fact or that the difficulties are born of a wrong analysis or based on wrong assumptions. Our failure to solve these logical difficulties will not necessarily lead us to the conclusion that self-consciousness is not a fact. For the difficulties which appear to be involved in the idea of self-consciousness are

not in any way greater than the difficulties which are bound to arise if we once deny all knowledge of the self. We may rather think that the difficulties of self-consciousness are the result of false analysis and false assumptions than suppose that there is no such thing as self-consciousness. We shall however try to show that the difficulties of self-consciousness are not insuperable and so our belief in self-consciousness need not be false.

Now, by self-consciousness we understand a consciousness in which the subject and the object of consciousness are supposed to be one and the same. It is a knowledge in which the knower knows himself. The very same self which is conscious must itself be given in an act of awareness in order to constitute a true case of self-consciousness. We do not get a case of self-consciousness even when one part of the self is supposed to know another part of it. For the knowing part being different from the part which is known, we find that in this case the knower (knowing part) is conscious of an other (known part) and not of itself.

But is not the subject in being conscious of itself required to turn itself into an object? It seems to be our experience always that that which is known is distinct from that which knows it. If in one and the same act of knowledge the subject could indifferently become either subject or object, and if the same thing were true also of the object, then when we say 'I know this book,' we might as well say 'This book knows me;' and both the statements should be taken as equally good readings of one and the same fact. This however is never the case. So if self-consciousness is to be regarded as a fact, we must be able to show either that what is known in knowledge is not always an object or that there is no absolute opposition between subject and object.

McTaggart in his article on 'Personality' seems to hold that there is no absolute opposition between subject

and object, and thinks that the self can become its own object. His argument is that if it were not true that the self can become its own object, no self would know its own existence, since no self can know its own existence without being an object of knowledge to itself. And since we know that we exist, it should follow, he thinks, that we can become objects to ourselves. It cannot be denied, he further argues, that there are certain relations by which a substance can be related to itself, and there is nothing in the relation of knowledge to justify our supposition that it is not one of such relations.

But is it a fact that there is no absolute opposition between subject and object? To be a knower never appears to be the very same thing as to be known. We have already seen that the subject and the object in any particular act of knowledge can never interchange their positions without altering the significance of the situation. The place and the function of the object in any instance of knowledge are not those of the subject; and if the situation is to retain the same significance, the subject must remain subject and the object object.

Whenever we assert any relation we do so on the supposition of some difference between the terms which are related. Without such a supposition even the relation of identity does not become significant. But even if we admit that the relation of identity does not presuppose any such difference and that it is a relation in which a term stands to itself, we cannot persuade ourselves to believe that the relation of knowledge is a relation of this sort. When I say 'I know this,' I can never be supposed to mean anything approaching in significance the proposition 'I am this.'

How is it then that the self is aware of its own existence or knows itself? It seems that even here we are bound to make a distinction between the self which knows and the self which is known. For epistemology the self as knower cannot be identical with the self as known. But metaphysically,

we may suppose the self is so constituted that it is able to perform the double function of knower and known in one and the same act of knowledge.

But if the whole self is the knower and if, again, the whole self is to be known, how can we think of the same self as knower and known and also keep the distinction between knower and known intact? We have already seen that in self-knowledge that which is known must exactly be the same as that which knows. We require identity as well as difference. Because self-knowledge is a case of *knowledge*, it is required that the knower and the known should be different, and because it is *self*-knowledge it is again necessary that they should be identical. How is this possible?

It is no explanation of the difficulty to suppose that there is metaphysical identity inspite of epistemological distinction. When we are moving on the level of knowledge we do not get at a metaphysical substance which is neither subject nor object. The difficulties of self-knowledge are difficulties of knowledge and should be and can be solved, if at all, only within its proper sphere. If by self we mean the subject and if it is intelligible only as the subject, then in order to vindicate self-knowledge, we must be able to show that the subject itself becomes the object. If this is impossible and if self-knowledge is also a fact, then we must believe that what is given in knowledge need not always be an object.

The point that clearly emerges from our discussion is that the subject as subject can never be also an object. To be a subject is to be a knower and we submit that the knower as knower is never reached as an object. When I know you, I may believe that you have the capacity of knowing things, but I can never find you, as an objective content of my knowledge, actually performing the function of knowing. The conscious subject is never got at in the form of an object. When I take you to be a conscious subject I understand you after the analogy of my own self. But you as a conscious

subject actually being conscious of something do not directly enter the field of my consciousness. When you are my object, you are simply a factor in my knowledge, and being such a factor you are never directly seen to initiate or actually perform the function of knowing. If by object we understand some definite content, held up before our mind in any concrete act of knowledge, it is easy to see that neither the subject nor knowledge itself is ever an object to us.

If the subject and knowledge are never our objects, how do we know that there are subjects and knowledge? If I am to know that there is the subject and there is knowledge, is it not necessary that the subject and knowledge should be my objects? Now, if by object we mean anything of which there is any consciousness (not necessarily by an external subject), then of course we have to say that all things in the world including subject and knowledge are objects. But when its meaning is so widened, will objectivity retain any distinctive character? In any instance of knowledge we have a subject as well as an object together with the fact of knowing. We know what a subject is and what knowledge is only in the act of knowing. When we know anything we are conscious of the subject and knowledge as well as of the object. So in a sense all these may be said to be objects. But it is a sense which will render objectivity almost meaningless. Even when we say that all these are objects, we do not mean that they are all objects in the same sense. The subject is subject-object, knowledge is knowledge-object whereas the object is object-object or mere object. But when we have made a distinction between subject and object, and also between object and knowledge, we cannot then speak of subject-object and knowledge-object with significance or consistency. If our analysis of knowledge into subject, object and knowing is valid, then the term object should have a meaning which cannot be shared also by subject and knowing. The object is only a factor in knowledge; it cannot absorb in

itself the whole being of knowledge together with that of the subject. Knowledge is not exhausted in the being of the object. When we know, our knowledge is not exclusively confined to the object only. It relates itself to the subject as well as to the object. All the three factors must be there. The subject is given as subject, knowledge is given as knowledge and all of them need not be given as objects. In knowing anything we are conscious of knowing as knowing, as well as of ourselves as conscious subjects. In one and the same act of knowledge in which a thing is given as an object to us, our selves as conscious subjects together with the fact of knowledge are revealed in their proper character. We do not need to direct a further act of knowing upon the subject and knowledge in order to know what they are. But they are not all given as objects. If they were to be given as objects in order to be known, their true character would not be known at all.

When I know X, I am conscious of the fact of knowing as well as of myself as the knowing subject. But I am conscious of myself as the knowing subject and not as an object of my knowledge. The object in this case is X, and not myself. Self-consciousness is not a new species of knowledge in which the subject needs to become the object; but it is an invariable aspect of all knowledge in which the subject remains subject and the object object.

But is it not possible, it may be asked, for a being to be conscious without being self-conscious? It is conceded, *e.g.*, by McTaggart, that 'the only conscious being of whom I am ever aware is necessarily self-conscious, since it is myself.' But it is argued, "I am not always self-conscious when I am conscious. Memory gives me positive reason to believe in states when I am not aware of myself at all...in which I am conscious of other objects and am not conscious of myself, because my attention does not happen to be turned that way." It is however believed that 'a self could always be self-conscious if circumstances turned its attention to itself.' But

this does not, it is maintained, alter the fact that, at those times we are just as really not self-conscious as at other times we are really self-conscious.'

We are however inclined to believe that self-consciousness is inseparably bound up with all consciousness. We cannot say anything about a consciousness with which we are not acquainted; but the consciousness which we find in ourselves seems always to carry with it self-consciousness as an inseparable aspect.

If we try to see whether we can be conscious without being self-conscious, our experiments are bound to end in failure. Actually by observation I cannot find myself simply to be conscious without being self-conscious. The very attempt to see whether I am self-conscious at once makes me self-conscious. So we must go to past experience in order to prove that we can be conscious without being self-conscious. Now, suppose I remember a state when I was conscious of X and was not conscious of myself. If anyone now asks me whether I was conscious of X, I must be able to say that I was. But that I was conscious of X is not a case of direct present knowledge but is a case of memory. And what I remember is not simply X or the consciousness of X but the whole fact of *myself* being conscious of X. But I can remember only that which I knew. So if I am able to remember that I was conscious of X, it is certain that I *knew* then that I was conscious of X. This shows that I was not merely conscious of X, but was positively self-conscious.

Let us even suppose that I remember that I was not conscious of myself. Here on the strength of memory, I am asserting something about myself, not about myself as I am now, but about myself as I was at some point of time in the past. But if I had absolutely no knowledge of myself at that point of time, how can I rationally assert anything about how or what I was then? If my mind were a perfect blank about myself I should not be able to remember

anything about myself. When I remember that I was not conscious of myself, I do not try to hold a blank picture of mere unconsciousness before my mind ; but I remember *myself* as being unconscious of itself. But how can I remember *myself* being in a particular state, unless myself in that state was originally known to me? My memory can never lead me back to a conscious state in which I was not conscious of myself. So it appears impossible that we should be able to establish, either by observation or by memory, the being of a consciousness in which we are not self-conscious. The fact that we think we are at times not conscious of ourselves, only shows that at those moments our minds are much too occupied with the objects of our knowledge and not that self-consciousness is altogether absent. To be able to say that I am conscious and not to know that I am there or that I am conscious seems impossible.

It may be objected that our whole discussion tends to do away with the obvious distinction between the judgments " I know " and " I know that I know." If the distinction between these two judgments is a valid distinction, then to be conscious cannot mean to be self-conscious.

The judgments " I know " and " I know that I know " may appear to be different, but in fact the latter judgment is only an explicit statement of the former.

When I know anything, I know that I know it. The fact that I know that I know is revealed and involved in the primary fact that I know. Self-knowledge is necessary to constitute a complete case of knowledge, but it is not by itself a new case. It is an aspect of all knowledge which we may overlook at times but which we can never rationally deny.

We conclude therefore that self-consciousness is a fact but it is a fact which does not involve the necessity of turning the subject into an object. It is an aspect of all human knowledge in which the subject reveals itself as subject.

CHAPTER XI.

The Self as Active.

There cannot be any rational doubt about the existence of the self. It is also beyond doubt that the self is conscious. The whole being of the self, however, does not seem to come out in the simple fact that it is conscious. The self, which each one of us knows in himself and which seems to be required by the validity of moral consciousness, is not a self of which mere consciousness is the only predicable characteristic. We feel ourselves to be active as certainly as we feel ourselves to be conscious. Not only do we *know* but we are always *doing* something or other. We cannot conceive of any act in which no one is active, and undoubtedly there are acts whose activity (*i.e.*, the activity implied in them) is referred only to ourselves.

But what is it exactly that we mean when we say that we are active? I do not think that activity can strictly be defined. It is a primary experience, and if a person has no sense of activity, we shall not be able to convey an adequate idea of activity to him by words, gestures or any other symbols. Still we may name or describe certain experiences in which activity is involved. When 'we seek anything, strive after it, aim at it or intend it,' we undoubtedly find that we are active.

It is at least certain that we begin or initiate many processes which would not otherwise come into being. We may not be the sole and sufficient causes of these processes, but our participation in them must be an important factor in any explanation that may be sought to be given of them.

The full explanation for them may not be found exclusively in us, because many other things besides ourselves help to materialise a process which nevertheless is initiated by us. But if we are left out, no consistent account of them will be possible. We give our willing assent and the process begins. But the process does not begin of itself; it has to be started by us, so that the fact becomes indisputably clear that the process would not take place if we did not act in the way we did. If I did nothing,—and if indeed I can do nothing,—why should I be sorry for the result of any action that merely happens in the world? The fact is that we are not merely the theatres of certain psychical processes which may be supposed to take place in us without our playing any part in their being or doing. The cognitive relation is not the only relation that exists between us and the world of change and process. We do not simply see changes and posit them to be there. But many of them are actually brought about and maintained in being by our activity. It is only when we recognise this and believe that we are right in this recognition that we can rationally endow ourselves with rights and duties. If essentially I can never be active, if nothing can really be done or effected by me, no question can at all arise of my exercising any right or performing any duty. There should be then no morality for me.

We always speak of a moral *agent*. A person that exercises only the ghostly function of a mere spectator, without being in any other way connected with the things he sees, cannot lay claim to any moral attribute. If he is by nature incapable of adopting any active attitude in thought or action, if things are only done to him and he does nothing, he cannot by any means be subjected to any moral criticism. Even when we are criticised for not doing certain things, it is never doubted that it was possible for us to do those things. In fact it is this possibility which

gives meaning to and justifies such criticism. It is clear therefore that the validity of our moral consciousness is consonant only with the certainty that activity is one of our essential characteristics. If it remains originally doubtful whether or not we can at all be active, that is, whether or not we can effect anything in the world, we should not on any occasion feel so certain that we have been right or wrong nor should we be so positive in ascribing moral attributes to others. That we are active and that our activity counts in the world are facts which appear to be beyond all question. They appear particularly indisputable to us who have started our metaphysical speculation from the certainty and the validity of moral consciousness.

Yet there have been philosophers who deny that the self can really be active. It is contended on the one hand that no activity can really be found in the self, and, on the other, that the idea of activity, especially as applied to the self, is itself full of contradiction and cannot therefore be true.

Those who maintain that the self cannot directly be found to be active do not necessarily seek to uphold that the self is not really active. It is maintained, *e.g.*, by a writer in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, "that there is no direct consciousness of activity" (Vol. I, p. 82). But he does not mean to assert that we have no idea of activity or that the idea of activity is a fictitious one. He thinks 'that the conception of activity is a symbolic knowledge founded on certain complex groups of feelings and presentations.' "There are, of course," he says, "primitive experiences on which these conceptions are based, but the conceptions are built upon them, and not drawn out of them" (*Ibid*, 81). All that he seems to mean here is that we have no primary consciousness of activity and that by direct observation we do not find any activity experience in us. But to say that activity cannot be found by direct

observation is not to say that it is not there. If there are sufficient grounds in the form of some primary experience on which the idea of activity can be based, and if those experiences belong to ourselves, then we think we cannot be wrong in applying the idea to ourselves. So our main position that the self is active will not be affected even if we grant that by direct observation we do not know ourselves to be active. For to be active is not the same thing as to be known directly as active; and if we deny the latter, we do not thereby necessarily deny the former. But although the admission that the self is not directly perceived to be active may not seriously affect our main position, the admission is likely to create a presumption against it, inasmuch as in our defence of the view that the self is active, we have mainly supported ourselves on the direct evidence of consciousness which testifies to the activity of the self. We are not directly interested just now to ascertain the manner in which the self is known to be active; we want only to maintain that the self is really active. How it is known to be so is not very material to our main argument. But as it appears to us that the denial of a direct knowledge of the activity of the self makes it very difficult to ascertain whether the self is really active, we feel obliged to say a few words against the supposition that there are no activity experiences.

That we have an idea of activity, no one will perhaps seriously deny. The problem related to it is, first, whether the idea is built up out of some experiences which are non-active in their nature, or is simply drawn out of an elementary primitive experience which is incapable of being further analysed into some non-active elements. Secondly, we have to ascertain whether the idea, however we may come by it, is really capable of being applied to the self truly. If it is found that the idea of activity is derived from a primitive experience of the self, then in knowing the source of

the idea we know whether or not it is applicable to the self. For to have a primitive experience of activity is directly to experience the self being active. We are inclined to the view that we have a direct experience of activity in ourselves and know thereby that we are active. Let us examine the opposite view.

If there is no direct experience of activity, there must be other experiences which, being non-active in their character, are yet able to give rise to the idea of activity in us. If we accept this position, then several hypotheses suggest themselves to us. We may suppose (1) that although activity is not directly perceived, it is reached by inference from some other experiences ; or (2) that it is the sum of such non-active experiences. We may even think (3) that whenever we have some particular experiences, they are of themselves followed by an idea of activity in our mind or (4) that our idea of activity is nothing but a symbolic representation of those experiences. Let us try to explain and examine these alternatives one by one.

(1) Now what is contended by those who deny any primary activity experience in us does not seem to be that we have no knowledge of activity as such. What they seem to deny is the givenness of activity in any direct experience. But if there is no direct apprehension of activity, how do we know that there is any activity at all ? One answer to this question may possibly be that we infer activity from non-active experiences. But can this be a satisfactory answer ? In all inferences what is inferred must already be directly experienced by us. A thing of which we have had no experience whatever cannot be made an object of inference. The antecedent experience of the thing, necessary for its inference, cannot itself be inferential ; for that would necessitate some other previous experience which must be direct and immediate. So in order to be able to infer activity from other experiences, we must have had some direct

experience of activity itself. If we deny all direct experience of activity, we have also to deny that it can be reached by inference.

(2) We may suppose that what we call activity is only a whole of some particular experiences which are not in themselves active. The whole as such is never given in experience. What is given is some particular experiences and they are constructed into a whole by synthetic imagination. But if activity were really a whole, it should consist of certain constituents. Activity seems to be a simple idea and it is difficult to find out what may possibly be its constituents. Professor Laird has very ably shown that activity can never be equated to any other experience or group of experiences (*Problems of the Self*, Ch. V). Mere change or transition is not equivalent to activity. The feeling of strain or effort does not give the essence of activity. If there is activity, there will no doubt be change or transition from one state to another, and the activity may be accompanied by a feeling of strain or effort. But these severally or together never bring out the essence of activity. If we turn to experience, we find that we are very often aware of change or transition without knowing that we are active. The feeling of strain or effort only shows how we are affected in being active. But our being active is never identical with our being affected in a particular way. One may suggest other experiences in the place of those we have named here, in order to give us an equivalent of what we understand by activity. But in every case it will be found that the essence of activity can never be given in terms of some other experiences which are themselves not active.

(3) If we give up the idea that activity is a complex whole, we can only think that it is a simple notion. If there is also to be no direct experience of it, we have only to suppose that the idea occurs to our mind whenever we have experiences of a certain type, or (4) that we form

the idea of activity simply as a representation of those experiences.

Now, the idea of activity may be preceded or accompanied by certain other experiences. But activity cannot be an idea only, for the simple reason that there can be no such thing as a mere idea. The idea must refer to some experience. If the experience to which the idea of activity refers is non-active in its nature, then to think of it as active is simply a mistake or an illusion. But we can mistake one thing for another only when the other thing, for which we mistake the thing before us, is already known to us. If some non-active experience is to be mistaken for activity it is necessary that we should previously be acquainted with activity. If we have no experience of activity, we cannot possibly commit the mistake of seriously supposing some non-active experience to be active. If our idea of activity is not illusory, then, of course, it will refer to some experience which is really active. Thus it appears highly improbable that non-active experiences should give rise to the idea of activity in our mind.

(4) We may not really commit the mistake of supposing non-active experiences to be active, but we may consciously use the symbol of activity to represent a class of non-active experiences. But the difficulty in this supposition is that we cannot think of anything merely as a symbol. The symbolic character of a thing consists in its standing for something else. But the thing itself must be something, before it can stand for another. Its being itself cannot be symbolic. Now if activity is to serve as a symbol, it must itself be something which in its being is not symbolic, although it may be so in its *use*. Activity itself does not mean a symbol; it is simply used as a symbol. So it is clear that activity as activity must be something. And what can it possibly be unless we refer it to some direct experience of ours?

It is indisputable that we have got some idea of activity. Our language is full of words and phrases which are significant only on the supposition that we have a notion of activity. The question is: Whence did we get the idea? It cannot be derived from the phenomena of the external world. There, strictly, we find only succession and change. In the external world one phenomenon is followed by another. We cannot sense any activity out there in things. Merely to undergo change is not to be active. If we cannot draw this idea from the outside world, then it is only possible that we have obtained it from ourselves, *i.e.*, from our own experience. This seems also warranted by facts. Whenever we are able to do something, we feel a sense of activity. It is only when we have obtained this idea from ourselves that it becomes possible for us to apply it, rightly or wrongly, to other things as well. But the reverse process is not possible. If this reading of facts is correct, then it appears reasonable that we should admit that there is a direct experience of activity in ourselves. Otherwise it is difficult to account for the idea of activity which we undoubtedly possess.

What we have considered above relates only to a fact of observation. We have tried to ascertain whether it is a fact that the self is not directly perceived to be active. But although the ascertainment of facts is an important business of philosophy, it is not mainly concerned with the observation of facts. It has principally to enquire into the rationality of things. Philosophy is concerned more with rational criticism than with mere observation of facts, external or internal. Naturally for philosophy the objections against the activity of the self, based on the alleged facts of observation, are less important than those which are raised on the grounds of reason. When a man says that he does not find any activity in himself, we may think that he has not correctly observed, or has otherwise been misled in his

observation. But when he insists that the conception of activity is such that it cannot validly be applied to anything in the world, far less to the self, he makes a more fundamental challenge to our belief. Even if we feel that we are active, we must be ready to think that our feeling is an illusion when it is proved to us that the idea of the self being active is not a consistent idea. In order therefore to validate our belief that the self is active, we have to show that our position does not suffer from those inconsistencies which have been alleged against it on grounds of reason. So let us consider here some of these arguments which seek to prove that the self cannot be active.

The idea of activity certainly implies the idea of change. If I do not change at all, I do not know how I can then be active. But mere change does not mean activity. If I am made to undergo certain changes by some external cause I am not then active but passive. The change which I undergo in being active, must be a change which is entirely due to myself. It is not mere change but self-caused change that brings out the meaning of activity. But have we got really an instance of a purely self-caused change? Nothing seems to change without some cause or other. If a thing could by itself be the sufficient cause of its change, why should not the change take place at a time other than the moment of its actual occurrence? Moreover, a change unrelated to any antecedent seems unintelligible. So it appears inevitable that a thing, in order to change, must at least require an occasion to put itself in the process of change. But if the change is brought about by an external occasion, how can it be then self-caused? If in changing I am determined by an outside occasion, I am passive rather than active. Therefore, it may be argued, activity cannot be a self-complete or consistent idea (*Cp. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Ch. VII*).

Now, although an occasion may be necessary to make us active in a particular direction, the occasion by itself does not

account for the series of changes which is supposed to follow upon it. The occasion itself is not sufficient to lead to the changes, but it certainly requires the co-operation of the subject which puts itself in the process of change. It may be inconceivable that a thing should burst forth into activity without reference to any appropriate occasion or other suitable conditions. But it is just as inconceivable that an occasion by itself should be sufficient to bring about any change in the world. The self too plays its part. It is never contended that the activity of the self is in no way determined by any other conditions or that it explains itself without referring to anything outside it. It is a matter of common knowledge that our activity is determined by the circumstances in which we have to be active as well as by the object which we seek to realise by our activity. But an admission of these external conditions never amounts to a denial of activity as such. These conditions cannot explain activity away precisely because they leave out of account the part played by the self. The self does play a part, and so long as its contribution cannot be shown to be mechanical or to be a passive resultant of external conditions, we have no means of assuring ourselves that the self is not active. It can at most be said that so far as the self is determined by an occasion, it is not active; but as it is not wholly determined by any external condition, it has room enough to be active also.

It cannot be said that the self receives passively and mechanically some influence from an external occasion and as an inevitable effect of such influence, a process of change ensues, of which the self is only a helpless sufferer or a disinterested spectator. We find, on the contrary, that, whenever there is a genuine instance of activity, the self takes note of all relevant conditions and determines itself to act. A conscious subject cannot be made to act quite in the same way as a piece of stone is made to move. We do not consider here whether the self is at all free to act. The will of a person may be as

thoroughly determined as you please by his heredity and education ; but the fact that he does will cannot be gainsaid. And what are heredity and education ? They are also part of himself. He may find it inevitable under certain circumstances to be active. But even then it is not absolutely necessary that he should will the action, give his ready consent to the accomplishment of the act and actively work for it. The opposite alternative of his remaining absolutely idle, taking no part in the action, seems always possible. The fact that he, constituted as he is, cannot help acting in the way he does, can never mean that he does not act.

But our troubles do not end here. It has been argued that the self cannot be active if it is a simple unity, and it cannot, also, be active even if it includes variety within it. And as the self either has or has not got variety, in either case it cannot be active. Activity involves change and change means the introduction of some difference. But an absolutely simple substance seems incapable of providing any room for internal differentiation. So it is evident that the self cannot be active if it is a simple unity. If the self includes variety, then too it cannot be active. For the parts changing, *i.e.*, appearing and disappearing, cannot be included in that which is active throughout the process and in order to be the subject of an activity, a thing must remain the same throughout the act (*Cp.* Bradley, *ibid*).

The same objection may be urged from a slightly different point of view. If I am to be active, it may be urged, I must change before I can act. If I remain absolutely the same, I cannot be said to be active rather than inactive. In order to be able to initiate an action, I must have already undergone some change. But if I have already changed, how is it to be ascertained that it is the same I who am active ?

The question has ultimately to be asked as to whether the idea of change is not compatible with our idea of the self. It is said that the self cannot change. In order to

know that there has been some change, the knowing subject must remain self-identical throughout the process of change. If the witnessing subject were itself to change, then there would be no consciousness of change. If the self which noticed the earlier state of a thing, is not the very same self which now sees its present state, then it is impossible to know by direct experience whether there has been any change at all. So it is contended that all changes are intelligible only on the basis of the unchanging self which witnesses them.

But the question is whether the idea of change is a valid idea. If we find it possible to conceive change, we should not find it more difficult to think of the self as active or changing. Change itself implies that the thing changing should remain the same and also become different at the same time. If a thing is simply replaced by another utterly different from it, we do not get an instance of change. The thing must somehow remain the same and also become different.

The difficulties of the self being active are ultimately the difficulties of the conception of 'identity in difference.' Abstractly considered, what is self-identical is not of course different. The idea of identity seems opposed to the idea of difference. But in any concrete thing there is an element, which is self-identical with itself, along with others which are different from one another. In such a case we may legitimately make use of the conception of identity in difference in order to express our idea of the thing.

The self has undoubtedly an element in it which remains ever identical with itself. As witnessing subject, the self never undergoes any change. No difference is ever introduced in its pure subjectivity. But the self is not simply the pure subject. There are obvious differences in its various states which are also owned and recognised by it. The self is constituted by various elements, some of which are persistent and remain identical, while others are changing. The name self is not given merely to the self-identical element

or to the changing elements as divorced from the basis of identity ; but it is applied to the changing elements as unified with the self-identical element. As the basis of identity is never lost the self can become conscious of differences in itself and in others. As different elements come to be unified with it and the self is understood to be self only as thus identified with them, there are obvious differences within itself. In this way we find room for identity in difference in the life of the self ; and so the idea of the self being active no longer presents to us any insuperable difficulties.

If the self were a simple unity or a mere variety, then, of course, it should be very difficult to conceive it as active. If it were only a principle of changeless identity or of mere difference and change, we would not know how it could be active. But as the self is an unity in variety, permanent in the midst of change, we are persuaded that the alleged difficulties of its activity do not arise at all.

CHAPTER XII.

The Self as Appearance.

We have already referred to the ambiguity of the term appearance. Anything that appears may be called an appearance. But what appears need not always be real, for there are cases of illusion in which things, as seen by us, do not exist. An appearance, again, is not always unreal, since there are veridical perceptions in which things appear just as they really are. And as we cannot think of an intermediate category between reality and unreality, it is impossible to credit all appearances with a common metaphysical status. An appearance as such therefore has no determinate metaphysical character.

But although the use of the term appearance is bound to create confusion whenever it is used without any qualification, if it is properly qualified, it may not only be rendered quite harmless, but it may also fulfil a very useful function. It appears to be the most convenient term we could find to describe that aspect of the self which we shall try to bring out in this chapter. We shall therefore begin with an explanation as to what we mean to signify by the term appearance.

By appearance we do not mean something which does not exist. An appearance certainly is, but is likely to give place to another appearance and disappear. Its being, as determined by its time and place, is as real as anything else. But it is not the last nor the permanent state of the thing which appears in it. If an entity x passes through the several

states of a , b , c , etc., then x as ' a ' or simply ' a ' is an appearance. ' a ' is not the last word nor the only word to be said about x , but it is a real state of x which however is liable to be superseded by b . Anything that lacks stability is in our view an appearance. With us it is not a question of a part being taken as the whole or of a truth being taken as exclusive of other relevant truths. When we view a part as the whole, we are certainly in error and the appearance is an illusion. But when x is in a real state, a , b or c , there is no illusion if we think that it is in that state, although in our view a or b would still be an appearance. In order that a may be an appearance we need not think that it is the only state or property of x , but we may know full well that there are other states or properties of x , and still the state or the property we now associate with it will not cease to be an appearance. In brief, with us appearance is a name for unstable reality. That which is capable of being superseded, although real at present, is an appearance.

When it is said that the self is an appearance, we mean that the self, as it is found at any given moment of its life in the world, possesses no stable reality. It is seen only in its passing phases. We seem to occupy only temporary stations in life. Nowhere have we got, nor do we like to have, a permanent footing. There is an inward urge in us which makes us move from stage to stage, and never allows us to drop down with impunity into a state of static rest. If we were to be made rigidly immobile in any particular state of our being, as it is lived in this world, it would mean our complete death. There would be no possibility of life and growth, and in every respect we should be more dead than alive. We never like to remain absolutely fixed in any particular situation, however desirable that situation may appear to us for the time being. On the contrary, the movement from one state to another is accepted by us as part of the process of self-realisation. We never accept

any particular state of our being in the course of our earthly life, as the final or the only state which we can truly and properly enjoy. All that we are or can be never seems to be brought out completely in any of our deeds and thoughts. At every stage we seem to fall short of what we think we really are. It is not simply the fact of change, which is inevitable and independent of our choice, that we like to emphasise here ; but we wish also to call attention to the fact that we never believe that any particular state or character, which we exhibit in life, can really contain or bring out the whole sum and substance of our being. So according to our definition of the term, the self, as it is found here, is an appearance. It is presented only in its aspects which supersede one another and is never found truly in possession of itself. This however is not to be regretted ; it is in the interest of moral experience that the self is an appearance. This point will now be brought out by a consideration of the object of moral judgments.

Ultimately it is the self which is the true object of all moral judgments. Without some reference to the self, such judgments cannot be made wholly intelligible. When we say that something is good, if the judgment is a moral one, the something in question cannot be a mere thing or an unconscious substance in the ordinary sense of the terms. There is nothing specifically moral or immoral in a thing which exercises no volition and cannot adopt any attitude towards anything in the world. A mere thing can be called good in an aesthetic sense or by transference of epithet. Only human conduct can be called good in the moral sense. Even conduct is not good or bad merely as an action or a series of changes in the external world. It is good or bad in so far as it expresses the nature or character of some conscious personality.

Again, when we say that an action is good, we do not simply mean that it is a fit object of our contemplation. We really mean that it is something which we ought to follow.

To say that an action is good is to say that we ought to do it. The goodness of an action does not carry with it simply a recommendation for its adoption to all morally-minded people, but it implies an obligation on all such people to follow the action actually in life.

Moreover, when we say we ought to do a thing, oughtness refers not so much to the thing to be done as to ourselves. And even with regard to ourselves, it is not our mere *doing* which is emphasised as our *being*. The mechanical performance of an action is not of much ethical value. What is important is that we should *be* such that the action may naturally and truly follow from us. So when we say we ought to do something, we really mean that our nature or character should be such as would make the action quite natural for us.

So the ultimate form of moral consciousness seems to be : ' I ought to be such and such ' or ' I ought to be good.' This consciousness arises most significantly when I really find that there is a distinction between what I am and what I think I ought to be. If I happen to be really what I ought to be, there will be no significance in my feeling that I ought to be such and such. The moral quality of the feeling comes out most vividly when I am painfully aware that I am not what I ought to be. At the same time, if my not being what I ought to be came to me as a fixed fact about myself, which could by no means be altered, then, too, it would be difficult for me to feel genuinely that I ought to be such and such. Whenever I feel that I ought to be something, I cannot but experience, however mildly, a desire to change my present state which falls short of what I ought to be. I can feel this desire, because I know it is possible for me to change into something better than what I am. If what I am now were something I have got to be eternally, and if it were impossible for me to change, however slightly, from what I now find myself to be, such inevitabilities would rule out any desire on my part to change myself and would thus negate all moral

consciousness which implies such desire. My feeling that I ought to be something different from what I am, has significance only because it is possible for me to get out of my present state. In fact the feeling that I ought to be different can really arise when I have already begun to be different. When I genuinely feel that I ought to be different from my present state I have really dissociated myself from my present state and have identified myself in thought with an ideal. So long as I remain identified with my present state in thought and being, it is not possible for me to feel genuinely that I ought to be different. In any case when I feel I ought to be different, I condemn my present being; such condemnation is possible only when I am already on the way to get out of my narrow imperfect being.

Thus the fact comes out that the self, whenever it has any moral consciousness, takes itself to be capable of improvement and negates in thought the particular state in which it finds itself for the time being. The self, as unified with the state which gives us an occasion to feel the revolt or the self-assertion of the moral self, is denied by us. We do not accept it as our true self, as the last or the only self we can have. But the negated self is not an unreality. If it were wholly unreal, not in any way attached to us, we should not seriously feel any dissatisfaction with ourselves which is the case in all genuine moral experience. It is undeniable that, for a time, the negated self happens to be our actual self, but its ultimacy or absoluteness is not accepted by any moral being. This is what we understand by appearance. Moral consciousness is possible if and only if the self is an appearance in this sense. If the self in any of its states were taken to be the final or absolute self, which can no further be changed or modified in the slightest degree, we should have to get ourselves reconciled to it and resign ourselves to the inevitable destiny. From such a state of things, no genuine moral consciousness, no consciousness of

a higher to be realised in life, no serious efforts to effect a change in the present self can possibly arise. The moral life then would come to an end. But we refuse to accept any particular state of the self as the final state for which we are destined in life. We yearn towards an ideal which is not already embodied in the present self and we struggle against the imperfections of the present, immediate self in the interest of the ideal.

What we are trying to bring out here is essentially the same point which Bosanquet made out in one of his Gifford lectures when he said : " No one ever dreams of acting on the assumption that a mind is for itself, especially at a given moment of time, all that it is in itself. If this were the truth, we should never argue or persuade. For to argue or to persuade is to rely on factors of the mind which are at the moment not explicit, and which we desire to evoke into explicitness. We could never appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober, nor even point out that there and then the man was not himself " (*Value and Destiny*, p. 60). We believe we are not making an extravagant claim when we assert that the self never expresses itself fully in any of its particular states, that no state, through which it passes in its earthly life, is adequate to contain or define the whole or the real self. This much will probably be granted even by common sense.

It may be thought that the self is nothing but the unity of its states, so that it is wholly expressed in its states, just as a whole is expressed in its parts. But our substantive notion of the self cannot be expressed entirely in terms of states which are adjectival in character. Moreover the states of the self are not parts of the self in the ordinary sense. Although it will be right to say that the self is real in any particular state, it will not be right to say that all its states are real then, because the different states of the self occurring at different times, can never be available at the same time. Besides whenever we predicate any state

of a self, it is the whole self that is made the subject. When we say X is angry, we do not mean that it is only a part of X that is angry. We mean on the contrary that the whole X is in a state of anger. Whatever is predicated of the self at any particular time seems to apply to the whole of the self and not to a part of it only. And although the whole self really happens to be in a particular state, it manages to get out of it and assumes other states without ceasing to be itself. Herein lies the significance of our calling any particular state of the self an appearance of the self. Any particular state of the self is a state of the whole self and yet the self does not for ever remain in that state, but passes out of it and assumes other states.

We have tried to emphasise the fact that it is ultimately the being of the self which is the object of moral judgment and which is sought to be changed by moral efforts. This self cannot be a self which is withdrawn from all relations with the external world or other human beings. The being of the self which makes no difference to, and is not in its turn affected by, anything outside itself, is not of much consequence to moral experience. It is as good as not there from the moral point of view. We are neither moral nor immoral in the private enjoyment of our own being. It is only when we come in relation with other human beings that we become morally conscious. When we find that our relations with them are attended with undesirable results, we feel the moral necessity of bringing about some change in ourselves. So the self that requires to be changed is the self which is expressed in its relations with and acts towards other human beings. The self viewed under the form of appearance is the concrete empirical self which manifests itself in its various acts, thoughts and feelings. The moral self has to be understood as inclusive of all these acts, thoughts and feelings. It is this inclusive self which is required to modify itself in the light of moral consciousness.

It is clear that a self which cannot enter into any significant relation with any other human being cannot be the subject of any moral attribute. The moral self has to be understood along with its relations. It must be a self whose being is to some extent one with that of its relations.

People sometimes speak of 'external relations.' We are not concerned here to find out the real sense of these terms nor to consider whether in any sense all relations can be called external. But this much we seem to know for certain that a significant relation always gives us some knowledge of the nature of the terms which are related by it. If no part of the nature of the terms related came out in the relation, that is asserted between them, there would be no justification, nor any provocation, for making the assertion. The terms related can never be unconcerned in the assertion of any relation between them. If they were totally indifferent, any relation might be asserted. So we find that relations do bring out the nature of the terms related. Then again, metaphysically speaking, where are the relations to go? If we are to believe in relations we must admit that they are somewhere real. But where can they be? They cannot be simply thrown between the terms. Relations are not self-subsistent entities. If they were, they might be supposed to be real apart from the related terms. Since they are not, if they are to be real, they must be real only within a whole composed by the terms which are related by them. They are sometimes supposed to be real in the world of subsistence and not in that of existence. It is, however, very much to be doubted whether the world of subsistence has any reality apart from the world of existence. In any case when we speak of real entities of the world of existence, and assert relations between them, if the relations are to be real, they must be real in the same world. It is highly doubtful that the terms should be members of one world, and the relations between them should belong to an altogether different world. If the terms are real only as related,

the reality of the terms should imply the reality of relations in the very same world in which the terms are real.

Now, if things are always found in relation with one another, then unrelated things have to be considered as unreal abstractions. What is true of other substances in this respect is true also of the spiritual substance, the self. The self is never found in utter isolation from the rest of the world. All the contents of its thoughts and feelings have come from the world; and without such contents the self would be reduced to a principle of bare identity, which again is an empty abstraction. The body and the mind of the self have been built up by the co-operation of different factors of the world. We may even say that the very substance of its being has been the product of the action and reaction among various forces, both physical and spiritual, operative in the world. It preserves its being by carrying on a commerce between itself and the world around it. If a person refuses to breathe in or breathe out for fear of having anything to do with the outside world he will within a short time be reduced to a mere lump of flesh and will no longer be called a self. If he does not learn anything from the world nor make any contribution to anybody's knowledge, his mental life will soon wither away. Our being, both physical and mental, is most intimately entwined with the being of the rest of the world; and if we were to be cut adrift from the world, it would result in our death. It is impossible that we should cease to be a member of the world without at the same time ceasing to remain what we are. Every man is found in some particular situation and his character cannot be truly understood if we view him apart from his situation. He is always a member of a group or a whole which shapes his character and which is in its turn influenced by him. Every man is a member of a family; he is in certain relations to the other members of the family. He is what his family has made him, although according to his capacity he too contributes something to the total

character of the family. He is a father or a son or something else. And the total character of his manhood, of his life and thought, would not be understood if his fatherhood or sonship were not taken into consideration. When a man is a father, he stands in a particular relation to some other member or members of his family and fulfils certain characteristic functions. This relation and these functions colour the whole being of the man. He would be a fiction and not the man he is, if he were conceived apart from his relation and functions. He belongs also to larger social and political groups, and very often to some religious community as well. His membership of these groups does not leave his being altogether unaffected. He has inherited a civilisation which has an individuality of its own. He is the product of an historical movement at a particular stage of its evolution. If the concrete reality of a man is to be understood, if, that is, we are to know him as he really is, we have to view him in these and many other aspects.

We find as a matter of fact that every man is bound by a network of relations with other human beings. The currents of his life and thought run into those of his fellow men's. A man is not a windowless monad imprisoned within the four walls of his private being. He lives and grows not only in intercourse and communion with his fellow men, but literally in them as well. It may sound strange, but nevertheless it appears to be a fact. Not only did the Father live in the Son, we ordinary mortals too seem to live in one another. Take the instance of a father in a family where the relation among the members is particularly close. If his thoughts and feelings are any part of himself, he cannot be said to live entirely within his narrow self confined in his physical organism. His thoughts and feelings are never centred exclusively round his narrow self; they embrace his relations and children in such a way that we cannot separate them from his being. His own well-being cannot be separated from the well-being

of his children. Any harm done to them is more really his than any injury to his physical person. These are plain facts of everyday experience, and they unmistakably suggest that there is an actual intermingling of personalities in all our social life. We do not mean to uphold of course that the father lives merely in his children so that when they disappear he should disappear also. His life and being may and do extend beyond those of his children; but his children form part of himself and when some of them meet their death before him, we should say, he suffers to that extent a serious loss in being.

We hold that the mental life of a man cannot be separated from his self. His thoughts and feelings, hopes and fears, ideas and ideals are part and parcel of his being. It is these which determine the concrete individuality of each man. Merely as knowing subjects, no two men ever betray any difference between themselves. As such they have no individuality. It is the contents of their mind which definitely mark out the distinctions of their personality. A person in his concrete reality will not be there if he is isolated from these contents of his mind. So we conclude that the thoughts and feelings of a man are part of his own self. Now, these are never exclusively centred within the person himself, but they go out to various objects and include them in their being. Just as it is an abstraction to think of the self apart from its thoughts and feelings, so will these thoughts and feelings be mere abstractions if they are viewed apart from their objects. We never entertain mere thoughts and mere feelings; but we always have thoughts about something and feelings for some one or another. These objects are essential to our thoughts and feelings. If the objects are included in our thoughts and feelings, and if our thoughts and feelings are within the self, the objects must also be included in the self. When we think of some one and feel for him, our being goes out in our thoughts and feelings and embraces their object. This is not a matter of mere theory.

The things in which we are greatly interested are taken for all practical purposes as part of our very self. Our friends and relatives, houses and lands, clothes and furniture are part of our self in a very practical sense. We live and move in and about them, and if an attempt is made to efface the mark of our selfhood from them, we resist it with all the strength of our being. We call them 'mine'; and 'mine' has no intelligible meaning unless it is interpreted as 'part of myself.'

There cannot be any set limit to the personality of a man as to how far it can go and how much it can include in itself. It is always found connected with a physical organism, but on the basis of it, a spiritual superstructure is raised,—a new dimension of being which covers in its influence and being a much wider area of existence. We are changing from moment to moment according as the constituents of our body and the contents of our mind are changing. And although there are constant meetings and minglings between different personalities in many identical contents, our distinct individuality is never lost, because there are no two persons who do not differ in their mental and physical constituents.

In upholding this view of the self, we are aware, we are going against the verdict of two very important schools of Indian thought. Both Sankhya and Vedanta maintain that the self or the spirit is a principle of intelligence which has no real connection with anything else. But although both these schools maintain that the self in its real nature exists in itself and is unattached to anything else, they do not deny the fact that in the world the self is found identified with a body together with a mass of physical and psychical dispositions. This identification is supposed to have taken place through 'ignorance.' But whatever may be the explanation of the fact that the self in its worldly course is found identified with a portion of the world of men and things, the fact itself is not and cannot be denied.

CHAPTER XIII

The Self as the Ideal.

We have seen that the self, as it is found in the course of its worldly life, is an unstable reality. It moves from stage to stage, and at no stage of its career can we say that it is completely itself, that it shows forth characteristics which are *the* characteristics of its real and ultimate nature. But the fact that it is something changing presupposes that there is a basis of identity in it. The thing which changes must remain identical with itself in some sense or in some respect in order that we may be able to say that *it* has changed. So the very form of the self as appearance suggests that there is some underlying identity in the self.

In practical life, the identity of the self is very rarely doubted. It is taken almost as a given fact. Nobody ever thinks that he is to-day a different man from what he was yesterday. When I remember certain things which I did in the past, I know at the same time that I am the very same person who did them. Otherwise there is no meaning in remembering or thinking that I did them. By memory of this sort, which is accompanied by recognition of the past self as identical with the present one, we seem to be acquainted with an undoubted fact,—the fact of the identity of the self. Some philosophers have admitted the fact as well as the validity of recognition. It is accepted of course in implicit faith in everyday life. Still there are certain difficulties which make the fact appear as a thing of doubtful validity. There are undoubted differences between our past self and the present one.

And if there is to be identity in spite of these differences, we must be able to point out wherein that identity lies. When we look out for the point of identity between the past and the present self of a man, we find that it is not very easy to discover it. In what point is a child identical with the self of its old age? The body has become totally different. The cells which constituted the body of the child is altogether absent from the body of the old man. The thoughts and fancies of the child are quite foreign to the mind of the old man ; they are perhaps not even remembered by him. If the body and the mind constitute the concrete self of a man, and if they both become totally different, how can we say that the person still remains identical with himself ?

It is generally believed that personal identity is guaranteed by the unity and the continuity which are discoverable in the life of a self.

It may be frankly admitted that unity and continuity do really supply some very plausible arguments in favour of the identity of things. Without some unity we cannot say that *a* thing is there. Conversely, if we find some unity in some terms, we conclude that they are members of a single whole. The whole is the same whole which has each different member as one of its parts or aspects. From the unity of the parts, we pass on to the identity of the whole which shows itself in them. Laird, for instance, has maintained that the self is a substance or a whole which has experiences for its parts. When we see some characteristic unity in experiences, we may conclude that it is based on the identity of the self of which these experiences are the parts. Similarly we may conclude to the identity of a thing when we find some continuity in it. If there are to be two different things, then one of them must cease to exist where the other begins. There must be a break in the middle. If there is no break, if, *i.e.*, one has not ceased to exist, we feel justified in saying that it is the same thing that has continued. Such arguments are

not perhaps vitiated by any palpable fallacy, and it is natural for us to suppose that there is some identity at the root of all unity and continuity. Still we shall presently see that unity and continuity do not satisfactorily explain the difficulties of personal identity.

Is there any unity at all in the self or its experiences? It is said there is. "And there are general arguments which go to prove that any experience, to be an experience at all, must imply a considerable measure of unity. The most famous and the strongest argument on this head is Kant's deduction of the synthetic unity of apperception" (Laird, *Problems of the Self*, p. 215).

It may be true that in any experience there must be a considerable measure of unity. But this unity is confined to particular experiences. If there is to be any experience, there must be some unity in it, but the unity need not go beyond the particular experience concerned. So far and so long as some synthetic function is exercised, there must be some unity but not beyond that. If from such unity we are to infer the identity of the self, the self will be identical with itself only so long as one particular experience lasts. If there is to be the same self in different experiences, it must be proved that the different experiences are bound by some unity. If we are to be justified in our belief that it is the same self, which is present in all the experiences, that are ascribed to a man from his birth to his death, and if we are to rely, for this purpose, on arguments from unity, we must be able to show that there is some unmistakable unity in all such experiences. And this is very difficult to show.

It is not at all easy to discover any running unity in the lives of many persons. People have their own whims and eccentricities. Some are expressly recognised as whimsical or capricious. A whim or a caprice is that which does not fit in with the plan of one's character. A whimsical person is one whose conduct is not regulated by a unitary plan. But to

be capricious is not the privilege or misfortune of a few rare individuals. There is a streak of caprice in every one of us. It is the element of irrationality in human lives and no one can even pretend, not even the greatest among us, that his life from beginning to end is completely rational. There are acts and incidents in the life of every man which are not in strict conformity with any principle that is supposed to regulate the other parts of his life. Laird says "The lives of many of us show a wanton disregard of unity. Traits of character appear which seem totally out of keeping with the general trend of the life and often it seems impossible to say that a particular life has a general trend at all" (p. 217). If there is no 'general trend,' 'no closely knit unity' in the life of a self, how are we to be sure, basing ourselves on the criterion of unity, that it is the same self which has lived the life?

We do not seek to maintain that there is no unity at all in the life of a man. We admit with Laird that 'there is a closely knit connection in many particular strands of a life.' But we say that all the unity that we can discover is of particular strands only. There is no strict unity in the fabric as a whole. Even Laird says that "The unity of the self from the cradle to the tomb is less than the unity of many particular strands of its experience" (p. 361). When it is said that the unity of the whole is looser or less than the unity of many particular strands, it seems to be recognised that when we regard any life as a whole we find many elements which do not strictly form part of any unity at all. Otherwise why should the unity of the whole be less than the unity of its parts? Now if there are experiences which do not form part of any unity, and if unity is the proof of the identity of the self, then these experiences along with others which fall within the plan of a unity cannot be ascribed to the very same person. They will belong either to momentary personalities or to no person at all. But since it is not

possible to have any experience without an experiencer, it is more likely that they will belong to persons with momentary existence. But if the life of a man were to be interfered with by the appearance and disappearance of such foreign personalities, there would be no real continuity and unity in the life, and consequently, it would not be true to say that the whole life belongs to one and the same man.

It may be contended that the whole life of a man is not altogether devoid of all unity. There is some unity, but the unity of the whole life is less marked or close than the unity of its many particular strands. But if the unity can be more or less, then the identity which is marked or judged by it will be also more or less. And personal identity, as Bradley says, will be "mainly a matter of degree." But is it really so? If identity means sameness, can we have identity between things which are not really the same? If they must be the same can their identity be more or less? In any case when I assert that I was there, do I really mean that I am more or less the same person who was there and the very person who was there cannot now be found at all?

Moreover there is no one single unity in the life of a man; there are many unities. A man generally belongs to a group for his religion, to another for his profession and sometimes to a third for his pleasure. These different groupings mark more or less well-defined unities in his life. There does not appear to be any special unity which co-ordinates all these unities under it. There is no particular unity between a golfer and a catholic or a dealer in hides. Again unity is found not only in the life of one person, but it can also be found in the lives of many different persons. Persons coming from a particular locality, or belonging to a particular profession or faith, exhibit some characteristic unity in their lives. The unity cannot be overlooked at least in a family, where all different members are bound together by harmonious relations. If this is so, and if unity is our criterion for

identity, then we shall be obliged to admit that what is generally supposed to be the life of a single man is in fact the lives of many different persons and the so-called different persons again are nothing but parts of a composite personality. From this it is evident that mere unity cannot throw any clear light on the problem of personal identity.

Even if we suppose that there is some characteristic unity in the life of one person which is not available in the lives of many, and that this unity is not the unity of its particular strands, we shall find that unity is not sufficient to account for identity. "This self," says Laird, "it is plain, consists of experiences and identity is of the experiences" (p. 245). If the self consists of experiences, the identity of the self should mean the identity of its experiences. But have we got identity of experiences when we are talking of their unity only? Two or more terms may be the constituents of a single whole and on that account there may be some unity in them. But that will never guarantee any identity between them. If the experiences of a child are not the experiences of an old man, they are not clearly identical, although they may be unified under the conception of a long life. If then the identity of the self is the identity of its experiences, the self of an old man is not clearly identical with the self of the child. The unity of experiences may at best signify that they are parts of a single life or a single self but it cannot show that the self is the same at different stages of its life or in its different experiences. For the self as constituted by all its experiences is not clearly available in any of its particular experiences, and so there cannot be any significant judgment about its sameness. When I say I am here or I was there, if by the personal pronoun 'I' we mean a self, we do not take the self to be constituted by all its experiences. For the self with all its experiences can be neither here nor there. The problem of the identity

of the self does not refer to the identity of a supposed self, which consists of all its experiences, but to the identity of the self which is here and now, and is supposed to have been there some time back.

When we come to consider continuity, we find ourselves confronted with similar difficulties. Consciousness seems to be essential to the self. The self would be no self if it had no consciousness. And the continuity of the self should include the continuity of consciousness. But it is open to serious doubt whether there is any continuity in the consciousness of the self. By sleep, and sometimes by swoon, the self is deprived of its consciousness. These are supposed to occasion undoubted gaps in its consciousness. How can we then maintain that there is any continuity at all in its consciousness?

It may be supposed that the self is not mere consciousness, it is body as well, and there is no break in the continuity of its body and this accounts for its identity. But it should be remembered that when I pass any judgment of identity about myself, I do not do so after realising the fact that my body has all along been continuous.

Continuity may justify the unity of a series but never the identity of its terms. A compact series of numbers may be continuous but this does not mean that any two of its terms are identical with each other.

Mere continuity is not thought sufficient to guarantee personal identity. As Bradley has pointed out, qualitative sameness also is necessary. "As far as I can judge it is usual for personal identity to require both continuity and qualitative sameness." The question is whether we find any qualitative sameness at all. Not only is it not certain that in any case there is qualitative sameness along with continuity, but it appears even doubtful whether with qualitative sameness we can have any continuity. If there is qualitative sameness, how can we know or indicate that there has been any transition? And without transition how can we speak of continuity

at all ? From this we get the more fundamental question whether any continuity is at all compatible with identity. In the case of real identity, we are left with what is essentially one and the same thing. In what is it to be continuous ? It is not very usual to speak of one and the same thing as continuous with itself.

Thus we see that it is very difficult to find any valid ground for our belief in personal identity. But this belief is universal and so before accepting the belief as true or rejecting it as false, we should make clear to ourselves the sense in which the belief is actually held and in which it seems to be essential to a rational interpretation of experience.

We do not believe that the self taken concretely as the unity of its mind and body remains absolutely the same throughout its whole life. If it were absolutely the same, it should preclude the possibility of all change in the life of the self. But, as we have seen, all our endeavour to improve ourselves, morally or otherwise, is invariably accompanied by the belief that it is possible to make changes in the self. The very experience which requires that the self should remain identical with itself also requires that the self should be subject to change. So it is certain that we do not believe in the pure identity of the self. It is no use trying to find basis for a belief which is not there.

But even though the self may not be absolutely identical, yet if any identity is there it must be a real identity. That is to say, although the self as a whole may not be absolutely identical throughout its life, there must be some element in it which remains absolutely identical. There must be a respect in which the self is wholly identical. Let us see if there is any element in the self which remains identical.

No experience is possible without a subject with which the self is identified. And the self never detects any change in its subjectivity. The object changes and the changes can clearly be pointed out. But the subject remains the same.

The subject is not given as an objective content of any experience. It is given in its self-enjoyment and in this no change or difference is ever discoverable. We may imagine it to undergo some change by confusing it with a complex of objective contents. But if we view it in its subjectivity, we find that no change is possible in it. We find that the subject remains ever truly identical with itself. True identity can be found only where there is no change or difference. The identity of the subject is the only meaning of the identity of the self. Here we have got identity in the absolute sense. All other identities are only more or less and with regard to certain elements and in some respects. And unless the elements and the respects are specified, we cannot determine whether any judgment of identity is right or wrong. When I say ' I was young, I am now old ' I can never mean that my identity can be secured by the identity of my youth with my old age ; that is clearly impossible. My identity can be secured only by the identity of my subjective self which is the same in all stages of my life. We are justified in speaking of ourselves as the same self because, although differing in mental and bodily conditions at different stages of life, we are ever the self-same subject. The subject in me is really one with the subject in you. But as I never grasp your pure subjectivity, but always associate you with a mass of objective conditions, which are not the objective conditions of myself, I do not as a matter of fact identify myself with you.

What do you mean by the subject ? we may be very reasonably asked here. But we confess it is not possible to give a definition of the subject in the strict sense of the term. Definition is possible only of definite objects. The subject has to be understood in itself or not understood at all. But we hope we do not mean by the subject anything very different from what everybody understands by it. It may be that we want to bring out certain implications of this understanding which are not very clear in popular thought.

Though we cannot strictly define the subject, still it is desirable that we should try to explain however vaguely our notion of the subject. By subject we do not mean the self. I and you are selves. We are rich or poor, tall or short, wise or foolish. As selves we cannot probably disown these characteristics, but they do not belong to the subject. These objective determinations pertain to objects which can be grasped in thought, but the subject is felt or known only in self-enjoyment. It cannot be held up before thought. It is true that there would be no true self unless we associate it with the subject but pure subjectivity is not a sufficient description of the self. Our selves are usually associated with a mass of objective contents from which however the subject as such has to be distinguished.

The objective contents of experience lack the principle of self-manifestation. Considered in themselves, we would not speak of them as known. It is the subject which makes them known, enlightens them with the light of its knowledge. That which makes an objective content known and without which it would not be known at all, is the subject, the principle of intelligence.

We have said that the subject in me is the same as the subject in you. If we carry this thought further, we have to say that there is only one subject in the universe, in the light of which all things are known. We get the proof of this one subject in a very simple manner. That there is knowledge nobody can deny. Also it cannot be denied that there cannot be any knowledge without a subject. When we know further that the subject in one instance of knowledge cannot be differentiated as subject from the subject in another instance of knowledge, we cannot resist the conclusion that there is only one subject in the universe.

How can one subject, it may be asked, be responsible for all knowledge in the world? Almost an infinite number of things is known by different individuals at the same time. It

is inconceivable that they should be objects of the same subject at the same time. It would appear almost miraculous if all objects were simultaneously to be present to the same subject.

This, however, is not an insoluble mystery. To be the subject is to be conscious. There is no necessity in the nature of consciousness that there should be only one object for it at one time. When I look at the watch in my hand, I find I see its colour and shape, hear its tick-tick sound and feel its touch quite at the same time. We know for certain that two or three objects can be grasped in one and the same intuition. This shows that multiplicity of objects is no argument against the unity of the subject. That we are not able to know an indefinite number of objects at one and the same time is also a fact. But this is due not to any inability of the subject to know many objects at the same time, but to the constitution of the psycho-physical organism which is our instrument for knowledge. Our senses cannot reach out to very distant objects. Our minds cannot take on the modification of too many objects at the same time. This is why we cannot know many things at the same time. But this is an accident of human knowledge and is no indication of any limitation in the knowing capacity of the subject. We have to know through our body and mind. They serve as the instruments of our knowledge and as they are things of limited capacity, we too are limited in our knowledge of objects. But the subject is neither mind nor body. The mind and the body act and change to make knowledge possible for us, but knowledge itself is not changing and belongs to something which is changeless. There is no doubt of the fact that the mind and the body undergo changes. These presuppose that there should be unchanging something, the subject, which can be conscious of these changes. A thing which changes cannot itself become conscious of the change. This shows that there must be a subject, different from mind and body,

which is not limited, therefore, in its knowledge, by mental and bodily conditions.

This raises the question: where then is the subject? We talk of the subject in you or in me. Wherever there is knowledge, there is the subject. And if knowledge is found only in ourselves, it seems certain that the subject can be found only in human beings, *i.e.*, within some mind and body. But when it is said that it is the same subject which is in us all, it is evident that no one of us makes any difference to its being. And if it can dispense with any one of us, it is possible that it can dispense with us all. Is it really possible?

We have no doubt spoken, though loosely, of the subject as in you or in me. We vaguely feel that knowledge takes place within us. It is a fact—and it agrees with our own hypothesis—that wherever there is knowledge, there is the subject. But where exactly is knowledge? Can we locate knowledge anywhere in the outside world or within our body? It is impossible that knowledge as knowledge should be found anywhere except in self-enjoyment along with the subject. If it could be found, it would be found either *here* or *there*. But 'here' and 'there' have meaning only in a field of knowledge, and they cannot contain knowledge in them. It is evident therefore that knowledge cannot be found anywhere. All finding is the work of knowledge or the subject which itself cannot be found anywhere in the world. We may believe that there is knowledge in birds and beasts and in men; we may infer the presence of knowledge from the behaviours of men and animals. But knowledge as knowledge is nowhere seen. It is felt and realised only in our own selves. We say we realise it in ourselves, but we do not find it in any part of the psycho-physical organism. We might more truly say that knowledge reveals itself to us so far as we succeed in identifying ourselves with the subject. We find objects *here* or *there*, but knowledge is realised only in

knowing. But knowing is not a spatio-temporal event that it can be realised anywhere in the world. It is an eternal fact which is revealed to us when we realise our identity with the subject.

We speak of the subject in us, not because the subject is really within our body or mind, but because we think of ourselves as in union with the subject. The subject is really beyond mind and body and is not involved in their history and fate nor is it affected by their birth and death. The subject is the eternal principle of knowledge which enlightens all things and gives meaning to their existence. If we are to think of anything being there, we have to think that the subject is also there. It is not something which has arisen in course of history. It has been there from the beginning of time. But how do we know it?

It is usual to imagine a long course of world history prior to the appearance of any human or living being on earth. But is not the history imagined just as it would have appeared to a witnessing subject? If we really believe that things were there just as they would be known, are we not required to believe that they were actually known and, with them, there was the subject to know them? How can a thing be *just as* it is known, unless it is known? It is supposed that a thing as known is quite the same as it is when it is not known, that knowledge makes no difference to its objects. But how can it be proved? How are we to know that a thing as known is the same as the thing as not known? The only way of deciding the question is by comparison. But it is absolutely impossible for us to compare a known thing with an unknown thing. We cannot get at anything without the light of knowledge. When we are not actually knowing something we can imagine it as existing, but even in imagination we think it exists only as known. It seems therefore more reasonable to suppose that a thing is as it is known only when it is actually known. It seems unreasonable to think

of anything as known without there being any knowledge of it. So if things were there as they would be known or simply (which comes to the same thing) as known, before my birth or the birth of any living being, there must have been the subject with them to know them. We readily admit that our knowledge makes no difference to its object, simply because there are no unknown objects. We even grant that things are independent of all the knowledge that we can accomplish in the world; but they are never independent of the knowledge which is there. We are ready to believe that things as known by us remain quite the same even when we cease to know them; because when we know them, we know them as they are known by the subject which never ceases to know. They do not remain the same by lapsing into the obscurity of unknownness, but by continuing to be what they really are, *i.e.*, informed with the knowledge of the subject. When we know any object, we do not bring about any change in the object or in knowledge. We only appropriate, according to the capacity of our mind and body, the knowledge which is already there. But knowledge does not become more or less by being shared by many. In knowing we become one with the subject, and the object remains what it is, enlightened by the presence of the subject.

The subject knows things in their reality and truth. It is the ultimate standard of truth, and the ground and ideal of our knowledge. It is ever our effort to identify ourselves with the subject and in so far as we are able to accomplish it, we know and we know truly.

It is not by a half-hearted compromise of supposed coherence among our imperfect knowledges that we can attain real knowledge and truth. Nor can we gain the same object through an unintelligible correspondence between intelligent knowledge and unintelligent blind things. No such things are ever there; even if they were, there would be no real correspondence. We attain truth by our identity with the

subject. Where there is truth there may be a sort of coherence and even correspondence, because our identity with the subject underlies them both. But it seems to be a misreading of facts to call truth either coherence or correspondence.

The pure subject here conceived is really the same as the ideal which we discussed in our ninth chapter. The subject as such is nothing but the principle of knowledge considered in relation to objects. The principle of knowledge is not different from the ideal ; it constitutes that aspect of the ideal which is responsible for the manifestation of things. If the identity of the self, which is felt as given and which is required for a rational interpretation of experience, implies our identity with the subject or the principle of knowledge, it proves indirectly our identity with the ideal itself. The identity of the self with the ideal follows from other considerations also.

It is not generally thought possible that a thing should become other than itself. A mango plant never becomes a banian tree. A thing can develop its innate capacities but it cannot transcend the limits prescribed by the nature of its being. So it appears that if we are ever to become our ideal, it should be such as can be brought within the definition of the nature of our being. If it should be such that the nature of our being cannot allow it, it would be impossible for us ever to become it. So it seems evident that there should be an inner identity between our being and the ideal which we wish to become.

It may be said that a thing does become what it is not. The fact that it becomes something shows that it comes to be different from what it now is. By the process of change, which is present everywhere in the world, a person may develop into what we never expect from him.

But if a thing is to become anything and is not to be simply cancelled, destroyed or replaced by another, then there must be some identity between what it now is and what it

comes to be afterwards. If it is not there in the thing it has become, how can we say it has become it? All becoming is possible only on the basis of some identity. And the identity of a thing, in the last analysis, is the peculiar nature of the thing itself which is not brought about by any process of change.

Moreover even if it be true that things become really different from what they are, it is not found that anybody ever desires to become somebody else. No one ever wishes that his being should disappear in the being of someone else. We may desire to be like many another person. But we never desire to be exactly another person. Even if we ever entertain any such desire it would be almost meaningless. The person we wish to become is either there or not there. If he is not there, and if we are to be exactly he, we should not also be there, *i.e.* we should die. So our desire to be another person is a desire for death. If he is there, then, too, our desire to be exactly he means our desire for death. For continuing our being, however like him we may become, we can be only different from him. But desire for death is contrary to the law of nature.

If we examine our notion of the ideal, we find we think of it as that which we desire most sincerely to realise in our life. It is something with which we want to become one. It is impossible that the ideal should be less than this. We have seen that it is our being rather than our doing that is the true object of moral judgment, and that our goodness consists in our being one with the ideal. There is no doubt that we want to be good. This means we want to be one with the ideal. Now if the ideal is real, and if in wishing to be good, we are not wishing for our own death, it seems certain that the ideal must not be an other to ourselves. It must be our very self.

We know we feel an obligation to be moral, to realise the ideal. There is a moral necessity that we should identify

ourselves with the ideal. We know we achieve goodness in so far as we submit to this necessity. But it is also a fact that there cannot be any goodness in submitting to a foreign demand. There cannot be any moral necessity to bear the burden of an external imposition. All the moral necessity is the necessity of the self which arises from the self's identity with the ideal. We are good when and so far as we realise the ideal, because in realising the ideal, we realise the self. If in realising the ideal, we are simply submitting to a foreign necessity, we could not be good in any sense. Our realisation of the ideal can be accounted as our goodness only when it is an expression of our own self. All this implies that the ideal is nothing but our self itself.

This however raises a very serious difficulty. If the self is already the ideal, what means all its moral struggle to realise the ideal? If the self is the subject, the eternal principle of knowledge, by which everything is manifested, how is it that the self is so limited in its knowledge and how could we speak of it as an appearance, as changing and acting? The solution of this difficulty will be found in the fact that the self is possessed of a double nature. It is divided within itself, and its inner division is the root of all its moral struggle and the cause of its limitation in knowledge and goodness.

The subject and ideal is really a transcendental principle. It is the presupposition of all knowledge and goodness. If the aspect of knowledge is inseparable from the existence of things, we may say that it is the ground of all existence. But it is not anywhere in the world nor is it in any way involved in any worldly change. It is the unmoving ground of all movement in history and nature. The self however is too much immersed in the world. It finds itself as part of the world without being separated from its transcendental ground. Thus the self has an empirical aspect also and its true nature cannot be adequately understood by considering its transcendental aspect only. We have to consider its

empirical aspect also. In its empirical aspect, it shares in the characteristics of the world ; and so a true understanding of its nature would require an understanding of the world as well. Some consideration of the nature of the world will therefore help us to a better understanding of the nature of the self and thereby to a more adequate solution of the difficulty we have suggested above.

CHAPTER XIV

The World.

We do not propose to deal in this chapter with the nature of the world in all its aspects. We wish to consider it only in some of the principal metaphysical aspects of it in so far as they seem to be connected with the nature of the self.

By the term world we understand the spatio-temporal system in which everything has a physical constituent and a history. We cannot think of anything in the world which has no physical property nor can there be anything in it which has not gone through a process of change. The world thus includes the world of dead matter as well as the vegetable and the animal kingdom, from protons and electrons up to saints and prophets. There are in this world, men with physical organisms, endowed with the capacity of pleasure and pain. And there are things in the world which can be changed through the agency of men and can be thus made either the means of their enjoyment or the instruments of their suffering.

Not only do we find this world to be there empirically but it is also presupposed by our moral consciousness. Moral consciousness comes to its fulness only when there are, besides the moral agent, other human beings who can be helped or hindered in their lives by him. I can have real moral consciousness when I realise that I owe certain duties towards others which I can discharge only through my actions. If the self were alone in this universe, it could not have any sense of duty, since there would be nobody to demand it from

it. And if there were no world, there would be no field for its actions. This would be equally fatal to its moral consciousness. One can be active only by being able to bring about some change in some material medium which is provided only by the world. So it is evident that the world must be there to make morality possible. In fact it is through the mediation of the world that the self which, as the pure subject, is identical with the ideal, has been divided into the moral agent and the ideal, and thus has morality been made possible. If the self or the ideal existed in its singularity, no morality and consequently no moral consciousness would be possible. For this the intermediation of the world is absolutely necessary. The philosopher who starts with the fact of moral consciousness must find some room for the world in his scheme of reality. If there is any validity in moral consciousness, the reality of the world must remain undoubted. Particular facts of the world may, under certain circumstances, be doubted. But the idea that the world itself is not there, cannot be entertained without impairing our belief in the validity of moral consciousness. And since we found no reason to doubt the validity of moral judgments, we should not, for this reason at least, doubt the reality of the world. So the first proposition we know about the world is that it is real.

The world is an appearance also. By appearance we understand what we understood by it when we spoke of the self as an appearance. The reality of the world is not incompatible with the fact that it is an appearance. The world is certainly there. But at no time of its existence can we find that it possesses characteristics which possess ultimate reality. By ultimate reality we mean a reality which never needs to change itself. But nothing in the world remains absolutely the same for two successive moments. What the world is at this moment, when we take it in its concrete particular character, is not found to remain the same at the very next

moment. At every moment the world is certainly real, but its reality is not such that it remains unaffected by time and change. It is not unalterable and fixed. We do not need to take the world as it now is as the only possible world that ever is or can be there. The world changes of itself, independently of all human operations, and is also liable to further changes brought about by human efforts. The face of the earth at least is largely what man has made it.

Just as morality demands that the world should be real, it also requires that the world should be an appearance. If the world were real in such a way that it never changed and was not changeable, then we would all be fixed in our immobility, and morality as a free activity would be utterly an illusion. So the world which moral consciousness presupposes is a world which must be in a fluid state of change and changeableness. In our terminology, it must be an appearance.

We have tried to make it clear that through all our rational activities, we are seeking to realise the ideal. But what are we? As pure subject, we are identical with the ideal and there is no question of our realising the ideal. But we are also part of the world and, as forming part of the world, we seem to be under a necessity to realise the ideal. The physical organism from which we are never separated is undoubtedly part of the world, regulated by its laws of birth and death, growth and decay. Our life too is surely a worldly phenomenon. Even our mind is imbedded in the soil of the world. It too is born, grows and decays and finally disappears. By mind we do not understand the pure subject which illuminates all objects with the light of its consciousness. The mind is the mechanism whose acts and states are not the acts and states of the body, although they may not be separable from some bodily changes. There are certain characteristic bodily acts and states, *e.g.*, movement and heat. But we know of some other acts and states such as attention,

anger, fear, etc. There are at least two principal reasons why they cannot be referred to the subject. Consciousness is the only state of the subject. We know of the subject simply as knower. Anger and fear could be referred to the subject if they were the modifications of consciousness. If we think a little, we shall find that there is only a consciousness of modifications but no modification of consciousness. All modifications are possible only of limited objects which can be thrown into this or that mould. If consciousness itself were limited, there would be no consciousness of limitation.

Again we know that anger and fear are not known as the pure subject nor as pure consciousness but as definite objects of consciousness. They are certainly objective traits and must belong to some object, and we know that the subject cannot be an object and so they are not the states of the subject. Since they are never identified simply with bodily states, we refer them to a third something which we call the mind.

Just as we inherit the body from our parents, so do we inherit the mind also. It is to the gifts of the mind that we owe many of our distinctions. The mind and the body give us our individuality and they are part of the world. All our efforts are either of the body or of the mind. But our mind and body being part of the world, we can say that, in all our moral endeavours to realise the ideal, it is the world itself which is seeking to realise the ideal through us.

Human beings are not alien inhabitants of the world, they are its natural products. They have been brought into existence as a result of a very long process of development and natural selection. Even now they are maintained in existence by the operation of different forces of the world. It is not given to them to persist in any of their efforts for a long time, right in the face of opposition from the rest of the world. Their opposing efforts must cease or they would cease to exist. The human race has been fairly persistent in its

efforts to realise the ideal. It could not have been the case if the efforts of men were not supported by the forces of the world, if, that is, man's pursuit of the ideal were not also the pursuit of the world in the same direction.

The tendency towards the realisation of the ideal is at the root of the history of the world. And the increasing realisation of the ideal is the meaning of evolution and progress. Evolution and progress imply a movement towards the ideal standard of goodness. When we say that there has been progress or evolution, we pass a judgment of value. Such judgments can be valid only when we find that there has been an approach to the ideal.

We know life and mind have appeared on earth in course of time. And whatever may be the ideal in itself we know that amid earthly conditions it can be realised only on the basis of life and mind. So in bringing forth life and mind, the world is showing a sure tendency towards the realisation of the ideal.

When we say that the ideal is being realised in the world we mean that the world is different from the ideal. If the world were one with the ideal, it would not be true to say that the world is realising the ideal. The world presents itself as an other to the ideal; and this otherness is sought to be eliminated by the process of realising the ideal. This otherness remains an inherent characteristic of the world so long as the being of the world is not merged in that of the ideal.

We have spoken of the world as an appearance. But the ideal is in no sense an appearance. The world possesses a sort of unstable reality. It is constantly assuming new forms and putting them off as unsuited to the expression of its real character. All the forms that the world presents to us are unstable. Instability, a sort of indeterminateness, seems to be the form of the world. The ideal is not so; it is eternal and is fixed in its self-sameness.

But in spite of this difference there must be some underlying unity between the world and the ideal. If it is possible for the ideal to be reflected in the world or for the world to be gradually identified with the ideal, there must already be some inner harmony between the natures of the two. If again we find that the world as a matter of course tends towards a gradual identification with the ideal, we cannot help thinking that the world has got its root in the ideal, and in becoming one with the ideal, it is only fulfilling the law of its being. Nothing can ever go against the law of its nature. Everything is or does what is made possible by its own nature. If in men the world tends to become one with the ideal, we have to think that such unification with the ideal is inherent in the law of the nature of the world. This presupposes that there is some fundamental unity between the ideal and the world.

We have tried to show how the world is trying to realise the ideal through the efforts of men. But we can go further and say that all the different stages of its history and evolution represent only its attempts to catch and embody the ideal in the medium of matter, life and mind. There seems to be an urge in the world to embody, to realise or to be one with, the ideal. As no form of the world is sufficient to embody the ideal fully, it is driven forward from form to form in its eternal quest. The different attempts of the world to catch the ideal in its mould must be regulated by the presence of the ideal. In order to be drawn towards the ideal with the necessity of the law of its being, the world must fall completely within, and be dominated by, the presence of the ideal. The world must never be sundered away from the ideal. If the connexion between the world and the ideal were ever lost, the perpetual attempt of the world to catch the ideal, this drawing of the world ever nearer to the ideal, could not be possible. The great attraction, which the ideal by its mere presence exercises over the world and under which the world is made

to assume different forms in order to give expression to the ideal, is possible only if the world is pervaded by the presence of the ideal. This means that the world must have a unity of being with the ideal.

We have spoken of the world as an appearance in the sense of an unstable reality. But mere instability or change cannot be the only character of the world. If a thing were merely unstable, without a stable or abiding ground in it, it would forthwith lapse into non-being. So if anything is to be real, it should not be merely unstable or changing. Mere change or movement is unintelligible by itself.

A's movement is intelligible only because there is B, which, relatively to A, is stationary. B can move only if there is C which must be stationary with regard to B. If there is to be any movement we must ultimately come to something which does not move. Otherwise we shall involve ourselves in a vicious circle.

There is no doubt of the fact that the world is a process. But this process must begin somewhere and attain to something ; and so long as it is there, it must be maintained by a permanent background. Sometimes it is thought that the process is without a beginning or an end. But we do not understand how it can be so. The process may be too long to be followed by our thought. We may not actually know the beginning or the end of the process. Our thought may get tired after following it to some extent. But that in fact there should not be any end seems hardly credible. After every step in the process, either backward or forward, we may ask the question : what next ? The question will arise again and again till we come to something which ends the process and is not itself involved in it. This is an important issue. It is supposed that the world process may very well be without a beginning or an end. We are however contending that a process as such can never be endless. We may not be able to follow a process very far and we may try to get

rid of the matter by declaring the process endless. But this will scarcely make the matter more intelligible. A process is a sort of going. All going is from somewhere to somewhere. An endless and beginningless process is a going from nowhere to nowhere, which perhaps is no going at all. It is easy to speak of anything as endless but it is not so easy to think of it clearly as such. What idea have we got of an endless process? Can it really be thought? It is extremely doubtful that a thing which undoubtedly has a middle should not have a beginning or an end.

If we believe that thought is competent to determine the nature of reality and if we find that an infinite process is really unthinkable, then we have to admit that the world must have a definite beginning. But if the world came into existence at a definite point of time, the question naturally arises whence came the world? It is a law of thought to demand reasons for things which are not explained by themselves. If the world had beginning, it is evident that there was a time when there was no world; and the sudden beginning of the world without there being anything previous to it does not appear to be explained by itself. So we feel justified in asking for the ground which gave rise to the world. Something cannot come out of nothing. If the world has come into being, there must have been something out of which it came.

Let us first of all try to analyse the implications of this question. The question implies that there was a time when the world was not there; but the ground of the world must have been there even before the world, otherwise the world could not come out of it. There is the further implication that the world was not already contained in its ground. If the world is already there, there cannot be any real beginning of it and we cannot properly ask: whence came the world? The question is legitimate only when there is a ground of the world in which no trace of the world can be found. If the

world has come out of something, if really there is any beginning of the world process, the world should not be posited before it had come into being.

We are likely here to meet with an objection from those who believe that an effect must already be contained in the cause. If the effect were absolutely non-existent, they may argue, how could it ever come into being? If what is non-existent could come into being, then all effects as non-existent being of the same character, any effect could follow upon any cause. But this would mean that there can be no rational determination of cause and effect. So it is believed that from a particular cause only that effect can follow which is contained in it.

But against this argument we have got a counter argument which appears more reasonable. If the effect is already there in the cause, how is it that we speak of the effect as following upon the cause? The effect should be identified with the cause and the distinction of cause and effect should not arise. The fact that the effect is never found in the cause shows that it is not there. To say that an effect must be non-existent in the cause, is not to say that anything that is not in the cause can be an effect of it. In our everyday life we constantly find that what is not there does come into being. In fact all happening means the coming into being of something which is not already there. If this were not so, nothing could ever happen, and the world process would not be there.

So there is nothing wrong in the supposition that the world should be wholly non-existent in that which is to be its ground. But what can it really be? All that we can think of and think of as real is always a part or an aspect of the world. We can think of abstract qualities; they are not real in themselves. If they are to be real, they must be real in things which are part of the world. It is clear therefore that all that offers itself as an object to our thought and is thought

of as real, forms part of the world. If then the ground of the world is such that the world should be non-existent in it, we have to think away the world in order to have some idea of it. But what remains there when we have thought away the world? At first consideration, it appears as though there should remain nothing, because if all that we can think of forms part of the world, what remains after the world has been thought away must be something that we cannot think of at all. And what cannot be thought of at all is, to all intents and purposes, as good as nothing. But this cannot be the truth of the matter. We are sure that there must be some ground of the world. To say that the ground of the world is nothing is to say that there is no ground at all. So we have to admit that the ground must be something. But if we are to posit something as the ground of the world, we must have some knowledge of it, otherwise for philosophy it would be nothing. The ground of the world is, therefore, something which we should be able to know but which should not form part of the world. We have said that all that we can think of is always a part or an aspect of the world. Is there anything which we know but which forms no part of the world? If there is anything to which this description applies we can suppose that this may be the ground of the world. If there is only one thing, answering to this description, then we know that this is the ground of the world.

The world comes to us as an object or a group of objects. Objectivity is the very form of the world. But we have seen that objectivity is not the only form of knowledge. All that we can think of as object forms part of the world but that which is aware of objects is not itself an object and forms no part of the world. It may be said that I am aware of objects and I am part of the world. But I am part of the world only in so far as I can think of myself as an object. As the knowing subject I am no part of the world. The body and

the mind belong to the world but the subject which illuminates them both is nowhere found in the world. In fact it is not found at all ; it is realised in self-intuition. We know what the subject is but we do not know it as an object. And we know further that it is the subject alone which is known but which forms no part of the world. We conclude therefore that the subject is the ground of the world.

It may be said that the subject is never found in isolation from the world. It is always found in association with some object. The subject and the object are absolutely relative to each other and one cannot be found without the other. If this is so, then it may be argued, it does not seem proper to say that the subject is the ground of all objects.

But although it is a fact that the subject is correlative to the object, the being of the subject is not exhausted in its correlation to the object. No term of a relation is ever resolvable into the relation itself. What is called subject is of course, as subject, relative to the object. But in itself it must be something which is not dependent for its being on its relation to the object. The subject is the unchanging principle of knowledge. It takes on the aspect of subjectivity only when objects are given to it. What the subject in itself is, is not strictly definable. It is metaphorically spoken of as self-shining light and is realised in ourselves as pure consciousness. It is no use arguing that in ourselves we always find consciousness of something and no pure consciousness as such. Because even though we find our consciousness is always of something, consciousness as such must have some meaning for us. We do possess some sense of consciousness as such. In being conscious of anything we certainly know what consciousness is. If, to begin with, we had no idea of consciousness as such, we should never understand what consciousness of something means. It is true that the term consciousness has many human associations, but I think with

sufficient care we can get to the realisation of what consciousness itself is. The being of the subject, as we have tried to make clear, is constituted by what, for want of a better name, we may call the principle of consciousness itself. The subject as thus understood is the ground of the world.

We have tried to maintain that the subject is the same as the ideal. It is one of our theses that the world is moving towards the ideal. Such movement alone gives meaning to our idea of evolution and progress. This movement is part of the law of the world. It is probably the essence of all law. We cannot think of an external hand which can impose this law upon the world. So the movement towards the ideal must be a law of the being of the world, and in obeying this law the world must be following the law of self-fulfilment, which is the fundamental law of all being. If the world moves necessarily towards the ideal, it is because the ideal constitutes the very self of the world. The world moves towards the ideal, clings to it and has no being apart from this movement, and so we think that the ideal is the ground of the world. The ideal is the unmoving axis of the whole world-movement. It operates as an end because it is there right at the beginning.

Here we are met with a paradox. If the ideal is the ground of the world, it must be there at the beginning of the world process. If again the world moves towards the ideal, the ideal can stand only at the end of the process. The one and the same ideal seems to be at the beginning as well as at the end of the world. The increasing realisation of the ideal in the world shows that there must be some fundamental unity between the world and the ideal. The fact, that the ideal has yet to be realised, shows that the ideal is different from the world. All our efforts to improve ourselves and the world are inspired by a clear sense of discrepancy between the world and our notion of the ideal. How is this paradox to be resolved.

It seems to be a fact that all movement and change which is not imposed by any external agency is a movement of self-fulfilment. There can be no inner necessity in a thing except that of its own being. It seems unintelligible why a thing should ever have any tendency to become other than itself. If a thing is left to itself it can only follow the necessities of its being. The inward urge can come only from the depth of one's own self. But the self of anything is the thing itself. It is what the thing is. If this is so, how can there be any tendency to be itself, seeing that it is already itself?

There cannot be any movement of a thing in itself towards itself. We have to suppose that in order to move towards itself the thing must have suffered some fall from itself without suffering a complete break. There may be movement round to itself, although there cannot be any movement in itself to itself.

The world in its movement towards the ideal is not determined by any external agency. So the process of the world appears to be a process of self-fulfilment. The world in its present state represents a state of alienation from itself which it is trying to overcome. We have said that the world is grounded in the ideal (the pure subject is identical with the ideal), and also that it is moving towards the ideal. This is possible only if we suppose that the world has suffered a fall from the ideal and through the process of history it is only trying to regain its unity with the ideal. We have also said that the world had a beginning. This means that the ideal alone was there when there was no world. So the genesis of the world represents the first step in the self-alienation of the ideal. The world is the self-alienated ideal. The process of history represents the gradual overcoming of the self-estrangement of the ideal which took place at the birth of the world. The ideal alienated itself from itself without ceasing to be its real self. The world arose out of the ideal but it did not result in any limitation of the infinite, absolute ideal.

Some differentiation took place but it did not amount to any actual division. Although the world became an other to the ideal, the ideal remained the ground and support of the world and thus the very self of its alienated part. Thus otherness without independence or self-sufficiency produced the eternal unrest which characterises the being of the world. The world seems to be under the pressure of an inward urge to get itself identified with the ideal. It is at the same time still an other to the ideal and so we have got the process which is directed towards the gradual elimination of this otherness. In its movement towards the realisation of the ideal, the world is passing through modes of infinite variety. These different modes represent the different grades in the identification of the world with the ideal. At no stage, in none of its modes, is the world entirely separated from the ideal. The world as a whole as well as each of its modes is focussed in the ideal. The ideal is the transcendental unity of all facts and things.

In men the world seems to be identified with the ideal with particular closeness. The ideal is the transcendental ground of stocks and stones as well as of birds, beasts and men. No one is entirely let loose from it. But in men we find a greater realisation of the ideal than in anything else. In mere matter, we find that the ground of its being is outside itself, it is in something which is not material. But man is so conceived that the ground of his being is supposed to lie within himself. His otherness from the ideal is not so sharp as that of dead matter. He is not conceived as separated from the subject which is the ideal. He considers himself as identified with it. But the material aspect of his being, which is the stamp of his otherness from the ideal, is not eliminated or transcended in man. So the process of the world still goes on and man still endeavours consciously or unconsciously to establish his complete and real identity with the ideal.

For an adequate explanation of our experience we have to suppose that there is the world of which we too are members or parts. Merely by the subject or ideal nothing seems to be explained. If the ideal alone were real, there would be no experience at all. Our experience has various aspects and they imply the presence of differentiated elements in reality. But no such elemental differences can be found merely in the ideal. On the other hand the unintelligent world with its objectivity and movement does not explain itself without an intelligent principle of permanence, fixity and light which is the ideal. The two are necessary and we have to accept them both, if we are to accept any experience at all. About their position with regard to each other, we have said that the world is grounded in the ideal. But the ideal is not the ground of the world in the sense that there are elemental differences in the ideal corresponding to the differences in the world. Such a supposition of differentiated elements in the ideal to account for the differences in the world would imply the presence of the world in the ideal in a germinal state and the ideal would in that case include the world and would not be the ground of it. We take the ideal to be the ground of the world in the sense that the form and character of the world are determined by the ideal. The ideal is the immutable principle of illumination and so it is required to give meaning as well as form to the being of the world which is supposed to be in itself unintelligent and changing. The world therefore has got a sort of dependent being. The ideal however does not depend upon anything else. We have also supposed that the world has a beginning. And the question at once arises : How did the world arise on the basis of the ideal ?

One answer to the question is that there can be no answer to it. We see that the world is there, grounded in our sense in the ideal, although there is nothing in the ideal to show why there should be any world at all. How or why the world

arose and is there, trying to secure its identity with the ideal may be a question which from the nature of the case admits of no answer. Such questions about 'how' or 'why' have their scope limited within the world, and cannot legitimately be extended beyond it. Or it may be supposed that the world does not represent the emergence of a foreign entity on the basis of the ideal. Instead of supposing that something merely other than the ideal suddenly came into being and has ever been struggling to establish its identity with the ideal, we may think that the ideal itself by an act of self-differentiation opposed itself to itself and the history of the world represents only the process of overcoming the opposition which was precipitated by that pre-empirical act of self-heterisation. The ideal which is infinite and absolute made itself finite and limited. Although it is one single principle, it made itself two by an act of self-division and appeared as an other to itself. But since what is really infinite cannot remain in finitude and what is one cannot permanently be sundered into two, we find there is always a tendency towards self-transcendence in the self-limited ideal which is ever striving to undo the first act of self-limitation and to establish itself in its unity and infinitude.

But there are difficulties in this supposition. How could the self-sufficient, perfect ideal disturb the peace of its being by an unaccountable act of self-disruption? Something must have disturbed the harmony of its being before the ideal could go so far out of itself as to present itself to itself as an other. But this is neither accountable nor conceivable. Could the infinite make itself really finite even by an act of self-limitation? And if it really could, why should there be a tendency towards self-transcendence?

So we may suppose that there is no actual limitation of the infinite, but only an appearance of it. This would come to mean that although in fact the ideal alone is there, there has supervened upon the ideal an appearance of the world. The

world is only seen to be there, although in fact there is no such thing as the world. But if this supposition were true, all our experience would turn out to be mere illusion, and this universal illusion would remain absolutely inexplicable. To whom shall we ascribe this illusion, seeing that an illusion is never self-subsistent?

The illusion cannot belong to us individuals because we come into existence along with the world when the illusion has taken place. The illusion cannot of course belong to the ideal which, besides being perfect, is the principle of light and knowledge and cannot, therefore, suffer from any illusion.

Thus we see that the supposition of a radical illusion cannot strictly be maintained. We have therefore to suppose that the ideal alone is not real, there is another principle which is real along with it. All change, activity and otherness in the world are due to this other principle, whereas the ideal is the principle of stability and unity, of absolute peace and perfect enlightenment. Out of a union of these two principles, the world has arisen. In the language of the Sankhyas we might say that the ideal is the Purusha and the other principle is the Prakriti. The Prakriti is the principle of materiality and activity, and the Purusha that of consciousness, manifestation or enlightenment. All forms of existence are lighted up by the enlightening presence of the Purusha. The Prakriti cannot establish itself apart from the Purusha, but the Purusha, too, being altogether inactive and immaterial, cannot by itself account for any fact of the world. The presence of the Prakriti is marked by materiality and activity which are inseparable from all modes of earthly being.

We have said that the world of our experience has got a beginning and will have an end. This presupposes that there are times when the Prakriti is not active at all, for the world, as we see it, is due to the activity of the Prakriti or, more

strictly, the Prakriti in action is the world of our experience. So if this world is not to be there at any time, then the Prakriti at that time must remain in an absolutely quiescent state. But the world is the form in which the Prakriti manifests itself, and so, when the world is not there, we have to suppose that the Prakriti remains then in an unmanifest condition. That means it remains identified with the Purusha or the ideal. We cannot think it is not there at all, for an ultimate positive principle cannot absolutely be negated nor can we suppose that it remains distinct from, and so in a sense opposed to, the ideal, for in that case it would be an object to the ideal and would not therefore remain altogether unmanifest. So the really ultimate principle is the ideal identified with the quiescent principle of the world. Prakriti and Purusha, Maya and Brahma, are the different names for the pair of principles which in their unity appear to be the basis of the world and, indeed, of all existence.

But how are the two principles to be conceived as identified with each other ? They are sometimes conceived as a thing with its capacity or as a person with his power or strength. A strong man is not always displaying the strength of his muscles. The strength comes to be seen when he is in some action. But when he is not active, the strength does not disappear ; it is still there but it is not seen as distinct from him. But examples like this give only an aid to our imagination to conceive a difficult fact ; they never literally render the fact itself.

In any event two principles in their unity or one principle in its duality is the ultimate fact of the universe. If the two principles remain in their identity, the panorama of the world will never unfold itself. We have to suppose that the identity is somehow disturbed, the union is somehow partially severed. In this breach of the union, one of the pair, *viz.* the Purusha, remains quite inactive. If the Purusha too were to be active and so involved in change, there would

be nothing to give meaning to change and activity. But the Prakriti being a principle of activity, puts itself in action and struggles to establish its lost identity with the Purusha. Union and separation, attraction and repulsion seem to give the fundamental law of growth and decay, of birth and death, in the world. The different forms of being in the world represent only the different modes of the union of the Prakriti with the Purusha. The different evolutionary steps in cosmic history indicate the degree of completeness with which the Prakriti succeeds at different stages to identify itself with the Purusha. When the Prakriti succeeds completely in identifying itself with the Purusha, it becomes quiescent and the drama of the world comes to a close. Hence it is said that the world disappears when the *summum bonum* of life is reached.

But why is the identity of the Prakriti with the Purusha disturbed at all? Why cannot the Prakriti remain for ever in its close and intimate union with the ideal? Why should first of all a gulf be created in order to be bridged over again? To questions like these, it is difficult to find a suitable answer. Every act in the world process is determined by its previous act and determines in its turn what happens after it. But the very first act, which really started the process, must itself remain undetermined. There is nothing before to determine its nature and character. In fact all before and after and so all rational causality has meaning only within the process. The beginning of the process therefore cannot be determined by any law. It being undetermined, we cannot say how or why it took place. In metaphorical language we can ascribe the first act of separation to the freak of the Prakriti. It separated itself from the ideal, because it would and there is no other explanation for it. We can however find out a teleological explanation. If the separation had not taken place, the divine play of the world would not have ensued. So the separation was there, because the *Lila* or the

play was to be there. Union and separation are part of the play. The play may also be conceived as the manifestation of a principle of love which always works with two entities, in fundamental unity, disporting themselves in a series of acts of union and separation. The act of partial separation is thus seen to be necessary for the play and so it took place because the play was to be there. But why should the play be there? The play has to be there because the principle of love, which may be supposed to hold together Purusha and Prakriti, sometimes in absolute union and sometimes in partial separation, can express itself only through this play.

CHAPTER XV

Conclusion.

We have now come to the end of our enquiry. We hope we have arrived at some positive conclusions about the nature of the ideal, the self and the world. Let us now try to see how our conclusions about the nature of reality explain some of the problems of ethics and metaphysics. We shall try to view these problems in the light of our conclusions and we hope we shall thereby not only have our difficulties with regard to these problems rendered less pressing, but shall also attain to a better understanding of the ultimate principles we have sought to establish in these pages.

The problems which we wish to discuss here briefly, are, first, the problems of moral experience which we have already mentioned in the course of our previous discussions. We have repeatedly referred to the fact that as moral agents we feel it incumbent on us to realise the ideal. There is such a thing as moral obligation. The self feels itself obliged to realise or to be one with the ideal. Whence comes this obligation or necessity ?

The self is the ideal. But in its individuated existence, it is encased in the world and is identified with it. It has been made limited, and also differentiated from its ground, the ideal. But its differentiation from the ideal is not the ultimate fact about itself. Its identity with the ideal is more ultimate. It is the identity of the self with the ideal that comes to assert itself in our sense of moral obligation. The whole world process means, as we have seen, the movement of the world towards the ideal. This movement is a fact and has to

be accepted as a necessity by the world, because it cannot but be drawn towards the ideal. The various laws of nature are nothing but the ways in which the movement is taking place. These laws are supposed to explain the necessity which we find in the realm of physical matter.

We as moral persons are part of the world and are participants in its movements towards the ideal. The ideal is drawing the world to itself along with ourselves. And just as this attraction of the ideal and the movement of the world are at the root of physical laws and physical necessity, so are they the basis of the laws of morality and of moral obligation. It is the attraction of the ideal that moves matter by physical necessity and draws it towards itself by way of chemical affinity, life and consciousness. The same attraction operates in self-conscious individuals and assumes the form of moral obligation. That we feel it incumbent on us to realise the ideal means that we feel irresistibly drawn towards it. This has to be taken as a fact. It implies our present relative difference from, but ultimate identity with, the ideal, but there is no further problem about it.

But how is moral obligation to be reconciled with moral freedom? It has been said, perhaps rightly, that without freedom there can be no morality. But if we are drawn irresistibly towards the ideal, what becomes of our freedom? And if we are not free, how can we be moral?

Now, if by freedom we mean the capacity for doing anything under the sun, then we are not certainly free. We are physically incapable of doing many things in the world; there are many other things which it is morally impossible for us to do. A saintly person can never do or will an unrighteous act, although his physical constitution may not be such as to make the commission of the act impossible for him. Such freedom then to do anything in the world is not given to any human being. Moreover a freedom of this kind is not required by moral experience. In fact if such freedom were a

fact of human character, it would falsify all our judgments of moral excellence. It is sometimes said that when a man acts in a particular way, it is also possible for him to act in a certain other way. But if it is really possible for him to act in this way as well as in that, why does he actually act in this way rather than in that? So we think men are so constituted that they are capable of acting only in the way they actually act. It was not possible for Socrates to humour his judges or to run away from his confinement. The only thing possible for him was to drink off quietly the cup of hemlock offered to him and thus pass off into the land of the immortals. Suppose A and B are two lines of action possible under certain circumstances, of which A is good and B is bad. Now if a person, who actually follows A, has also the capacity for following B, how can we call him either good or bad? We call a person good and give him credit for his moral excellence, because we think that good actions are the necessary outcome of his inherent good nature. Either all actions have to be supposed as quite external to the nature of human beings and so men should not be praised or blamed for any actions which are attributed to them; or we have to suppose that definite actions are necessarily connected with definite human characters. If we accept the first alternative we cannot make any judgment of moral worth. The characters of men must remain unknown and unknowable to us. Since this is not acceptable, we have to think that all actions, especially the purposive ones, express the peculiar nature or character of the person who does them. What he does therefore, we cannot but think, is absolutely determined by the physical, intellectual and the moral constitution of his being as well as by the hold the ideal has gained upon him.

We cannot say that 'ought' implies 'can' if by so saying we mean that one is quite able to realise the ideal at any stage of one's moral evolution; because it is not a fact that we can realise the ideal at any time we like. If it were a

fact that we can realise the ideal at **any** time we like, then, since we sincerely desire to realise the ideal, we should have realised it here and now. When I say I ought to do a thing, I mean I ought to be a person who does the thing naturally without a mistake. But when I feel I ought to be something, I have simply a sense of the ideal (which it may be possible for me to reach in course of time); but this sense of the ideal is not equivalent to, nor does it rationally give, any knowledge of my present capacity. 'Ought' implies 'can' only in the sense that there is a possibility of our realising the ideal in fullness of time. Our sense of the ideal, which is equivalent to our feeling of 'ought,' gives us no indication whatever about what we are able or not able to do here and now.

Still we do not mean to deny that for moral experience freedom is a necessity. Here by freedom we do not mean the indeterminate freedom of arbitrary actions but the freedom from external restraint. If in all our activities we were simply obliged to perform certain actions by some external compulsion, there would be no morality for us; because such actions would express neither goodness nor badness. But when a good man feels obliged to follow the path of righteousness, he is not under the necessity of an external compulsion. He feels and works under a necessity, but a necessity of his own being which is another name for freedom. He is irresistibly drawn towards the ideal; but the ideal is his own highest self and not an external other to him. He feels himself free and realises his freedom only in yielding himself up to the domination of the ideal over his lower and worldly self.

A word may be said here about the social nature of moral experience. We think that the nature of the ideal and the self should be so conceived as to render this aspect of moral experience at once necessary and intelligible. Does our view of the ideal and of the self fulfil this requirement?

By the social nature of moral experience we understand the fact that we achieve goodness, not by remaining inactive

or by actions which do not concern anybody else in the world, but by contributing to the well-being of other human beings. Love and benevolence are recognised as highly moral virtues. This implies that if we are to be rightly moral our nature should be such as to go out in actions which will conduce to the well-being of others. We cannot claim to be really moral if we are anxious only about our own well-being and remain indifferent to the well-being of others. Morality requires that we should be concerned about the well-being of others as well. But why should it be so ?

By moral experience we have broadly understood the experience which is involved in the realisation of the good. The ideal alone is the good for us ; and we are good and achieve goodness in so far as we are able to realise the ideal in us. So apparently our idea of goodness or of moral experience does not imply that there should be other human beings and we should be concerned about their well-being. Even if I were alone and my ideal were there, it seems, I could be moral by striving after my ideal. My goodness is my own private and individual affair, and the being or the well-being of any other human beings need not be involved in it. But this is so only apparently. We have said just now that the self could realise goodness even if it were alone in the universe. But can it really be so utterly alone in the world and remain the very same self which it now is ? By the self we understand the self which exists. And the self which exists is the self which has its being shared by many individuals. We have seen that the currents of our being run into many persons and as a matter of fact the members of a family or a community live literally in one another. We are members of one community or another. Having conceived ourselves in this way, we cannot also suppose that we could be alone in the universe. The self which could be so alone is a self which we do not know, and we cannot say anything of its goodness or morality. In fact a self cut off

from all social environments is a myth and its morality would be equally mythical.

All human beings are deeply in union with one another and it is only by a forced abstraction that we can think of them in their rigid particularity. In truth and in reality a person is identified not only with a mass of living matter but also with a number of conscious individualities which cannot be affected favourably or unfavourably without producing a like effect upon him. His concrete self is a self which is joined to many other persons with an inseparable bond of unity. The bond of unity among all human beings is twofold. We have all our transcendental identity in the absolute subject or the ideal. We are again the products of the same nature, subject to the same laws of growth and decay, embedded in the same material relations or circumstances. We are children of one all-comprehensive mother which is the Prakriti or nature, and carry within ourselves the seed of the same father, the absolute ideal. Our brotherhood is thus an unmistakable fact and has to be reckoned with in all credible accounts of our nature and destiny. By this common bond of brotherhood we are so bound together that the well-being of each cannot be separated from the well-being of all. When we realise our unity with other human beings, we understand that our good cannot be separated from their good. We cannot remain indifferent to their happiness and misery. We feel them as our own, and it becomes not only a duty but a necessity for us to remove the causes, which are productive of sufferings to any human beings, because in causing suffering to any man, they cause suffering also to ourselves. It is true that all people do not possess the same range of personality, although no man lives exclusively in his private particular self. Most of us feel their unity with the family and the particular society to which they belong. Some of us can transcend the boundaries of our particular social groups and think and feel for the whole nation. Some

can go still further and make their own the happiness and misery of the people who live beyond the borders of their own land. In general those who have achieved a greater realisation of the ideal, possess a greater range of personality than others who occupy a lower level in spiritual evolution. In the life of the former the happiness and misery of a larger number of human beings are reflected than in that of the latter. The former have greater range of personality in the sense that they can think and feel for, and realise their unity with, a larger section of humanity than can their less advanced brethren. A tree is scarcely affected by the being or non-being of other trees which stand beside it. A gregarious animal is affected by the states of other members of its herd; but knows perhaps nothing beyond its immediate narrow circle. A man by his thought and imagination puts himself in sympathy even with those who live far away from him. He makes their cause his own and works and suffers for it. In proportion as the goodness of a man increases, the field of his sympathy widens and the sphere of his influence and existence becomes ampler and ampler. When he feels and realises his being in others, that is, in beings who at first sight appear as others to him, he cannot but feel that he cannot be perfectly good when those 'others' who form part of his being are left without goodness. Therefore does the Bodhisattwa willingly forego the blessedness of *Nirvana* till the last of the mortals comes to escape the wheels of birth and death.

Morality does not exactly require us to work for the pleasure of others. If the enjoyment of any pleasure is found to be degrading for any human being, then we should be going against all morality if we try to provide that pleasure for him. What morality requires is that we should help our fellow-beings to realise the good. The good for our fellow-beings assumes in our eyes the form of happiness. And in this we are not wrong, because happiness, in the

sense of conscious equanimity of the spirit, is a dominant aspect of the ideal as we have conceived it here. We work for the happiness of others naturally and necessarily when we have realised our unity with them. Love is a moral virtue because through love we can unite with others. Without the realisation of such unity, all talks about brotherhood and service remain mere formal precepts and the demand to fulfil them in life remains an external demand to our moral nature. In order rightly to be moral, we should first aim at realising our unity with all mankind and the rest of morality will become quite easy and simple. When we say that we cannot love God if we do not love his creatures, we only mean that we cannot realise our identity with the ideal, without feeling ourselves at one with all mankind. When we speak of the fatherhood of God, we seek to express in terms of religion the metaphysical fact of our identity in the absolute subject, which is our highest self and on which our very existence depends as does the existence of everything else in the world. The brotherhood of men, on which all love and service depend, follows almost as a corollary. It expresses nothing more or less than the fact of our mutual interpenetration at all higher stages of our being.

This is how it has come about that we can accomplish our own well-being only by contributing to the well-being of all others.

Before we conclude, let us briefly consider the bearings of our conclusions on the problems of evil, immorality and God. These questions are very important for our life and thought, and it is expected of every system of metaphysics that it should say something definite on each of these questions.

The problem of evil has proved particularly difficult for all idealistic metaphysics. People who would not otherwise object to a system of idealism are still dissatisfied with it, because in their opinion it provides no satisfactory explanation

for the problem of evil. Now, what is the problem? No problem seems to be there merely in the being of evil. If we do not believe that there is any unifying principle in the universe or, believing that there is such a principle, if we refuse to endow it with any moral attribute, then the fact that there is evil in the world cannot give rise to any serious question. The evil may be there just as other things of the world are there, and there appears to be no problem about it. The problem arises only when we think that the world is grounded in a principle which is all-perfect. This belief appears incompatible with the fact that there is evil in the world. The ultimate principle of reality may be conceived as God or as the Absolute; but in either case it cannot remain perfect if it allows the being of evil in the heart of the world. The presence of evil anywhere in the world will inevitably make the absolute whole evil, at least in part. Perfection cannot be claimed for a creator whose creation is vitiated in the core by the presence of evil. Thus the problem of evil appears well-nigh insoluble for religious theism and for philosophic absolutism. We have to suppose either that there is no evil or that there is no perfect principle at the basis of the world.

The fact of evil seems too patent to admit of any serious denial. When we cannot also deny God or the absolute, we find ourselves in a veritable impasse. We may suppose that the evil serves only as the means of the good and so, in the interest of the good itself, the evil has been allowed to remain there. Or we may think that the good itself, when imperfectly viewed, appears as evil to us. In both these cases we seem to deny the reality of evil. When we take evil as an instrument of the good, all the bitterness associated with our sense of evil, as opposed to good, at once falls away, and we come to regard evil only as a stage in goodness. Evil thus understood is no evil at all. When we think it is our imperfect view that gives us the appearance of evil in the world, we are

obliged to think that there is no evil at all, but only an illusion of it. But to take away reality from our idea of evil is to cut off the nerve of all our moral endeavour. All our activity is meant to remove some evil; but if we believe that there is no evil at all, we shall not find a real motive for any rational action. Moreover the fact of the appearance of evil itself remains unexplained. We do not understand why the perfect does, and how it can, assume the appearance of evil, when in fact there is no evil at all.

What is our attitude towards this problem? We do not deny that there is real evil in the world. In fact when we have started with the certainty of moral experience, we are bound to hold by the reality of evil. It is only when we are in presence of some serious evil that our moral consciousness is roused to its utmost clarity, and we can be sincere and earnest in our moral efforts only if we believe that evil really exists. So for us a denial of evil in the world is unthinkable. But the evil which moral experience presupposes is not an evil which is an ultimate and unchangeable fact of reality. It is certainly there but it is there only as a vanishing aspect. If evil appeared as a dead fact which has simply to be accepted as final, we could rationally make no effort to change it. All our moral efforts are inspired by the belief that although evil is there, it is there to be conquered, and that it is capable of being changed and removed. Evil is part of the world and like everything else in it, it is an appearance in the sense of a vanishing or unstable reality.

Evil is always relative to the good or the ideal. By evil we do not necessarily understand pain and suffering. They may well be evil under certain circumstances, but also they may not. Pleasures and pains do not themselves indicate either good or evil although they may become elements in either. We have direct intuitions of pain as well as of pleasure. But we have no direct immediate intuition of evil. If we had no conception whatever of the good or the ideal, we

could under no circumstances have any sense or idea of evil. That which opposes or hinders the realisation of the good is evil. We cannot say that the good is similarly dependent on evil, for that would involve us in the fallacy of 'mutual dependence' (*anyonyāśraya*), and there would be really neither good nor evil. We have found reasons to believe in the reality of the ideal; and we have also seen that we are good in so far as we are identified with it. Our identity with the ideal is the ground of our goodness. Difference from the ideal is the form of the evil as it is also the form of the world. So in a sense we are obliged to say not only that evil is real in the world but that evil is the very form of the world; for the world appears as different from the ideal, and, so far, evil may be said to characterise its very form. Our difference, as well as the difference of the world from the ideal, however, is not a final and ultimate fact of reality. We achieve goodness in so far as we succeed in overcoming this otherness; and in the final consummation, all otherness is bound to vanish in the undifferentiated self-enjoyment of the ideal. Evil was not there and will not be there; but it is there along with the world and will be there so long as the world or its difference from the ideal lasts.

The being of evil in the world does not vitiate the ideal, which in a sense can be called the absolute. The ideal is absolute because it is not limited or determined in its being by anything else. But it is not an all-comprehensive absolute in which the world is also included. If it included the world, it would have made itself evil by making evil an element in it. But as the world remains different from the ideal, and as there is evil in the world in so far as it is different from the ideal, and as, again, the world as different from the ideal, cannot also be identified with it, our absolute or the ideal cannot be affected at all by the presence of evil in the world.

Belief in immortality seems to be inculcated by all religions in some form or other. Cessation from all existence is

not generally desired by human beings. We all like to continue in existence as long as we can; and the desire of our heart is encouraged by the belief that there is some form of existence for us beyond the grave. But how can this belief be justified?

By immortality is here meant not the kind of immortality which consists in being only remembered by our successors or in being connected as a link in the continuous chain of human lives. We mean by it continued existence beyond birth and death, in which our present personal identity is never lost. In short by immortality we mean personal, human immortality. Our personality is determined by our mind and body. As pure consciousness, there are no distinctions between one person and another. Our distinctiveness and individuality arise from our mental and bodily characteristics. So it is reasonable to expect that our individuality will disappear with the disappearance of our mind and body. When we die, our body gets decomposed very quickly or is reduced to ashes by cremation. There is no sign of life or mind in the body after death. It is difficult to imagine that material particles of our body, blown up in the wind or mixed up with earth, carry a mind with them which is also the mind which we now possess. The unity of our body is not, it is obvious, maintained in its identity beyond our death. So even though by a stretch of imagination, we suppose that the body, which remains there after our death, still has a mind, it is very difficult to maintain that it is the same mind which we now have. We have already seen that even in life we are not always the same mind and body; it is preposterous therefore to expect that we shall remain the same even in death and beyond it. We have no evidence of mind except on some material basis. When with death, the bodily basis is destroyed, it appears reasonable to suppose that the mind too disappears at the same time. We as persons do actually die and pass out of existence at the time of death. Thus it appears very

difficult to sustain by reason our belief in personal immortality.

Still the belief is there and philosophers have tried to supply some moral arguments to support this belief. It is said that in life we very seldom find that the virtuous are happy, whereas it is a demand of our moral reason that the virtuous should reap the reward of their virtue, in the form of happiness. So it is contended that there is life beyond death where in appropriate measure the virtuous receive the reward of happiness and the vicious the punishment of suffering.

The argument is put in a slightly different form by Indian philosophers. Their theory is that we can suffer or enjoy only the results of our own actions. The happy and unhappy lots of different individuals in life are sought to be explained by the hypothesis that they did, in their past lives, actions of different merit, which have produced these different results now. Just as our present experience of happiness and misery presupposes a previous life where we worked for it, so does our present life of actions, not rewarded always with appropriate measure of happiness and suffering, imply a next life in which we are destined to reap the fruit of our present actions.

But do these arguments carry us very far? We may demand that the virtuous should be made happy but what evidence is there that the universe does respect this demand? There is no necessity in the nature of things that this demand should be fulfilled. Moreover does not the good man feel himself satisfied in the performance of a virtuous act?

We may very well believe that our enjoyments as well as our sufferings are the results of our own actions. But has anybody ever succeeded in fixing an exact ratio or definite proportion between our enjoyments and actions? Can we not think that all our enjoyments and sufferings are due to our actions in this very life? When it is not at all fixed how much of suffering or enjoyment is to accrue to any person from any particular action, it cannot be

ascertained that some balance of pleasure or pain is still due to us as the result of our actions here, and so we cannot say that the balance has to be experienced in some future existence. If the account of our actions and sufferings is made clear at the time of our death, and if nothing is carried forward either on the credit or on the debit side, it is safe to assume that death is really the end of our personal existence. Our happiness and misery are due to what we are here and now ; and what we are is determined by our environment and heredity. If these natural causes can explain our present lot, we need not go to supernatural causes in the form of actions in the past life to account for the same fact. Even if we suppose that there is some definite ratio between our actions and enjoyments, which is demanded by justice, and that this ratio is not found to be satisfied in this life, we cannot be sure that this ratio is going to be satisfied in a next life. If, so far as our experience goes (*i. e.*, in this life), the demands of justice are not fulfilled, we have no right to think rationally that they are ever satisfied by the nature of things.

Thus we see that it is difficult to establish the validity of our belief in personal immortality ; and we are persuaded this belief is not of much account for theory or practice. It is sometimes felt that if everything ends with our death, we shall have no motive for any right actions which are not directly advantageous to ourselves. If I am to die out completely with the dissolution of my body, why should I be kind, righteous or just ? If I am tyrannous and strong, I can be cruel and oppressive for my own personal satisfaction. That I am not cruel, even when I can be so with impunity, in this life, shows that there is in me some fear of punishment in the next life. This implies that the belief in existence after death is helpful to the morality of people.

But is it the right sort of morality whose interest is served by a belief in personal immortality ? If I am good

and walk in the path of virtue only in the hope of some reward of happiness and if I do not deviate from that path only out of fear of some punishment or suffering, will my goodness or morality have any real value? Will it signify any goodness in me? If I regulate my actions by such hopes of reward or fears of punishment, I can never achieve any real goodness in life. When my actions are inspired in this way, I give only a free play to the instinct of selfishness which, from the point of view of the ideal, is certainly a vice and not a virtue. If we are to be good, we must be able to be kind, righteous and just with no thought of any personal advantage to ourselves. Virtue should be considered its own reward. In our efforts to realise the ideal, or to be good, we should never be influenced by any extraneous consideration as to whether or not we shall be happy in a future life. The ideal should have for a really virtuous man sufficient splendour in itself to attract him for its own sake. Is not goodness enough for us? If we can achieve goodness in doing a right action, what further reward can we or should we expect in this world or in the next? So it appears that in achieving morality or goodness it is an altogether irrelevant consideration whether or not there is an existence for us beyond the grave. A genuine votary of goodness should have courage to be good and to do the right act, even though he may be certain that the world along with himself is going to meet its doom of destruction at the very next moment. Otherwise his goodness is a make-believe; and his morality a misnomer for trafficking in self-interest.

Do we really desire immortality for our present self? No one of us feels that he is perfect. Nobody can be perfect before he has reached the ideal. To desire the immortality of our present selves is to desire that the imperfection of our nature should be made permanent. But this is never a rational desire; at least it is not a desire which can be made consonant with our moral aspirations. As moral beings,

we desire that all the imperfections of our nature should pass away, leaving us at one with the ideal. We think that, as self-centred particular individuals disfigured by sin and lacerated by sorrow, we do not even deserve to be there. We wish that our self with all its limitations should really pass away. To wish that I should be there is to give expression to sheer egoism. It is far worthier of a moral agent to wish that goodness should prevail than that he should not die. And if the increasing realisation of goodness in the world requires that I should pass off from existence, I should willingly and gladly submit to this divine necessity.

Still nobody likes to cease from existence. But to desire permanence in being is not to desire permanence for our limited selves with all their imperfections. We have seen that absolute being belongs only to the ideal and our rational desire for the ideal naturally implies a desire for permanent being. We have also seen that we are all grounded in the ideal. If we are immortal in anything, we are immortal in the ideal. All the mortal part of our nature will surely pass away. Only the immortal part of it will remain. Our mind and body which give us our distinctiveness and constitute our individuality, are things of natural growth and decay. They exist in time and what exists in time will pass away with time. The ideal alone enjoys timeless existence and we are immortal only in our transcendental unity with the ideal. It is vain to expect permanence for things which are foredoomed to extinction.

Belief in God is deeply rooted in human nature. And it stands to reason that this belief should not be lightly treated. We too are not inclined to repudiate this belief. We found reasons to reject the view that God is the ideal, because God is generally conceived as an external creator of the world and as an other to the person who worships him. But there is no reason to think that the only possible conception of God is the conception that is just indicated here. If

by God we mean simply the standard and basis of all goodness, that is, a being which is the seat and centre of all perfection, then we can equate God with the ideal, and in maintaining the absolute reality of the ideal, we only justify our belief in the existence of God. God may be viewed also as the ground of the world, and we have seen that the ideal is really the ground of the world. So from this point of view also, we may regard the ideal as the true God. It may be said that God is God because he is a God of love. But the ideal being absolutely static can never show any activity of love. It does nothing and can do nothing. I cannot love anything without taking up an active attitude towards that which I love. I cannot be loving without giving rise to some changes within myself. But it is impossible for the ideal to assume any active attitude or to allow any changes within itself. So it appears that the ideal cannot be a God of love and so is no God at all. But can God really love his creatures just as one human being loves another? Our love is always selective. We love one and do not love another. But can God afford to be selective in this way? It is supposed that God loves us all equally. He has the same love for saints and sinners, for worms crawling on earth and angels flying in heaven. But what sort of love is that which makes no discrimination? Is it love for anybody at all which is love for all? So it seems certain that the love of God for men has to be understood differently from the love which one individual may bear for another. Love is not simply an attitude which God assumes towards his creatures. It must be an abiding characteristic of his being. This characteristic may be that aspect of his being by virtue of which people feel themselves attracted towards it. We know we are all being attracted by the ideal and this attraction may be viewed as the operation of divine love within us, God's love can never be regarded as a psychological emotion as all our earthly loves are. It must be conceived as a constant principle expressive of the divine and eternal nature of

God. We know that the divinity of God consists in the perfection of his goodness, and it expresses itself in the attractive influence which God (ideal) exercises over all human beings by his mere presence or being. This is divine love and the God of such love alone is worthy of our love and worship.

We know that this view of God and his love will not be satisfactory to many. It has been said that the strongest man is he who can stand most alone. And most of us are not strong enough to stand alone with the ideal. Our heart craves for sympathy. We want some one on whom we can rely in times of danger and difficulty. But the ideal is utterly indifferent to the lot of human beings. It remains always in itself, shining in its singular splendour. It suffers no loss or gain in itself with the emergence or disappearance of the world. In its supreme unconcern about mundane affairs, it shows itself powerless to help us in any way. It is the principle of goodness but its goodness is such that we can never utilise it in our favour. We want a less exalted God who will not be too perfect to administer the balm of sympathy to our afflicted hearts, who will carry us in his bosom to the desired goal of our life. Such a God cannot be a self-sufficient principle unconcerned in the affairs of men, but he must be a participant in the venture of our life and destiny. Can the scheme of reality, we have conceived, provide for the being of such a God?

We have conceived of the world as moving towards the ideal. When we think of the world in this way, we do not think of it as a mere principle of materiality. We conceive it as sensitive to the presence of the ideal. It may be even viewed as the self-differentiated ideal moving in the form of the world towards itself. As thus being active and moving along with us, towards the supreme self or the ideal, the self-differentiated ideal, identified with the world, is the God of whom we are now in search. A God without form eludes the grasp of our thought and imagination. The God whom we

have now found is a God whose visible form is the universe.

Although this God together with us is ultimately grounded in the supreme ideal, we live, move and have our being in him. He is the world-spirit, sustaining us all in our individual existence and carrying us forward towards the ideal. The substance of our being, physical, mental or spiritual, is drawn from him. All that we need for our life, is to be obtained from him. We get our nourishment from the material world which forms part of his body. We can evade our dangers and difficulties by a suitable adjustment of natural forces which are simply the modes of his active being. He gives us his love in the love of our friends and relatives who too are his embodiments.

He cannot be indifferent to our life and destiny. We make changes in the world and they must have appropriate significance for the God in the world. We know he too is working for identification with the ideal. But it is only in our being identified with the ideal that the world-spirit gets itself identified with the ideal. Will in the psychological sense may not be appropriate to him, but in his active tendency towards the ideal, we can look upon him as a will. In putting ourselves in unison with this tendency, we may be said to be in communion with God. The highest prayer of the human heart seems to be: 'Thy will be done,' because the object of this will is nothing less than the identification of all particular selves with the divine self or the ideal. We cannot conceive anything higher than this. It is of course true that we cannot get anything done by God through our selfish prayer and praise. But by a sincere prayerful attitude we can put ourselves in a position in which the higher faculties of our nature may find fuller play.

We enjoy the fellowship of God in the company of good men, because good men in their active tendency towards the ideal represent God for us in human forms. It may be an

open question whether it is possible for us to enjoy real communion with God apart from the companionship of his good men. It may be possible for spiritual influences to work even without a human medium. But of that we do not know. We may at least try to be content with what we can get in visible and tangible form.

This is the God for whom we ordinarily ask, the leader and sustainer of our spiritual adventure. Religion is generally content with him. He is the lower absolute, the Saguna-Brahma, in the language of the Vedanta. Metaphysics does not deny his being, but it also takes care to point to what lies beyond him as the presupposition of his being, the ever-completed, self-shining ideal.

KOṆKAṆĪ PHONETICS¹

BY

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§ 1. The word “Koṇkaṇī” is used in the present sketch to denote those Indo-Aryan dialects which form a group closely allied to Marāṭhī and which have branched off from the common parent Prakrit at a relatively early period, spoken today along the strip of country between the Western Ghats and the sea, from Ratnagiri in the north to Goa and the two Kanaras in the centre and Cochin in the south. Koṇkaṇī is spoken by over one and a half million people, but it has had a chequered history; and the speech has never been elevated to a literary or political status. At present we can recognise five main dialects ranging themselves into three principal groups, the Southern, the Central and the Northern. The Southern group consists only of the one dialect spoken in Cochin by the Aryan

¹ I must take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to Professor S. K. Chatterji for his kind suggestion that I should present this sketch for publication in the Journal of the Department of Letters of the Calcutta University. This sketch is preliminary to a scientific study of the “Dialects of Koṇkaṇī” on which I am at present engaged. Owing unfortunately to the absence of Phonetic Laboratories in India I have been unable to amplify my personal observations by means of actual records. In writing out this description I have constantly referred to Prof. Chatterji's *Bengali Phonetics* and *The Pronunciation of Marāṭhī* by Lloyd James and S. G. Kanhare, both appearing in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, Vols. II and IV. I have used the following abbreviations :

K.	Koṇkaṇī.
sK.	K. spoken by the Kanara Sāraswat Brahmins.
gsK.	K. spoken by the Gauḍa Sāraswat Brahmins.
cK.	The Cochin variety of K.
xK.	Dialect of the Christians of Goa and the Kanaras.
nK.	The Northern Dialect spoken in Ratnagiri.

In indicating K. words I have used the Devanāgarī script and Romanised Transcription in brackets for facilitating the reading of both Eastern and Western scholars; the transcription is based on Turner's *Nepali Dictionary*, with the addition of the dental affricates ^vc, ^vj, ^vjh. Elsewhere the letters of the alphabet of the International Phonetic Association have been used as symbols for speech sounds,

Brahmins who settled there some four centuries ago, and this is conspicuous by the absence of dental affricates. In the Central group there are three dialects of which one is the mother-tongue of the native Christians of Goa and the Kanaras, and the other two of the Brahmins of this region. That spoken by the Kanara Sāraswat Brahmins will be denoted by Sāraswat Koṅkaṇī and the other one by Gauḍa Sāraswat Koṅkaṇī, according to the denominations of these two sections of Brahmins. The Christian dialect, among other characteristics, uses a large number of Portuguese words, and has a broad pronunciation of the vowel अ (a), *e.g.*, xK. मज्ज (mojḥ) : gsK. मेज्ज (mej(j)ḥ) : sK. मज्जे (majjḥ) *mine*, *cf.* Marāṭhī (mājḥā). The two Brahmin dialects differ in so far as polysyllabic words of gsK. tend to lose the penultimate (a) अ vowel, *e.g.*, gsK. (kassalḥ) कसल्ले : sK. (kaslḥ) कसल्ले. The Northern dialect is more nearly related to the standard Marāṭhī than all the rest, and north of Ratnagiri actually merges into it. It shares with xK. the peculiar property of ending in consonants where the others show final vowels ; *e.g.*, (rāmān) रामान for sK. gsK. (rāmāne) रामाने. The divergences between the various dialects are not so great morphologically as to make them mutually unintelligible. The main differences are phonetic, phonological, and in some cases syntactical ; we are concerned here only with phonetics.

§ 2. In most of the Indo-Aryan languages, except those which have come under Persian and Arabic influence, one or another form of script has been used uniformly throughout the region where they are being spoken ; thus Bengali has a definite script which is used all over the province, although it has four main dialect groups. The existence of traditional literature tends to normalise the orthography, however unphonetic it may be. In the case of Koṅkaṇī we have altogether a different state of affairs ; with no literary tradition to unify the different dialects, and with the absence of economic grouping, the speakers of K. have been forced to use the neighbouring court languages in literary and business dealings, with the result that if K. has to be written three scripts are in use : in the south Kanarese, in the centre Roman, and in the north Marāṭhī. The total absence of any correspondence between these three scripts has given rise to a variety of forms representing the same sound group in several ways. Where possible I have consulted printed forms in

all the three scripts and taken down their phonetic value from the different persons speaking these dialects; in this description I shall stick to the forms given in Devanāgarī (Marāṭhī) script, the value of which will be given in transcription in brackets and in the letters of the alphabet of the I. P. A.

§ 3. My own dialect is sK. belonging to the central group. I do not claim to have sufficient knowledge of the northern and southern dialects, my informants being a few friends in Bombay. Consequently the field has been restricted principally to the central group, description of the others being given only where personal observation has been possible. A fuller discussion about the phonetic peculiarities of all these dialects in comparison with those of Marāṭhī will only be possible when a fully equipped University department of Instrumental Phonetics undertakes the recording of each sound.

§ 4. The consonants of Central Konkani are shown in the following table :—

Bilabial		Labio-Dental	Dental	Alveolar	Palatal	Retroflex	Velar	Glottal
Plosive :								
Unaspirated	p b		t d			ʈ ɖ	k ɡ	
Aspirated	ph bh		th dh 1	2		ʈh ɖh	kh ɡh	
Affricate :			ʈs ɖz	ʈʃ ɖʒ				
Unasp.			ɖzh	ʈʃh ɖʒh				
Asp.								
Nasal	m	ɱ	n			ɳ	ŋ	
Lateral :								
Unasp.			l			ɭ		
Rolled				r				
Fricative		(f)		s (z)				h
Semivowel				ɹ	j			

¹ See § 16. I have retained the terminology of *The Pronunciation of Marāṭhī*, but it would be truer to term these 'dento-alveolar affricates.'

² See § 16(a). In actual phonetic representation I have used the symbols ʈʃ, ɖʒ, for the palato-alveolar affricates.

The sounds given within brackets are not commonly used, and are to be found only in words borrowed from foreign languages.

§ 5. Following is the table of vowels :—

Bilabial		Front	Central	Back
Close . .	[u]	i ĩ		u ũ
Half close . .	[o]	e ĕ		o ɔ
Half open . .	[ɔ]	æ æ̃	ə	ɔ ɔ̃
Open . .			ɑ ă	

In the phonetic representation of these sounds I have not followed the notation used by Lloyd James and S. G. Kanhare for Marāṭhī (Bull. S. O. S., IV, pp. 791-801) where special signs have been given to long and short vowels. Length will be denoted here by the symbol [:]. It will be noticed that all the vowels are capable of nasalisation; this nasalisation is particularly important for the real understanding of K. which has often been termed a nasal language. The neutral vowel is more common in the Brahmin dialects than in the Christian where it is almost absent.

THE CONSONANTS

§ 6. The voiceless plosives [p t ʈ k] are to be pronounced without the slight aspiration which generally follows the corresponding English sounds. In this respect French is nearer than English to Indian pronunciation.

§ 7. The voiced plosives [b d ɖ g] are only fully voiced in intervocalic position, slightly voiced initially and finally.

§ 8. As in other Indo-Aryan dialects there is complete explosion of the first element of a plosive group like [pt kt ʈk], etc. The only exception is when the same plosive occurs doubly (see *Bengali Phonetics*, §11).

§ 9. When the first element of a plosive group is unexploded or not fully exploded a vertical bar in line with the letters will be employed to indicate this fact; *e.g.*, [kap,pəɳi] कापणि (kāppaṇi). In the case of a length of a consonant the same symbol employed in the case of vowels is used here; *e.g.*, [bəɳ:u] बन्नु (baṇṇu-).

§ 10. [p, b] : [pɑ:nə] पान (pāna-) *leaf*, [pərəbə] परब [paraba-] *day of festival*, [upasu] उपासु (upāsu) *fast*, [əp:ə] (appo) *kind of sweet*, [pit:ɑ] पिता (pittā) *he, she, it drinks*; [bədəkə] बदक (badaka) *duck*, [balə] बाल (bāla) *tail*, [bi:gə] बीग (bīga) *lock*, [khəb:əri] खबबरी (khabbari) *news*= xK. nK. [khabar].

§ 11. [ph, bh] : To the untrained Indian ear these sounds and the other aspirates appear as simple sounds. Dialectically the first plosive aspirate is pronounced as a dento-labial [f], or even as bilabial [ɸ], but the circumstances seem to be spread over a large tract of the Konkani territory. It is certainly strange that [bh] has escaped similar treatment.

[ph] : sK. gsK. [phələ] फळ (phaḷa) *fruit*, xK. nK. (phaḷ); sK. [pha:ṭi] फाटि (phāṭi) *back*, nK. xK. [pha:ṭɑ] (phāṭa); [tupha:nə] तुफान (tuphāna) *storm*, also pronounced [tufa:nə]. There is a tendency to de-aspiration in the medial position: [ka:pi] कापि (kāpi) for [ka:phi], *cf.* English *coffee*; [phirta] फिर्ता (phirtā) *he, she, it wanders*, pronounced in nK. or at least in some parts of Ratnagiri as [firta].

[bh] : sK. gsK. [bhərtɑ] भर्ता (bhartā) *he fills*, etc. Sk. (bharant-); sK. gsK. [bha:nə] भाण (bhāṇa) *a vessel*, Sk. (bhāṇṭa-), xK. nK. (bhāṇ). A tendency towards de-aspiration is developed in xK. and nK.: *e.g.*, (bhaṅgāra-) *gold*, is pronounced in some places as [bāga:r] but it is not general; the reverse is found in xK. nK. [bhəjlə] भाय्ल (bhāyḷa) *wife*, sK. gsK. (bāyḷa-); de-aspiration in the medial position is seen in [ʃa:ba:s] शाबास (śābhās) for [ʃa:bhas] शबास (śābhās). On the whole K. has remarkably kept the original aspirate pronunciation, even in final positions where a vowel has developed, as in sK. gsK. [la:bhu] लामु (lābhu)= Sk. (lābha-) *gain*.

§ 12. [t d th dh] are true dentals made by striking the point of the tongue against the back of the upper teeth. The tongue is fully spread out as in the English pronunciation of *th* [θ, ð], but is somewhat higher (*cf.* *Bengali Phonetics*, § 13). Examples :

[t]: [tərnə] तर्नो (tarnō) *young*; nK. xK. [təvəl] तवल (tavala), sK. gsK. [təp:i:lə] तपोल (tappila) *a vessel*; [dit:a] दिता (dittā) in sK. gsK., [dita] दिता (ditā) in xK. nK. *gives*.

[d]: sK. [dərə] दरो (darō), gsK. nK. xK. [dərə] दोरो (dōrō) *an enclosing wall or fence*; [ni:də] नौद (nīda), gsK. nK. nī:d नौद (nīmda), [nid:əta] निदता (niddatā) *sleep, sleeps*.

[th]: occurs only initially, medial and final positions being rare; sK. [thəŋ:li] थडि (thanḍi) *cold*; sK. gsK. xK. [thæbə] थेबो (thembo) *a drop of water or any liquid*; nK. [thaju] थायु (thāyu) *room*; de-aspiration in final positions is seen, e.g., sK. gsK. [ha:tu] हातु (hātu), xK. nK. [ha:t] हात (hāt) *hand*, cf. Hindostani [ha:th].

[dh]: initially only; seen elsewhere in learned borrowings only; xK. nK. [dhəḍə] धड (dhaḍa, Sk. dṛḍha-) *sound, strong*; [dha:rə] धार (dhāra, Sk. dhārā) *edge, sharpness*; [dhōku, dhō:ku, dhōku] धे(ठे)कु *belching*. Final aspiration lost, as in sK. gsK. [du:də] दूद (dūda), xK. nK. [du:d] दूद (dūd), *milk*, Sk. (dugdha), Marāṭhī [du:dh].

§ 13. [ṭ ḍ ṭh ḍh] are true retroflex sounds in central Koṅkaṇī and southern Koṅkaṇī; from what I have heard of the northern dialect I believe that the same observation may be safely made. The tip of the tongue is curled up and the point of articulation is near the hard palate.

[ṭ]: rare initially; in general represents the English alveolar as in [ṭuv:a:lu] टुव्वालु (ṭuvvālu), Eng. *towel*; [ṭebələ] टेबल (ṭebala), Eng. *table*; it is interesting to observe here that the Portuguese [t] is generally dental in K.; e.g., nK. xK. [butā] बुताव (butāmv), Portuguese *botão*, Eng. *button*; occurs medially and finally, e.g., sK. gsK. [pi:ṭə] पीट (piṭa, Sk. piṣṭa-), xK. nK. [pi:ṭ] पीट (piṭ).

[ḍ]: initially more common than ṭ; [ḍələ] डोलो (ḍōlō, dōlō), *eye*; [ḍuk:ərə] डुकर (ḍukkara) *pig*; represents English alveolar (d): [ḍəka:rṭə] डोकार्ट (ḍōkārtā), Eng. *dogcart*; here again Portuguese [d] is dental in K., e.g., [baldi:] बाल्दी (bāldi), Port. *balde*, Eng. *bucket*; intervocally and finally sK. gsK. [so:ḍi] सोडि (soḍi), xK. nK. so:ḍ (soḍ) *let go*.

[ṭh]: rare phoneme; [ṭhək:u] ठक्क (ṭhakku) *a cheat*, originally a *Thug*; xK. nK. [ṭha:jə] ठाय (ṭhāya) *space, room*; medially only in learned borrowings: [kəṭhi:nə] कठीण (kaṭhīṇa, Sk. kaṭhina-) *hard, difficult*; or in combination with the unaspirated plosive: sK. gsK. [ləṭṭha:] लक्का (laṭṭhā) *strong, muscular*.

[ɖh]: initially rarer than [tʰ]; in my collection of words I have only three of which two are onomatopoeic; sK. [ɖhɔ̃kə] ढोंक (ɖhɔ̃mkə) *a crane*; intervocally loses aspiration except perhaps in the north; thus sK. gsK. xK. [sa:ɖe] साडे (sāḍe) for nK. and Marāṭhi [sa:ɖhe] सढे *a half over*, as in [sa:ɖ(h)e-sa:tə] सढिसात (sāḍhesāt in nK. and sūḷisāta in sK. gsK.) *a half over seven or seven and a half*; among the retroflex plosives this sound is the least common.

§ 14. The difference between the dental and the retroflex sounds is of great semantic importance, as is the difference between aspirated and unaspirated plosives. Thus [sa:ta] seven सात (sāta), [sa:tə] (sāṭa) *a kind of sweet-meat*; [pa:du] पादु (pādu) *fart*, [pādu] पाड (pāḍu) *bad*; [kā:ti] काति (kāṁti) *grate!* (imperative of *to grate*), [kā:ṭi] काटि (kāṁṭi) *a basket*; [ka:də] काड (kāḍa) *forest*, [kha:də] खाड (khāḍa) *beard*; [pa:li] पाळि (pāḷi, Sk. pāli, Pa. pāli) *turn, chance*, [pha:li] फाळि (phāḷi) *a piece of rag*.

§ 15. [k, g]. Articulation as in English, and Bengali; as in the case of the latter the articulation is more forward, but is not forward enough to produce the palatal plosives [c ɟ] which are non-existent in K.: sK. [kəsɬə] कस्ले (kaslṭə), gsK. [kəs:əlɬə] कसले (kassalṭə), xK. nK. (?) [kahalɬə] कहले (kahalṭə) *what?* sK. gsK. [tə:k:a] ताका (tākkā), xK. [ta:ka:] ताका (tāka) *to him*, dative of [to] तो (to); sK. gsK. xK. [ki:ru] कौर (kīru) *parrot*; [kæ:ɬə] केळ (keḷṭə) *banana*; [kəṇə] कोण (koṇa) *who?*

[g] [ga:ɖi] गाडि (gāḍi) *carriage*; [gi:nə] गौण (gīṇa) *a meringue made of the milk of a milch cow*; sK. gsK. xK. [gæ:nə] गेण (geṇa) *a span*; sK. gsK. [ma:gə] माग (māga), xK. [ma:g] माग (māg), imperative of *to beg*.

The corresponding aspirates are very common sounds in K., the number of words in each exceeding seventy. Medially they are not uncommon. sK. [khak:ə] खाको (khākkṭə) *arm-pit*; [kha:nə] खाण (khāṇa) *food*; medial de-aspiration in sK. [rakta] राक्ता (rāktā), cK. xK. nK. [rakhta] राखता (rākhtā) *protects*; [ghəḍə] घोडे (ghṭṭə) *horse*; [ghərə] घर (ghara) *house*; as a postposition this last word takes the form [gər, geri], (gar, geri) besides the aspirated form; de-aspiration is more common medially and finally, and may be said to be the rule.

§ 16. The four dental affricates of Marāṭhi given by Lloyd James and Kanhare correspond closely to the three shown in the

table above. As in Marāṭhi the same symbol च or ज is used to denote the dental and the alveolar affricates. The dental affricates are sounds in which the dental plosive elements [t d] produced at a higher position of the teeth ridge, are blended with the [s z] glides. It would be more accurate to call these K. affricates "dento-alveolar" affricates, produced slightly above the position for true dental affricates.

§ 16 (a). In the case of the alveolar affricates I notice the identity of Bengali sounds with those of K., and I believe Prof. Chatterji's "palato-alveolar" affricates explain the state of affairs better.

§ 16 (b). The affricate nature of these sounds is a recent discovery; as in other Indo-Aryan languages they are generally felt by the speakers to be simple plosives at first sight; but with a little observation the continuation of the glide [s] or [z] or [ʃ] or [ʒ] may be easily felt.

§ 16 (c). The general rule for K. seems to be that the dento-alveolar affricates are used before back vowels and the palato-alveolar affricates before the front vowels: sK. gsK. [d̪əpu] जप (jap^v) *meditation*, sK. gsK. [d̪a:gi] जागि (jāgi) *awake*, sK. gsK. [d̪uga:ru] जुगार (jugāru) *gambling*, sK. gsK. [d̪u:nə] जून (jūna) *ripe*, sK. gsK. [d̪o:ru] जोर (joru) *fast, vigorously*; sK. gsK. xK. [ʃ̪irta] जिरता (jirtā) *digests, is digested*; [ʃ̪i:b(h)ə] जीब (jīb(h)a) *tongue*; [ʃ̪ævəṇa] जिवण (jōvaṇa) *dinner, lunch*.

§ 16 (d). An apparent exception to the above rule is the pronunciation of च, ज before back vowels in both ways: e.g., sK. [d̪əṇə] जण (jāṇ^v) in composition meaning *persons*, sK. [ʃ̪əṇə] जन (jana) *people*; the probable exception, sK. [ʃ̪et̪i] जटि (jaṭṭi) *a wrestler*; the explanation in the first case appears to be in the doublet [ʃ̪əṇə] जेन (jena). The number of exceptions of the second type where the palato-alveolar pronunciation obtains before back vowels is happily small in K.; it seems in these cases that the palatal semi-vowel has developed: sK. [c̪a:ri, c̪ja:ri] चारि (cāri, cyāri) *four*, as opposed to [t̪sa:rə] चार (cāra) *fodder for the cow*. In this sketch I have not taken into account learned borrowings, especially philosophical terms, where the palato-alveolar sounds have developed in accordance with the modern Sanskrit pronunciation.

Medially : sK. gsK. [ətsu] ^{vv} ञसु (accu) *stencil* ; [radzu] ^{vv} राजु (rājju) *rope*. Aspirated [tsh] does not occur initially or otherwise. [d̥zh] occurs very rarely in intervocal position ; where it does occur the explanation is to be found in the speech habits of the individual ; I have noticed only one word xK. [kad̥zhu]o कडुळो (kājhu)o but my informant had too many aspirates in his speech. sK. gsK. [ud̥z:o] उज्जो ^{vv} (ujjo), cK. [uʃʃ:o] उज्जो (ujjo) *fire* ; sK. [pəc̥d̥i̯hu] पच्छु (pacchu) *sapphire* ; from this last example it will be clear that the affricate ʃ (ch) tends to give length to the preceding syllable.

§ 17. [m] is a fully voiced nasal. So far as initial position is concerned it vies with [p] for the second place in frequency, the first being [k]. sK. gsK. xK. [məd̥ʃ] मडे' (maḍḥ) *a corpse* ; sK. gsK. [maʃi] माळि (māli) *a staircase* ; [mi:ri] मीरि (mīri) *pepper* ; sK. gsK. xK. [məṇə] मे (meṇa) *wax* ; sK. gsK. (kāma), xK. (kām) काम [ka:m(ə)] *work*. In the intervocal position m tends to pass into a nasalised (ṽ) : thus [nā:v, na:ṽ] (nāv, nāṽ). Sk. [na:mən] ; sK. [ma:vũ] (māvũ) *father-in-law*, as opposed to [ma:mu] (māmu) मासु *uncle*.

§ 18. m̥. This is a fully sounded labio-dental nasal, shared by Marāṭhī also, appearing before [r], [v], or [vh], [ʃ], [s], [h]. In the pronunciation of K. (gāv=Sk. grāma, nāv=Sk. nāman, etc.) this labio-dental makes its appearance as in the case where it is followed by an original [r, v], etc. The same examples given for Marāṭhī suffice for Koŋkanī.

§ 19. According to Sanskrit Grammarians [n] is a purely dental nasal, and this classification has found favour with modern phoneticians also. In pronouncing it the tip of the tongue touches the back of the teeth at a higher point than in pronouncing the dental plosives, but before [t d th dh] it is somewhat more forward. As in Bengali (see *Beng. Phon.*, § 18) it is an alveolar sound in Koŋkanī. sK. gsK. [na:mə] नाम (nāma) *a mark on the forehead* ; [ni:də] नौद (nīda) *sleep* ; xK. cK. nK. [na:khə] नाख (nākha), sK. gsK. [nā:kə] नाक (nāṃka) *nose* ; sK. gsK. [tanə] तान (tāna) *thirst* ; sK. [sa:ni, sa:nu] सानि, सानु (sāni, sānu) *small, short*.

§ 20. [ŋ] has a more elevated tongue position than the retroflex plosives, but less elevated than [ɭ]. Initially it occurs only in the K. word for *ninety*: sK. gsK. [ɳeɪ:f:] नव्वी (ṇavvī), xK. oK. [ɳoj] णीय (ṇey); intervocalic: [mɛ:ɳi] मणि (maṇi) *bead*; sK. [kɛ:ɳi] कणि (kaṇi) *a thick soup made of cereals for children*; [kɛ:ɳu] कण (kaṇu) *a particle*; occurs frequently before the plosive as in sK. gsK. xK. [kaṇṭɔ] काण्टो, कांटो (kāṇṭo, written also kāmṭo); [thəṇḍi] थंडि (thaṇḍi, thaṇḍi) *cold*. Finally: xK. nK. [ta:ɳ], sK. [ta:n:u], gsK. [ta:ɳdunu] *having pulled, taut*; etc.

§ 21. [ŋ]. This is a velar nasal which has no independent existence; its articulation takes place further back than the velar position of the corresponding plosives. Its pronunciation is as in English *king*, *pink*. It can occur either at the end or in the middle of the word; sK. gsK. [sa:ɳə] सांग (sāṅga), xK. [sa:ɳ] (sāṅg), *say*, imperative of (sāṅgčə, *to say*).

§ 22. [v] This sound has no correspondence in English; the Marāṭhī sound resembles English [v] under certain circumstances, but such is not the case with K. There is not the slightest breath accompanying its pronunciation. sK. [vɔ:tə] वत (vata), gsK. xK. nK. [vɔ:tə] वीत (vota) *glare, sunshine*; [ka:vɪ] कावु (kāvu) *heat*.

§ 23. The aspirated lateral is not an original sound in K.; it is a secondary development, due probably to analogical formations, arising out of the glottal fricative; examples: sK., etc. [vɪhɔ:tə] व्हर्ता (vhartā), cf. Root (hṛ) as in (harati) of Sk. In some instances the influence of Marāṭhī pronunciation is felt, but, on the whole, it is negligible. Only in one word sK. [vɪhɔ:ɖi:kə] व्हडोळ (vhardika) and its cognates in gsK. xK. there is a possibility of an original sound developing from Sk. (vadhūvara-, : *vahūvara-, *vahū-ara, *vhaūara, *vhora); but even here we have doublets [hɔ:re] होर (hora), [hɔ:ɖi:kə] होडोळ (hordika).

§ 24. [ɭ] has also been classified by Sanskrit Grammarians as dental; like [n] it is pronounced higher up than dental plosives. There is only the clear variety, as in English *love*, in use; the dark variety, as in English *purple*, is not commonly heard. It is fully voiced: sK. [ləsuɳə] लसुण (lasuṇa) *garlic*; [lə:pu] लेपु (lepu) *painting or application of medicine*; [va:li] वलि (vāli) *creeper*; sK. [tɕəl:i] चली (calli), gsK. [tɕəl:i] daughter, girl; sK. gsK. [ka:li] कालि

(kāli), xK. nK. [ka:l] काल (kā) *yesterday*. The alternation between [l] and [n] is not uniformly distributed; it is more likely a characteristic of the speech of women, children, and of the lower classes, as noticed in other Indo-Aryan languages; sK. [nimbuvo] निंबुवो (nimbuvo), gsK. [limbiɔ] लिंबियो (limbiyo) *lemon*; sK. [lonɕi] लोणचे (lonɕ), gsK. [nonɕi] नोणचे (nonɕ) *pickles*.

§ 25. The articulation of the lateral retroflex [ɭ] has already been described in § 20. It occurs only in the intervocalic position, and as a result of this in the final position in xK. and nK. In K. as in Marāṭhī it represents the intervocalic single [ɭ] ¹ of Sanskrit and Prakrit, except in *tatsamas* and *semi-tatsamas*. Medially it occurs before dental [t]: sK. [kəɭta] कळता (kalṭā) *is known*; this is a result of the loss of the neutral vowel between the two sounds. Finally: sK. [ba:l] बाळ vocative for (bāḷu), having a doublet [baɭa:] बाळा (bāḷā). [ɭ] occurs through assimilation of [l]: sK. [pəɭ:ɔ] पळळो (paḷlo), xK. nK. [pəɭlo] पडलो (paḍlo).

§ 26. [r] has only two values in K.; initially it is an alveolar rolled [r] as in Bengali, with two or three taps of the tongue against the teeth-ridge (*Beng. Phon.*, § 21); medially and finally it is just an alveolar flap; the rolling in these positions is characteristic of only affected speech. sK. gsK. [ra:ti] राति (rāti), xK. nK. [ra:tə] रात (rāt(a)) *night*; sK. gsK. [bə:ri] बरि (bari) *side*: sK. gsK. [sə:rə] सर (sara), xK. nK. [sə:r] सर (sar) *move away*. sK. gsK. [ma:ri] मारि (māri), xK. nK. [ma:r] मार (mār) *strike*.

§ 27. [s], like [l, n], is considered dental, but it has a higher articulation. In fact it is an alveolar. In K. as in its sister-dialect it appears only before back vowels; this is a test for determining in certain cases whether a given word is inherited or borrowed. In morphology it alternates with the palatal alveolar, since it is palatalised before front vowels. sK. [səmə] सम (sama) *straight, satisfactory*; [su:tə] सूत (sūta) *string*; [so:ji] सोयि (soyi) *desiccated cocoanut*; [pa:su] पासु (pāsu) *a loop*; [bə:s] बस (bass) *enough*. It occurs also before [t] and [th].

¹ This change of Skt. -l- to modern Indo-Aryan -ɭ- is common to Gujarati, Rajasthani, Singhalese, Oriya, Panjabi and all those dialects where -n- of Skt. is changed to -ŋ-.

§ 28. The palato-alveolar [ʃ] is without lip-rounding. Its position is more forward than that of the corresponding fricatives. It replaces the Sanskrit retroflex (ṣ), but in learned circles the true retroflex is employed wherever it occurs in Sanskrit. In K. it represents both original [ʃ], and the palatalised alveolars before front vowels and the palato-alveolar affricates: sK. nK. [ʃambə:ri] शंबरि (śambari) *hundred*, Sk. (śatam): [ʃikta] शिक्ता (śiktā) *learns*, Sk. (śikṣ-); sK. [kaʃso] : [kaʃi] काळसी, काळशि (kāṣo, kāṣi) *blackish*; [pi:ʃo] पिशो (pissō) : [piʃ:i] पिशि (piśsi) *foolish, mad*.

§ 29. The retroflex fricative is used only in borrowed words or in a fricative group the second element of which is a retroflex, unvoiced plosive; in this case the orthography uses (ṣ) or (ṣ̣) indiscriminately. Acoustically it is not perceptibly different in actual speech from the palato-alveolar.

§ 30. The glottal fricative is voiced in K. The proper symbol for this voiced [h] is [ɦ]; but [h] is also used. It occurs everywhere except in the final position after a vowel. Initially it alternates in certain historical cases with the aspirated labio-dental lateral (see § 23 above). Examples: sK. [ha:ɖi] हाडि (hāḍi) *bring*; xK. [kaɦalæ] कहले (kahalē) *what?* In this last example the medial [h] or [ɦ] corresponds to the alveolar [s] of sK. and gsK. In sK. and gsK. intervocalic [h] disappears after aspirating the preceding consonant: sK. [bha:jre] भयर (bhāyra) *outside*, cf. Marāṭhī [baɦier] बाहेर (bāher). It is retained, however, when the preceding consonant is a fricative: sK. [səɦāvo] सहानो (sahāvo) *sixth*, [səɦadze] सहज (sahaja) *naturally*.


In sentence-sandhi there is a voiceless [h], and this is generally the case when the preceding consonant is a voiceless plosive. This voiceless [h] is dropped in many cases: sK. (dāvo hātu) becomes (dāv-hātu) and then [da:v- a:tu] (dāv-ātu) *left hand*, etc. The de-aspiration of the aspirated plosives at the end of a word is probably due to this devoicing of the [ɦ].

§ 31. [z] sounded with a medium voice, occurs only in foreign words, especially from Persian and Portuguese. It alternates in these cases with the dento-alveolar [d̪z]: K. [mæze] मेज (meza), *table*, cf. Port. (mesa), Persian (mêz); a doublet of this is K. [med̪zi] मेजि (meji) *table*. Modern borrowings from Persian and European languages contain this [z], but in the speech of the uneducated people the affricate is more common.

§ 32. There is only the palatal semivowel [j] used in K. as in Marāṭhī; (w) or consonantal [u] is rare, being replaced by [v]. Its presence is felt especially in those instances where the dento-alveolar affricates and fricatives are palatalised before front vowels: sK., etc. [ɕjja:r(i)] चरि (cāri, pronounced cyāri) *four*.

THE VOWELS

§ 33. The vowel sounds of Koṅkaṇī are shown below in the diagram in relation to the *Cardinal Vowels* recorded by Prof. Daniel Jones on H. M. V. Record B. 804. The Cardinal Vowels are indicated by square brackets and the approximate position of K. vowels shown by crosses. In addition to these simple sounds there are two diphthongs [əu] and [əi]. All vowels and diphthongs may be nasalised; it is to be observed that nasalisation has the effect of raising appreciably the tongue position in the case of front vowels.



§ 34. The length of vowel sounds is very important in K. and it should be clearly borne in mind that the tongue position is slightly more elevated in the case of the long vowels than in the short and that it is not merely a question of quantity. With this must be

connected the idea of consonantal length in order to appreciate fully the differences in the pronunciation of groups like sK. [ka:ḍi] काडि (kāḍi) *remove, take away*, and [kaḍ:i] काडि (kāḍḍi) *a stick*. To the uninitiated, and particularly to Dravidian speakers who do not use the neutral vowel [ə], the first (ā) will appear to be the lengthened variety of the second (ā), whereas, in reality, the total phonetic length in the second case is slightly in excess of the first.

§ 35. [i:, i]. Pronunciation same in all the K. dialects: [ki:ḍo] कौडो (kīḍo) *a worm*; [pi:t(ə)] पीट (pīṭa) *kneaded flour*, [piṭ:i] पिटि (piṭṭi) *powder*; [bī:] बी (bī) *seed*; etc.

§ 36. [e:, ē:, e, ē]; these sounds alternate with the following: [æ:, æ:, æ, æ]; this change seems to depend upon the quality of the following vowel. Examples: sK. [kṣ̃:ḍi] कॅडि (kṣ̃ḍi) *a banana*, [ke:li] केळि (keḷi) *banana plant*, [kṣ̃:li:] कॅळी (kṣ̃ḷi) *bananas*; [bhæ:ṭə] भेट (bheṭa), [bhe:ṭi] भेटि (bheṭi) *interview, meeting*; [bhæt:a:] भेत्ता (bhettā) *breaks*, [bhe:ti] भेति (bheti) *broken condition*; [pælo] पेलो (pelo) *a glass*, [ke:su] केशु (kesu) *hair*; [te:ru] तेरु (teru) *sacred car used in car festivals*. It will be seen from these examples that the series [e:, ē:, e, ē] is replaced by the series [æ:, æ:, æ, æ,] when the following vowel is not (i, ī, ı, ı̄) (u, ū, ũ, ũ̄); in the Devanāgarī alphabet there is no separate sign for the two series; this remark holds good for the corresponding back vowels (see § 38 below).

§ 37. [a:, ā:, a, ā]; sK. [ba:ra] बारा (bārā) *twelve*; [ka:ro] कारो (kāro) *a cowrie*; [gā:vu] गांवु (gāvu) *town*; [kaṇṭə] कांटो (kāṇṭo) *thorn*. It must be remembered here that the neutral vowel is not the short corresponding to this long vowel; in those dialects where the neutral does not exist a broad pronunciation has resulted (see § 40 below).

§ 38. [o:, ō:, o, ō] alternates with the series [o:, ɔ:, ɔ, ɔ], under the same conditions as for the e-series, although there is only one orthographic sign in the script. Examples: [pəlo] पोळो (poḷo) *a pan-cake*, [po:li] पोळि (poḷi) *special delicacies, particularly sweets*; [bhoḷə] भोळो (bhoḷo) m., [bho:li] भोळि (bhoḷi) f., *simple, unsophisticated*; [koḷso] कोळसो (koḷso) *coal*, [ko:(i)u] कौळ (koḷu) *juice, solution*; [so:ḍi] सोडि (soḷi) *let go*, [soḍṭi] सोडति (soḍṭi) *lucky-dip*; [dzoḷo] जोळी (joḷo) *let it burn*.

§ 39. [u:, ū:, u, ū]. Examples: sK., etc. [khu:ṇə] खूण (khūṇa) *trick, secret*; [du:ki] दुकि (dūki) *pain*; [duba:ri] दुबारि (dubāri) *double*; xK. nK. [dukə|ə] दुकळ (duka|a) *famine*; [çerqũ(:)] चेरड् (cerḍũ) *child*; [rũv:ə] रूव (rumva) *a sore, boil, etc.*; [kũv:a:|æ] कुंवाळ (kũvā|ṭ, kũvvā|ṭ) *pumpkin, gourd*; sK. [mu:gu] मूग (mūgu), gsK., etc. [mũ:gu] मूग (mūngu), Sk. (mudga-) *a kind of pulses*.

§ 40. [ə]. This neutral vowel is the most intriguing in the pronunciation of Koŋkaŋi; this, the so-called short अ (ă), is really not the short corresponding to the long आ (ā), but is of a different timbre altogether. In certain dialects of the Christian speakers it has assumed the back position of ओ (ô).

Examples: SK. [mə:ṇu] मण (maṇu) *a maund*; cK. [mə|ə:pə] मळप (ma|apa) *sky*; sK. [məstə] मस्त (masta) *many*; [bəda:mə] बदाम (adāma) *almond*; [hə|ə:di] हळदि (ha|adi) *turmeric*; [khə:ji] खंयि (hăyi) *where?* [ã:] अ (ām) *pardon?*

xK. [mo:ṇu] *a maund*; sK. [khə:|u] खळ (kha|u) *solution*, with its doublet [ko:|u]. I see here the influence of the broad pronunciation of this indeterminate vowel.

Although Koŋkaŋi has no settled orthography, a word of explanation is necessary with regard to the pronunciation of this vowel when we use Devanāgarī characters. When a word consists orthographically of two syllables each containing the vowel [ə], either the first or the second is pronounced long according to the stress on that syllable, e.g., [ˈd̪zə:ḍə] *heavy*, [d̪zəˈḍə:] *very heavy*. When three syllables containing this vowel follow each other in the same word, the middle vowel is invariably long; the first may be either short or long. In general, when a word consists orthographically of more than two syllables, and two adjacent syllables contain this vowel, the second vowel is not pronounced at all: sK. [pharkə:ṭə:] फरकटो (pharkaṭo, written as pharakaṭo) *useless, dirty, etc.*; [kəṭṭi] करटि (karṭi, written karaṭi) *a boil or abscess*. In polysyllabic words ending in two syllables containing this [ə], both may be long; there is no restriction on long syllables following each other in the same word, and each is pronounced distinctly.

§ 41. Normally, only two diphthongs have survived in learned speech, [əi] and [əu]. These occur only in words borrowed from

Sanskrit and the Dravidian languages. But the actual number of diphthongs is much larger, and all of them are of the falling variety, the stress being on the first element. In the written form one element is generally the palatal semivowel or the labio-dental lateral [v] (probably developed from the bilabial semivowel which I have not been able to trace in the surviving speech habits of the central Koṅkaṇī people), but they are actually in ordinary speech nothing but diphthongs.

[ie] :—[korie:də] कोरियेद (koriyeda) *may be done*, written either as [korje:də], or as [korijedə].

[ia] :—[korijā:] कोरियां (koriyā) *let us do*, or [koriā:].

[eu] :—[ke(:)u] केव (kevu) *slag for money*; [de:u] देव (devu) *God*.

[æo] :—[ʃiæo] जेवो (jevo) *let him (her, etc.) eat or dine*.

[ai] :—[kaɪli] कायलि (kāyli) *frying pan*; [baɪlə] बायल (bāyla) *wife, lady*.

[au] :—[kau] कावू (kāvu) *heat*; [bauṭo] बावटो (bāvṭo) *flagpost*.

[aɔ] :—[khaɔ] खावो (khāvo) *let him eat*.

[oi] :—[boi] बोटि (boyi) *a clove of garlic, or a division of an orange*; [koiti] कोयति (koyti) *a bent knife used for cutting cocoanut*.

[ui] :—[dzui] जूयि (jūyi) *jasmine*; [mui] मूयि (mūyi) *ant*.

[uo] :—[dhuoru] धुवोर (dhuvoru) *smoke*.

These are all the more important diphthongs. There are no triphthongal or tetraphthongal groups in Koṅkaṇī.

SOUND ATTRIBUTES

§ 42. LENGTH. We have already noticed that both vowels and consonants have length. In the case of vowels the quantity of the short or long vocal element is a matter of rhythm. They have generally three shades of length; the difference between the long and short vowel is in the tongue position which is more elevated in the one case than in the other; both have a short and long duration; but the lengthened variety has two recognisable durations, depending upon whether the syllable containing it is closed or open (the syllable is said to be closed when the following is a double consonant or a consonant group). All Koṅkaṇī vowels have the three quantities.

§ 43. Monosyllabic words always have the vowel long: e.g., [tə:] *he*; [ti:] *she*; vocatives have a long final vowel: e.g., [aɡo:] *आगो* (āgo) addressing the woman as opposed to [na:ɡo] *नागो* (nāgo) *not so, indeed* (when talking familiarly with women). High pitch of the voice is always accompanied by long quantity.

§ 44. STRESS. Stress is denoted by [ˈ] before the syllable which bears it. Word stress is generally initial, but may be varied according to the needs of the speaker in order to emphasize a particular shade of meaning; an example of this has been already given in § 40. Since there is no well-defined word order in Konkani, word-stress is subordinate to sentence-stress, and this will depend upon the sense in which they are used. In words borrowed from Sanskrit, stress is generally on the heaviest syllable; and as a result of this tendency proper names are stressed similarly.

Sentence-rhythm is very characteristic of the language, but is extremely varied. Unlike in Bengali all words, including pronominals, conjunctions and other particles are stressed.

For the purpose of stress K. words have to be divided into several syllabic groups, since a secondary stress is developed in polysyllabic groups; generally two syllables form one group, except when the next contains the neutral vowel, in which case it may also be included in this group. This secondary stress will be denoted by *grave* accent [ˋ] before the syllable so stressed. Examples: [ˈmɛdhuˈkəru] *मधुकर* (Madhukaru, a proper name; but in a sentence group this may be omitted: e.g., [ˈmɛdhuk ɛranɛ] *मधुकराने* (Madhukarāne) *by Madhukar*; [ˈtɪmɪŋgˋ i(:)l] (timingila) a whale; [ˈkʊsɛrˋ mɑ:ɳdɔlu] *Russell's viper*; but as in the first case cited above, in a sense-group this secondary stress is likely to be slurred over, unless the real stress is transferred to that syllable.

§ 45. INTONATION. As an element of speech intonation or pitch of voice is not very significant in Konkani. It shares with Bengali and other Indo-Aryan languages the two words [ū] and [ã] where intonation has significant value (see *Beng. Phon.*, § 62) sentence intonation, however, is more important, and plays a considerable part in the semantic significance of the word-group. But this subject needs to be studied separately for each dialect and

possibly in each region. Even so far as sK. itself is concerned sentence intonation differs in the two Kanaras.

§ 46. There is one point which requires careful study in the two Central Brahmin dialects, with regard to pronunciation of individual words in a sentence-group. It was already remarked that the Christian and Northern dialects generally drop the final vowel of an individual word, even in grammatical construction (see §1 above). In sK. and gsK. words by themselves, whether inflected or not, end in vowels, but these vowels tend to disappear in a sentence-group. Thus [kəṇṇṇṇ] (koṇṇ) means *by whom?* but [kəṇ kəl:ṇ] (for koṇṇ kəlṇ) *who has done it?* literally, *by whom is it done?* Such examples may be multiplied without number.

It is generally contended that the final vowel in Koṇkaṇi is a result of Dravidian influence, and that its disappearance in a sentence-group represents its original nature, but this is not so. Koṇkaṇi has preserved the Middle Prakrit final vowel, and the disappearance is due to the rapidity of normal speech. In such cases where a man is bound to speak slowly all the final vowels are preserved, and even in rapid speech they are found at the end of sense-groups.

§ 47. In conclusion a few connected passages in two of the Central Koṇkaṇi dialects will be given in phonetic transcription with a literal translation. Sentences are divided into portions by vertical lines | and ||, indicating sense-groups, the double lines expressing a slight pause (see *Beng. Phon.*, § 57).

§ 48. The following passage is taken from the First Book of Koṇkaṇi published by the Codialbail Press, Mangalore; it represents the dialect spoken by the Christian community in Kanara.

'ḥedzu

'tumi | 'ḥedzūk volketa:tgi: ? || 'ta:tsō 'mog | karta:tgi: ? ||
 ḥedzūtso:'mog | karidzaj 'dza:lja:r | 'pojḷḷ | 'ta:ka: 'volkadza:j' ||
 'ḥedzu | 'dev dza:vna:sa: ; || 'sarga: a:ni 'sōvsa:ra:tsō | ratsna:r; ||
 'a:ni | 'sarv 'vastūtso | dhani. || 'a:mēja 'mēga: 'pa:sun | to | 'sarga:
 'tha:vn | 'sōvsa:ra:nt a:jlo; || 'nidz dev'a:stā: | 'a:mēje | 'karits
 kuḍ | a:ni | 'atmo ghevn, || 'nidz monis | dza:lo || 'tet:is | 'vorsā ..
 'parja:nt, || 'j:a: 'sōvsa:ra:nt | ḥijelo; || a:ni | 'kaḍek | 'sabq:r'

dagd | 'sosun, || 'a:plā | 'pavitr 'raga:t | vikra:vn', || 'saba:r' | 'vo|vo|-
ja:ni, || jeka: 'khursa:r | melo. ||

JESUS

Do you know Jesus ? Do you love him ? In order to love Jesus it is necessary to know him first. Jesus is God ; (he is) Creator of Heaven and Earth, and Ruler of everything. On account of his love for us he came down to the earth from heaven ; while being really God, taking a piece of our rib and the breath of life he became a real man. For thirty-three years he lived in this world ; and in the end, having suffered many difficulties, and shedding holy blood, and having undergone physical torture, he died on the Cross.

§ 49. I will conclude this short sketch with a specimen of sK. It is the first paragraph of a Koṅkaṇī article by a veteran scholar, appearing in the Saraswat Quarterly (Organ of the Kanara Saraswat Association, Gamdevi, Bombay), Vol. I, No. 2, p. 27.

'koṅṇi 'bha:f:a

'sa:rəs'vetə 'trēima:sikə | 'ka:ḍtso 'vitsa:ru | 'lokā:k 'kəltə:ḍi, ||
'tā | 'kəslja: 'bhaḥṣṭu 'bərəuka: || 'hja: 'viḥja:ḍ'eri | 'loka:ntu ||
bhin:ə 'vica:rə | 'a:jilā || 'thəḍeḥḡəṇə || 'koṅṇi 'bhaḥṣṭu | 'tā |
bərəuka: | 'mhəṇa:lə. || 'mhəisu:r 'prantā:tulja:ni | 'tā | 'kanəḍi:ntu
bərəuka: || 'əfi | 'sutṣailā. || 'məstə 'lokā:gəḷā | 'mhəṇ:ā | 'tā |
iṅrəḥḡi:ntu 'bərəuka: || 'əfi | disu:n'ū 'a:jilā. || 'tjan 'mit:I | 'nā |
trēima:sikə || 'iṅrəḥḡi:ntu | 'bərəuḍḡā | 'tharilā. ||

THE KONKANĪ LANGUAGE

After the idea of publishing the Saraswat Quarterly became generally known, different suggestions came to the people with respect to the language in which it was to be written. Some said it should be written in Koṅkaṇī. Residents of Mysore suggested that it should be written in Kanarese. Most people were of opinion that it should be written in English. Therefore, it was decided to publish this Quarterly in English.

TRUE DATES OF THE BUDDHA AND OTHER CONNECTED EPOCHS

By

DHIRENDRANATH MUKHOPADHYAYA.

Diwan Bahadur L. D. Swamikannu Pillai (*Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XLII, pp. 197-204) working from the week-days recorded for events of the Buddha's life as given in Bigandet's 'Life of Gaudama,' finds that they suit Tuesday April 1, 478 B.C., which consequently he regards as the true date of the Buddha's death. But we should remember here that only one week-day out of the four given in Bigandet can be verified with this epoch. As such this epoch cannot be accepted as the true date of Buddha's death, provided astronomical data recorded have got any worth. With Swamikannu's date of 478 B.C. for Buddha's death we come to 558 B.C. for the year of Buddha's birth. In this year *Vaisākhi purnimā* occurred on Sunday the 15th April, as against Friday of the tradition. Hence Swamikannu went over to the next year 557 B.C., thus making the span of Buddha's life one of 79 years as against the unanimous verdict of 80 years of all Buddhist chronicles. Similarly on Swamikannu's epoch Buddha entered into solitude on Sunday the 22nd June (*Āshāḍhī purnimā*) 529 B.C. as against Monday. Though Swamikannu makes the Buddha enter into solitude on the next day (Monday) there was no *purnimā* then. On Swamikannu's own calculations, *purnimā* ended the previous night at about 8 P.M., even long before midnight when Gautama left Kapilavastu. He attained Buddhahood or Nirvāṇa on Friday the 18th April (*Vaisākhi purnimā*) 523 B.C. as against Wednesday. Hence Swamikannu went over to the next year, 522 B.C., Wednesday the

8th April (*Vaisākhī purnimā*). But even on his calculation *purnimā* ended this day at about 2-40 P.M. But from the tradition preserved, it is evident that *purnimā* should have continued that day till the next morning : 'In the morning of the *Vaisākhī purnimā* day Sujātā was preparing her gift...in the evening Buddha defeated Māra...A little before daybreak...on the day of the full moon...the perfect science broke at once over him. He became the Buddha.'

As for the other proposed dates 483, 486 or 487 B.C. we see that none of these dates do satisfy the week-days recorded for events of the Buddha's life. Swamikannu Pillai has also shown that none of the proposed dates 544, 543 or 483 B.C. satisfy the week-days recorded. The epochs 483, 486 or 487 B.C. might otherwise have originated with the accession of Vijaya Simha to the throne of Ceylon. Vijaya landed in Ceylon the very year in which the Buddha died. But it is unthinkable that that was the very year of his accession to the throne of Ceylon, which must have taken place some years later, as is also evident from the chronicles.

In May 1932, Nirvāṇa year 2476 of Buddha expired according to the modern Ceylonese reckoning. This gives 2476 — 1931 = 545 B.C. for the date of Buddha's Nirvāṇa. Up to April 1932 this year was 2475. Careless conversion easily makes this year (2476 — 1932) or (2475 — 1932), *i.e.*, 544 or 543 B.C. Calculation from the current year, of course, gives 544 B.C. But the ancient Ceylonese date of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa as given in the *Oriental Magazine* of Ceylon and quoted by James Prinsep in his *Indian Antiquities* (1858, Vol. II, p. 165) is 546 B.C. 546 B.C. is also the date of the Nirvāṇa of the last Buddha according to the Northern Buddhists (*vide* Weber, *Hist. of Indian Literature*, p. 287). With this date of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa or attainment of Buddhahood all other dates are found to be exactly true to the Buddhist tradition. Thus we find that the Buddha was born on Friday, the 30th March (*Vaisākhī purnimā*) 581 B.C. (*purnimā* began at 10^h 30^m P.M., Ujjaini Civil Time,

and ended the next day at 8^h 45^m P.M.) He left Kapilavastu in the midnight of June 17 (*Āshāḍhī purnimā*) 553 B.C. (*purnimā* began at 8^h 10^m P.M., Ujjaini Civil Time, and ended the next day at 6^h 30^m P.M.) and he entered into solitude the next morning on Monday, the 18th June (*Āshāḍhī purnimā*), 553 B.C. in his 29th year. He attained Buddhahood or Nirvāṇa on Wednesday, the 3rd April (*Vaisākhī purnimā*), 546 B.C. (*purnimā* ended at 11^h 45^m A.M., Ujjaini Civil Time, in the morning of April 4) when he completed his 35th year and his Parinirvāṇa or death occurred on Tuesday, the 15th April (*Vaisākhī purnimā*), 501 B.C. (*purnimā* began the previous night at 4^h 30^m A.M., Ujjaini Civil Time), when he completed his 80th year, exactly tallying with all astronomical data available. The distinction between the Buddha's Nirvāṇa or attainment of Buddhahood, and his Parinirvāṇa, or death, was very ingeniously pointed out by Mr. Curter for the first time (*vide* Cunningham's *Indian Eras*, p. 36). But owing to insufficient data at his disposal he could not arrive at the correct date for the Buddha's death. Dr. Bhandarkar also in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. X, p. 268, accepts the distinction between the Nirvāṇa and the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha.

Now with the above dates in the Buddha's life we come to the exact determination of the date of Chandragupta Maurya and that of his grandson Asoka.

From Puranic and other records we know that Ajātasatru reigned for 25 years. His son Harshaka or Darsaka reigned for 24 years. In some manuscripts of the *Vāyu Purāṇa* the name Harshaka is to be found (*vide* Dr. Wilson, *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, Book IV, Ch. 24). Then Ajātasatru's son-in-law, Udayana, reigned for 33 years. (This will be further discussed later on.) Then followed kings with the names Nandivardhana, Mahānandin, etc. Dr. R. C. Majumdar is inclined to regard these two kings as belonging to the Nanda dynasty. (*Vide Journal of the Behar and Orissa Research Society*, 1923, p. 418.) Dr. Vincent Smith was also of that opinion (*Early History of India*, 4th ed., p. 41).

Now the reign period of all the Nanda kings as given in the *Purāṇas* is one of 100 years. Mr. Pargiter in his '*Dynasties of the Kali Age*,' p. 24, remarks: 'The time assigned to Mahāpadma may mean the entire length of his life, as the *Matsya Purāṇa* seems to imply; and if so, the whole dynasty may have lasted about a hundred years as stated.' But the *Purāṇas* never bring into calculation the pre-regnal years of any king. However, if we regard Nandivardhana and Mahānandin as Nandas and take their regnal periods into consideration then the Nanda period of 100 years is easily explained. Thus for the period between Ajātasatru and the last Nanda, we have

Ajātasatru	...	25 years.
Harshaka or Darsaka	...	24 „
Udayāśwa	...	33 „
The Nandas from Nandivardhana to the last Nanda	...	100 „
Total	...	<u>182 years.</u>

Now knowing that the Buddha died 8 years after Ajātasatru's accession, the period between the Buddha's death and the death of the last Nanda is one of $182 - 8 = 174$ years. Adding to this 24 years for Chandragupta and 25 years for Bindusāra we get $174 + 24 + 25 = 223$ years for the period between the Buddha's death and the accession of Asoka. Now Buddhaghōṣa in his *Samanta Paśādikā*, i.e., the commentary on the *Vinaya*, states this period as one of 224 years. (The reckoning from one manuscript only yields this figure.) We have got the Puranic figure for this differing by only one year. It seems, the difference of one year is due to an inter-regnum of one year between the Nanda and the Maurya dynasty. This figure is usually stated in other Buddhist sources as 214 years. But if we remember that 'there is a constant difference of 10 years throughout the early series of the latter chronicle,' (James Prinsep, *Indian Antiquities*, Vol. II, Useful Tables, p. 165), this discrepancy of ten years can be easily explained away.

That there was really a discrepancy of ten years will be evident from the following: 'Regarding the subsequent rulers there is no agreement in our sources. The sum total of years which elapsed between the death of D. Tishya and the accession of Abhaya Dutthagāmini is given as 96 (or 106).'—Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 119. Again, 'If we wish to weigh against each other the value of the Southern and that of the Northern Sources we must begin by leaving out of the reckoning all unwarranted additions, either by the Sinhalese or by others. By so doing and by waiving points of secondary importance, we perceive that the difference turns about ten years. The Pali Canon fixing the Council at Vaisali at 100 years after Nirvāṇa, whereas most Northern traditions give 110 years' (*ibid*, p. 107).

Now let us come to the Jaina evidence on this point. From Jaina chronicles we get the period between Jina Nirvāṇa and the death of the last Nanda which was synchronous with the death of the Jaina patriarch Sthulabhadra as 219 (in some as 215) years. We know that both the Buddha and Mahāvira were called 'Jina,' they were contemporaneous for some time and there were striking similarities between the two religions which flourished side by side. (*Vide* P. V. Bapat, M.A., 'A Comparative Study of a Few Jaina and Ardha-Māgadhi Texts with the Texts of the Buddhist Pali Canon,' in the *Sir Asutosh Memorial Volume*.) With Jina Mahāvira his death was Nirvāṇa, with Jina Buddha his attainment of Buddhahood was Nirvāṇa and his death was Parinirvāṇa. Hence the Nirvāṇa and Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha as well as the Nirvāṇas of the Buddha and Mahāvira were confounded at times causing troubles. Now this period of 219 years from Jina Nirvāṇa to the death of the last Nanda will clearly be seen to be the period between Jina Buddha's Nirvāṇa (attainment of Buddhahood which happened 45 years before his death) and the death of the last Nanda. We have already got the Purāṇic figure for the period, between the Buddha's death and the death of the last Nanda, as one of 174 years. Adding to this 45 years for the period between Buddha's Nirvāṇa and

Parinirvāṇa we get exactly $174 + 45 = 219$ years, the figure from Jaina sources. Hence we see that the Puranic, Jaina and Buddhist evidences are quite in harmony, with slight discrepancies which are easily explained away.

In some Jaina chronicles the period between Jina Nirvāṇa and Vikrama is stated as 470 years. This places Mahāvira's death in $470 + 58 = 528$ B. C., *i.e.*, 18 years after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa or attainment of Buddhahood (546 B.C.). In others it is stated that Vikrama was born 470 years after Jina Nirvāṇa and he became king 16 years later, *i.e.*, 486 years (or 488 years from other reckonings as shown by Dr. Hoernle, I.A., Vol. XX, p. 359) after Jina Nirvāṇa. Now adding 486 or 488 years to the epoch of the Vikrama era (58 B. C.) we get 544 or 546 B. C. which we know to be the date of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa. Dr. Hoernle also remarked, 'In any case the coincidence of the years of the Mahāvira's and Buddha's Nirvāṇa is a curious result' (I.A., Vol. XX, pp. 341-61). Hence it seems, this discrepancy of 16 or 18 years had arisen from a confusion of the Nirvāṇas of the Jinas (Mahāvira and Buddha).

Another plausible explanation of the Ceylonese date 483 B.C. or that of the Cantonese dotted record of 486 B.C. is perhaps to be ascribed to the above. Some Buddhists perhaps mistook the date of Jina Mahāvira's Nirvāṇa (528 B.C.) for that of Jina Buddha's Nirvāṇa and then subtracted 45 years from this and got $528 - 45 = 483$ B.C.

The total period between Jina Nirvāṇa and Vikrama being 488 years, by subtracting 219 years from this we get $488 - 219 = 269$ years for the period between Chandragupta and Vikramaditya. Adding this to 58 B.C. the epoch of the Vikrama era, we get $269 + 58 = 327$ B.C., for the death of the last Nanda. Again, by subtracting 219 years (the Jaina figure) from 546 B.C. we get $546 - 219 = 327$ B.C. or, by subtracting 174 years (the Puranic figure) from 501 B.C., the date of the Buddha's death, we get exactly the same figure $501 - 174 = 327$ B.C. for the death of the last Nanda. After his death there seems to have

been an inter-regnum of about a year after which Chandragupta ascended the throne in 326 B.C. That this is true will be evident from the following : 'While Alexander was stopped in his advance at the Hyphasis in 326 B.C. he was informed by a native chieftain Bhagala or Bhagela whose statements were confirmed by Poros, that the king of the Gangaridae and Prasii nations on the banks of the Ganges was named, as nearly as the Greeks could catch the unfamiliar sounds, Xandrames or Agrammes.....The reigning king was alleged to be extremely unpopular owing to his wickedness and base origin.....' (Vincent Smith, E.H.I., 4th ed., p. 42). 'Bhagala' seems to me to be 'Bhāgurāyana,' the brother of the commander-in-chief of Chandragupta Maurya in the 'Mudrā Rākshasa' and Xandrames is evidently 'Chandramas' (the moon), i.e., Chandragupta the Maurya. The reigning king during Alexander's visit in 326 B.C. was therefore Chandragupta. From the 'Mudrā Rākshasa' also we learn that Chandragupta was of low origin and a scion of the Nanda family. It seems clear that he was born of the last Nanda's queen Murā (probably a Kshatriya daughter of the Moria clan), but by a barber paramour. Hence the extreme unpopularity of the king for his base origin and his wickedness for having exterminated the Nanda dynasty. In fact Chandragupta was an illegitimate scion of the Nanda family and as he was of low origin, his father being a barber, he preferred being called by his mother's name. (In the Jones manuscript of the Vāyu Purāṇa at the India Office Library the Mauryas are called '*Nanda sambhuta*.') Hence his dynasty was named 'Maurya.' Though as a result of the palace revolution Chandragupta became king, the throne was too hot for him and he had to flee away from the capital in company with Chāṇakya. The Buddhist and Jaina stories on Chandragupta and Chāṇakya learning a lesson from the conversation of a mother and her children depict the situation. The story runs thus : 'At evening they (Chandragupta and Chāṇakya) reached a village, and going about in quest of food, they came to the hut

of a poor woman who had just prepared the supper for her children. One of them greedily put his finger right in the middle of the dish and being burnt began to cry. The mother railed at him for being as big a fool as Chāṇakya was. Hearing himself alluded to in such terms, Chāṇakya entered the house and asked the woman the meaning of what she had just said. The woman replied that the child had burnt his fingers because he would eat from the middle of the dish instead of from the outer part which was cool ; in a similar way Chāṇakya had been defeated because he had not secured the surrounding country before attacking the stronghold of the enemy.....’

Chandragupta, in disguise, at this time saw Alexander and tried to induce him to invade Pataliputra. Alexander got offended and Chandragupta had to seek safety by a speedy flight. After Alexander’s retirement Chandragupta seems to have induced Philippos who seems to me to be ‘ Parvata ’ of the *Mudrā-Rākshasa*, to help him. Chandragupta had then Philippos murdered in 324 B. C. and re-ascended the throne of Pataliputra after subduing his enemies. ‘ Malayaketu ’ in the *Mudrā-Rākshasa* seems to refer to General Meleager or to Seleucus who might have remained with Philippos in India for some time. Mr. K. P. Jayaswal also identifies ‘ Malayaketu ’ with Seleucus. (*Vide Ind. Ant.*, XLII, p. 265.) ‘ Vairochaka ’ in the same drama might refer to Poros II and ‘ Bhāgurāyana ’ as already stated to Bhagela.

From all Jaina records we learn that after Jina Nirvāṇa Palaka’s dynasty ruled for 60 years and then the Nandas ruled for 155 years. Hemachandra’s sole figure of 155 years for the time after Jina Nirvāṇa when Chandragupta became king evidently refers to the duration of the Nanda dynasty as given in all Jaina records. Merutunga in his *Vicārasreṇi* quotes the verse of Hemachandra and dismisses it as contradicted by all other sources which place the same event sixty years later in 215 A. V. That 155 years is an impossible figure for the period between Mahāvira’s death and the death of the last Nanda also follows from the

inscription of Khāravēla, the Jaina king of Kaliṅga, where it is stated that 300 years after Nandarāja is equivalent to 164 years after Rājā Maurya (Chandragupta). Thus the duration of the Nanda dynasty is one of $300 - 164 = 136$ years. The reign period of kings from Udayāsua or the first Nanda or Asoka to the last Nanda according to the Purāṇas is 137 years (Udayana as king of the Vatsa country for 4 years, then 33 years as king of Pataliputra, *plus* 100 years for the total duration of kings from Nandivardhana to the last Nanda). Due to an error of 16 years for causes already explained, this period is stated in Jaina works as 155 years. The period between the first and the last Nanda being 136 or 137 years it is impossible that Mahāvira died only 18 years and that the Buddha died only 23 years before the first Nanda as supposed by some.

That Udayana or Udayāsua was the first Asoka or king Nandin of the Buddhist and the first Nanda of the Jainas will be evident from the following: King Ajātasatru ascended the throne 8 years before Buddha's death (501 B. C.) and reigned for 27 years according to the Matsya Purāṇa. Therefore he ruled from 509 to 482 B. C. His son ṢHarshaka or Darsaka, who was childless, ruled for 24 years till 458 B. C., when Harshaka's brother-in-law Udayana ascended the throne of Pataliputra. Dr. Bhandarkar identifies Darsaka with Nāga (probably Saisunāga) Dasaka who is represented in the Ceylonese Chronicles as the last king of Bimbisāra's line. The Ceylonese tradition is confirmed by the following passage in Hiuen Tsang's Si-Yu-Ki. "..... To the south-west of the old Sanghārāma about 100 li is the Sangharāma of Ti-lo-shi-kia. It was built by the last descendant of Bimbisāra rāja." 'The name of the second Sanghārāma was probably derived from that of Darsaka who is here represented as the last descendant of Bimbisāra.' (H. C. Roychowdhury, *Pol. Hist. of Ancient India*, 2nd ed., p. 130.) We know from Buddhist, Jaina, Puranic,¹ and other records that this

¹ *Sa vai pura-varam rājā prthivyām Kusumāhvayam | Gangāyā dakṣiṇe kule caturthe'vāśe kaṭṭevatī ||*—Vide also Pargiter, *Dynasties of the Kali Age*, p. 22.

king Udayana or O-su-kia of Hiuen Tsang transferred the capital from Rājagriha to Pataliputra. We also know that the year 458 B. C. was exactly the epoch of the earlier Sri Harsha era as stated by Alberuni. It seems Harshaka started building Pataliputra but could not finish it. As Harshaka had no sons his dominions passed on to Udayana who in memory of his brother-in-law Harshaka started the Sri Harsha era from the date of declaration of Pataliputra as a capital. It is stated in the Dīpavaṃsa that 'at the time of the Second Buddhist Council Asoka, the son of Sisunāga, was king : that prince ruled in the town of Pataliputra.' 'Elsewhere Sisunāga is called the immediate predecessor of the Nandas.' (Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 105.) We know that Udayana was not the son but the son-in-law of Ajātasatru. The Buddhist Jātaka similarly mis-states Sitā as the daughter in place of daughter-in-law of Dasaratha. Tārānātha mentions that the Second Buddhist Council was held under the patronage of king Nandin. In one Buddhist Chronicle we are told that king Nandin ascended the throne 88 years after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, i.e., in $546 - 88 = 458$ B. C. 'Before adducing other testimonies we cannot help observing that the date assigned to the second Council (100 years after the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa) is impossible, unless the heroes of the tale are purely fictitious. A century after the Parinirvāṇa, Sarvakāmin would have been at least 140 years of age ; and so, too, the other Theras. A chronology leading to such monstrous results condemns itself.' (Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 105.) The Mahāvamsa states the name of the king at the time of the Second Council as Kāla-Asoka. Therein it is stated that the end of the 11th year of Kāla-Asoka's reign was the 100th year after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, i.e., $546 - 99 = 447$ B. C. which is also 11 years after 458 B. C.—the date of Udaya's accession in Pataliputra. Hiuen Tsang also states that 100 years after the Nirvāṇa of Tathāgata there was a king called O-su-kia who changed the capital from Rajagriha to Pataliputra and built an outside rampart to surround the city. Hence, from the above we find very

clearly that Udayāśwa, the first Asoka or Nandin are one and the same king.

From the Buddhist tradition that Sisunāga was the immediate predecessor of the Nandas we see that Udaya was meant by them to be the first Nanda whose successor was Nandivardhana. We have already seen that the accession of Nandin is placed in the Buddhist charonicle 88 years after the Nirvāṇa of the Buddha, *i.e.*, in 458 B. C., the date of Udaya's accession in Pataliputra, in the ~~city~~ founded capital, which happened in the fourth year of his reign as king of the Vatsa country. Therefore Udaya or the first Nanda ascended the throne of the Vatsa country in 462 B. C. That this is correct will be evident from Mr. Jayaswal's reading of the Udaigiri or Hāthigumphā inscription of Khāravela, the Jaina king of Kalinga. From this we learn that Khāravela flourished 164 years after Chandragupta the Maurya and 300 years after Nandarāja. We have already seen that Chandragupta ascended the throne in 326 B. C. Therefore Khāravela flourished in $326 - 164 = 162$ B. C. and as this was 300 years after Nandarāja, Nandarāja ascended the throne in $300 + 162 = 462$ B. C. Hence we see that the Harsha era is identical with the Nanda era which was abolished by the orders of Chaulukya Vikrama VI about the 11th century A. D. (*vide* Fleet and Leumann on the Chaulukya Vikrama Era—*Indian Antiquary*, Vols. VIII and XII). Dr. R. C. Majumdar also suspected that the earlier Sri Harsha Era mentioned by Alberuni perhaps refers to the Nanda Kāla of the Hāthigumphā inscription of Khāravela. (*Vide* J. B. O. R. S. 1923, p. 418. 'A Passage in Alberuni's India—A Nanda Era ?')

One of the large Patna statues in the Indian Museum of Calcutta has been identified by Mr. Jayaswal as that of Udaya who built Pataliputra. Dr. R. C. Majumdar reads the figures for 40 and 4, *i.e.*, 44 in the inscription on the statue. Referring this to the date of Buddha's death, we get $501 - 43 = 458$ B. C., the well-known date of Udaya's accession in Pataliputra. Hence Mr. Jayaswal's identification seems correct.

In the inscription on the Parkham statue Mr. Jayaswal has read the name of king Ajātasatru and the figures for 4, 20, 10 and 8; and taking these to mean the reign period of Ajātasatru, he takes these to mean $4+20+10=34$ years and 8 months. But this does not seem to be correct. The correct period seems to be $4+20=24$ years, 10 months and 8 days or practically 25 years. If 34 was intended, the scribe should have written the symbols for 4 and 30 or the figures might have been written in the order 4, 10, 20. We know that the reign period of Ajātasatru as given by all the Purāṇas except the Matsya (which gives 27 years) is one of 25 years.

It has been admitted by all European savants that there is an error of more than 60 years in the Sinhalese Chronology. It will now be seen that the real discrepancy is one of 45 years with the Sinhalese, the period between the Nirvāṇa and the Parinirvāṇa. By placing the Parinirvāṇa in 483 B.C. (about), in place of 501 B.C., *i.e.*, 18 years later, the European savants made the discrepancy more than 60 years, *i.e.*, $45+18=63$ years. 'The preference to the Sinhalese account is, from a critical stand-point, the less intelligible, because ever since Turnour advocated the claims of the Sinhalese Chronology, it has been admitted on all hands that it contains an error of more than 60 years. That error has been palliated by the guess that such an error has sprung up after the period of Asoka. But a system which contains such a blunder or wilful misstatement at a later period is *a fortiori* suspicious for more ancient times.' (Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 108 ff.) Kern's suspicions will now be found to be true from the following.

According to the Ceylonese chroniclers the period between the accession of Ajātasatru and that of Nandivardhana (the successor of Kāla-Asoka according to them) is 127 years. This period is in error by 45 years (the period between Nirvāṇa and Parinirvāṇa). Therefore the true period is 82 years. This is exactly the period between the accession of Ajātasatru and that of Nandivardhana, according to the Purāṇas (Ajātasatru—25 years,

Harshaka—24 years and Udayāsua—33 years). Now Ajātasatru ascended the throne 8 years before Buddha's death (501 B.C.). Therefore he ascended the throne in 509 B.C. Subtracting 82 years from this we come to 427 B.C. for the year of Nandivardhana's accession according to the Vāyu Purāṇa. We get 426 B.C., according to the Matsya Purāṇa, a difference only of one year. Then the Nandas from Nandivardhana to the last Nanda ruled for 100 years, *i.e.*, up to $427 - 100 = 327$ B.C. The next year, *i.e.*, in 326 B.C., Chandragupta Maurya ascended the throne for the first time. Vincent Smith in his *Early History of India* (4th edition) doubted if 325 B.C. may not be the date of Chandragupta's accession.

In placing Mahāvira's death even 10 years after the Buddha's death, Jarl Charpentier and others discard Buddhist and Jaina tradition altogether. In a very significant passage in the Majjhima Nikāya (the Sāmagāma Sutta) it is stated that the Buddha, while he was staying at Sāmagāma in the Sākya country, heard the news of the death of Niggantha Nātaputra (*i.e.*, Mahāvira) which occurred at Pāvā. Similar statements are also found in the Digha Nikāya. Just after Mahāvira's death quarrels ensued amongst his disciples, and the Buddha was asked by his disciples if similar things would also happen after him, etc. Again on the twentieth year of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa (enlightenment) there happened a remarkable change in the management of the domestic affairs of Gautama Buddha. This seems to have been necessitated by the lesson from Mahāvira's death which occurred shortly before (528 B.C.), *i.e.*, in the 19th year of Buddha's enlightenment (546 B.C.).

That the year 546 B.C. was the year of the Buddha's Nirvāṇa also follows from the statement of *Bṛiddha* Garga as quoted by Varāha Mihira in his Brihat Samhitā. There it is stated that 2556 years before the Saka Kāla, king Yudhishtira ruled the earth. The words '*Shaddvikapanchadviyutah Saka kālas*' was rendered by Bhattotpala (A. D. 966) and by Kalhaṇa (1148 A. D.), both of Kashmir, as 2526 years

(*Shad*—six, *dvika*—two, *pancha*—five and *dvi*—two) before the Saka Kāla of A.D. 78. Kalhaṇa thus found that the Mahābhārata war happened in $2526 - 77 = 2449$ B.C., i.e., $3102 - 2449 = 653$ years after the epoch of the Kali Yuga era and began to vaunt about this in his Rāja Tarangiṇi. The true meaning of *Briddha* Garga's statement is, *Shad* (six) *dvikapancha* (two fives—55) and *dvi* (two), i.e., 2556 years before the Saka Kāla which is nothing but the Sākya Kāla, the era of Sākya Muni or the Buddha, as long ago suspected by me in 'The Hindu Nakshatras' (*Journal of the Department of Science, Calcutta University*, Vol. VI, 1924, p. 44). It gets support from the following: 'And the ultimate basis of them is to be found in my opinion in the point that in early times, alongside of the words Saka, Sāka, as a tribal name, there were in use the forms Saka, Sāka=Sakka, Sākka, corruptions of Sākya, a Buddhist.' (Dr. Fleet, *The Date of Kanishka*, J. R. A. S., 1913, p. 994). Moreover, in his Gārgi Samhitā, Garga mentions Sālisuka (200 B.C.), the fourth successor of Asoka by name and also of the later Yavana invasion (by Demetrios) during Pushyamitra's rule. (*Vide* discussion on this in V. Smith's *E. H. I.*, 4th ed., pp. 228-29.) From Mr. Jayaswal's 'Historical Data in the Garga Samhita and the Brahmana Empire.' (J.B.O.R.S., Vol. XIV, 1928, pp. 397-421) we learn that the date of the composition of the Garga Samhita was about 58 B.C. Kern long ago arrived at the same date of the book. *Briddha* (the elder) Garga thus flourished long before the birth of Christ and his statement quoted by Varāha on the Saka Kāla cannot refer to the Saka era of 78 A.D. Dr. Finot in his article in the *B. E. F. E. O.*, Vol. XVII, 1917, points out that in the 13th century the Thai immigrants from Burma brought with them in Indo-China the Buddha era of 544 B.C. known as the Buddha Saka Kāla. The date of Buddha's Nirvāṇa is 546 B.C. Adding to this 2556 years, we get exactly $546 + 2556 = 3102$ B.C., the well known epoch of the Kali Yuga era or that of the Mahābhārata war.

Now we come to the dates of Asoka's reign which are intimately connected with the date of the Buddha's death. We have already found Asoka's accession to have taken place 224 years after Buddha's death, *i.e.*, in $501 - 224 = 277$ B.C. As Asoka's accession was peaceful there seems no reason to suppose that his coronation took place some four years later. The statement in some Buddhist books which makes his coronation and accession the same seems to be the correct one. The idea of Asoka's coronation four years after his accession might have arisen from the fact that Udayāswa or the first Asoka reigned for four years in the Vatsa country before he ascended the throne of Pataliputra. This first Asoka reigned for 4 *plus* 33 or 37 years, exactly the same period as that of Asoka the Maurya. We have already found that Chandragupta the Maurya ascended the throne for the first time in 326 B.C. Chandragupta and Bindusāra ruled for 25 and 24 years. Therefore they ruled up to $326 - 25 - 24 = 277$ B.C., when Asoka ascended the throne. The statement that Asoka had a hundred brothers and he slew all of them with the exception of one seems to refer to his numerous brethren whom he slew during the Kalinga war and the one that was left was his own brother Mahendra. According to the oldest chronicles the history of the brothers happened in the 7th year of his reign. Therefore the Kalinga war began in 270 B.C. Now in Rock Edict XIII it is stated that Kalinga was conquered when Asoka had been anointed eight years, *i.e.*, in 268 B.C. The great remorse after the havoc of the Kalinga war was more than sufficient to convert Asoka along with Mahendra and other members of his family shortly after. Burmese Chronological Tables translated in Crawford's Embassy make Mahendra become a priest and Sanghamitrā a priestess ten years after Asoka's accession. In Rock Edict VIII Asoka says that he repaired to the Buddhist fold (*ayāya Sambodhim*) when he had been anointed ten years. Thus Asoka, Mahendra and Sanghamitrā's conversion took place in 266 B.C. [=234 A(nno) B(uddha)]. We know that in 236 A.B., *i.e.*, two years later, Mahendra proceeded

to Ceylon. Hence the statement that Mahendra proceeded to Ceylon after he had been twelve years a priest is in error by ten years and should be two years. It was after twelve years of Asoka's accession or coronation when Mahendra proceeded to Ceylon. Thus this happened in $224 + 12 = 236$ A.B. (= 264 B.C.). This tallies exactly with the prophecy of Buddha, just before his final extinction, that 236 years later, a man, Mahendra by name, would reveal the faith in Ceylon. We also know that immediately after the Assembly at Pataliputra under the patronage of Asoka, which was held that very year—236 years after the Parinirvāṇa—Mahendra undertook the glorious task of converting the island of Ceylon. We also know from the Buddhist tradition that, at the conclusion of this Council, missionaries were sent to Greece and other foreign countries. (*Vide* Bigandet, *The Life of Gaudama*, Vol. II, pp. 140-41.) Now from Rock Edicts II and XIII we know that Asoka sent missionaries to foreign lands when he had been consecrated twelve years. As this occurred in 236 A.B. (= 264 B.C.), it shows clearly that Asoka's coronation (or accession) took place in $236 - 12 = 224$ A.B., and not in 214 A.B.

The reference to an exact date in the reign of Asoka is to be found in Hiuen Tsang's Records. (*Vide* Beal, *Buddhist Records*, Vol. II, pp. 89-90.) It is stated that king Asoka erected numerous stupas all over India and desired that the relics of the Buddha should be deposited in every stupa at the same moment exactly and communicated his wish to his preceptor Upagupta. The Arhat Upagupta replied 'Command the genii to go each to his appointed place and regard the sun. When the sun becomes obscured and its shape as if a hand covered it, then is the time ; drop the relics into the stupas.Meantime the king, Asoka, watching the sun's disc, waited for the sign ; then at noon (or the day) the Arhat, by his spiritual power, stretched forth his hand and concealed the sun.' '.....the gods having been ordered to deposit their relics at the moment the hand was seen darkening the sun.' (Watters, *Yuan*

Chwang, Vol. II, p. 91.) This is a clear reference to a solar eclipse during Asoka's reign. This eclipse has been identified by Th. Fazy in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1930 and a short summary of his result is to be found in Mr. Jayaswal's 'An Exact Date in the Reign of Asoka' (J.B.O.R.S., Vol. XVII, p. 400). This was the total solar eclipse of May 4, 249 B.C. (astronomical year—248). The total phase was observed from Northern Punjab and Kashmir in India. This eclipse began at 9 minutes past 3 o'clock in the afternoon in Asoka's capital Pataliputra and the middle of the eclipse occurred at 4-25 P.M. when more than $\frac{3}{4}$ ths (9·4 digits) of the sun's disc (= 12 digits) was obscured. Mr. E. J. Thomas of the Cambridge University very kindly informs me that in the *Journal Asiatique* of 1932 (April-June) D. Sidersky has written an article on the same subject wherein he is stated to have remarked 'that more exact calculations show that this eclipse of May 4, 249 B.C. was total in Persia and not in India, where it was only 8 digits' and hence he draws the inference that this eclipse can have had no connection with the one in the time of Asoka as related in Hiuen Tsang. Sidersky, however, intends to identify this eclipse with the one of June 15, 242 B.C., which, curiously, he admits was not total in India (96 per cent. at Baroda). But I have just shown that the eclipse of 249 B.C. was total in North Western India and the greatest obscuration in Patna was 9·4 digits (calculated from elements given by Oppolzer, Schram, Neugebauer and Schoch). Hence Sidersky does not seem to be right in saying that this eclipse was not total in India and that it was only 8 digits there. Moreover, on calculation I find that the eclipse of 242 B.C. was also not observed as total by Asoka from his capital where it was obscured to the same extent as the one of 249 B.C. From Hiuen Tsang's language ('and its *shape* as if a hand covered it') it does not follow that the sun was totally obscured as seen by Asoka. Hence Sidersky's arguments for not accepting the eclipse of 249 B.C. do not seem valid. Now this depositing of

the relics of Buddha in stupas was clearly the occasion of setting up of Pillars of Dhamma ('Dhamma Thambhas' in Pillar Edict VII) when Asoka had been anointed 27 years. 27 years after Asoka's coronation as depicted in Pillar Edict VII is, therefore, equivalent to 249 B.C. Now in several inscriptions of Asoka, the importance of the Nakshatras Tishya and Punarvasu is to be found. The importance of these Nakshatras lies in the fact that Sree Krishna's coronation—'*Pushyābhisheka*' took place on the full-moon day of Pausha and the coronation ceremonies of several Hindu kings take place on this occasion. In 277 B.C. full-moon in Pausha occurred on the 20th December. *Purnimā* ended on this day at midnight (12 P.M. Ujjaini Civil Time). The Nakshatra Punarvasu continued till quarter to ten in the night of Dec. 20, 277 B.C., after which the moon entered the Nakshatra Tishya or Pushya. Asoka's coronation ceremony then occurred about 10 o'clock in the night of December 20, 277 B.C. The importance of Tishya and Punarvasu in Asoka's inscriptions is now evident. By January 249 B.C., 27 years after Asoka's coronation had elapsed. This again shows that Asoka's accession and coronation are identical. Otherwise, it has to be assumed that his accession took place in $277+4=281$ B.C. when Antiochos Soter (280-262 B.C.) with whom Asoka's father Bindusāra had friendly intercourse had not even ascended the throne.

We know from the Tibetan tradition that Asoka visited Khotan in 250 and 254 A.B. As Asoka's accession took place in 224 A.B. we see that 254 A.B. was 30 years of Asoka's reign, when we know his queen Asandhimittā died. These Khotan traditions show that Asoka's accession cannot have taken place in 214 A.B., for in that case it has to be assumed that Asoka reigned for more than $254-214=40$ years against the unanimous testimony of all Puranic and Buddhist accounts that he reigned for 36 or 37 years. Hence Asoka's entrance into the Samgha, as a monk, must have taken place 30 years after his accession, in 254 A.B., on the death of his queen. He could not

have entered the Samgha earlier, as we know, a married man can never enter the Samgha. Asoka's statement in the Minor Rock Edicts to the effect that 'It is more than two years and a half that I am hearer of the law, and did not exert myself strenuously. But it is a year and more that I have entered the Samgha (the community of ascetics) and that I have exerted myself strenuously,' will now be understood very clearly. Hence follows that Asoka was writing these inscriptions 32 years after his accession *i.e.*, in $224 + 32 = 256$ A.B. And curiously we find these inscriptions dated exactly 256 years, evidently after the death of Buddha. Dr. Bhandarkar's translation runs thus 'and this discourse has been caused to be heard when there had elapsed 256 (years).' (*Vide* also Dr. Bhandarkar's *Sahasram-Rupnath-Brahmagiri-Maski Edicts of Asoka reconsidered*,—*Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. X, pp. 246-268.) In the first Bairat Rock inscription only the symbols for 50 and 6 in big types are found below. (*Vide* plate, Cunningham's *Corpus*, Vol. I). The symbol of 200 have clearly been worn out. This is again a clear confirmation that the figures 256 refer to a date. 'We believe also that the figures 256, notwithstanding all objections, are really intended as a date of the Lord's Parinirvāṇa.' (Kern, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 115.) Drs. Fleet and Bühler also held the same view. It seems to me that the phrase in the Sahasram Edict '*duve sapam-nālātisatā*' means '*duve*' (two) '*sapamnāla*' (having or with fifty-six) '*atisatā*' (= *atisayitā*—having exceeded or elapsed), *i.e.*, two hundred and fifty-six having elapsed, or *atisatā* = *atigatā* = *atikātā* = *atikrāntā*. Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar of the Calcutta University kindly suggested to me that '*duve sapam-nālātisatā*' might originally have been '*duve sapamnāsātisatā*,' *i.e.*, *sapamnāsa* (= *shatpanchāsad*) *ati* (= *adhika*) *duve* (= *dvi*) *satā* (= *sata*). We know that Asoka remarried 4 or 3 years after the death of his first queen. This again shows that Asoka's accession cannot have taken place in 214 A.B. As in that case, his reign period becomes $260 - 214 = 46$ years or more. The

date of the Minor Rock Edicts is, therefore, $501 - 256 = 245$ B.C. We also notice that the Parinirvāṇa year 256 is equivalent to the Nirvāṇa year $256 + 45 = 301$. This being the first year of the fourth century after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, Asoka took a legitimate pride for this year having fallen during his reign and thus immortalised this in several of his inscriptions. We know from the Purāṇas that Asoka ruled for 36 years (37 years according to the Buddhist Chronicles) and then died. It may be that he ruled for 36 years and some months more and thus there is no difference in the statements. Therefore Asoka ruled up to 261 A.B. (= 240 B.C.). Asoka's successors then ruled for 51 years more till $240 - 51 = 189$ B.C. when Pushyamitra the Sunga ascended the throne. The Sungas ruled for 112 years, i.e., till $189 - 112 = 77$ B.C., when the Andhrabhrityas succeeded them.

That 273 B.C. is the latest possible date of Asoka's coronation follows from Asoka's mention of five foreign kings. The second Rock Edict of Asoka mentions Antiochos and the 13th Rock Edict mentions Antiochos and besides this the four other kings Ptolemy, Antigonas, Magas and Alexander. Now we know that Antiochos Soter was the son of Seleucus who was defeated by Chandragupta and made peace with him. There was friendly intercourse between Antiochos Soter (280-262 B.C.) and Asoka's father Bindusāra. Moreover, the four kings mentioned besides Antiochos, seem to have belonged to the 'quadruple alliance (311 B.C.) of which Seleucus was the subordinate confederate and local representative during his Indian expedition, and of the eastern rights and titles of which Antiochos Soter became the apparent heritor.' (Prinsep, *Indian Antiquities*, Vol. II, p. 29.) Hence Antiochos mentioned in Asoka's inscription must have been Antiochos Soter who died in 262 B.C. and the other four kings are Alexander of Epirus (273-260 B.C.), Magas, king of Cyrene (308-258 B.C.), step-son of Ptolemy I Soter who married Antiochos Soter's daughter and entered into an alliance with Antiochos Soter against Ptolemy II Philadelphus, Ptolemy II Philadelphus (309-247 B.C.) and Antigonas Gonatas (283-242

B.C.). Ptolemy II Philadelphus was the founder of the Alexandrian Library and his librarian was anxious to translate books of the Hindus. These kings must have been living when Asoka sent missionaries to their lands. Now the Rock Edicts of Asoka were promulgated when Asoka had been consecrated twelve years. As Antiochos Soter died in 262 B.C. the latest possible date of the Rock Edicts is $262+11=273$ B.C. As Asoka's accession is assumed in some chronicles to have taken place 4 years before his coronation and as this latter event is stated in Buddhaghosa to have taken place 228 years after the Buddha's death, the Buddha died in $273+228=501$ B.C.

Vincent Smith lately assumed 543 B.C. to be the date of the Buddha's death. (E. H. I., 4th ed., p. 50.) That this date cannot be true will be evident from this that the accession of Asoka is placed in the Buddhist chronicles in 224 A. B. at the latest. Thus this date becomes $543-224=319$ B.C. which falls during the reign of Chandragupta, shortly after Alexander the Great. Hence the impossibility of 543 B.C. to be the date of the Buddha's death.

We thus see that the First Buddhist Council was held immediately after the Buddha's death, *i.e.*, some time about 500 B.C. The Second Buddhist Council was held 100 years after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, or 55 years after the Buddha's Parinirvāṇa in 446 B.C. The Third Buddhist Council should have been held 200 years after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, *i.e.*, in 346 B.C. But perhaps owing to the fact that the pro-Hindu and Jaina Nanda kings were ruling about this time, it could not be held then. This Third Council was held during Asoka's reign in 236 A. B., *i.e.*, in 265 B.C., *i.e.*, 19 years earlier than the third centenary after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa when another council should have been held. We see that in 236 A.B., twelve years of Asoka's reign had elapsed when the Fourteen Rock Edicts were promulgated. The third century after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa was the 256th year after his Parinirvāṇa and we find Asoka immortalising this date in his Minor Rock Edicts. The Fourth Buddhist Council should have

been held 400 years after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, *i.e.*, in 146 B.C. But as the Sungas who were strongly Hindus were ruling about this time, perhaps this council could not be held then. This Fourth Council was held afterwards during the reign of Kaniṣka.

EARLY CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

Birth of Gautama	Friday, the 30th March (<i>Vaisākhi purṇimā</i>), 581 B.C.
Gautama leaves Kapilavastu	Midnight of 17th June (<i>Aṣāḍhi purṇimā</i>), 553 B.C.
Gautama enters into solitude	Monday, the 18th June (<i>Āṣāḍhi purṇimā</i>), 553 B.C.
Gautama's attainment of Buddhahood or Nirvāṇa	Wednesday the 3rd April (<i>Vaisākhi purṇimā</i>), 546 B.C.
Nirvāṇa or death of Mahāvira	528 B.C.
Parinirvāṇa or death of Buddha	Tuesday, the 15th April (<i>Vaisākhi purṇimā</i>), 501 B.C.
Accession of Udayana at Pataliputra	458 B.C.
Second Buddhist Council	446 B.C.
Last Nanda overthrown	327 B.C.
Chandragupta the Maurya, 1st accession	326 B.C.
Chandragupta the Maurya re-accession	324 B.C.
Asoka's accession	About 10 P.M., Dec. 20, 277 B.C.
Kalinga conquered	268 B.C.
Asoka's conversion to Buddhism	266 B.C. (=234 A.B.)
Third Buddhist Council	264 B.C. (=236 A.B.)
Mahendra's Mission to Ceylon	264 B.C. (=236 A.B.)
The Fourteen Rock Edicts issued	264 B.C. (=236 A.B.)
Asoka's Mission to foreign lands	264 B.C. (=236 A.B.)
Asoka places Buddha's relics in Dhamma Thupas	May 4, 249 B.C.
Pillar Edict VII	249 B.C.
Queen Asandhimittā dies	247 B.C.
Sahasram and other Minor Rock Edicts issued	245 B.C. (=256 A.B.)
Asoka dies	240 B.C.
Pushyamitra's accession	189 B.C.
Khāravela's thirteenth year	162 B.C. (=300 years after Nand Rāja).

A MUNDA COLONY IN BENGAL—THE COMPACT MUNDAS

By

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The Compact Mundas are a class of people who live in some parts of Bengal. Probably they came in Bengal as Mundas during the indigo-planting time and settled there, and hence they are known as the Compact Mundas. They are found mainly in Jessore, Khulna, Faridpur and Nadia.

The Compact Mundas lead a very simple life. They work as day-labourers. They are looked down upon by the Hindus and the Muhammadans as a low class people, and in some places, like Bhowkhali, Pakirdanga, Ghritakhandi, etc., they are called the *Buna*.

The Compact Mundas are divided into a number of exogamous groups called *gotras*. Marriage within the *gotras* is strictly prohibited.

Early marriage is the rule of the society.¹ Girls above the age of 4 and below 8 are considered highly fit for marriage. The age of the boys varies from 10 to 16. Noses and ears of the girls are punctured through to bear ornaments which are generally made of silver. Anklets, nose-rings and earrings are generally worn. The girls take special interest in decorating their hair-knots with porcupine pins, which are also

¹ S. C. Roy, *The Mundas and their Country*, p. 496, 1912,

used by the Bunas.¹ Iron bracelet is the mark of marriage presented by the eldest female of the husband's house. Amulets of brass strung together make the most pleasing necklace. Wedding-ring is generally made of conch worn by both the bride and the groom.

Marriage negotiation is conducted by the chief or the headman of the community, father, elder brother and the sister's husband of the bridegroom. There is no professional match-maker. One member of the community acts as the middleman. The father of the bride gets 30 to 50 rupees as bride-price.

There is no fixed time for the betrothal. At any convenient time after the settlement of the marriage, the bridegroom's father or an elderly member of the house goes to the house of the bride and fixes the date of the marriage. Then on the fixed day the bridegroom's party marches to the house of the bride and gives a feast for two successive days to the friends, relatives and co-villagers of the bride. When the bridegroom's party returns home with the bride, it is customary for the elder sister or the grandmother to accompany them and stay for a short period (*i.e.*, 3 days) in the bridegroom's house and go back with the couple. The bride seldom returns to the groom's house before she attains puberty.

The community has its own priest and the priest performs the ceremony.

The bride goes round the bridegroom in the arm of an elderly person for seven times and is made to change flower-garlands with the bridegroom. The bridegroom generally wears a red-bordered cloth and a yellow-bordered scarf, while she dresses herself in a red-coloured *saree* veiling herself completely.² The pair has got to bow down to the priest first and then to the chief of the community of each party. After this the couple is conducted inside the hut where they are fed together by the

¹ M. N. Basu, Bunas of Bengal (unpublished data).

² A Hindu influence.

hand of an elderly woman, especially the grandmother, and the womenfolk out jokes with them. Next follows the feast of wine and drinking by both the sexes at the cost of the bridegroom's party. The rest of the night passes in revelry of dancing by the females in company and in harmony with a small drum-like instrument called Madol. The feast, drinking and dancing continue for two long days, during which the bridegroom's party remains at the bride's house.

Sometimes according to necessity, and when the father-in-law has only one daughter, the bridegroom settles in his family as a domiciled son-in-law.

The day following the marriage night is characterised as the day of celebration of a bathing ceremony, in which both the bride and the groom are rubbed with turmeric-paste and washed by the female relatives and they are decently dressed in the fashionable way.

In case of widow remarriage the above-mentioned ceremonies are absent.¹ The bridegroom goes with some of his relatives and friends to the bride's house and the party is feasted and the bride is taken home by the bridegroom. There is another sort of marriage in which a widow lives as the wife of a person of her selection, and in such a case no sanction is necessary. The practice of junior levirate, or the custom of marrying the deceased husband's younger brother, is in vogue.

Love marriages are not uncommon among them. If any objections are raised the girl is often induced by the lover to elope with him.

Polygamy is the rule. A man can marry as many wives as he can maintain, but if he marries two sisters then he must marry the elder one first.

Divorce is possible only in the case of extreme adultery and barrenness of the woman.

¹ S. C. Roy, *The Mundas and their Country*, p. 456.

When a married girl attains puberty and is left alone and the husband is unheard of, or takes no notice of the wife for over a year, or is unable to maintain her, she is then considered as an abandoned wife, and she becomes free to marry again with the sanction of the chief of the community. The Bunas of Bengal also observe this rite.¹

M. N. Basu, Bunas of Bengal (unpublished data).

A NOTE ON THE KOM PEOPLE OF MANIPUR

BY

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I cannot but begin with a contradiction. Lt.-Col. Shakespeare committed a great mistake in speaking of the Chiru and the Kom together. He grouped both the above tribes under the general heading of the "Old Kuki Clans," along with some others such as the Purum, the Chowthe and the Vaiphei. With this classification in mind he proceeded to find out the cultural similarities among these allied tribes. But in doing so he committed the mistake of not observing the great differences, both cultural and ethnic, between the Kom and the Chiru. The physical features of the Kom people and their differences with those of the Chiru, I propose to discuss in a separate paper. In the present article I shall write only about the bachelor's house, and some customs and practices in connection with that. It may be mentioned here that the presence or absence of the bachelor's house is regarded to be of great anthropological importance, especially in determining the cultural and ethnic relations of a people. Before I proceed any further I should quote a full passage from Lt.-Col. Shakespeare's book "The Lushei Kuki Clans" (1912). The author writes :—

"The Chiru, Kom, and Tikhup still build *zwalbaks*. No woman is allowed to enter these buildings, which besides

being the dormitories of the unmarried men are used for drinking bouts. They are externally very like those built by the Lushei, but have several fire-places, evidently used for cooking and the general hearth in the centre is absent."

I cannot, for the sake of truth, agree with the author of the above passage. My information, based strictly on my personal observations of the customs and practices of the Kom and the Chiru tribes in their own villages, are quite at variance with what the learned author says. In connection with my anthropological research work I have visited the Kom and the Chiru villages of Manipur, situated near Bishnupur. On a hillock, just in front of the Bishnupur Dak Bungalow there is a Chiru villages called Nungshei. Many a time I went to the village and had been much intimate with the inhabitants thereof. My observations regarding the Chiru people of Nungshei are in complete agreement with those of Shakespeare. There is on one side of the village a large house called the "Zwalbuk" or the bachelor's house. In the local tongue it is called "Kangshin." The "Kangshin" can easily be distinguished from all other houses of the village, by its very construction. The bachelor's house is about 4 or 5 times bigger than an ordinary house and is erected on a raised platform, while other houses of the village are built just on the ground and scarcely on even a clay plinth, as is the custom among the neighbouring Kabuis. The most distinctive feature of the Kangshin of Nungshei is a large wooden post carved into a female figure. It is the image of the goddess Thongnung. The Kabuis of the neighbouring village seem to follow a reverse custom. They build their houses on a high clay plinth, and the bachelor's house, situated in the middle of the village, just on the ground. However, the Kangshin of the Chiru is a well-built commodious house, used as a dormitory for the unmarried youngmen of the village. All the bachelors sleep in the Kangshin, for even before they have attained puberty

they are separated from their sisters, and have to keep aloof from them, and hence are required to sleep in the dormitory. (There is no brother-sister avoidance of the Melanesian type.) The above shows that incest-dread is at the origin of such a custom of the bachelor's house. However the bachelors assemble every now and then in the bachelor's house which is not merely a sleeping place, but is also a club-house. The bachelors, as is natural, make merriments in this house. But the Kangshin is strictly tabooed to the other sex. The women of the village, married or unmarried, must on no occasion enter the bachelor's house ; they are prohibited from touching its walls or from peeping into it from a distance, for that will be considered as a breach of tabu. This tabu, which is a good example of sex-dichotomy, has maintained the sanctity of the bachelor's house to a great extent, because no man can take his lady-love to the Kangshin.

In connection with the bachelor's house one important custom of the Chiru need be mentioned. The bachelor's house for some months of the year is 'genne.' At this time no bachelor will go and sleep into the Kangshin. When I visited the Nungshei village for the last time in the month of October (24th Oct., 1934) the Kangshin was 'genne' ; no youngman slept into it and the whole spot was entirely deserted. On enquiry I came to know that the 'genne' had been on for over two months, and a few days after my visit worship of the village-deity was to be held at the stone altar in front of the Kangshin after which the tabu would cease. During this period of 'genne' the Chiru bachelors used to sleep in their own paternal houses and always in the outermost room or the verandah of the house. On my visit to a Kabui village, in the vicinity, I marked a similar practice which was but a temporary adjustment of the social customs to an emergency, and not due to any tabu or genne occurring regularly at a certain period. When I went to the Kabui village the bachelor's house of the village was broken and a new construction was indispensable to make it habitable. On enquiry

I was informed that the Kabui followed entirely the Chiru practice. According to their custom all the bachelor's of the village above 10 years of age sleep in the bachelor's dormitory because the brothers must not sleep under the same roof with the sisters. This is the general rule in the whole area. But in an emergency when the bachelor's house had to be reconstructed it was interesting to note how the people modified their normal habit. The bachelors of the village for the time being slept in their own paternal houses, under the same roof with their sisters, but always in the verandah and never inside the house. Thus far, regarding the practices of the Chiru and the Kabui, I agree with the statements of Lt.-Col. Shakespeare, which are nevertheless incomplete, scanty and lamentably superficial. But when I turn to the Kom I find every reason to contradict his statement. Lt.-Col. Shakespeare writes : "The Chiru, Kom, Tikhup still build 'Zwalbucs'.....Some of the clans that do not build Zwalbucs say that their forefathers did so." On many occasions I had been to the Kom Kairap village, where there are about 50 Kom houses. I had been quite at home with the people there, but I never found a 'Zwalbuk' or anything approaching that in any Kom village of the area. I took up the subject as a problem for particular study and made enquiries through every possible avenue. But on every occasion I got the same result. The Kom people unhesitatingly say that to build a Zwalbuk is not their custom and they do not build Zwalbucs because their forefathers never did so. The bachelors of each house go to sleep in a neighbour's house where there are unmarried grown-up girls "to serve them with their (the girls') best," just to quote the Kom phrase. The Vaiphei (Kuki) system is also the same, as I can gather from my informant Lunjakhai (a Vaiphei Kuki). Regarding the Purum Shakespeare writes, "among the Purum I am told that if a man has one unmarried son and one unmarried daughter, the boy goes to sleep in the house of a man who has an unmarried daughter." This statement is also confirmed by the information collected by Mr. T. C. Das, Lecturer, Calcutta University, who

is now working among the Purum and the Chiru, and whom I consulted on the matter. Mr. Das told me that the Purum never build a bachelor's house. My study of the Kom people, as I have told, gave me indications of the custom similar to that of the Purum. The Kom bachelors of the Kom Kairap village have no separate sleeping-place, but they distribute themselves among the houses of the village where there are unmarried grown-up young girls. In this respect the Kom are allied to the Purum and other Kuki tribes rather than to the Chiru and the Kabui who follow essentially the Naga system. It might, however, be argued that the present Kom system is a later development after the abolition of the 'Zwalbuk' system due to contact with foreign cultures. But the argument is quite untenable in face of the facts I have quoted above. I have shown it definitely by citing actual cases that when the Zwalbuk is 'genne' or uninhabitable for natural causes the Chiru and the Kabui show a tendency towards the system which is prevalent all over the civilized world, *i.e.*, the bachelors sleep in their own houses and do not go to sleep in a neighbour's house. If the Kom people of the same area had previously the Zwalbuk system and had given it up lately, there is no reason why they should not have decided as the Chiru and should have adopted a new course altogether. On the other hand there are reasons to suppose that the Kom system existed from very early times in the life of that people. One strong argument in favour of my statement is the presence in the Kom and the Kuki language of such terms as 'soamin' meaning, 'the bachelor's part of the house'; 'soampa' meaning, the bachelors who sleep in the 'soamin'; 'soamnu,' the batch of unmarried girls who serve the 'soampa.'

Soam—a batch of unmarried men or women.

In—house or living-place.

Soamin—the sleeping place for the bachelors. Among the Kom, and all the Kuki tribes 'soamin' designates a part of each house reserved for the bachelors; and not a separate building as the 'Zwalbuk'

Pa—the suffix to designate a male.

Soampa—unmarried bachelors.


Nu—the suffix to designate a female.

Soamnu—unmarried women.

Besides the above linguistic evidences that are of undoubted value I have other facts in support of my contention. In every country we find that the ancient customs and traditions of the people are recorded in the popular stories. The Kom people have many such stories of which I shall take leave to quote one. It is the story of the “Rat that ate the cloth.” The people who related the story commented at the beginning that though it is their custom the bachelors sleep in the houses of the unmarried girls (soamnu), who are always expected to look to the comforts of the nocturnal visitors (soampa), still a good woman will never sleep with the bachelors and shall always retire to the parents’ beds on the other side of the house. But the story says that in ancient times there was an immoral woman in the Kairap village named Khobnujang, who used to sleep with the bachelors who came to sleep in her father’s house. Her parents and also the old women of the village advised her not to do so, but she never cared to mend herself, and the villagers could not give any evidence in support of their suspicion except a rumour, because she could never be caught in wrong-doing. Unfortunately for Khobnujang once it so happened that when she went to sleep with her paramour in the soamin she left her piece of cloth at the corner of the house and went naked. Some naughty rat (might have been sent by Pathen, the Supreme Being) came to the place and ate up the piece of cloth. In the morning, however, Khobnujang searched for her cloth but found it nowhere. By that time the other inmates of the house woke up and found her nude. Very soon the event came to be known to the villagers and the girl was put to much shame, though never punished for her action. The above folk-story which is believed to be very ancient by the Kom themselves is a good testimonial to the fact

that the Kom never build a Zwalbuk and their forefathers also never did it.¹

The diagram of a Kom house is given below, showing the respective sleeping-places of the inmates.



XYAD—the verandah of the house.

MN—the door of the house.

a, b, c, d, e—posts that form a median line and theoretically divide the house into two lateral parts though practically there is no partition wall.

In the figure, the part above the median line is the part of the house for parents. On one side of it sleep the parents with the little ones, and on the other side is the sleeping-place of the grown-up daughters. The part of the house below the median line is called 'Soamin' or the bachelor's part. Here the bachelors who visit the girl at night sleep. The extreme hind part of the house is partitioned off as a store.

¹ Mr. J. K. Bose, M.A., Research Scholar, who has worked long amongst the old Kukis, thinks that the type of grouping of bachelors as found now-a-days amongst the Koms is only a degenerated form of the bachelors' house which was at one time one of the most important organisations of the village—*P. Mitra*.

SINGANPUR CAVE-SITE IMPLEMENTS

By

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Foreword

Singanpur cave is famous for its paintings on the rock-shelter. First discovered by Mr. Anderson in 1914 and later on visited by Mr. Percy Brown who made copies of the paintings which have been reproduced by his kind permission with his note in my "Pre-historic India" and still later described by Rai Saheb M. Ghosh, it has attracted world-wide attention. Since coming back from Europe fresh from the caves of Altamira and other Spanish sites I had an opportunity of revisiting the cave for the second time in 1931. I was fortunate enough in picking up quite a heap of flakes from the foot of the hills and the mesolithic character of the implements was apparent. Even from the ledge where the paintings occurred I could pick up one or two implements of the same type.

Thus from the style of the paintings I had already pointed out their affinities with the art of the rock-shelter of the North of Spain. The mesolithic implements which have been analysed and measured also amply confirm this chronological conjecture. Several other mesolithic sites have been discovered and in more than one place we have found beads with a technique reminding us of chalcolithic Mohen-jo-Daro. My personal examination of the pointed pottery designs of Mohen-jo-Daro with the cave-art of

Singanpur irresistably gave me the impression of close affinities. Thus as Dr. J. Boulnois is coming to the conclusion from a study of a mesolithic site at Pondichery discovered by him, I am getting more and more confirmed of the mesolithic foundations in the South and North-East of India of the chalcolithic N. W. Indian culture.

PANCHANAN MITRA.

Typology

Taking first the micro-grattoirs and micro-racloirs which are 30 in number, Nos. sg. 37 to sg. 41 are very finely made having beautiful parallel flakings and long delicate ridges. The others are of various geometric forms.

Micro-grattoir, round, (No. sg. 94) has a raised concave surface, Nos. sg. 37, sg. 38, sg. 39, sg. 40, sg. 41 and sg. 42 are racloirs.

Nos. sg. 37 and sg. 38 are sub-rectangular in shape having parallel flakings along the length on one of the surfaces while the other surface is more or less plain.

The others from Nos. sg. 39 and sg. 42 are rectangular along the transverse section and triangular along the cross section with a fine median ridge on one of the surfaces. In No. sg. 39 the bulb is present on the anterior surface.

The next group Nos. sg. 66 to sg. 71, which strikes one most are the micro-burins, No. sg. 66 is a micro-bee-de-parroquet with a sub-triangular cross section and a curved beaked flaked pointed end. The flakings are all along the length of the implement. One surface is raised and the other is flat and plain.

Nos. sg. 67, sg. 69, sg. 71, sg. 72, sg. 73, sg. 74 and sg. 75 are single blow micro-burins.

No. sg. 68 is a double-blow, notched, micro-burin and Nos. sg. 70 and sg. 76 are notched double-ended micro-burins.

The next group is a collection of some of the micro-blades.

No. sg. 77 is a micro-shaver, leaf-shaped with a median ridge on one surface. The two lateral sides are very much sharpened.

No. sg. 78 is a rectangular blade with two sharpened consecutive lateral sides and a bulbed angular thick end. There are lateral flakings which are marked at the thick end.

No. sg. 79 is a double micro-blade. Concavo-convex along the surface with parallel flakings No. sg. 80 is a backed blade.

No. sg. 81 is also a backed micro-blade having a conical shape. It has one blunted lateral side, the other being a sharpened one. One terminal end is notched and is the continuation of the sharpened side ; the other terminal end is thick narrowed and blunted to a neck. Along one surface is a median and a lateral ridge which are running along the length leaving two flaked slanting sides. The sharpened side is convex externally.

Taking the *points* (which are from Nos. sg. 82 to sg. 87), No. sg. 82 is a typical point which has arch-shaped rectangular base and a pointed apex. Of the four sides one being triangular gives it a definite shape of a four-sided pyramid. There are two other raised points along one lateral side.

Nos. sg. 83 to sg. 85 are flat sub-pentagonal in shape with pointed apex and a flat base.

No. sg. 83 has a semi-circular lateral blunted side and the side opposite to it is trimmed and sharpened and has one lateral median ridge on the raised surface. No. sg. 85 has some lateral flakings along the lateral sides.

No. sg. 86 is flat and rectangular in shape and has one pointed curved angle.

No. sg. 87 is a sub-triangular, curved cat-nail type point* or micro-perçoir sur angle de lame cassee. The concave lateral side has been trimmed laterally. The convex side is also angularly

* Compare No. sg. 87 with implement No. 2, pl. XXVIII of Memoir No. 4 in *paleo-lithic de la chine*.

flaked. One angle at the base is notched and pointed. There is a bulb at the other angle of the base.

Perçoirs. Nos. sg. 88, 89 and 90 are the thin awl-like implements, which were used for such purposes, are detected by their long narrow shape and thin pointed drilling ends.

No. sg. 91 is a combined implement of burin and grattoir surbout de lame. It is long, with sharpened sides. It is a concave and convex surfaced implements having a triangular cross section. It has a raised median ridge running along the length. The scraping end is curved inwards. Series of lateral flakings are marked.

Nos. sg. 92 and 93 are typical. *Micro-Grattoir* (surbout de lame). No. sg. 92 is slightly curved along the flaked surface, which has one mark of lateral flaking. The sides have been blunted. No. sg. 93 is a simple type but along the other terminal end it is possibly a burin.

Of the micro-crescents 29 could be detected (from sg. 97 to sg. 125).

No. sg. 97 is curved along the length. It is flaked along the length leaving two terminal ridges along the sides. These are trimmed at rt. angles to the length just to make it sharpend, one terminal is notched and double pointed. This one has the maximum dimension. The other 28 are smaller in size and have not been measured.

Coming to the crescents I find that they are though very crudely made have attained a definite Lunate shape. They are from No. sg. 132 to sg. 145 ; most of them have pointed burin ends and some of them have sharpened lateral sides ; many have been flaked and trimmed. They are made of variety of stones. Their sizes range from 2 cm. to 1·372 cm. in length and from 1·4 cm. to 9·45 cm. in breadth.

There are some arrow-heads which show and forms and sizes. Some are barbed, others are notched and winged and shouldered. They are from sg. 146 to sg. 155, have the definite shape of a mino at arrow-head with barks and shoulder. On

one surface of the arrow-head there is series of semi-circular transverse rings. The arrow has been flaked at breadths to its length. The two lateral sides are sharpened. They vary in size from 2·772 cm. to 1·154 cm. in length and from 2·5 cm. to 1·054 cm. in breadth. There are three geometric microliths No. sg. 156, sg. 157 and sg. 158.

No. sg. 156 is a rectangular microlith. Nos. sg. 157 and sg. 158 are sub-rectangular microlith with protruding points at the angles.

Sg. 160 is a backed blade. Its effective side has been sharpened by retonching. The other blunted side has a number of angular flakings. There is a bulk at the conical end of one of the surfaces. The other terminal end is broken, protruded and broad.

A comparative study of these mesolithic types with those from other Indian sites and places outside India will be offered in my forthcoming paper on Saborian Mesolithic Culture.

Singanpur Cave-site Implements

Measurements.

Name.	No.	Length.	Breadth.	Thickness.	Colour.
Grattoir nuclei forme	Sg. 1	1·801 cm.	1·827 cm.	1·581 mm.	Light Brick-red
	Sg. 2	1·654 cm.	1·227 cm.	3·81 mm.	Dark brick-red
Grattoir sur-bout de lame	Sg. 15	1·7 cm.	1·802 cm.	3·63 mm.	Do.
	Sg. 16	2·272 cm.	1·054 cm.	5·72 mm.	Do.
	Sg. 17	1·536 cm.	9·45 cm.	3·72 mm.	White
	Sg. 18	1·4 cm.	1·136 cm.	8·27 mm.	Pink & brick-red
	Sg. 19	1·827 cm.	1·1 cm.	4 mm.	Dull brick-red
	Sg. 20	1·753 cm.	9·36 cm.	5·45 mm.	White trans- parent.

Name.	No.	Length.	Breadth.	Thickness.	Colour.
Grottoirs :—					
Grattoir, elliptical.	Sg. 21	2'354 cm.	1'8 cm.	6 mm.	Smoky and brick-red.
Grattoir, round	Sg. 24	1'4 cm.	1'445 cm.	5'45 mm.	White
	Sg. 94	1'527 cm.	1'236 cm.	5'72 mm.	Dull colours
Grattoir, rectangular	Sg. 22	1'645 cm.	1'3 cm.	4'81 mm.	Do.
	Sg. 25	2'045 cm.	1'6 cm.	1'201 mm.	Brick-red
Grattoir, triangular	Sg. 23	1'136 cm.	1'201 cm.	5'36 mm.	White-red
Racloirs :—					
Racloir, rectangular	Sg. 3	1'345 cm.	1'254 cm.	3'86 mm.	Yellow
	Sg. 9	1'636 cm.	1 cm.	5'72 mm.	White
	Sg. 10	1'363 cm.	1'227 cm.	4'36 mm.	Do.
	Sg. 13	1'236 cm.	1'172 cm.	4'54 mm.	Do.
Racloir, elliptical	Sg. 4	2'372 cm.	1'563 cm.	7 mm.	Brick-red
Racloir, triangular	Sg. 5	2'027 cm.	1'8 cm.	7'54 mm.	Dull white
	Sg. 6	1'318 cm.	1'054 cm.	6'72 mm.	Brick-red
	Sg. 7	1'818 cm.	1'472 cm.	5'81 mm.	Light brown
	Sg. 8	1'445 cm.	1'354 cm.	4'72 mm.	Brick-red
	Sg. 11	1'163 cm.	1'3 cm.	5'63 mm.	Yellowish white
	Sg. 12	1'554 cm.	1'345 cm.	4'72 mm.	Smoky white
	Sg. 14	1'072 cm.	1'154 cm.	5'18 mm.	Milk white
Burins :—					
Bec-dé perroquet	Sg. 26	4'254 cm.	1'3 cm.	1'154 cm.	Dark ash-coloured
	Sg. 27	1'954 cm.	1'345 cm.	1'1 cm.	Translucent stone
Burin, simple	Sg. 28	2'727 cm.	9 mm.	7'63 mm.	Dark ash-coloured
Single shouldered Burin	Sg. 29	1'8 cm.	9'63 mm.	6'54 mm.	White
Double shouldered Burin	Sg. 30	2'745 cm.	1'5 mm.	8'72 mm.	Pink

Name.	No.	Length.	Breadth.	Thickness.	Colour.
Blades or (Lamé)					
Thumb nail blade	Sg. 31	1'718 cm.	1'254 cm.	6'63 mm.	Smoky
Toothed Blade Double edged	Sg. 32	2'318 cm.	8'54 mm.	4 mm.	White
Double edges elliptical blade	Sg. 33	1'418 cm.	8'54 mm.	3'01 mm.	Brick-red
Sub-triangular double edged micro-blade	Sg. 34	1'301 cm.	8'18 mm.	1'81 mm.	White
Sub-triangular concavo-convex left-handed blade	Sg. 35	2'872 cm.	2'945 cm.	1 cm.	Smoky translucent
Sub-triangular singled edged micro-shaver	Sg. 36	1'4 cm.	1'21 mm.	2'45 mm.	Ash and dull red
Micro-Racloir Sub-rectangulaire	Sg. 37	1'1 cm.	5'81 mm.	2'01 mm.	Light pink
	Sg. 38	1'3 cm.	8'27 mm.	2'18 mm.	White.
Micro-Racloir triangulaires	Sg. 39	9 mm.	7'63 mm.	2'45 mm.	Smoky translucent
	Sg. 40	1'1 cm.	8 mm.	2'72 mm.	Dull white
	Sg. 41	7'54 mm.	6 mm.	2'27 mm.	Colourless transparent
	Sg. 42	5'45 mm.	7'45 mm.	1'81 mm.	Smoky translucent
Micro-Grattoirs and Micro-Racloirs	Sg. 43-65				
Micro-burins :—					
Micro-bec. de perroquet	Sg. 66	1'4 cm.	7'27 mm.	4'27 mm.	Yellowish white
	Sg. 67	1'163 cm.	5'81 mm.	5'27 mm.	Dark hazy pink
Micro-burin single blow	Sg. 69	1'401 cm.	8'81 mm.	3 mm.	White
	Sg. 71	1'072 cm.	7'54 mm.	3 mm.	Do.
	Sg. 72	8'72 mm.	5'01 mm.	2'72 mm.	Smoky translucent

Name.	No.	Length.	Breadth.	Thickness.	Colour.
Double blow notched micro-burin	Sg. 68	1'136 cm.	7'81 mm.	3'18 mm.	Transparent colourless
Double-ended notched micro-burin	Sg. 70	9'63 mm.	6'81 mm.	3'81 mm.	White
	Sg. 76	72 mm.	5'45 mm.	3'54 mm.	Opaque dull yellow
Micro-shaver	Sg. 77	8'18 mm.	6'36 mm.	1'54 mm.	Yellowish white
Rectangular micro-blade	Sg. 78	1'072 cm.	1'072 cm.	3'45 mm.	White
Double micro-blade	Sg. 79	8'81 mm.	7'45 mm.	2 mm.	White
Backed micro-blade	Sg. 80	9'72 mm.	9 mm.	2'01 mm.	Translucent smoky
	Sg. 81	1'463 cm.	7'45 mm.	3'63 mm.	White
Points	Sg. 82	1'1 cm.	1'136 cm.	8 18 mm.	White
	Sg. 83	9'81 cm.	1 cm.	3'54 mm.	White
	Sg. 84	1'313 cm.	1'3 cm.	3'72 mm.	Dull pink
	Sg. 85	1'363 cm.	1'2 cm.	1'36 mm.	Yellowish white
	Sg. 86	9'01 mm.	7'81 mm.	2'45 mm.	Dirty white.
Cat's nail point	Sg. 87	1'4 cm.	1'063 cm.	3'63 mm.	Dirty translucent
Perçoir	Sg. 88	19'45 cm.	7'27 mm.	4'27 mm.	Yellowish
	Sg. 89	1'045 cm.	4'72 mm.	2 mm.	White
	Sg. 90	1'018 cm.	3'36 mm.	3'27 mm.	Colourless crystal
Burin and Grattoir combined	Sg. 91	1'985 cm.	5'18 mm.	4'27 mm.	Dirty colourless
	Sg. 92	1'036 cm.	6'01 mm.	2 mm.	Smoky
	Sg. 93	1'401 cm.	5'54 mm.	3'72 mm.	White

